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This thesis examines the relationship between the European Union (EU) and the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) with a focus on why their normative 
elements, e.g. values and norms, affect their ties in the post-Cold War era. Since the end 
of the Cold War, policy-makers and academics have become interested in region-to-
region interaction, termed interregionalism. Though interregionalism is considered to 
have become an indelible feature of post-Cold War international politics, there are 
question marks over its importance. It is often argued that interregionalism reinforces 
the collective identity of the regional organisations involved. It is also maintained that 
its overall relevance to the international system depends on the level of actorness, 
which is primarily measured in institutional and material terms, of the participant 
regional organisations.  
This thesis contends that the normative components of the EU and ASEAN are 
also fundamental constituents of their actorness and, consequently, define significantly 
their interregionalism. This is based on a crucial observation that normative factors are 
of importance to the regional and international relations of the EU and ASEAN. Yet, 
while they strongly espouse norms and values to guide their internal and external 
activities, their normative premises radically differ from each other. Furthermore, these 
normative differences jeopardise their cooperation. Building on this observation the 
inquiry takes the normative components of the EU and ASEAN as the criterion as well 
as the focus for investigating their interregionalism. In doing so, it hypothesises that the 
EU and ASEAN are two different regional actors that adopt two dissimilar sets of 
norms to conduct their regional and international affairs and that such normative 
differences hinder their relations. Within this hypothesis, it seeks to address three 
central questions. First, what are the normative features that constitute the EU and 
ASEAN as actors in world politics and that make them different from each other? 
Second, what are the main sources of their normative differences? Finally, why do their 
normative differences become an obstructive factor in their relationship? 
To address these issues, the inquiry adopts a constructivist interpretation (of 
International Relations) and opts for a narrative and empirical inquiry, which is based 
on information and data acquired from official documents, scholarly works and 
interviews and questionnaires. In doing so, it finds that as they were born and evolved in 
two dissimilar temporal and spatial settings, the EU and ASEAN are two different norm 
entrepreneurs and normative powers. The former advocates a set of liberal cosmopolitan 
norms whereas the latter champions a set of traditional communitarian principles. Their 
normative differences become a major obstacle to their cooperation, especially when 
one regional organisation’s norms are refused or violated by the other. Thus, a key 
lesson drawn from these findings is that in order to explain more fully EU-ASEAN 
interregionalism, it is essential to consider their norms, the reasons behind their 
normative differences and the implication of those differences to their relations. 
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1. EU-ASEAN cooperation and interregionalism 
 
1.1. Background and aim of the study  
A major trend of post-Cold War world politics is the re-emergence of regional 
organisations, which is related to new regionalism or second wave of regionalism 
(Hettne 2005; Söderbaum and Langenhove 2005).1 This phenomenon has occurred 
across the globe and become a prominent force in contemporary world politics (Farrell 
2005; Katzenstein 2005; Hurrell 2007; Joffé 2007). As regional arrangements have 
proliferated, a third wave has emerged with its defining feature being that regional 
organisations have had a stronger external orientation (Söderbaum and Langenhove 
2005). They have sought to revive and/or establish relations with major powers and in 
doing so, they became world political actors in their own right (Wunderlich 2012a: 
127). For instance, even though both the EU (see Appendixes 1 and 3) and ASEAN (see 
Appendixes 2 and 4) are organisations whose main purpose has been to cultivate 
regional integration and cooperation they have, to some extent unwillingly and to some 
extent by design, became actors on the international scene (Mahncke 1999). The EU has 
widely been pictured as an international/global actor/player (Cremona 1998; Ginsberg 
1999; Helly and Petiteville 2005; Hettne 2011). ASEAN’s international influence is not 
at the same level as that of the EU and it still lacks an EU-like supranational agency 
(Weatherbee and Emmers 2005). Nevertheless, it still has the ability to act as a bloc vis-
à-vis other major powers, e.g. (People’s Republic of) China and the United States 
(US).2
Besides their efforts to establish links with major powers, regional organisations 
have actively sought to set up relations with each other. Consequently, unlike pre-
1990,
  
3
                                                 
1 Unlike the ‘old’ regionalism, i.e. the first wave, a Cold War phenomenon with specific objectives 
(security-motivated or economically oriented), ‘new’ regionalism is a post-Cold War/globalisation 
process with multidimensional orientations. 
 in the post-Cold War era, interregional arrangements have become more 
influential in world politics because more regional organisations being involved in the 
interregional network (see Appendix 6). Even though the EU remains the chief 
2 ASEAN is also regarded as a central actor in wider regional institutions, e.g. ASEAN Regional Forum 
(ARF), East Asia Summit (EAS) and ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus 8 (ADMM + 8). 
3 In the 1970s and 1980s, the European Community (EC) had established interregional relations (see 
Appendix 5 and Edwards and Regelsberger 1990). They, though, were not very visible and influential 
because in those years, regional organisations were often inward looking and the interregional network 
only centred on the EC.  
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advocator of interregionalism, it is no longer the sole organisation to do so. Others have 
also sought to establish interregionalism. This has resulted in producing a new 
component in world politics, namely interregionalism, defined as the process whereby 
one region interacts with another (Gilson 2005: 309; Söderbaum and Langenhove 2005: 
257).  It is regarded as an indelible aspect of the international system (Hänggi et al. 
2006a: xiii; Doidge 2007: 230) and will remain an important dynamic in international 
relations (Smith 2005: 68). This is very true in the case of the EU, which is regarded as 
the patron saint of interregionalism (Aggarwal and Fogarty 2005: 327), because 
interregionalism has become a highly visible feature of its foreign policy (Hettne and 
Söderbaum 2005: 535; Hettne 2008a: 15; Wunderlich and Bailey 2011b: 5). 
The re-emergence of interregionalism has interested scholars, who have seen it as 
a new subject and a new field of research in political sciences (Rüland et al. 2008). A 
number of works have been undertaken to investigate it (Gilson 2002b; 2005; Doidge 
2004b; 2007; Robles 2004b; Hänggi et al. 2006a; Söderbaum and Langenhove 2006; 
Yeo 2007a; 2007b and Rüland et al. 2008). Yet, despite such an increasingly scholarly 
interest, interregionalism is underrepresented in the research community (Söderbaum 
and Langenhove 2005: 377) and remains an under-researched phenomenon (Doidge 
2007: 230). For instance, the most insightful and completed book on it so far is arguably 
Interregionalism and International Relations, edited by Hänggi et al. (2006a). For the 
first time a volume systematically investigated the key issues of interregionalism, e.g. 
its forms, functions and related theoretical approaches to it, and examined concrete 
interregional relationships. However, even with its solid empirical and theoretical 
foundations, as Rüland (2006a: 295-313), one of the book’s editors, comments in the 
last chapter, entitled Interregionalism – An Unfinished Agenda, this volume does not 
provide the indefinite answer, but rather opens up valuable avenues for further 
investigations on interregionalism. A particular area, which is still understudied and the 
one to which this thesis aims to contribute, is the impact of the ideational and normative 
factors,4
                                                 
4 In literature, ‘ideational’ and ‘normative’ factors refer to a wide range of non-material elements, e.g. 
norms, values, principles, worldviews and ideas. In this thesis, they are used to include these terms, which 
can be defined as cognitive and normative beliefs held by political actors, be they states or regional 
organisations, e.g. the EU and ASEAN. Yet, it focuses on values, principles and particularly norms. 
Later, this chapter and Chapter 2 will define values, principles and norms and explain their relationship to 
other related concepts. 
  or what Lucarelli (2006a: 1) refers to as the ‘software’ dimensions, e.g. norms, 
values and principles, of regional organisations on their interregional relations. A look 
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at two main bodies of literature on regional organisations and their interregional 
relations will reveal such paucity.  
A key aspect of interregionalism, which greatly attracts scholarly interest, is the 
impact of interregional relationships on the formation of the collective identities of 
regions or regional organisations involved (Gilson 1999; 2001; 2002a; 2002b; 2005; 
2011; Higgott 2000; Hänggi 2003; Gilson and Yeo 2004; Holland 2006; Manea 2008). 
In fact, identity formation is one of the so-called five functions of interregionalism, 
which was first theorised by Rüland (2001a; 2001b; 2001c) and used by many latter 
works to investigate the relevance of interregionalism to the international system.5
The relevance of the ideational factors of regional organisations to their external 
relations and interregionalism in particular is also under-explored in the works on the 
concept of regional actorness. This term, which signifies the ability of a (regional) actor 
“to behave actively and deliberately in relations with other actors in the international 
system” (Sjöstedt 1977: 16),
 This 
function, which is theoretically deduced from constructivism, means that the interaction 
between two regions/regional organisations may distinguish ‘self’ from ‘other’ and thus 
help to galvanise regional identity. While there is a significant body of literature arguing 
that interregional relationships shape and consolidate the collective identities of the 
participant regions, there are no major investigations of the reverse. In other words, 
there still exists a scarcity of analysis of whether, and if so why, regional organisations’ 
identities – or more exactly, the norms, values and principles that constitute them as 
actors in world politics – determine their interregionalism.  
6
                                                 
5 Rüland (2001c: 4) maintains that how much interregional relations contribute to the international system 
or what he calls “an emergent structure of global governance” depends on how well they perform these 
functions. Using EU-ASEAN cooperation as an empirical case, he finds that despite being the most 
advanced relationship, it only partly fulfils them because only limited balancing and identity formation 
are visible in this relationship. 
 is employed to explain the influence of a regional 
organisation in its external activity. Though referring to norms and identity, most 
scholars on this concept, e.g. Sjöstedt (1977), Allen and Smith (1991), Hill (1993; 
1998), Jupille and Caporaso (1998), focus mainly on the institutional and material 
elements of regional organisations and consider these as the key requirements of their 
actorness. As a result, they pay little attention to their ideational and normative elements 
and the implication of these factors to their external relations. In their work on the EU’s 
actorness, Bretherton and Vogler (2006) regard its shared values and principles as one 
6 Rüland (2006: 311) defines the actorness of a regional organisation as its ability “to become identifiable, 
to aggregate interests, formulate goals and policies, and make and implement decisions”. For a more 
updated understanding of this concept, see Wunderlich (2011; 2012a; 2012b). 
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of the four components that constitute its actorness and regard its identity as a key 
element of its actorness. Nevertheless, they do not explore how the EU’s shared values 
and principles affect its relationship with another regional actor, e.g. ASEAN, which 
prefers a different normative framework. In fact, all the scholars mentioned as well as 
most of those who work on the concept of actorness, e.g. Larsen (2002), Toje (2008), 
Kaunert (2010) and Thomas (2011), use this concept mainly to measure the EU’s 
external influence. A researcher, who links regional actorness to interregionalism, is 
Doidge (2004a; 2004b; 2007; 2008; 2011). However, like Sjöstedt (1977) and others, on 
whom he draws to develop his framework, he focuses primarily on the institutional and 
material aspects of regional actors. Consequently, he downplays the importance of the 
ideational and normative aspects determining their nature (Wunderlich 2012b: 657) and 
does not explore how these shape their interregional relations.7
From what has been discovered, it can be concluded that the existing literature on 
interregionalism and regional actorness rarely considers the relevance of the ideational 
and normative factors of regional organisations to their external activities and their 
interregional relations in particular. This can be a significant omission because for 
regional organisations, e.g. the EU and ASEAN, their software elements are of central 
importance to not only their regional cooperation but also their international affairs. 
Indeed, taking the relationship between these two regional organisations as an empirical 
case, this thesis shows that the ideational and normative factors of regional 
 After all, his aim in 
developing and using the concept of regional actorness is to further Rüland’s work by 
investigating why interregional relationships fail to perform the five functions 
mentioned. By hypothesising that the extent, to which interregional relations perform 
those functions, depends on the level of the actorness of the regions involved, he uses 
EU-ASEAN relations as an empirical case to test his hypothesis. In doing so, he finds 
that this relationship fails to perform them because the EU and ASEAN do not have 
enough actorness. In other words, the level of actorness of the participant regions is the 
criterion he uses to measure the performance of their interregionalism. This means he 
neither considers whether their actorness, especially the ideational and normative 
components of their actorness, is convergent or not nor explores how such a 
convergence or divergence affects the overall performance of their interaction.  
                                                 
7 According to him, actorness consists of three fundamental components, namely the ability (1) to set 
goals, (2) to make decisions in relation to these goals and (3) to pursue the policy decided in relation to 
the said goals. He argues that the extent to which regional organisations possess these requisites depends 
on where they are on a continuum running from intergovernmental to supranational. 
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organisations play a key role in shaping their regional actorness and their 
interregionalism. The question arises is why is the case. 
1.2. Assumptions, reasons and questions of the study 
To begin with, this thesis agrees with the argument that interregional 
relationships, e.g. EU-ASEAN relations and Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), form and 
reinforce the collective identities of the participant regional organisations or groupings. 
As will shown in Chapter 7, by interacting with the EU, the Asian side of ASEM, forms 
and reinforces what can be referred to as ‘Asianness’ or ‘we-ness’, which not only 
makes it distinct from the EU but also enables it to act as a distinct regional actor vis-à-
vis the EU (Higgott 2000a; Gilson 2002b; 2005; 2011). It also acknowledges that the 
institutional and material dimensions of regional organisations play an important part in 
determining their actorness and, consequently, their influence on the external world. For 
instance, Chapter 8 will show that the lack of material capabilities, notably military 
ones, of the EU considerably prevents it from being regarded as a relevant security actor 
in Southeast Asia and the wider Asia-Pacific region in general, which still faces major 
‘realist’ security issues. Furthermore, it shares Doidge’s view that the level of actorness 
of the regional organisations involved influences the performance (or lack of one) of 
their interregional relations.  
Yet, adopting a constructivist interpretation (of International Relations), this 
inquiry contends that the ideational and normative components of regional organisations 
are also fundamental constituents of their actorness. Consequently, they play a 
fundamental role in defining the nature, shape and outcome of their interregionalism. 
Manners (2002: 252) is arguably apt to hold that the EU “is built on the crucial, but 
usually overlooked observation that, the most important factor shaping the international 
role of the EU is not what it does or what it says, but what it is”. This view can be 
applied to ASEAN, which is able to play an influential role in the wider Asia-Pacific 
region not because of its economic or military weights but because of its norms. Indeed, 
as will be illustrated in the subsequent chapters of this thesis what the EU and ASEAN 
are greatly defines their internal and external relations. For this reason, this inquiry 
postulates that interregional relations and EU-ASEAN interregionalism in particular 
will not be fully explained if the ideational and normative factors of the organisations 
involved are ignored. Such a belief is based on the three following observations of the 
EU’s foreign policy, ASEAN’s external relations and the EU-ASEAN interaction in 
13 
 
particular since the end of the Cold War. These are also the starting positions that this 
study takes to examine the EU, ASEAN and their interregionalism.  
Firstly, it is commonplace that the protection and promotion of a set of democratic 
values, e.g. human rights and democracy, has become an integral aspect of the EU’s 
external relations (European Commission 1995a; 1995b; 2007). The promotion of 
human rights and the promotion of democracy and good governance are regarded as two 
of the five particular foreign policy of the EU (Smith 2008a). The spread of this liberal 
internationalism is also one of three roles of its interregionalism (Söderbaum et al. 
2005: 368-77).8
Secondly, like the EU, ASEAN has developed its own normative framework, 
known as the ASEAN way, to conduct its regional and international relations. This set of 
Westphalian norms, e.g. national sovereignty and non-interference, has not only defined 
ASEAN’s raison d’être but also been accepted as the modus operandi of other ASEAN-
led institutions, e.g. the ARF and the EAS (Busse 1999; Khong and Nesadurai 2007; 
Stubbs 2008; Teo 2010). In other words, like the EU, ASEAN can be regarded as a 
normative power. The defining difference is that while the EU is seen as a post-
Westphalian entity based on a set of democratic values (Manners 2002; Laïdi 2008a; 
Whitman 2011), ASEAN is premised on a set of Westphalian principles (Haacke 2005; 
Rumelili 2007; Acharya 2009; Wunderlich 2012a).  
 The EU has increasingly been described as a normative power 
(Manners 2002; 2008a; Whitman 2011) because it is founded on those principles and 
seeks to advance them in Europe and globally (European Council 1991a; Consolidated 
Version of the Treaty on European Union, Articles 2 and 3-1). One may agree with this 
argument by looking at the ‘Copenhagen criteria’ or the ‘membership criteria’ and the 
‘human right clause’ that it applies to those, which want to establish cooperation 
agreements with it (Elgström and Strömvik 2005: 123). 
Finally, such normative differences have become a prominent issue and indeed an 
inhibiting factor in their interaction since the end of the Cold War. Given its focus on 
the promotion of its liberal and democratic norms, the EU has introduced measures, e.g. 
the human rights clause, into its agreements with third parties (European Commission 
1995a; Miller 2004). In fact, since 1995, the EU has established more than 120 such 
agreements (Balme 2008: 144; Doan 2010a: 45). Yet, while the EU has successfully 
                                                 
8 The other two are building the EU as a global actor and the promotion of its power and competitiveness. 
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included that clause in its cooperation agreements with other regional groupings,9 it has 
so far failed to do so with ASEAN. Furthermore, the EU’s insistence on that clause and 
ASEAN’s resistance to it was a key reason for their disagreements over a number of 
political matters, e.g. the East Timor issue and the Myanmar problem.10
These three positions lead this inquiry to consider the EU-ASEAN relationship 
and take their normative dimensions, i.e. the norms and values that constitute them as 
regional actors, as the criterion and the focus to examine their interaction. In doing so, it 
puts forward a central assumption: that is the EU and ASEAN are two different regional 
actors that espouse two dissimilar sets of norms to conduct their regional and 
international affairs and that such normative differences hinder their relations. Within 
this overarching hypothesis, the thesis explores the following three questions:
 These not only 
became an obstacle in their cooperation (Balaoing 1997) in the 1990s but also 
negatively affected their interaction during the 2000s. The Myanmar issue even averted 
the ASEM process (Goh 2004: 324). Thus, in the case of EU-ASEAN cooperation, it 
seems that not only the lack of actorness of each regional organisation but also the 
conflicting norms of the two organisations significantly hamper their interaction.  
11
• First, what are the normative features that constitute the EU and ASEAN 
as actors in world politics and that make them different from each other?  
  
• Second, what are the main sources of their normative differences? In other 
words, why do they promote two opposing sets of norms? 
• Third, why do their normative differences become a conflictual and 
obstructive factor in their relationship? 
This also means that the first aim of the thesis is to examine the impact of the 
normative dimensions of the EU and ASEAN on their interregionalism. Simply put, it 
essentially investigates EU-ASEAN interregionalism as an intrinsic or theory-guided 
idiographic case.12
                                                 
9 These include MERCOSUR (Santander 2005), the group of 12 Mediterranean countries (Panebianco 
2006; Martinez 2008) and the ACP, i.e. the group of 78 countries in Africa, the Caribbean and Pacific 
(Balme 2008). 
 This relationship merits such an investigation because, for the EU 
10 The country was originally called Burma, which is still used by the US and the United Kingdom (UK) 
continue to call it ‘Burma’. The United Nations (UN) and ASEAN use Myanmar. Some scholars and the 
EU often use both names, i.e. ‘Burma/Myanmar’. This thesis refers to it as Myanmar. Yet, it keeps 
‘Burma/Myanmar’ and ‘Burma’ when these names are used in/by official documents, officials and others. 
11 Beyond the principal questions that guide the research, in each chapter of the thesis, additional 
subordinate questions will be introduced to specify and support the analysis.  
12 Stake (1995) identifies three types of case studies, namely intrinsic, instrumental and collective. 
Regarding the intrinsic case, it is not undertaken primarily because the case represents other cases but 
because in all its particularity, the case itself is of interest. For Levy (2008), an idiographic case is used to 
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and ASEAN, their respective normative aspects play an integral part in their internal 
and external relations. Among the existing regional organisations, they are probably the 
only ones that develop two prominent – and indeed divergent – normative frameworks 
to conduct their regional and international affairs. Furthermore, their normative factors 
prominently feed into and negatively affect their interaction. In addition, as noted 
below, they are arguably the most successful regional organisations in the developed 
world and the developing world respectively and the two most active organisations in 
developing interregionalism. 
By tackling the three questions, the thesis also attempts to advance an analytical 
framework that can be used to elucidate the application of the normative factors of the 
regional organisations to their external relations and their interregionalism. Precisely, by 
taking EU-ASEAN interregionalism as an instrumental case,13
Moreover, by examining a number of key issues of EU-ASEAN relations, the 
thesis wishes to contribute to the literature on this relationship. As noted, the EU and 
ASEAN are involved in most of the interregional mechanisms (Hänggi 2006: 34; see 
also Appendix 6). In addition, this long-standing relationship is viewed as the model of 
interregionalism (Hänggi 2006: 34; Villacorta 2009: 7), the most advanced interregional 
 it aims to generate some 
explanatory variables that help to explain why different regional organisations may 
adopt different sets of norms to conduct their internal and external affairs and to explore 
whether – if so, why – such normative differences restrain their interaction. The EU, 
ASEAN and their interregionalism offer a relevant area for investigating those issues 
because of the reasons mentioned. Furthermore, in addressing its key questions, the 
thesis also attempts to counter a number of commonly upheld positions. One of these is 
the argument that in world politics, Western/developed countries in general and the EU 
in particular are norm producers/exporters and weak/developing countries are norm 
takers/receivers. Another is related to the normative power Europe (NPE) thesis, which 
often sees the EU as a force-for-good in world politics. The thesis seeks to illustrate that 
weak actors, e.g. ASEAN, can be norm entrepreneurs and that normative power can 
become a source of contention and conflict.  
                                                                                                                                               
explain a single case as an end in itself rather than as a vehicle for developing broader theoretical 
generalisations. It has two subtypes. The first is inductive case study, which is highly descriptive and 
often lacks an explicit theoretical framework to guide the empirical analysis. The second is theory-guided 
case, which is explicitly structured by a well-developed conceptual framework that pays attention to some 
theoretically specified aspects of reality and neglects others.   
13 Stake (1995) defines a single instrumental case study as the one that is designed to provide insight into 
or illustrate a particular issue. 
16 
 
relationship (Rüland 2001: 4) and the best example available for empirical analysis of 
interregionalism (Doidge 2004b: 39). Yet, unlike ASEM, which has given rise to a very 
large literature though being only established in 1996,14 EU-ASEAN interregionalism 
has not been extensively written about (Doidge 2004a: 10). In a survey of academic 
literature on EU-ASEAN relations in 2004, Robles (2004a: 6) found 99 works done by 
European and Asian scholars, published in English, French, German, Italian and 
Spanish. According to him, 80% of publications on this relationship were published 
over the last two decades. However, among these titles identified by him there are only 
four books. The most recent and major work on it is The Political Economy of 
Interregional Relations – ASEAN and the EU of Robles (2004b). Moreover, as Robles 
(2004b: 1) points out, the majority of the literature on this relationship is in the form of 
descriptive and historical accounts.15
A final note that should be made here is that the thesis focuses on the post-Cold 
War interaction between the EU and ASEAN. More precisely, it primarily looks at their 
interaction from 1991, i.e. when political matters, e.g. human rights, became a divisive 
issue in their interaction, to 2009, when they failed to negotiate and conclude a region-
to-region free trade agreement (FTA), partly due to their disagreement over the 
participation of Myanmar in this FTA. There are three reasons for this focus. First, as 
already mentioned, regional organisations began to emerge as actors on the international 
stage in the post-Cold War era. Second, and because of the first, interregional relations 
just become a relevant trend in both the practice and study of world politics after the 
end of the Cold War. Third, ideational and normative elements also became prominent 
in both the policy and scholarship of world politics, the EU’s foreign policy, ASEAN’s 
external relations and the EU-ASEAN interaction following the collapse of the Soviet 
bloc. Yet, this does not mean that it ignores completely their pre-1991 contact. Indeed, 
it also looks at their link before 1991 because their post-Cold War relationship and the 
 For these reasons, while the thesis examines, to 
some extent, ASEM and other ASEAN-led interregional mechanisms, e.g. the ARF and 
the EAS, it mainly focuses on EU-ASEAN interregionalism. 
                                                 
14 These include – but are not limited to – Camroux and Lechervyb (1996), Serradell (1996), Dent (1997; 
2001; 2003; 2004; 2006), Gilson (1999; 2001; 2002a; 2002b; 2004a; 2004b; 2005; 2011), Stokhof and 
Velde (1999; 2001), Lee (2000), Yeo (2000; 2003; 2004; 2007a; 2007b; 2008a; 2010a), (Preston and 
Gilson 2001a; Rüland (2001a; 2001b), Rüland et al. (2008), Robles (2008a), Gaens (2008a) and Yeo and 
Hofmeister (2010). 
15 As its title reveals, in this book Robles approaches EU-ASEAN relations from a view of political 
economy. 
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impact of their normative factors on their relations during this period are only fully 
explained if their pre-1991 links are considered. 
 
1.3. Some conceptual clarifications  
The thesis has so far referred to a number of key terms, which are often contested. 
Thus, it is worth defining them in order to make clear what they mean and how they are 
used in this thesis. 
 
Interregionalism: Definitions and forms 
Hänggi et al. (2006b: 18) regard interregionalism as a process of widening and 
deepening interaction between regions. For Rössler (2009: 317), it refers to different 
forms of bi- or multilateral relations between one or more regional organisations, or 
between regional organisations and states, under the conditions that regional grouping is 
acting as an entity in the international system. These definitions illustrate that there is no 
consensus on the conceptualisation of interregionalism (Söderbaum 2011: 224). Yet, 
even though they describe it differently, they all imply that in order to establish a formal 
interregional relationship the regions involved, or at least one of them, must achieve 
some kind of what Hettne (1993; 2005; 2011) calls ‘regionness’. This concept refers to 
a five-level process of regional integration that transforms a region as a geographical 
area, i.e. an object, to an active subject, i.e. an actor. In other words, they must be either 
a regional complex, or a regional society, or a regional community or an 
institutionalised entity. As the concept of regionness illustrates, the regions involved in 
interregionalism can be at different levels of development. Given this, their 
interregional arrangements differ from one another. Hӓnggi (2000; 2006) identifies five 
types of ‘interregionalism’. They are the relations between (1) two regional 
organisations, (2) a regional organisation and a regional group, (3) two regional groups, 
(4) groups of states from more than the two core regions and (5) a regional organisation 
and a third country in another region. In his view, the fourth type, which he sees as 
‘megaregional relations’ and the last type considered as ‘quasi-interregional relations’, 
are only understood as interregional relations in the wider sense, whereas the first three 
are viewed as interregional relations in the narrower sense. This thesis defines 
interregionalism in the wider sense. Thus, even though it mainly focuses on EU-
ASEAN relations, i.e. the first type, it examines ASEM, i.e. the second type, in which 
the EU and ASEAN are members. It also looks at two ASEAN-led institutions, namely, 
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ARF and EAS, which can be seen as the fourth type because such an examination 
provides a comprehensive understanding of EU-ASEAN interregionalism as well as 
additional valuable information for exploring the questions that are central to this thesis. 
Regional actors: Actorness, actorship and actorhood 
As already explained, the concept of regional actorness is used to evaluate the 
relevance of regional organisations and the EU in particular in the global system. 
However, it is not the sole concept employed to explain the ability to influence of a 
regional organisation in its external activity. To explore its capability to exert influence 
on the external world, Hettne (2008a; 2008b; 2011) uses the term of actorship, which 
consists of three interacting components. The first is regionness, which has been 
explained earlier. The second is actorness, which he defines as a region’s “capacity to 
act purposively to shape the outcomes in the external world” (2008a: 2). The last is the 
region’s international presence, which is mainly measured in terms of its size, economic 
strength and military capability. In his study to examine the international identity and 
role of the EU, or more exactly whether the EU should transcend its civilian power 
model, pioneered by Duchêne (1973), in order to cope with the globalised and uncertain 
world of the 21st century, Tèlo (2007c) uses the concept of actorhood. By doing so, he 
proposes three scenarios (see also Tèlo 2001b: 247-274; 2006: 198-251). The first is to 
continue with the existing low profile civilian power. The second is to build a ‘Fortress 
Europe’ as part of global new-mercantilist competition. The third is to foster a new kind 
of civilian power Europe as a pillar of a new democratic and multilateral world order. 
Chapter 4 will refer to these three characteristics of the EU. What is meant here is that 
Tèlo’s concept of actorhood focuses prominently on the nature of the EU as an actor in 
the international system.16
                                                 
16 Jepperson et al. (1996: 58) also use actorhood to describe to the identity of states and maintain that 
ideational and cultural, institutional and normative elements of states, most often norms, constitute their 
basic identities. Meyer and Jepperson (2000) argue that modern actors, be they individuals, nation-states 
or organisations derived from them, are a historical and ongoing cultural construction, and that the 
particulars of this construction should help to account for a number of specific features of their actorhood. 
 In this sense, actorhood of a regional organisation is related 
to the area that this thesis investigates, namely the nature of the EU and ASEAN. A 
regional actorhood can also be seen as an integral part of its actorness or its actorship. 
Yet, the point being made is not that the former is an intrinsic component of the two 
latter. Rather, it is to state that the central concern of the inquiry is not to analyse all the 
components (including the institutional and material dimensions) of the actorness or 
actorship of the EU and ASEAN. As underlined, the thesis only focuses on their 
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normative aspects – the factors that constitute their respective identity, or what is 
referred to as ‘the nature of the beast’ (Risse-Kappen 1996; Bretherton and Vogler 
2006) – and examines why these influence their interregional relations.  
Norms, values and principles 
As mentioned earlier, though in this thesis ideational and normative factors refer 
to a wide range of non-material elements, which include norms, values, beliefs, 
worldviews, ideas, political and strategic culture (Alagappa 1998a; Noble 2004; Reus-
Smit 2005; Béland and Cox 2011; Bode et al. 2011),17 it focuses on values, principles 
and particularly norms. For this reason, it is worth briefly defining these three terms. 
Lucarelli (2006a: 10) defines values as “notions laden with an absolute positive 
significance for the overall order and meaning we try to give our world”. Examples of 
values, which can be understood as moral and/or political concepts, include liberty, 
freedom, equality, democracy and respect for human rights. As highlighted, these are 
also the values, on which the EU is founded. Principles are understood as “normative 
positions that translate values into constitutional standards for policy action” (Lucarelli 
2006a: 10). An example of values turning into principle of action is that the EU’s values 
are not simply the values on which it is founded. They are also legalised and guide its 
relations with the wider world, in which it upholds and promotes those values. That is 
why Manners (2006a: 32) use both ‘values’ and ‘principles’ to refer to the normative 
framework that the EU is based on and promoted by it. However, as Lucarelli (2006a: 
10) notes, the mode of translation (from values into principles) depends on how values 
are interpreted according to a particular worldview.18
                                                 
17 While Ruggie (1998) consider normative factors as a component of ideational dimensions, in most 
cases, the terms ‘normative’ and ‘ideational’ are used together without being distinguished. Stubbs (2008) 
uses the term ‘ideas’ to refer to (1) cognitive beliefs, (2) normative beliefs (about what is considered to be 
good and bad in terms of ideals, values and norms) and (3) tastes and desires that shape people’s 
preferences. 
 For instance, liberty has a very 
different meaning according an individual/cosmopolitan or communitarian view of the 
social world. This point is worth underlining because it enables the thesis to explain 
why the EU and ASEAN have divergent and even opposing views of human rights, 
which will be looked at in Chapter 6. Regarding norms, they are defined as standards of 
appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 
891; Barnett 2005: 265). In this sense, norms are related to values, principles and 
another key concept, namely identities. As it is central to the thesis, Chapter 2 will 
18 Worldviews, also known as images of the world (Lucarelli 2006a: 10), are a way of organising, 
interpreting and making sense of a complex reality so as to provide guidepost for knowing and acting. 
Actors conduct their identity and reality with reference to a worldview (Jachtenfuchs 1997: 48).  
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theorise norms and explain their relations to other key terms, notably values, principles 
and identities.  
 
1.4. Theoretical considerations 
This thesis draws from social constructivism because the insights it offers are very 
useful in explaining many key issues, e.g. the pivotal roles of norms and values in the 
EU and ASEAN and their impact on EU-ASEAN relations, which are central to the 
inquiry. Chapter 2 will explain more detail why many areas of constructivist thought 
enable it to address adequately its key research questions. A core argument of 
constructivists, which should be mentioned here, is their argument that ideational and 
normative factors, e.g. principles, norms and beliefs, are just as important as material 
ones, e.g. wealth and power (Reus-Smit 2005: 196). A key reason for their emphasis on 
these software elements is their conviction that these non-material factors condition 
actors’ identities and inform their interests. For instance, in their views, norms not only 
regulate actors’ behaviour but also define and redefine their interests and constitute their 
identities, including the development of collective identities (Acharya 2009: 4). Another 
reason why they emphasise the relevance of the ideational and normative factors in 
world politics is their belief that a convergence of these features between political actors 
foster their cooperation whereas a divergence hinders their interaction. For instance, 
Kowert and Legro (1996: 454) maintain that norms play a key role in international 
politics, shaping both cooperation and conflict. The reasons why ideational and 
normative factors can be both cooperative and conflictual are explained by two different 
perspectives of social constructivism (Rumelili 2007: 32-7).19
The first view, which is upheld by those who work on security communities, e.g. 
Deutsch (1961), Adler and Barnett (1998), Acharya (2009), or liberal constructivists, 
e.g. Wendt (1994; 1999) maintains that the formation of collective identity always 
involves a ‘we-feeling’. Furthermore, for them, this ‘we-feeling’, which includes shared 
norms and values, is the condition for cooperation among political actors. The second 
view, which is maintained by critical constructivists or post-structuralists, e.g. Connolly 
(1991; 1995), Campbell (1992; 1998) and Rumelili (2004; 2007), assumes that the 
   
                                                 
19 This also shows that there is not a single constructivism, but different forms of constructivism 
(Rosamond 2000: 171; Adler 2002: 96; Devine 2008: 464) because while some constructivists prioritise 
agents, others structures. Some focus on interstate politics, others domestic politics whereas others seek to 
bridge these two domains (Adler 1997; 2002; 2005, Barnett 2005). Yet, despite those differences, 
constructivists share core arguments, e.g. the social construction of reality, the importance of ideational 
and normative factors in world politics (Price and Reus-Smit 1998; Reus-Smit 2005).  
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formation of collective identity also entails the production of a sense of difference with 
outsiders. Moreover, in their views, this sense of difference can bring about conditions 
for confrontation and conflict with the outsiders. This thesis takes both these 
perspectives. This is because while the former is valuable for exploring why the 
members of the EU and ASEAN could come together and builds their respective 
collective identity and community/regional organisation, the latter is very beneficial for 
explaining the normative differences of the EU and ASEAN and the impact of those 
normative divergences on their interaction. 
In addition, the thesis anchors its argument in normative theory because it is very 
helpful in defining the EU and ASEAN as well as distinguishing them from each other. 
A normative theory approach often outlines two main normative positions, namely 
cosmopolitanism and communitarianism, with the former arguing that the central focus 
of any normative theory of world politics should concentrate either on individual human 
beings or humanity as a whole (Jackson and Sorensen 2003: 260; Smith and Owens 
2005: 279). In contrast, the latter argues that the appropriate focus is the political 
community, usually the state (Brown 1992: 55; Smith and Owen 2005: 279; Wiessala 
2006: 37). These two positions reflect quite well the EU, ASEAN and their respective 
normative premises because the EU’s values, e.g. human rights and democracy, are 
predominantly individual-centred whereas ASEAN’s principles, e.g. sovereignty and 
non-interference, are state-centric. Yet, it is imperative to underscore here that the thesis 
does not aim to make a judgment on which set of norms is better. Rather, it draws on a 
normative theory approach to explain what the EU and ASEAN are in terms of their 
normative dimensions, why their norms differ from each other and explores why their 
normative foundation and differentiation affect their interaction.  
Finally, it is important to state that the thesis’s adoption of a combination of social 
constructivism and normative theory to develop its theoretical framework to explicate 
the EU, ASEAN and their interregionalism does not mean that other IR perspectives, 
notably realism and liberalism, are completely irrelevant in explaining these two 
organisations and their interaction. Indeed, taking into account the moral of the story of 
Five Blind Men and the Elephant (Puchala 1972) and the views of scholars such Walt 
(1998) and Snyder (2004), this thesis recognises that these perspectives can be used to 
explain some aspects of the EU, ASEAN and their relations. For instance, as will be 
seen in Chapter 5, realism remains a key theoretical approach to international politics in 
Southeast Asia. The main reason that it chooses constructivism and normative theory is 
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that their key insights are more suitable to the investigation of the normative features of 
the EU and ASEAN, the sources of their normative differentiation and the significance 
of their normative differentiation to their interregionalism. 
1.5. Methodological issues 
As it has already been made clear, this research explores the normative features of 
the EU and ASEAN, the reasons behind their norms and the implications of their norms 
to their interregionalism. To that end, it follows a qualitative research methodology, 
which is guided by narrative and empirical inquiry. Narrative as a qualitative research 
methodology is commonly acknowledged (Clandinin and Connelly 2000; Czarniawska 
2004), with some even maintaining that all research is narrative (Hendry 2010). It is 
popular in various disciplines of social sciences, including political science (Shenhav 
2006; Spector-Mersel 2011) and its subfields, e.g. international relations (Suganami 
1997; 1999; 2008; Roberts 2006) and European studies (Agius 2007; Ciuta 2007; 
Martin 2011).20 The thesis adopts a narrative approach because whatever the EU and 
ASEAN are defined, such an act always involves a narrative. As narrative is seen as 
central for constructing collective identity and it always focuses on experience (Roberts 
2006; Henry 2007; Birchfield 2011: 151; Martin 2011: 191),21
Besides facilitating to construct identity, narratives also help to frame and 
structure action (Roberts 2006: 710). For instance, in regarding themselves as a force 
 it is very appropriate for 
the thesis to address its key questions, notably the two first ones. Manners and Whitman 
(2003: 383) identify three key elements that define the EU’s international identity, 
namely how it is constituted, constructed and represented. By constitution, they refer to 
the constitutive history and principles of the EU. By construction, they mean the way in 
which it is understood. By representation, they mean the ways, in which it represents 
itself and is represented in the minds of those who experience it. Such a way of defining 
the EU can also be applied to ASEAN. For instance, Southeast Asia’s history plays an 
important role in shaping ASEAN’s raison d’être and its constitutive norms. By 
adopting a narrative approach, the thesis can explain why and how the time-space 
setting, in which the EU and ASEAN have developed, significantly defines their 
respective normative premises (Postel-Vinay 2008; Stubbs 2008; Forchtner and Kølvraa 
2012).  
                                                 
20 Narrative research resembles intrinsic case study research because both focus on the issue/case itself 
(Creswell et al. 2007: 247). 
21 For Henry (2007: 493), the primary concern of narrative is to develop modes of analysis that provide 
explanatory power for understanding experience. 
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for good in world politics, EU actors engage in a discourse, in which they construct 
themselves as model citizens (Diez and Pace 2011: 211) and such a construction 
empowers the EU in projecting its values abroad (Cebeci 2012: 573). Thus, a narrative 
approach enables the thesis not only to explain the norms of the EU and ASEAN, the 
reasons behind their norms, but also to explicate, to some extent, why, when and how 
their norms affect their interaction. In this sense, narratives fit very well the thesis’s 
theoretical perspective, which is primarily based on constructivism, whose main theme 
is the impact of ideas on social action (Roberts 2006: 705). Yet, a major challenge arises 
is how to recognise the dominant narrative about the EU and ASEAN because as will be 
shown in Chapters 4 and 5, the EU and ASEAN are often narrated differently by 
different people. As has been explained in this chapter and will be explored in-depth in 
the subsequent chapters, this thesis chooses to narrate the EU as a cosmopolitan 
normative power and ASEAN as a communitarian normative power. 
To illustrate the normative nature of the EU and ASEAN, the sources of their 
normative foundation and differentiation and especially the reasons why their normative 
foundation and differentiation affect their interregional relations, the inquiry examines 
three empirical cases. The main evidence that supports the central arguments of the 
thesis lies in these three case studies. It is worth noting that case studies are widely used 
in qualitative research and very popular in international relations (Bennett and Elman 
2007) because they offer several advantages (Vaus 2001; Yin 2003; 2009; Hartley 
2004; Denscombe 2007;). As already mentioned, there are different typologies of case 
studies. Levy (2008) classifies three types: idiographic, hypothesis generating and 
hypothesis testing. Yin (2003) differentiates between single, holistic case studies and 
multiple-case studies. This thesis opts for multiple-case studies and the selected cases, 
which will be examined in Chapters 6, 7 and 8 respectively, are the East Timor issue, 
the Myanmar problem and the Aceh matter. Chapter 2 will establish the factors to 
explain the normative differences of the EU and ASEAN and identify the conditions 
under what their normative differences can lead to disruptions in their relations. Chapter 
3 will provide a historical background of these case studies. What should be underlined 
is that the cases chosen are not purely intrinsic or idiographic case studies. They are 
instrumental case studies, which serve as vehicles for demonstrating what the EU and 
ASEAN in terms of their normative constituents, why they develop and promote two 
different sets of norms and above all, why their normative differences can become a 
major obstacle in their interaction. The thesis also opts for a collective/multiple-case 
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study method because the findings it replicates across the selected cases enable it to 
explain better these issues.  
Regarding the three selected cases, the thesis chooses them because they are 
suitable for investigating the central issues it attempts to address.22 The East Timor 
issue and the Myanmar problem, which can be regarded as two extreme cases,23
                                                 
22 EU-ASEAN relations are multifaceted, involving a wide range of activities in different areas, e.g. 
economics, politics and security. These three fields can be selected as three case studies. However, the 
links between the two regional organisations in these areas overlap. Consequently, it is not easy to 
separate them from each other. For this reason, they are not selected. Other issues, e.g. the 1997/98 
financial crisis, might also be selected. However, they are rejected because they are either insignificant or 
unrepresentative in EU-ASEAN relations.  
 are two 
appropriate for illustrating the normative differences of the EU and ASEAN and the 
negative impact of such differences on their cooperation. The East Timor issue became 
a disruptive issue in their relations in the 1990s mainly because the EU and ASEAN 
upheld and promoted two opposing sets of norms. Similarly, given their normative 
divergences, the Myanmar problem not only negatively affected their relations in the 
1990s and their cooperation in the last decade, i.e. 2000s, but also hindered the progress 
of the ASEM process. These two issues also involved both political and economic 
matters. For instance, while the former was seen as a key reason for their failure to 
negotiate and conclude a new and far-reaching cooperation agreement in the early 
1990s, the latter was a dominant factor leading to the collapse of the negotiations 
towards a region-to-region free trade agreement (FTA) in 2009. Unlike the two first 
cases, the Aceh matter is much less talked about in the literature on EU-ASEAN 
relations. Yet, it is a relevant and indeed typical case for a number of reasons. The EU’s 
participation of the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) was the first-ever mission that it 
pursued under its European Security and Defence in Asia. The AMM was also the 
unprecedented mission that the EU and ASEAN undertook together. Yet, until their 
participation in the AMM, ASEAN states were never concerned about the Aceh conflict 
even though it was a deadly and long-standing conflict in their region. Furthermore, 
while the AMM was repeatedly hailed by the EU, they were rarely talked about in 
ASEAN. These raise a number of questions whose answers will provide valuable 
insights into the issues that the thesis seeks to address. One of these is why unlike the 
issues of East Timor and Myanmar, over which the EU and ASEAN greatly differed 
and hardly found a common ground to solve them, the EU and ASEAN could work 
23 An extreme case is selected because of its extreme values on the independent or dependent variable of 
interest whereas a typical case is used to provide a broader phenomenon (Seawright and Gerring 2008: 
299, 301). 
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together to monitor the AMM. Another important question is why the EU was so 
interested and actively engaged in solving the Aceh conflict, ASEAN and its members 
were largely indifferent to it. Overall, while the two first cases focus on economic and 
political matters of EU-ASEAN relations, the Aceh matter deals with their security 
cooperation. Thanks to this, besides offering the thesis valuable evidence to illustrate its 
key arguments, the three cases also enable it explain more comprehensively the EU-
ASEAN relationship.   
In terms of information and data used for its narrative and empirical inquiry, the 
thesis draws on three types of sources. The first and most important one is the official 
documents issued by the EU and ASEAN and those jointly released by the two 
organisations. These documents, which exist in different forms, e.g. treaties, 
declarations, communications and speeches, not only enable the thesis to narrate amply 
what the EU and ASEAN are in terms of their normative features. They also allow it to 
explain adequately why the normative foundation and differentiation of the two regional 
organisations defines their relations in general and their posture vis-à-vis the three case 
studies in particular. This is because throughout their existence and development, the 
EU and ASEAN have published a variety of treaties and declarations, which not only 
underline their nature and orientation but also guide their actions and policies. For 
instance, on the European side, there are a huge number of lengthy and legally binding 
documents on the EU’s values as well as its wider objectives in the world. On the 
ASEAN side, even though compared to the EU, ASEAN’s internal and external 
relations are less documented and particularly much less legally binding, it has a 
number of influential documents, e.g. the Bangkok Declaration (AMM 1967), or the 
TAC (ASEAN Summit 1976b), which clearly outline its key principles and its goals in 
both its internal and external relations. There are also numerous and valuable documents 
on EU-ASEAN relations issued by the EU, ASEAN and/or jointly released by the two 
organisations. For instance, their Joint Communiqués, which are published at the end of 
the ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meetings (AEMM, see Appendix 7), provide a lot of 
information on their official relationship. Most of the official documents, on which the 
thesis is based to acquire information for its analysis, are publicly available on the 
internet sites of – or in the printed form by – the various institutions of the EU and 
ASEAN. Yet, some important statements, especially those made by the officials of the 
EU and ASEAN at their joint meetings, regarding sensitive issues, e.g. human rights, in 
their relations, are not published. The author feels fortunate to get access to these, which 
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are made available by the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union and 
the Historical Archives of the European Commission. 
The second type of information, which the thesis uses for its analysis, includes a 
wide range of genres, e.g. accounts on constructivism, scholarly literature on 
interregionalism, EU-ASEAN relations and on the EU and ASEAN. This second type of 
information is available in different forms, e.g. newspapers, journals, books and the so-
called Track Two works. These secondary sources not only enable the thesis to explain 
the key concepts that are central to the inquiry as well as to establish what the EU and 
ASEAN are. They also allow it to examine EU-ASEAN interaction, especially their 
stance vis-à-vis the issues of East Timor, Myanmar and Aceh. In brief, the scholarly 
literature and other forms of written material, which this author has extensively 
collected (as found in the bibliography) and thoroughly and critically examined, are also 
of great importance because they provide valuable information for the inquiry to 
develop and illustrate its key arguments.  
The third source of information derives from interviews and questionnaires. 
Though the data gained from the interviews and questionnaires is aimed at supporting 
the first two sources, they are also of importance because it permits the thesis to enrich 
the development, clarification and support of its key hypotheses. The author conducted 
nine high-quality interviews with officials of the EU, ASEAN and experts on EU-
ASEAN relations (see Appendix 19). This involved two visits to Brussels and a three-
week stay in Singapore. With regard to the interviews with officials, the candidates 
chosen were those who either ran or knew very well the daily activities of the EU-
ASEAN cooperation, e.g. those working in the Southeast Asia Unit of the European 
Commission and ASEAN’s former General-Secretaries. Given their first-hand 
knowledge and experience, they provide an official and insightful perspective of each 
side vis-à-vis the other and the overall cooperation between the two regional 
organisations. Interviews with academics as well as with those who worked as both 
officials and academics were also conducted to give a more balanced and 
comprehensive assessment of EU-ASEAN cooperation. All interviews, but one, were 
face-to-face. The interviews conducted were semi-structured. That is to say even though 
a guided set of questions had been prepared for a particular interview, each interview 
was flexible, allowing new questions to surface during the interview as a result of what 
the interviewee said. For reasons of confidentiality, all the names of interviewees whose 
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information is used or quoted in this thesis are withheld. The thesis only refers to them 
generally, e.g. an EU official, and mentions the year when the interview took place. 
The author also conducted a survey on the EU, ASEAN and their relations. Like 
interviews, questionnaires are a means to collect new information and data to test and 
support the key assumptions of the thesis. Targeted respondents were scholars in EU-
ASEAN relations, who have had works published on this relationship, and experts in the 
EU’s relations with ASEAN and East Asian countries, who work in different think 
tanks and institutions. Based on these two criteria, respondents were identified and sent 
the questionnaire.24
 
 The structure of the questionnaire was divided into three parts, 
which included 10 multiple-choice questions, 19 statements and one open question (see 
Appendix 20). The questions are aimed at asking the respondents to give their views on 
specific issues that the thesis is investigating. As the informants are scholars and experts 
in EU-ASEAN relations, their responses provide very meaningful information for 
analysis. Overall, the combination of documentary analysis (both primary and 
secondary sources), elite interviews and expert survey, is suitable for the narrative and 
empirical investigation into the norms of the EU and ASEAN, the reason behind their 
normative underpinnings and the impact of their norms on their relations. In other 
words, the information and data acquired from those sources will allow the thesis to 
address satisfactorily its three core questions. 
1.6. Structure of the thesis 
The thesis is divided into nine chapters. The present chapter, i.e. Chapter 1, has 
presented the context, aim, assumptions and research questions of the study. It has also 
briefly covered its theoretical considerations and explained its methodological issues. 
Chapter 2 develops in detail the theoretical framework for the thesis. Chapter 3 offers 
an overview of EU-ASEAN relations. Chapters 4 and 5 examine what the EU and 
ASEAN are in terms of their normative dimensions. As explained, to address this issue, 
with a narrative approach and based on a normative theory perspective, Chapter 4 
depicts the EU as a cosmopolitan normative power and Chapter 5 portrays ASEAN as a 
communitarian normative power. Chapters 6, 7 and 8 focus on the three cases studies, 
i.e. the East Timor issue, Myanmar problem and the Aceh matter respectively. Based on 
the findings provided by the previous chapters, Chapter 9 reaches a number of 
                                                 
24 Nearly a half (i.e. about 46 %) of them completed and returned the questionnaires. 
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conclusions regarding the EU, ASEAN, their interregionalism as well as the relevance 
of the normative factors of the regional organisations involved to their interregionalism. 
2. Theorising EU-ASEAN Interregionalism 
 
The main purpose of this chapter is to develop a theoretical framework for the 
thesis. To that end, it begins by highlighting the core arguments of constructivism and 
normative theory, on which the thesis is premised to explore the EU, ASEAN and their 
interregionalism. As they are central to the thesis, the chapter then defines norms and 
explains their relationship to other concepts, notably values, principles and identities. 
Two other principal concepts that are examined in this section are norm entrepreneur 
and normative power. In defining these two terms and relating them to the EU and 
ASEAN, the chapter aims to define what the EU and ASEAN are and how different 
they are in terms of their normative dimensions. It holds that both the EU can be aptly 
seen as norm entrepreneurs and normative powers. The difference is that the two 
respective normative frameworks that constitute them as actors in world politics and are 
promoted by them diverge from each other. While the EU heralds liberal norms, 
ASEAN opts for traditional/Westphalian ones. Basing on a normative theory 
perspective, it differentiates the EU from ASEAN by depicturing the former as a 
cosmopolitan normative power and the latter a communitarian normative power. Yet, 
this raises another relevant question that is why different actors, e.g. the EU and 
ASEAN, promote different normative frameworks. Consequently, the chapter identifies 
the processes or factors that lead them to generate and promote their own norms. In the 
current literature on norms, much has been written to examine whether norms matter in 
international relations and how they matter. However, less attention has been paid to 
why a given actor seeks to promote a particular norm or a set of norms. If the third 
section is aimed at clarifying why different actors promote different norms, the fourth 
one examines why their normative differences affect their relations. Such an 
investigation facilitates the thesis to explain meaningfully why the EU and ASEAN find 
it difficult to interact with each other in the post-Cold War period. Again, this is also 
relatively under-developed in literature on norms, which mainly focuses on why shared 
norms foster cooperation between actors in world politics. To explain why normative 
divergences can be conductive to hindering EU-ASEAN interregionalism, this section 
draws on critical constructivist or post-structural accounts, e.g. Diez (2004; 2005), 
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Rumelili (2004; 2007). In brief, an examination of these four issues will enable the 
thesis to tackle adequately its three principal questions raised in Chapter 1. 
2.1. Constructivism and normative theory: Core insights  
As noted in Chapter 1, in the post-Cold War period, when regional organisations 
and interregionalism (re-)emerged on the global system, constructivism also became 
prominent in both the study and practice of international politics. This constructivist 
turn has challenged two major and long-standing beliefs often maintained by 
mainstream IR theories, notably rationalist perspectives.  
First, actors in world politics are not pre-social as traditionally assumed. Like 
other social agents, they are defined by the environment, in which they find themselves 
(Risse 2005: 161). In other words, like other social agents, they do not exist dependently 
from their setting (Barnett 2005: 259). In this sense, as social actors, the EU, ASEAN 
and their respective normative underpinnings are influenced by their own context-
specific conditions, e.g. their respective historical, cultural and geopolitical factors 
(Christiansen et al. 1999; 2001; Postel-Vinay 2008; Stubbs 2008). That is why, though 
coming into existence almost at the same period, the EU, ASEAN and their respective 
ways of perceiving and conducting their own regional and international affairs 
significantly differ from each other.  
Second, unlike rationalists and particularly (neo-)realists,25
                                                 
25 Rationalists regard cost-benefit calculations as the logic underlying actors’ behaviour and neorealists, 
who maintain that only material factors and forces, e.g. wealth and power, matter in international 
relations. 
 constructivists hold 
that ideational and normative dimensions play a determining, rather than secondary, role 
in foreign policy interactions (Reus-Smit 2005: 196; Acharya 2009: 4; see also Wendt 
1992; 1994; 1995; 1996a; 1996b; Katzenstein 1996a; Adler 1997; 2005; Checkel 1998; 
Ruggie 1999; Acharya 2009). For these constructivists, ideational forces matter for at 
least two reasons. First, they condition actors’ identities and inform their interests. As 
will be shown, norms not only regulate actors’ behaviour as rationalists suppose; they 
also constitute their identities and define their behaviour in the sense of influencing their 
actions and the way they act. For instance, the EU’s values not only shape its 
international identity, role and goals, e.g. the promotion of those values as one of the 
core objectives of its foreign policy. They also define the ways it follows, e.g. the 
Copenhagen criteria or the conditionality, to achieve those goals. This point is of central 
importance because it enables the thesis to explain that ideational and normative 
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elements define not only the interests/goals of the external relations of the EU and 
ASEAN and their interregionalism, but also the approaches/ways they use/follow to 
achieve those interests/goals. Second, ideational features matter in world politics 
because they foster cooperation when they are compatible whereas they hinder 
interaction when they are incompatible. 
A third key argument held by constructivists is that formation of collective 
identity and the construction of security communities or regional organisations, e.g. the 
EU and ASEAN, like other social communities, is only made possible through the 
presence of some pre-existing conditions, e.g. historical similarities of its members, and 
the process of interaction between its members. Thanks to these pre-existing conditions 
and their socialisation, the members within a community or the states within a region 
can consider themselves as part of a ‘we-group’. This sense of belonging to a group is 
also the basis for the cooperation within the community. However, that process of 
collective identity formation and community building also involves a ‘they-group’ 
because “the production of a sense of collective identity within a community inevitably 
entails the production of a sense of difference with states outside of the community” 
(Rumelili 2007: 6). In other words, identity information “entails developing a collective 
sense not only of ‘who we are’, but also ‘how we differ from others’” (Acharya 2009: 
28). Furthermore, if a sense of belonging to a group enhances cooperation among states 
within the community, the production of difference generates conditions for conflict in 
the external relations of the community (Rumelili 2007: 7).  
The subsequent sections of this chapter will develop in more detail these three 
core arguments. Yet, two examples can be given now to illustrate them. The first, which 
will be studied in more detail in Chapter 4, is about the process of European 
enlargement vis-à-vis the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and Turkey. 
Just fifteen years after the collapse of the Soviet/communist bloc, 10 CEE countries 
were admitted into the EU in 2004. By contrast, despite Turkey’s interest in joining the 
European Community in 1959 (Rumelili 2007: 64), 50 years later, its request has still 
not been accepted. One may ask why the CEE countries were quickly allowed to join 
the EU whereas Turkey’s request has not yet been granted. While recognising that there 
are many factors involved, ideational factors play a significant role in the EU’s posture 
vis-à-vis the CEE countries and Turkey (Diez 2007; Dixon 2008). It is believed that the 
CEE countries’ membership to the EU was accelerated and accepted because they 
belong to Europe, i.e. sharing the same ‘we-group’ (Rumelili 2004; 2007; Diez 2007; 
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Oner 2011). By contrast, Turkey has not yet been allowed to join because it does not 
share a common history, culture and civilisation – or a European-ness or a ‘we-group’ – 
with Europe (Phillips 2009; Kuebler 2011). This example also shows that the spatial 
and cultural environment, in which actors, e.g. the EU and its members, embed define 
their identities and their ways of perceiving and conducting their internal and external 
affairs.  
The second example of is related to the EU and ASEAN. Conditioned by their 
own contexts, e.g. Europe’s war-torn past for the EU and Southeast Asia’s colonialism 
for ASEAN, these two organisations strive to organise and pursue their internal and 
external relations around their own set of shared norms. ASEAN has evolved a brand of 
diplomatic and security culture,26 i.e. the ‘ASEAN way’, to guide its regional and 
international policies (Acharya 1999: 56; Haacke 2005: 5; Nishikawa 2007: 45). Given 
this, while recognising that realist considerations, e.g. power politics, are strong among 
Southeast Asia’s political leaders (Emmers 2003: 6), nobody can deny the 
predominance of norms in ASEAN’s internal and external relations (Ciorciara 2008). 
Some even believe that they are “more insightful than ‘balance-of-power’ realism” 
(Peou 2002: 120). On the EU side, it has developed a set of liberal and democratic 
norms to inform its internal and external policies (Marsch and Mackenstein 2005; Laïdi 
2008). This set of values has now become an integral part of its foreign policy and its 
strategic culture, which is defined as a set of beliefs, attitudes, norms, worldviews and 
patterns of behaviour held by the EU vis-à-vis security and defence issues.27
These two examples illustrate that ideational and normative factors are pertinent 
to international relations. Yet, while they matter, they do not necessarily influence in a 
constructive manner; they can affect negatively (Acharya 2005: 103). For instance, as 
will be illustrated, norms shape both cooperation and conflict (Kowert and Legro 1996: 
454). Their positive influence is widely examined by constructivist accounts on security 
communities, which maintain that shared norms and identities, or the ‘we-group’ 
elements, are imperative for the creation and maintenance of security communities 
 
                                                 
26 Acharya (1999: 56-7) refers to the ASEAN way as security culture and differs it from strategic culture 
(see next footnote) in three respects. First, strategic security revolves around issues of threat perceptions 
and military doctrine. Second, it is largely associated with state security. Third, it concentrates on great 
powers’ behaviour. However, according to Wah (2000), Biava et al. (2011) and Haglund (2011), there is 
not much of a distinction worth making between these two concepts because they are interrelated.   
27 The ‘strategic culture’ concept, first developed by Snyder (1977), became prominent in the literature on 
international relations after the end of the Cold War (Ball 1993; Lantis 2003). It began figuring in the 
scholarship on the EU after its publication of European Security Strategy in 2003 (Rynning 2003; Cornis 
and Edwards 2005; Meyer 2005; 2006; Biava et al. 2011).  
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(Deutsch 1957; Acharya 2009). They become obstructive when they are incompatible as 
EU-Turkey relations demonstrate. Rentzow-Vasu (2006) points out that the EU and 
ASEAN disputed over a number of issues, notably human rights and democracy, 
because they have opposing socio-cultural norms.28
Like social constructivism, a normative theory approach to international relations 
prominently centres on norms. The distinction is that it focuses more on the ethical 
aspects of norms (Hurrell 2005). More precisely, it often outlines two main normative 
positions, namely cosmopolitanism and communitarianism. Cosmopolitanism argues 
that the central focus of any normative theory of world politics should concentrate on 
either individual human beings or the humanity as a whole (Smith and Owens 2005: 
279). In other words, for a cosmopolitan perspective, which has become increasingly 
popular in the West, individuals should be seen as agents and units of consideration in 
the realm of interregional politics (Dunn et al. 2010). In contrast, the latter argues that 
the appropriate focus is the political community or the state (Brown 1992: 55; Smith 
and Owen 2005: 279; Dunn et al. 2010: 298). These two normative positions are very 
useful in identifying the norms of the EU and ASEAN as well as distinguishing them 
from each other. In the current literature, the EU has already been depicted as a 
proactive cosmopolitan community (Smith 2006) or a normative power (Manners 2002; 
Whitman 2011), because it has espoused a set of liberal or individual-centred values 
(Taylor 1999; Rynning 2003). In contrast, ASEAN’s norms, e.g. sovereignty and non-
interference, are predominantly state-centric. Furthermore, as will be shown in Chapter 
5, whether there exist values that are typically ‘Asian’ is a point of contention. Yet, it is 
 Later, based on critical 
constructivist/post-structural accounts, the chapter will examine more in detail why 
become an obstacle in the relationship between international actors, e.g. the EU and 
ASEAN. A crucial point made here is that the realm of international relations can be 
interpreted as a place where international actors compete not only for material powers 
but also for ideational ones with actors seeking to promote their own normative 
frameworks. This also means that different actors may have different and even 
competing ideas of how world politics should be constructed or conducted. A normative 
theory perspective is useful for explaining these differences.  
                                                 
28 The divergent views between the EU and the US, and even between EU members, vis-à-vis the Iraq 
war are another example of why normative difference can impede cooperation between actors in world 
politics (Rynning 2003; Puetter and Wiener 2007). This example also shows that normative divergence 
can occur between members within a wider community (e.g. NATO) or a narrower organisation, e.g. the 
EU.  
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clear that some of ASEAN states’ leaders, e.g. Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew and 
Malaysia’s Mahathir Mohamad as well as those who advocate the Asian values 
maintain that (the economic development and stability of) the community, i.e. the state, 
is much more important than (the political rights and freedoms of) the individual 
(Zakaria 1994; Mahathir 1997). Another noteworthy difference between 
cosmopolitanism and communitarianism is that the former “rejects the idea that states 
have a right to autonomy if it allows them to undertake actions that conflict with the 
rights of individuals”, whereas the latter “opposes any restrictions on autonomy that do 
not arise out of the community itself” (Smith and Owens 2005: 279-80). In other words, 
they differ over whether and when it is right for states to intervene into others’ internal 
affairs. These insights are also very valuable for explaining the normative differences of 
the EU and ASEAN and the implication of those divergences to their relations. Given 
their emphasis on the individual’s rights and freedoms, the EU and its members are 
willing to interfere into other states’ domestic politics in order to promote democratic 
norms (Poos 1991; Moeller 2007: 474). In contrast, ASEAN members reject such 
interference because it violates the norms of national sovereign and non-interference 
that are central to their regional and international relations. As will be explained further 
later, based on these two contrasting normative positions, the thesis depicts the former 
as a cosmopolitan normative power and the latter as a communitarian normative power 
because their respective norms fit very well the characteristics of these two positions.  
Briefly, this chapter proposes three central positions that the inquiry takes in its 
exploration of the EU, ASEAN and their interregionalism. First, actors in world politics, 
e.g. EU and ASEAN, their identities and norms are socially constructed. Consequently, 
they are the products of their own temporal and spatial conditions. Second, like material 
factors, ideational ones are influential in global politics (Jepperson et al. 1995: 65) 
because the building blocks of international reality are both material and ideational 
(Christiansen et al. 1999: 530; Ruggie 1999: 239; Huntington 2007: 53). Precisely, they 
are of importance because they define international actors’ identities, interests and ways 
of operating in the international system and shape both positive and negative outcomes 
of world politics (Acharya 2009: 28). Third, the construction of a community, e.g. the 
EU and ASEAN, not only requires a sense of collective identity, i.e. a ‘we-group’, 
within the community but also entails the production of a sense of difference with 
outsiders, i.e. a ‘they-group’. Moreover, while the former enhance cooperation between 
members within a community, the latter can lead to tensions between the ‘we-group’ 
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and the ‘they-group’. The next section, which focuses on the three core concepts, 
namely norms, norm entrepreneur and normative power, will further explain these. 
2.2. Norms, norm entrepreneur and normative power 
2.2.1. Norms  
Norms are a core notion in social sciences (Horne 2001: 3). With the 
constructivist turn, they became prominent in the study of international relations 
(Finnemore and Sikkin 1998: 889; Elgström 2000: 459; Garcia 2006: 15-6; Capie 2008: 
637; Beyer and Hofman 2011: 290). Yet, though being widely mentioned, norms are 
understood differently by different people (Hechter and Opp 2001: xii; Horne 2001: 3; 
Cancian 1975: 1). For some, they are standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights 
and obligations, i.e. they specify what people ought to do (Williams 1960: 24; Krasner 
1982: 186; Kratochwill 1989: 59), while others regard them as frames of reference or 
standardised ways of regulating activities and perceiving the world (Sherif 1965: 24-5). 
Ingrebritsen (2002: 12) defines norms as established practices, codes of conduct and 
standards of acceptable behaviour. According to Klotz (1995a: 14) and Legro (1997: 
33) norms are broadly defined as collective understandings of standards for behaviour. 
For Finnemore (1996: 22), Jepperson et al. (1996: 54), Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 
891) and Barnett (2005: 265), norms are standards of appropriate behaviour for actors 
with a given identity or shared expectations about appropriate behaviour held by a 
community of actors. Sjursen (2003: 43) conceptualises norms “as inter-subjective 
beliefs about the worlds. They define actors and constitute their preferences and 
worldviews”. Based on these definitions, this chapter highlights four key elements of 
norms that the thesis takes to explain the EU, ASEAN, their respective normative basis 
and their interregionalism. 
Norms are generally defined as standardised ways of regulating activities or 
standards that govern people’s behaviour (bold for emphasis). In this sense, broadly 
speaking, norms refer to or convey what is ‘normal’. As conceptualised by Williams 
(1960), Krasner (1982), Kratochwill (1989), norms also imply what is ‘normative’ 
(bold for emphasis) or “a moral imperative – that is a sense of oughtness” (Hechter and 
Opp 2001: xiii) or “a principle of right action that can be approached from various 
ethical perspectives” (Forsberg 2011: 1190). They assume this moral/ethical role “when 
they express values that create new rights and responsibilities” (Bernstein 2000: 467). In 
this light, they are perceived as moral/ethical values (Womack 2008: 267; Stoeva 2010: 
13). This is true in the case of the EU’s set of liberal norms, e.g. peace, liberty, 
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democracy and human rights, which are often referred to (in the EU’s key documents as 
well as in the literature on the EU) as values.   
It is commonly held that norms regulate behaviour (Horne 2001: 4; Garcia 2006: 
16).29 Yet, norms also define actors’ interests and identities (Kloz 1995b; Finnemore 
1996) and constitute preferences and worldviews (Sjursen 2003: 43). Indeed, they shape 
not only the interests or the policies of actors but also their basic identities, i.e. the 
features of their actorhood (Jepperson et al. 1996: 58; Katzenstein 1996b: 5; Kowert and 
Legro 1996: 462; Barnett 2005: 265). According to Makarychev (2008), not only are 
norms and interests mutually constitutive, but so are norms and identities. Furthermore, 
norms affect the ways actors connect their preferences to policy choices (Kowert and 
Legro 1996: 463).30
While norms are regarded as normal practices, different actors in different 
temporal and spatial contexts often adopt different norms. They even interpret norms 
differently (Tocci and Manners 2008: 306-7). In other words, the meaning and 
significance of – the preference for – norms are not independent of time and space. 
They are all the product of a specific history (Ruggie 1999: 239; Laïdi 2008: 4; Postel-
Vinay 2008: 40). For Jepperson et al. (1996: 54), “norms establish expectations about 
who the actors will be in a particular environment and about how these particular actors 
will behave”. For this reason, as highlighted by Finnemore (1996a: 22), Sjursen (2003: 
43) Barnett (2005: 265), norms always involve collective expectations of proper 
behaviour of actors with a given identity (bold for emphasis).  
 
Finally, whatever norms are defined they always involves a discursive asymmetry. 
Practices are regarded as ‘normal’ because they are differentiated from others, which 
are seen as ‘abnormal’. As Acharya (2009: 26) puts it, norms help actors to distinguish 
between ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’. That is why normative discourse is “marked by a 
frontier separating the inside from the outside, a frontier between those who succeed in 
remaining within normative boundaries and those excluded from them” (Makarychev 
2008: 157). Indeed, like identities, which are only distinguished when they are seen as 
relative to the identities of others (Hopf 1998: 175), certain practices are regarded as 
democratic because they are defined against those, which are perceived as non-
democratic. Furthermore, the production of that difference can generate conflict. The 
                                                 
29 This role is strongly maintained by the works on international regimes, e.g. Krasner (1982), Keohane 
(1984), Young (1989) and Parker (2001). 
30 In this sense, norms are closely interrelated to other notions, which are referred to in this thesis, e.g. 
worldviews, principles, values, approaches, preferences and identities. 
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last section will examine why normative differences can be a source for conflict 
between different actors with different or opposing norms. 
2.2.2. Norm entrepreneur  
It makes no sense to talk about norms without examining how they come about 
because they do not appear out of thin air. In fact, as identified by Finnemore and 
Sikkink (1998: 894), international norm come into existence via a three-stage cycle and 
the first stage is known as norm emergence. The agents that play the central role during 
this stage are norm entrepreneurs,31
Various actors, e.g. individuals, non-governmental organisations and states, could 
embody the role of a norm entrepreneur in world politics (Finnemore 1996a; 
Ingebritsen; 2006). Nevertheless, states are the most prominent norm entrepreneurs 
 who first “call attention to issues or even “create” 
issues by using language that names, interprets, and dramatizes them” (Finnemore and 
Sikkink 1998: 897). In other words, norm entrepreneurs are those who are dissatisfied 
with the existing normative context and promote a particular norm or a set of norms that 
they think to be the appropriate behaviour (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 896-90; 
Ingebritsen 2002: 12; Hamilton 2008: 80) or those who set out to change the behaviour 
of other (Florini 1996: 375). For example, as will be examined in Chapters 4, 6 and 7, 
the EU strongly insisted on the protection of human rights in its post-Cold War foreign 
policy and its relations with ASEAN because it was concerned about the human rights 
situation in other parts of the world. The second stage is norm acceptance or norm 
cascade, during which the norm leaders, i.e. those have already accepted the new norm, 
try to socialise and convince others to accept the new norm and become norm followers. 
The EU is also very active in this second stage. However, the EU has also faced 
difficulties in persuading others, e.g. Mediterranean countries (Pace 2007b: 665) and 
notably ASEAN, to accept its set of liberal norms. If the norms pass the first two stages, 
they reach the third one, i.e. norm internalisation, during which “norms may become so 
widely accepted that they are internalized by actors and achieve a ‘taken-for-granted’ 
quality that makes conformance with them almost automatic” (Finnemore and Sikkink 
1998: 904). The former communist CEE countries’ compliance with the Copenhagen 
criteria before their admission to the EU is an example of this internalisation.   
                                                 
31 The term has its root in the French word, entrepreneur, which refers to someone who takes initiatives, 
introduces new ideas or undertakes a project. While it is mainly used in economics (Nandan 2009: 5), it is 
also used in political science and international relations. According to Florini (1996: 375), the term ‘norm 
entrepreneur’ was used by John Mueller at a conference on ‘The Emergence of New Norms in Personal 
and International Behavior’ held at University of California in May 1993 
37 
 
(Katzenstein 1996a; Wendt 1999). It is also often maintained that powerful states are 
better positioned to take on norm entrepreneurial role (Axelrod 1986: 1108; Florini 
1996: 375; Job 2007: 61). According to Womack (2004), the more powerful an actor in 
the international system is, the more likely it tends to advocate its preferred norms. The 
West’s strong focus on the promotion of liberal values to the non-Western world after 
the end of the Cold War is an example of this (Fukuyama 1992). Indeed, as will be 
shown in the subsequent chapters, this is somehow true in the EU’s foreign policy and 
its relations vis-à-vis ASEAN in the post-Cold War period (Lim 2012: 56). The 
triumphant mood in West following the collapse of the communist bloc prompted the 
EU and its members to advocate a new international system, which is based on liberal 
and democratic norms. It is also commonly held that international norms are mainly 
produced in and by the West (Postel-Vinay 2008: 40). However, this does not mean that 
major powers and Western countries always hold a monopoly on norm 
entrepreneurship. Small and non-Western one also play the role of norm entrepreneurs 
by seeking to advance norms that challenge the established order or influence world 
politics in a particular way (Arter 2002; Ingebritsen 2002; 2006; Jacob 2007; Stubbs 
2008; Brommesson 2010; Nasra 2011). In his study, Acharya (2011: 97) maintains that 
the post-colonial period, Third World states and regions in Asia and Africa engage in 
what he calls norm subsidiarity, which signifies a process whereby local or weaker 
actors “create rules with a view to preserve their autonomy from dominance, neglect, 
violation or abuse by more powerful central actors”. As will be shown in Chapters 5 and 
6, the fact that some leaders of ASEAN countries, such as Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew 
and Malaysia’s Mahathir Mohamad, championed the concept of ‘Asian values’ to 
challenge Western/European values, is an example of the engagement of small non-
Western actors in norm entrepreneurship. Moreover, norm entrepreneurs in world 
politics are not always states. They can be regional organisations. The EU is a very 
active norm entrepreneur (Björkdahl 2005; Pace 2007b; Zwolski and Kaunert 2010) and 
this is demonstrated by its efforts to cultivate democratic norms (Rynning 2003: 484; 
Elgström and Strömvik 2005: 123). Given this, there is a tendency to regard it as a norm 
producer/exporter and other countries and organisations as norm takers/receivers 
(Argomaniz 2009: 112). In fact, like the EU, ASEAN is a notable norm entrepreneur 
because it has proactively engaged in norm generation and diffusion (Katsumata 2006; 
Rüland 2011). 
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While actors in world politics have an interest in spreading their preferred norms 
(Björkdahl 2008: 136), the intensity of their interest in norm entrepreneurship differs. 
The selection of norms and the degree, to which norms are prioritised, also depend on 
their generators and advocates (Powel 2009). There are those who feel they have a 
moral obligation to promote certain norms and they are known as moral entrepreneurs, 
who have strong notions about appropriate behaviour and, consequently, invest time and 
resources to convince other actors to engage in this sort of desirable behaviour 
(Nadelmann 1990; Kingdon 1995; Florini 1996; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Elgström 
2000). The EU can be seen as one of these because promoting its democratic values has 
become a central issue in its post-Cold War foreign policy and it has used different 
positive and negative incentives to spread its values globally. In contrast, though 
seeking to disseminate its norms in the Asia-Pacific region, ASEAN does not regard the 
promotion of its norms worldwide as a key objective of its external relations.  
It is also important to note that norms “never enter a normative vacuum, but 
instead access a highly contested space in which they need to compete with other 
norms” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 897). Thus, a key condition for entrepreneurs to 
create and promote norms at the international level is the presence of some kind of 
organisational platform (Zwolski and Kaunert 2010: 15). These platforms can be 
multilateral, e.g. the UN, interregional, e.g. EU-ASEAN relations, and regional, e.g. the 
EU and ASEAN. As will be shown in Chapters 6, 7 and 8, their interregional interaction 
is the place where the EU and ASEAN seek to promote their respective norms. For the 
EU, three major platforms, from which its norms emerge, are the Council, the 
Parliament and the Commission because, as will be illustrated in Chapter 4, its key 
documents on issues such human rights and democracy come from these institutions. 
For instance, the European Parliament is regarded as an important norm entrepreneur in 
the EU (Smith 2004; O’Brennan 2006: 98-9). With regard to ASEAN, its ministerial 
meetings and summits are the place where its principles are formed.32
                                                 
32 As will be seen in Chapters 5 and 8, other ASEAN-led institutions, e.g. the ARF, are important 
channels for ASEAN to disseminate its norms (Gilson 2007a: 30). 
 In this sense, the 
primary norm entrepreneurs in ASEAN are its member states. Thus, it is worth noting a 
major difference between the EU and ASEAN in institutional terms (Doidge 2007: 
234). The EU has supranational institutions, e.g. its Commission and Parliament, which 
have the power to generate and spread norms. In contrast, ASEAN is a purely 
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intergovernmental organisation, which has no supranational bodies that have the power 
to determine and embed norms.33
In short, norm entrepreneurs are the agents or policy innovators that generate and 
promote a particular norm, which they think to be the appropriate behaviour. This norm 
entrepreneurial role is not limited to states and powerful actors in world politics as 
commonly held. Weak states and regional organisations, e.g. ASEAN and its members 
also attempt to create and disseminate norms. This thesis maintains that the EU and 
ASEAN are two norm entrepreneurs. In the EU, various actors engage in norm 
generation and diffusion and these include its Council, Commission and Parliament. In 
contrast, ASEAN’s norms are mainly formed by its member states. The leaders and 
officials of state members of the two organisations also play a major role their 
respective organisation’s norm entrepreneurship. The question is whether ASEAN, like 
the EU, can be regarded as a normative power. This leads to another concept that is 
important and related concept, which is central to the thesis, namely normative power. 
  
 
2.2.3. Normative power 
While the concept of normative power (NP) is hardly novel and unique to the EU, 
it has been largely developed in relations to the EU (Diez 2005: 620), especially since 
Manners (2002) coined the term of Normative Power Europe (NPE). In fact, since then, 
a huge number of works has been undertaken to examine and refine not only the NPE 
thesis but also the concept of NP. Thus, Manners’ definition of NPE can serve as a good 
starting point to describe a NP. According to Manners (2002: 239), the notion of a NPE 
“is located in a discussion of the ‘power of over opinion’, idée force, or ‘ideological 
power’”. With such an understanding, he defines NP is a power that is able “to shape 
conceptions of normal in international relations” (Manners 2002: 239; Diez and 
Manners 2007: 175; bold for emphasis). In this respect, the word of ‘normative’ in the 
concept of NP conveys what is ‘normal’ in world politics. In other words, the NP can be 
defined as the power that has the power to shape what is considered to be ‘normal’ or to 
contribute to determining the ‘norm’ in international affairs (Tocci 2008b: 4). If defined 
as such, the EU is not the only NP in world politics. Many other international actors, 
                                                 
33 For more information on the two different models of regionalism followed by the EU and ASEAN and 
especially the institutional differences between the two organisations, see for instance Henry (2007) and 
Wunderlich (2007; 2012a). Chapter 3 (section 3.1.2) will explain in more detail why European integration 
tends towards supranationalism whereas regionalism in ASEAN strongly focuses on 
intergovernmentalism.   
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e.g. the US (Hamilton 2008), China (Kavalski 2007; Womack 2008; Reilly 2012), India 
(Kumar 2008) and Russia (Makarychev 2008; Sakwa 2011) and ASEAN are also 
qualified as NPs because they also promote what are commonly practiced in 
international relations. The difference is, as the findings of Hamilton (2008), Kumar 
(2008), Makarychev (2008) and Womack (2008), who examine the US, India, Russia 
and China respectively demonstrate, different actors often emphasise different norms 
and use different means to project their own norms, with the EU being often depicted as 
a benign power or a force-for-good in world politics (Manners 2002). This can be a 
reason why in the current literature, the EU has been described as a NP whereas the US, 
China, India, Russia and ASEAN have not been portrayed so. In fact, the EU is given 
that depiction because there is another interpretation of the concept of NP. 
According to the second, a NP is not only a power that shapes what is ‘normal’ in 
international relations but also a power that advocates what is ‘normative’ (bold for 
emphasis) or what is ‘good’ or ‘ethical’ as previously explained. If the first 
interpretation focuses on the ‘normal’, this concentrates on the ‘normative’. Forsberg 
(2011: 1190) argues that the idea that NP “is the ability to define what passes for normal 
is not necessarily at all normative”. Such an analysis has its roots in normative theory, 
which focuses on the moral dimension of international relations (Smith and Owens 
2005: 278-80). Under this understanding, which is most commonly found in the 
literature on the EU (Tocci 2008: 4) as well as often adapted by the EU’s policy papers 
and officials, a NP would be a force-for-good for the world.34
An overview of the two major understandings of NP shows that both of them have 
their own limitations; and they are contested. The second is very controversial not only 
because no power can meet all the three requirements identified by Tocci et al (2008) 
 Given this, to be qualified 
as a NP, a power’s goals, means and impacts need to be normative (Tocci 2008: 5) and 
the EU is often regarded as “one of the most, if not the most important, normative 
powers in the world” because the EU’s principles, its actions and its impact are 
normative (Manners 2002: 252). However, if judging by these criteria, no power on 
earth could pass this test with any consistency because political actors employ a variety 
of means to advance a range of foreign policy goals and both instruments and goals 
change over time (Hamilton (2008: 81).  
                                                 
34 For instance, in its European Security Strategy (ESS), published in 2003, the EU states that it wants to 
become a force-for-good in the world (European Council 2003. Because of such an understanding, the 
EU’s norms are often seen as ‘values’.  
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but also because it involves the ethical issue, which is deeply contentious in 
international politics (Aggestam 2008: 5). In other words, while it is already difficult to 
agree on what is ‘normal’, it is even more challenging to concur what is ‘normative’ or 
ethical in international relations. For this reason, the thesis does not adopt the second 
interpretation. Another main reason for its rejection is that its primary objective is not to 
assess whether the EU and ASEAN are the normative powers that attempt to do what is 
good in international relations. Regarding the first definition, it is too simple. If a NP is 
understood as a power that possesses the ability to shape what is ‘normal’ in 
international relations, all states can be qualified as NPs (Tocci 2008b: 4). So, what is 
the plausible definition of normative power? 
In her study, though adopting the first understanding of NP, De Zutter (2010: 
1122) expands it by defining a NP “as the identity of a power in the international 
system that shapes the normal in world politics through its norm-driven practices and 
the adaption of its norms by others”. While this definition is somehow similar to the 
first interpretation, it singles out four important elements, and for this reason, with a 
minor justification, the thesis adopts it to explain the EU and ASEAN. First, a NP is an 
identity in the international system. In other words, it refers to what constitutes an 
entity, e.g. the EU and ASEAN, as an actor in world politics. In fact, the argument that 
NP is the identity of a power in the international system is widely underlined. For 
instance, according to Sjursen (2006a), the NPE thesis is about the nature of the EU and 
its international identity. Powel (2009: 195) points out that NPE “is conceived of as a 
particular type of international actor, predisposed to promote its values through its 
interaction with other actors”. For Diez (2005: 614) the discourse of the EU as a NP 
constructs a particular self of the EU. Second, a NP is also a power that has the ability 
to shape the normal in world politics. Third, a NP shapes the normal through its norm-
driven practices. As will be demonstrated in the subsequent chapters of this thesis, the 
internal and external activities of the EU and ASEAN are largely norm-driven. Fourth, a 
NP is a power, whose norms are adopted by others. This thesis slightly modifies the 
final point by adding the word ‘some’ before ‘others’ because there is no power that is 
able “to produce and put in place a global framework of norms that applies to all, 
including the most powerful” (Hamilton 2008: 81). The norms of a normative power, 
e.g. the EU and ASEAN, are only accepted by some others, not by all.  
Based on De Zutter’s definition of normative power, it is clear that a normative 
power is also a norm entrepreneur because it engages in the three-stage cycle of norms 
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identified by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998). A difference between a NP and a norm 
entrepreneur is that the former refers to not only the ability to shape the normal in world 
politics of a power or its ability to generate and diffuse norms but also its identity. 
Moreover, judged by the four elements of a normative power that her definition implies, 
both the EU and ASEAN are qualified as normative powers because they meet those 
criteria. These four characteristics also fit well a key argument by Manners (2002: 252) 
in his first work on NPE, in which he maintained that the EU “is built on the crucial, but 
usually overlooked observation that, the most important factor shaping the international 
role of the EU is not what it does or what it says, but what it is”. Such a view can be 
applied to ASEAN because, as will be illustrated in the subsequent chapters, ASEAN’s 
raison d’être greatly defines its influence in the Asia-Pacific region. This raises another 
question, that is: if they are both normative powers, what makes them different from 
each other.  
For Börzel and Risse (2009: 5), it makes little sense to attribute a normative 
quality to a power’s “identity as long as we do not specify which norms are being 
promoted”. While recognising that China, Russia, India, the EU and the US all promote 
norms, Tocci and Manners (2008: 307) point out a crucial difference between these 
powers, which “lies in the degree to which normative value is bestowed upon individual 
political, social and economic rights and freedoms on the hand, or collective rights, self-
determination and state sovereignty on the other”. Using this differentiation as a 
measure, they find that these actors position themselves respectively along a continuum, 
with China standing on one extreme end and the US positions on the other. While 
China’s normative framework focuses on state sovereignty, the US’s normative 
preference is individual-centred. Standing fourth and next to the US on this spectrum is 
the EU, “which like the US bestows prime normative value to individual rights and 
freedoms” (Tocci and Manners 2008: 308). If ASEAN is put on this continuum, it will 
stand in the same place as or next to China because ASEAN’s norms are strongly 
bestowed upon state sovereignty. Thus, this method is very helpful for describing and 
differentiating the normative nature of the EU and ASEAN. Indeed, based on a key 
argument made earlier that norms not only regulate actors’ behaviour but also define 
their identities and premised on the two major normative positions outlined by 
normative theory, this inquiry depicts the EU as a cosmopolitan normative power’ and 
ASEAN as ‘communitarian normative power’ because the EU gives prime normative 
value to individual rights. In contrast, ASEAN focuses on collective rights and state 
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sovereignty. Another question raised is why there exist such normative differences. In 
other words, why do different actors, e.g. the EU and ASEAN, often advocate ideas 
about desirable goals and appropriate behaviour that diverge from each other (Stubbs 
2008: 453)? 
2.3. The sources of normative differences 
2.3.1. Ecological, social and internal processes 
In their studies, Kowert and Legro (1996: 470-82) identify three processes that 
lead political actors to generate, maintain and change their norms, namely ecological, 
social and internal. With regard the first process, norms derive from the pattern of 
relations between actors and their environment. These patterned interactions may occur 
in two major forms. The first form takes place when actors confront a rapidly (or 
dramatically) changing environment (Kowert and Legro 1996: 470-4). For example, 
historic events in the international system can lead to a search for new ideas and norms 
(Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 910). This form is evident in the EU because as will be 
shown in Chapters 4 and 6 the end of the bipolar system led it to transform from the EC 
to the EU and this transformation brought with it a new identity and mission that 
strongly focused on the promotion and protection of human rights and democracy. The 
second form, which addresses the problem of norm and identity maintenance rather than 
their emergence, stresses that the continuity in the environment strengthens norms 
(Kowert and Legro 1996: 472). This is the true in the case of ASEAN’s norms because 
even though the end of the Cold War somehow affected international relations in 
Southeast Asia and the economic situation of the region’s countries may have changed, 
the overall regional context, especially at the security level, has not changed much 
(Katsumata 2003). Consequently, the core norms, e.g. national sovereignty and non-
interference, which ASEAN adopted when it was established in 1967, remain 
unchanged. They were all reiterated in the ASEAN Charter, which was signed in 2007. 
Concerning the second, norms stem from the relations between actors themselves, 
i.e. through social processes, and these take place in two forms. Norms are spread 
through a process of interaction between members within a community, i.e. the in-group 
interaction (Kowert and Legro 1996: 474). This form of norm building and spreading is 
underlined in many works on security communities (Deutsch 1957; 1961; Barnett 1995; 
Wendt 1995; Risse-Kappen 1995; Adler 1997; Ericson 2000). Norms also emerge from 
a process of in-group/out-group interaction (Kowert and Legro 1996: 475). This in-
group/out-group interaction in the formation of collective identity is underlined by a 
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number of scholars, such as Diez (2004; 2005), Neumann (1996; 1998; 1999) and 
Campbell (1992; 2998). Indeed, as mentioned in Chapter 1 and will be shown in 
Chapter 7, interregional relations, e.g. Asia-Europe Meeting, enable the participant 
regional organisations to form and reinforce their norms and identities (Gilson 1999; 
2001; 2002a; 2002b; 2005; Higgott 2000; Gilson and Yeo 2004). However, as will be 
shown in the last section of this chapter, the norms that emerge from these two forms of 
the social processes are the two facets of the same process.  
Finally, norms spring from the internal characteristics of actors, i.e. through the 
internal processes. Kowert and Legro (1996: 478-82) identify three different arguments 
relating to how norms emerge within political actors. The first regards the construction 
of norms as a psychological process. This argument, which is closely related to one of 
the social process examined, pretends that norms emerge because of people’s need for 
identity in social relations, i.e. their need to invent an in-group identity to differentiate 
with an out-group identity. The second argument maintains that norms and identities 
emerge from cognitive miserliness, which mainly focuses on ‘Who am I?’ or ‘Who are 
we?’. As will be shown later, these two internal processes play a key role in the norm-
building/spreading of both the EU and ASEAN. However, as the two forms of the social 
processes mentioned earlier, they are in fact two facets of a single process because we 
cannot define ‘who we are’ unless we differentiate ourselves from other(s) as Diez 
(2004: 321-2) rightly maintains. The third argument of the internal process focuses on 
the linguistic role, i.e. the use and interpretation of langue, in norm construction. As 
already mentioned in the methodological issues in Chapter 1, the processes and multiple 
levels of speech, e.g. speech events, phrases, sentences and texts of (the officials and 
institutions) of the EU and ASEAN also form an important source of their respective 
norms.  
 
2.3.2. Other causal factors and forces 
The three processes are very useful in explaining why political actors, e.g. the EU 
and ASEAN, promote their preferred norms and/or why their normative premises differ 
from each other. Nevertheless, there are other important factors that define their 
normative foundation and differentiation, which are either ignored or under-developed 
by Kowert and Legro (1996). One of these is their own historical backgrounds. 
According to Tocci and Manners (2008: 311-2), historical conditions and philosophical 
traditions are a defining reason behind the normative dissimilarities of the US, the EU, 
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China, India and Russia. For Manners (2002: 240), the historical context of Europe is a 
key factor that shapes the EU’s normative distinction. The role of history in ASEAN’s 
construction of its ASEAN way is also very influential (Katsumata 2003). The striking 
difference is that European integration in general and the EU’s norms are aimed at 
overcoming Europe’ past disastrous wars (Checkel and Katzenstein 2009b: 1) caused by 
ultranationalism (Yeo 2009b: 195) whereas ASEAN and its norms are shaped by 
Southeast Asia’s colonial legacy. This historical difference is the defining reason why 
the EU and ASEAN espouse two differing normative frameworks as well as follows 
two models of regionalism with one being inclined to supranationalism and the other 
tends towards intergovernmentalism mentioned earlier. Regarding the philosophical or 
cultural traditions, Tocci and Manners (2008: 311) maintain that the emphasis of the EU 
– and by extension the US – on individual rights and freedoms is also unmistakably 
linked to the legacy of Enlightenment. Chapter 5 will consider whether there exist some 
cultural elements in the so-called Asian values advocated by some ASEAN leaders.  
Tocci and Manners (2008: 312-4) also identify two other factors that define 
political actors’ normative preferences and differences. One is related to their 
background, location and perspective of powers in question. A case in point is that the 
EU upholds and promotes liberal cosmopolitan norms partly because its members are 
established democracies. In contrast, for decades ASEAN ignored those norms because 
its members were not democratic countries. Currently, despite their agreement to 
include human rights and democracy in their  Charter and their decision establish a 
regional human rights body, ASEAN states still prioritise national sovereign and non-
interference over human rights and democracy because some ASEAN members’ 
regimes remain authoritarian. In responding to the EU’s insistence on the inclusion of 
the human rights clause in a new cooperation framework the EU and ASEAN intended 
to negotiate in the early 1990s, ASEAN argued that in developing countries, there were 
other rights and concerns, which were far more important than civil and political rights 
(Tay and Goh 1999: 43). The second is related to “the power political configuration in 
which an actor finds itself in the international system” (Tocci and Manners 2008: 312-
3). According to this, the stronger an international actor it within the international 
system the more likely it seeks to promote and protect its desired norms. For instance, 
as they regarded the collapse of the communist bloc as their victory over their Eastern 
adversaries, in the 1990s, the West in general and the EU sought to impose their 
preferred values on the non-Western world. Similarly, given their countries’ impressive 
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economic growth before the 1997/1998 Asian financial crisis, Southeast Asian leaders 
became confident in their economic model. Consequently, as will be shown in Chapter 
6, they were more assertive and willing to oppose the EU’s assertion on the protection 
and promotion of human rights.  
In his own study, Manners (2002: 240) highlights two particular factors that make 
the EU’s norms different, namely the EU’s hybrid polity and its political-legal 
constitution. Regard to the first, he maintains that the EU has developed into a hybrid of 
international form of governance that transcends Westphalian norms. Indeed, this makes 
the EU radically differ from ASEAN, whose existence is intended to strengthen 
Westphalian norms. Concerning the EU’s political-legal constitution, Manners (2002: 
241) maintains that the EU is a political entity that “has largely occurred as an elite-
driven, treaty based order. For this reason its constitutional norms represent crucial 
constitutive factors determining its international identity”. This can be applied to 
ASEAN because even though being less legally based, it is an elite-driven organisation, 
whose current key norms have been adopted and maintained since its foundation and 
enshrined in its key documents.  
Briefly, the processes and factors examined affect, to a greater or lesser degree, 
the normative preferences and differences of the EU and ASEAN and, consequently, the 
thesis takes them to explain their normative foundation and differentiation. Yet, though 
they are identified separately by different scholars, they are related to each other and 
some of them even overlap. For instance, Kowert and Legro (1996) argue that norms 
are formed through a process of social interaction and they name the common heritage 
of actors (within a community, e.g. the EU and ASEAN) as the facilitating factor for 
norm building. This common heritage can include historical backgrounds and 
philosophical traditions, which are the elements identified by Tocci and Manners (2008: 
311-2). For this reason, while using these factors and processes, the inquiry regroups 
them into two major ones and takes them as the key typologies to explain the normative 
foundation and differentiation of the EU and ASEAN. The first is related to the ‘we-
group’ elements, e.g. the international,35
                                                 
35 A reason for the inclusion of the ecological or international factor in this group is that while the end of 
the Cold War, which was regarded as a defining event, it affected the EU and ASEAN differently. 
 regional and domestic/national factors shared 
by the members of each regional organisation, and the interaction within the ‘we-
group’. The second is about the ‘they-group’ factors and the interaction between the 
‘we-group’, i.e. the EU and ASEAN, and their respective constitutive ‘they-group’ or 
47 
 
‘they-groups’. Their relations with each other are a form of this ‘we-group’/‘they-
group’ interaction. Another major reason for its rearrangement is that it can explain 
more adequately the reasons why the normative factors can be both cooperative and 
conflictual. This leads to the last and most important section of the chapter. 
2.4. Why norms become cooperative or conflictual  
As underlined, a major argument held by the thesis is that normative factors can 
become a force for cooperation as well as a source of conflict between actors in world 
politics and to explain why they can be cooperative or conflictual, it has adopted two 
major – and indeed, divergent – perspectives of constructivism. The first, which is 
strongly underlined in the constructivist accounts on security communities, e.g. Deutsch 
(1961) Kahl (1998/99), Adler (1997), Adler and Barnett (1998) and Acharya (2009), 
maintains that the community building always involves a ‘we-feeling’, i.e. the feelings 
belonging to a group.36
Looking back at the foundation and evolution of the EU and ASEAN, one can 
easily recognise that shared historical experiences and normative factors play an 
essential part in the process of their establishment and development. For instance, 
sharing the same concern about nation building in the post-colonial period and facing 
similar regional challenges, e.g. territorial disputes, ASEAN’s five founding states 
sought to subscribe to a set of principles, i.e. the ‘ASEAN way’, to help mediate 
 Furthermore, according this liberal constructivist perspective, 
this ‘we-group’ is the foundation for the creation and maintenance of a security 
community (Acharya 2009: 29; Fligstein 2009: 134). Deutsch (1961: 100-1) identifies 
four ‘we-group’ factors or pre-existing conditions for building a security community. 
They are (1) geographical proximity and assimilation of culture, (2) economic 
interdependence, (3) mutual responsiveness and (4) the development of a ‘we-feeling’ 
among regional countries. Based on Deutsch, Adler (1997), Kahl (1999) and Adler and 
Barnett (1998) argue that a sense of a collective identity helps foster cooperation 
between countries and enable them to build security communities. However, unlike 
Deutsch, Adler (1997: 250) and Adler and Barnett (1998: 40) strongly emphasise liberal 
and democratic values as the basis of a security community. Risse-Kappen (1995), 
Wendt (1995) and Ericson (2000) also highlight that shared liberal and democratic 
norms make war impossible among democracies. 
                                                 
36 The process of the community building is somehow similar to that of the construction of a region 
identified by Hettne (1993; 2002; 2005) in his concept of regionness because both the processes involve 
intraregional factors and result in the formation of a particular community identity. 
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disputes and guide the interaction between its members. This has eventually become the 
basis for their regional and international relations since ASEAN’s foundation to present. 
Similarly, conditioned by Europe’s war-torn past and inspired by its own philosophical 
traditions, e.g. the Enlightenment, the EU has also developed its own set of liberal 
norms to foster its internal cooperation and inform its external policies. As will be 
shown in Chapter 3, the anti-communist posture that the EC and ASEAN shared during 
the Cold War also facilitated their interaction. Thus, while recognising that a common 
commitment to shared community norms is not always sufficient for cooperation 
between members within a community or organisation (Puetter and Wiener 2007), there 
is little doubt that the ‘we-group’ is the basis condition for cooperation between political 
actors. Without it, it would be difficult, if not impossible, for the countries of Southeast 
Asia and Western Europe to come together and build their respective regional 
organisations.  
The second perspective has different understandings of the formation of collective 
identities and norms and the implications of such a construction to contemporary 
international politics. Unlike the first perspective, which considers the formation of 
collective identities and norms as a self-generated and self-sustained process, it 
maintains that such an formation is a ‘double-sided process’, by which “the production 
of a sense of collective identity within the community inevitably entails the production 
of a sense of difference with states outside of the community” Rumelili (2007: 6). The 
presence of the ‘other’ in collective identity formation – and this is also applied to 
norms because the definition of one’s norms is a defining feature in the articulation of a 
political actor’s identity (Manners and Tocci 2008: 307) – has been widely studied by 
scholars in the field of national and international politics.37 The reason for such a strong 
focus is that “collective identity is also by definition about the construction of an 
‘other’” (Fligstein 2009: 135). In other words, there is no identity without difference 
because identity is incomprehensible and unthinkable without such a difference 
(Connolly 1995: xx; Diez 2004: 321; Gilson 2005: 310).38
                                                 
37 These include Said (1978), Connolly (1991; 1995), Campbell (1992; 1998), Huntington (1996), 
Neumann (1996; 1998; 1999), Passi (2001), Diez (2004; 2005), Rumelili (2004; 2007), and Lebow 
(2008), Morozov and Rumelili (2012) to name but a few. 
 Our perception of who we 
are is usually constructed as a response to some ‘other’ groups (Diez 2004: 321-2; 
38 The division within the EU vis-à-vis the US-led Iraq in 2003, which led to the emergence of ‘Old 
Europe versus New Europe’ discourse (Haseler 2004; Lansford and Tashev 2005; Lévy et al. 2005), can 
be an example of this because if there is a ‘we-group’ or a ‘New Europe’ it is because there is a ‘they-
group’ or an ‘Old Europe’. 
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Fligstein 2009: 135). Indeed, as underlined by Gilson (2002b: 20), an interregional 
dialogue, e.g. Asia-Europe relations or EU-ASEAN interaction, “can only take place if 
the self can identify an other with whom to communicate”.39
Furthermore, if the liberal constructivist accounts make a convincing case of how 
a sense of collective identity generate the condition for peace among states within a 
community, these critical constructivist/post-structural scholars maintains that “by 
virtue of the same logic, production of difference may perpetuate conditions for conflict 
in the external relations of the community” (Rumelili 2007: 6). The relations between 
the self and its constitutive other can be conflictual because order to assert itself, i.e. to 
protect or maintain its identity and its norms, the self sometimes has to belittle the other 
(Campbell 1992; 1998; Connolly 1996; Rumelili 2004; 2007; Morozov and Rumelili 
2012). That is why it is often argued that the self/other relationship may engender a 
situation known as ‘othering’, which can be defined as a way of defining and securing 
the self’s own positive identity through the deprecation of an other (Rumelili 2007: 8). 
A crucial question arises is whether othering is always conflictual.  
 
According to Campbell (1992: 69) in securing their identities, states engage in 
“boundary-producing political performances”, which consider the external realm as 
different, inferior and threatening. In his study, Diez (2004; 2005) identifies three forms 
of othering that are important in the discourse on European identity. The first is 
temporal othering, which means that the self of the present is also the other of the past 
as examined above (Waever 1998). The second is spatial othering, expressed in the 
interaction between the self and an external other, e.g. the EU vis-à-vis Turkey and 
Russia (Neumann 1998; Christiansen et al. 2000) or Asia (Loewen 2010; Murray 2010). 
The third is cultural/normative othering, which became more salient in world politics. 
Unlike the first form, the last two tend to be more exclusive, antagonistic and 
conflictual because they always involve one or many out-group(s). However, these three 
forms are often related to each other (Rumelili 2004; Diez 2004; Prozorov 2011). For 
instance, Europe’s war-torn past and Southeast Asia’s colonialism, i.e. the respective 
temporal othering of the EU and ASEAN, led them to espouse two different normative 
premises, which eventually became of source of tensions between the two organisations.  
Diez (2005: 628) also argues that the self/other relationship can create four 
different levels of othering. The first and the strongest level is the representation of the 
                                                 
39 For more understanding on self and other and their relationship, see Gilson (2002b: 20-25; 2005: 309-
10). 
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other as the self’s existential threat, which can lead to extraordinary security measures, 
e.g. war between the self and the other. The US’s war-on-terror discourse and policy 
following 9/11 terrorist events can be seen as an example of this level of othering. The 
second level occurs when the self considers the other as inferior. In this version of 
othering that sees the other as weaker, the self is constructed as superior to the other. 
Consequently, the other is perceived as feted, but at the same time looked down upon. 
In the third level, the other is perceived as violating universal principles. At this level, 
the self’s norms are not simply seen as superior, but of universal validity, with a 
consequence that the other should accept the principles of the self. According to 
Manners and Tocci (2008: 316) when one international actor interprets a normative 
difference as another actor’s violation of a universal norm rather than as a legitimate 
challenge to its own norms, it can generates mistrust among them. Finally, the self sees 
the other as different. Unlike the previous three, at this fourth level, the self does not 
place obvious value-judgements on the other, which is represented neither as inferior 
nor as a threat, but merely as different. While it does not create conflict or tension, it 
does not help foster cooperation either because if the self perceives other as different, it 
tends to be indifferent to the latter.  
Looking at the EU’s foreign policy and its relations with ASEAN since the end of 
the Cold War, one can see that the first level of othering does not occur. However, the 
second and third levels are widely employed. For instance, by requiring the candidate 
countries or any other partners to respect democracy and human rights, which it sees as 
universal values, in order to be allowed to become a member or enter into agreements 
with it, the EU directly or indirectly practises the second and third levels of othering. As 
will be shown shortly below and in Chapter 4, the EU and the countries or organisations 
with whom it interact will not clash if the latter are willing to accept its norms and wish 
to become like it. However, as will be demonstrated in Chapters 6 and 7, they will clash 
if the latter refuses the former’s norms. Regarding the last level, it somehow exists in 
the EU’s posture vis-à-vis ASEAN, especially in the security area. Chapter 8 will 
display that the EU does not substantially engage with ASEAN in this field in partly 
because the EU’s way of security differs from ASEAN’s. Consequently, the two 
organisations tend to be indifferent to the other’s perceptions and approaches to 
security, which deters, to a degree, their cooperation in the security area.  
As the last level of othering identified by Diez demonstrates, othering or 
normative difference is not always conflictual. According to Rumelili (36-38; 2007: 38-
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43), othering is conflictual or not depends on three conditions (Rumelili 2004: 36-38; 
2007: 38-43). The first condition is about the nature of identity and norms, which can be 
inclusive, e.g. democracy, or exclusive, e.g. Islamic. She also regards ASEAN’s core 
norms, e.g. sovereignty and non-interference, are predominantly exclusive (Rumelili 
2007: 128, 130). While the inclusive identity can be acquired if a state fulfils certain 
criteria, e.g. the Copenhagen criteria, the exclusive identity is based on some inherent 
characteristics and, as a result, it is more difficult to acquire or leave. A good example 
of the nature of identity and its implication is the EU’s policy vis-à-vis the CEE 
countries and Turkey previously examined. Tocci and Manners (2008: 315) maintain 
that the differences in normative nature are a major source for conflict between great 
powers. They point out that the US and the EU push for the rights of individuals, to the 
point of discursively justifying military intervention in breach of third states’ 
sovereignty to secure such goals. In contrast, China and Russia are far more inclined to 
defend the non-interference principle at the cost of tolerating gross violations of human 
rights. As will be shown in Chapters 6 and 7, EU-ASEAN relations are prone to 
tensions firstly because of the difference of their normative nature. The EU is premised 
on a set of liberal cosmopolitan norms and, consequently, willing to interfere into 
others’ domestic politics to promote them. In contrast, ASEAN is based on a set of 
traditional communitarian principles, which deject any external interference in any form 
or manifestation. This means EU-ASEAN relations are potentially conflictual not 
because of what either organisations does or does not do but because of what they are. 
Second, whether that potential occurs or not depends on the response of the other, 
which can be either acceptance or resistance. In the first case, i.e. acceptance, the self 
and its identity discourses are recognised by the other. As a result, the other is not 
treated as a threat to the self. Furthermore, if the other recognises the self as superior 
and wishes to become like the self, the latter is even more secure. For instance, if a non-
democratic actor recognises its shortcomings, seeks to promote democracy and 
considers the democratic one as a model, then such a response is seen as securing the 
latter’s identity. However, if the self’s identity is resisted or violated by the other, its 
identity becomes more insecure and the self regards the other as a threat to its identity. 
This second condition is useful in explaining why when the EU seeks to intervene in 
ASEAN’s domestic affairs to promote human rights, the latter reacts angrily because 
that intervention violates the core of its normative culture. Equally, the EU feels 
irritated when the values that make up its normative identity are resisted or violated by 
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ASEAN. Indeed, as will be shown in Chapters 6 and 7, their normative differences led 
to tensions in their relations in the 1990s because the core norms of one regional 
organisation were refused or infringed by the other. In contrast, as will be seen in 
Chapter 8, when their norms are accepted, or at least not defied, by the other, they do 
not face any major disagreements and even are able to cooperate with each other. 
Finally, whether the othering is conflictual or not depends on the social distance, 
i.e. the social connection or disconnection, between the self and other. According to 
this, states perform and secure their identities in international relations through 
associating with other states. In other words, they engage in acts that symbolise their co-
belonging within the same community or dissociate themselves from other states that 
they see as different, by refusing such an engagement. The interaction between the EU 
and the CEE countries is an example of social connection. The EU’s relations with 
Turkey and Morocco can be seen as an instance of social disconnection. This point 
illustrates well why during the Cold War when the EC and ASEAN were in the same 
boat, i.e. the anti-communist bloc, they found it easy to interact, especially at the 
political level. In contrast, when this bond broke, coupled with many changes at both 
the regional and international levels, they dissociated themselves from each other in 
terms of their normative dimensions. The EU represented itself as a community that is 
based on liberal and democratic values. In contrast, ASEAN fervently reaffirmed its 
core state-centric principles and some of its leaders, e.g. Malaysia’s Mahathir Mohamad 
or Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew, even promoted the Asian values. That disconnection 
caused frictions in their relations. 
Overall, the liberal constructivist/critical accounts offer valuable insights on the 
implications of the normative differences of political actors, e.g. the EU and ASEAN, to 
their relations. Precisely, the levels of othering identified by Diez (2005) and notably 
the three conditions under what othering may take place theorised by Rumelili (2004; 
2007) are very useful in explaining whether – and if so, why and when – the norms of 
the EU and ASEAN clash. This is why while recognising that there may be other 
approaches that can be adopted to explain why and when international norms clash,40
                                                 
40 For instance, in their study, entitled “When norms clash: international norms, domestic practices, and 
Japan’s internalisation of the GATT/WTO”, Cortell and Davis (2005) choose Japan’s domestic salience 
as the variable to examine when a state embraces an international norm. In doing so, they identify three 
criteria to measure domestic salience, i.e. high, moderate and limited and argue that an international norm 
is internalised or not depends on the level of the domestic salience of the state in question. This author 
thinks we can use this framework to examine why and when the normative differences of the EU and 
ASEAN determine their interaction. Indeed, the domestic condition of their respective members is a 
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the thesis follows Diez (2005) and Rumelili (2004; 2007) to explore the reasons why the 
normative differences of the EU and ASEAN became an obstructive factor in their post-
Cold War interaction.  
2.5. Conclusion: Key propositions 
To sum up, this thesis adopts social constructivism and normative theory (of IR) 
to examine the EU, ASEAN and their interregionalism. In doing so, it proposes the 
three following fundamental hypotheses.  
• First, actors in world politics, e.g. the EU, ASEAN and their respective norms, are 
always shaped by their own temporal and spatial (or historical, cultural and 
geopolitical) conditions.  
• Second, normative factors, e.g. norms, values and principles, are influential in 
world politics and their relevance is manifested in two particular manners: (1) 
they constitute actors’ identities, inform their interests and define their ways of 
perceiving and conducting their internal and external affairs; and (2) they 
influence both cooperation and conflict in world politics.  
• Third, the creation and building of a community or a regional organisation, e.g. 
the EU and ASEAN, is a dual process, which always entails a ‘we-group’, i.e. a 
sense of collective identity within a community, and a sense of difference with 
outsiders, i.e. a ‘they-group’ or many ‘they-groups’. If a sense of collective 
identity generates conditions for cooperation within the community, a sense of 
difference engenders conditions for tension or conflict in the external relations of 
the community.  
Anchoring its arguments on these three primary premises, the thesis puts forward 
the following key and related propositions: 
(1) Normative factors are crucial to the EU and ASEAN. These two organisations 
generate norms not only to guide their regional and international relations but also 
to seek to persuade others to adopt their preferred norms. In other words, norm 
entrepreneurship is a defining and influential component of their regional 
actorness. Yet, while they are both norm entrepreneurs and normative powers, the 
norms, on which they are founded and which they advocate, radically differ from 
                                                                                                                                               
defining reason behind the normative differences of the two organisations. However, as illustrated, it is 
only one of many important factors. For this reason, though very useful, the domestic salience as a 
criterion cannot fully explain the normative divergences of the EU and ASEAN and their implications to 
their relations. 
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each other. The EU upholds a set of predominantly individual-oriented values 
whereas ASEAN promotes a set of primarily state-centred principles.  
(2) The EU, ASEAN and their normative premises are different from each other 
because the ‘we-group’ factors, e.g. historical experience and cultural traditions, 
as well as the ‘they-group’ actors, e.g. external powers and forces, that shape their 
respective collective identity and normative underpinnings, diverge from each 
other.  
(3) Their normative differences are the reason behind their disagreements over a 
number of important issues and these tensions significantly hinder their economic, 
political and security cooperation in the post-Cold War period. These are 
manifested in the following forms and ways. 
a. Their normative differences tend to be conflictual firstly because the natures of 
their norms or their normative identity differ. As it upholds a set of liberal 
cosmopolitan norms, the EU has the tendency to push for the rights of 
individuals to the point of being willing to interfere into others’ internal affairs 
to make sure that its cherished norms are respected. In contrast, as ASEAN is 
premised on a set of traditional communitarian principles, it explicitly 
discourages any external interference into its internal affairs in any form or 
manifestation. This means EU-ASEAN relations are inclined to be conflictual 
not because of what either organisation does or not does but because of what 
the EU and ASEAN are. 
b. Their normative differences become a major obstruction in their cooperation 
when one regional organisation firmly upholds and keenly promotes its core 
norms and the other defies or violates them. More precisely, when the EU 
ardently defends and spreads the liberal and democratic values that make up its 
normative identity and ASEAN refuses to accept those values, it is certain that 
their relations become conflictual. Similarly, when ASEAN insists on the 
respect of its cherished norms and the EU ignores or violates them, their 
interaction probably faces tensions and standstills. 
c. Their normative differences are also likely to lead to disruptions in their 
cooperation when one regional organisation disconnects or disassociates with 
the other and its preferred norms. 
d. In contrast, whenever they try to limit, avoid or accommodate their normative 
differences their tensions are significantly decreased and this paves the way for 
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some cooperation. Yet, as long as their normative differences exist, while they 
may not clash, they still find it difficult to meaningfully to cooperate with each 
other. 
e. Not only the lack of actorness, notably the institutional and materials 
dimensions, of the EU and ASEAN, but also their normative differences 
considerably impede their post-Cold War cooperation. This thesis mainly 
examines why and when their normative differences are conducive to 
preventing cooperation. 
f.   Finally, not only does the EU-ASEAN relationship form and reinforce the 
collective identity and normative features of the EU and ASEAN as most of 
literature on interregionalism maintains. Their normative constituents also play 
determine (the shape, content and outcomes) of their interregional interaction. 
Again, the thesis mainly focuses on the latter aspect of this proposition. 
The above propositions are the main ones that this thesis takes to address its three 
principal questions that were raised in Chapter 1. The (1) supposition is aimed at 
tackling the first question, which looks at the normative features that constitute the EU 
and ASEAN as actors in world politics and that make them differ from each other. The 
(2) is formulated to address the second question, which examines the sources of their 
normative differences. Chapters 4 and 5 will explore in-depth these two first issues, 
which are also further illustrated by the three chapters on the case studies. The 
hypotheses proposed in the (3) are primarily aimed at addressing the third question, i.e. 
why their normative differences become a conflictual and obstructive factor in their 
relations. The two first case studies, i.e. the East Timor issue and the Myanmar problem, 
are examined to demonstrate the (3a), (3b), (3c), (3e) and (3f) propositions whereas the 
Aceh matter is aimed at illustrating the (3d), (3e) and (3f) ones. These three case studies 
are intended to offer further evidence to the (1) and (2) hypotheses. 
To provide a historical background of EU-ASEAN relations and of the three case 
studies and especially to facilitate the thesis to explain and illustrate these key 
propositions, the next chapter gives an overview of this interregional relationship. 
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3. EU-ASEAN relations: An overview 
 
This chapter gives an overview of the EU-ASEAN relationship. It is aimed at 
providing a historical background of their interaction and the three case studies in 
particular. As noted, the thesis mainly looks at their post-Cold War relations, i.e. since 
1991. Yet, the two regions have a long-standing interaction, dated back to the 16th 
century (Gilson 2002b: 32), which still has impacts on their current relations. As 
highlighted in the two previous chapters, history is vital to understanding contemporary 
events. Indeed, as Tilly (2006: 433) aptly points out, “[e]very significant political 
phenomenon lives in history and requires historically grounded analyses for its 
explanation. Political scientists ignore historical context at their peril” (see also 
McDonald 1996; Wah 2000; Rodrigo 2002).41 For this reason, it is difficult to 
understand the EU, ASEAN, their respective norms and their interregional relations, if 
their respective history is ignored.42 Consequently, the chapter also briefly looks at the 
two major and distinct periods of their interaction prior to 1991.43
                                                 
41 The role of history in international relations has been increasingly highlighted, especially since the 
historical and constructivist turn (Elman and Elman 2008). For instance, it is argued that constructivism 
“is inherently an argument about how the past shapes the way actors understand their present situation” 
(Copeland 2000: 210). 
 The first and longest 
period is from the arrival of Europeans in Southeast Asia to 1972, when the EC-ASEAN 
institutional link was initiated. The second period is from 1972 to 1991. Besides 
providing a historical background, which permits the thesis to explain more fully their 
42 Archer (2008: 19) points out that European integration “was not just an idea dreamed up by a few 
politicians and academics – it had and has a particular historical background”. Wunderlich (2007: 5) also 
maintains that only by locating the experiences of regionalisms in the EU and ASEAN “within their 
specific historical contexts can we begin to grasp the factors driving regionalism”. 
43 Doidge (2004a: 1-2) divides the long-standing relations between the two regions into four periods: (1) 
from 16th to the end of the World War II (WWII), (2) from the end of the WWII to 1967, (3) from the 
early 1970s to the end of the 1980s, and (4) the current one, since the end of the Cold War. Yeo (2005; 
2007b: 2009a) divides EC/EU relations into four different periods: (1) courtship, from 1972 to 1980, (2) 
consolidation, from 1980 to 1991, (3) turbulence, from 1991 to 2001, with ties becoming frosty between 
1991 and 1993, a new dynamism between 1993 to 1996 and stagnation from 1997 to 2001, and (4) re-
discovery from 2001.  
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post-Cold War interaction, this section demonstrates that until the end of the Cold War, 
in terms of their way of perceiving and conducting international affairs, the two regional 
organisations were similar and this facilitated their cooperation. In fact, thanks to this 
similarity, unlike their post-Cold War relations, which will be looked at in the third 
section of the chapter and examined in-depth in Chapters 6 and 7, their ties during the 
Cold War period did not experience any major political disagreements. 
3.1. Prior to 1972: From colonial to institutional relationship 
 
3.1.1. Colonisation and decolonisation 
Europeans arrived in Southeast Asia in the 16th century and by the 1800, five 
European countries, namely Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands, Great Britain and France, 
had colonies in Southeast Asia. During the first period, European colonialism was 
mainly pushed by commercial imperatives (Bridges 1999: 8; Elson 2004: 16). It reached 
to a new level by the end of the 19th century, when the Europeans sought to acquire 
territories in order to exploit their resources. This in turn gave the Europeans’ greater 
control over local populations and kingdoms (Bridges 1999: 10). By the early 1940s, 
Europe’s long-standing and largely unchecked colonialism gradually disintegrated 
(Berger 2004: 30). Japan, who avoided European colonisation, sought to secure its own 
colonial empire (Bridges 1999: 12). However, it control was short lived as it was 
defeated in 1945. With Japan’s defeat Japan and the end of WWII, independence 
became a top priority in Southeast Asia (Farrell 2010: 117). By that time, some 
European countries tried to come back, however, their return was greatly resisted by 
their respective colonies partly because when they returned, the situation in Southeast 
Asia had changed significantly. Nationalism and anti-Europeanism were now strong 
(Bridges 1999: 13); some territories declared independence in mid-1940s; 
decolonisation had expanded widely in the region. Yet, their process of decolonisation 
was not easy because some countries had to fight bitter wars with their colonial powers 
in the post-independent years. Colonialism also left the newly independent Southeast 
Asian nations with major challenges, e.g. territorial disputes. These significantly led to 
mistrust and conflicts between regional countries (Henderson 1999: 15). Chapter 5 will 
look more in detail these challenges. The point made here is that Europe’s four-century 
colonialism in the region, Southeast Asian territories’ hard-fought battles for their 
independence and the multiple problems they faced in their process of nation building 
are the key reasons behind ASEAN’s preference for its ASEAN way and especially the 
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non-interference principle. Such preference, as will be shown in this thesis, is the cause 
of their disagreements with the EU over political issues in the post-Cold War era. To 
sum up, it is apt to refer to Camroux (2008: 15), who argues that in dealing with 
ASEAN countries, the EU “has had to deal with an ambiguous colonial heritage. While 
the independence of the nations of Southeast Asia is over fifty years old, in terms of the 
millennial history of these countries in a sense this is only yesterday”. 
3.1.2. The creation of the EC and ASEAN  
After the end of the World War II, “which had wreaked such devastation on the 
European continent” (Leustean and Madeley 2009: 4), the primary objective of 
European countries was to reconstruct their own war-torn continent and reconcile great 
rivalries, notably between Germany and France, which were seen as the reason behind 
disastrous wars. A fundamental step that European leaders took to achieve that objective 
was to establish the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) on 18 April 1951. 
The ECSC, which was also known as the Treaty of Paris and signed by five democratic 
European countries, namely France, (West) Germany, Italy Belgium, the Netherlands 
and Luxembourg, began European integration and eventually resulted in creating the 
EC and then the EU. As nationalism or ultranationalism was regarded as a root cause of 
wars, European integration was seen as a restraining force against ultranationalism and 
a building block towards a new level of governance through the pooling of sovereignty 
and various socioeconomic means (Jones 2001: 10; Henry 2007: 858; Yeo 2009b: 195 
Wunderlich and Warrier 2010: 131). Given this, in terms of the market liberalisation 
and especially the level of institutionalisation, the EU has been much more advanced 
and far-reaching than any attempt made by ASEAN and other regional organisations. 
Another element that is worth noting is that from the outset, peace and democracy were 
among the core norms, on which the EU was founded. In fact, peace, which was 
emphasised in the Declaration of Robert Schuman,44
                                                 
44 “World peace cannot be safeguarded without the making of creative efforts proportionate to the dangers 
which threaten it [...] Europe will not be made all at once, or according a single plan. It will be built 
through concrete achievements, which first create a de facto solidarity. The coming together of the 
nations of Europe requires the elimination of the age-old opposition of France and Germany” (Schuman 
1950). 
 who was viewed as the architect of 
European integration, on 9 May 1950 and then was reiterated in the preamble of the 
ECSC, was the raison d’être of European integration; and democracy was the 
membership norm from the inception of the ECSC (Manners 2006d: 70-71).  
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In contrast, for the post-colonial leaders of the newly independent Southeast Asian 
countries, the primary concern was nation building, not region building (Yeo 2009b: 
195). To deal with the enormous task of consolidating their hard-earned independence, 
strengthening their newly acquired statehood and promoting their national development, 
what they really needed was not the help from other regional countries but a stable 
external environment (Rodrigo 2002: 337). This is because in their view, regional 
resilience could only be built on the foundations national resilience (Yeo 2009b: 195). 
Against this backdrop, ASEAN was established when its five founding members, 
namely Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, signed the Bangkok 
Declaration, on 8 August 1967. Given their preoccupation with nation building and 
domestic developments, it was not surprising that the institutional design of their 
institution was deeply wedded to state sovereignty. In fact, the core principles enshrined 
in the Bangkok Declaration, e.g. non-interference into internal affairs of other member 
countries, were aimed at protecting national sovereignty.45
ASEAN’s adoption of a set of norms to guide its internal relations from its 
inception shows that like the EC, ASEAN was also primarily based on norms. The 
difference was that they were founded on two different sets of norms. While the former 
was established on (liberal) peace and democracy, the latter was premised on a set of 
traditional or state-centric norms, e.g. national sovereignty and non-interference. 
Another element that is worth mentioning is that they were both established in the Cold 
War and during the Cold War years, their outlook was similar. In fact, they were anti-
communist, Westernised and capitalist organisations. As will be shown later in the 
chapter, this convergence of views in the political and strategic area not only diminished 
their other fundamental differences, e.g. their foundational norms, but also facilitated 
their cooperation, especially their political relations, until the early 1990s. Finally, from 
the very beginning both of them specified cooperation with other international and 
regional organisations as an aim of their respective establishment. In reality, as Lukas 
(1989: 102-3) and Redmond (1992b: 138) note, among regional institutions, only the 
 Furthermore, due to such a 
focus, unlike the EC, ASEAN had minimal economic cooperation during the first 
decade of its existence. Actually, until the late 1980s, ASEAN had very little interest in 
any regional economic cooperation, and as a result, it did not achieve a great deal in this 
area (Akrasanee 2001: 37; Narine 2002: 24).  
                                                 
45 It is for this reason, as noted in footnote 33, unlike European integration, which tends towards 
supranationalism, regionalism in ASEAN was and continues to be primarily intergovernmental. 
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EC and ASEAN specified the cooperation with other regional organisations as a 
declared objective when they were established. For instance, the Bangkok Declaration 
states that “To maintain close and beneficial co-operation with existing international 
and regional organisations with similar aims and purposes, and explores all avenues for 
ever closer co-operation among them” (AMM 1967, point 7). That paved the way for 
them to forge a new form of interaction in the international system, namely 
interregional relations.  
3.2. EC-ASEAN relations from 1972 to 1991: A smooth relationship 
“The political dialogue between ASEAN and the EC during the 
Cold War was very good. This is because if you were anti-communist 
and capitalist, you were pro-Western and you were supported by the 
West. Therefore, there was not a great deal of discussion about human 
rights and democracy at that time. The dialogue was pragmatic. If you 
were my enemies’ enemies, you were my friends” (Asian scholar, 
Interview, 2009). 
 
3.2.1. From informal to formal relationship 
The idea of cooperation between the EC and ASEAN was an endeavour initiated 
at the fourth meeting of ASEAN Foreign Ministers, also known as ASEAN Ministerial 
Meeting (AMM), in 1971. ASEAN states made the first move because with the British 
accession to the EC imminent in the early 1970s, two former British colonies and 
ASEAN members, i.e. Malaysia and Singapore, were concerned about the loss of 
Commonwealth preference in the British market (European Commission, DG for 
Information 1976: 2; 1981: 3).46
As it wished to intensify relations with the EC, ASEAN pressed for a regular 
dialogue between the ABC and the EC’s Permanent Representatives Committee. The 
purpose of this dialogue, which was first held in November 1977 and then in July 1978, 
 Consequently, in June 1972, a Special Coordinating 
Committee of ASEAN Nations (SCCAN) was set up, consisting of the ASEAN ministers 
of Trade and the ASEAN Brussels Committee (ABC), which was composed of the 
ASEAN ambassadors to the EC, with the responsibility to develop ASEAN’s relations 
with the EC (European Commission, DG for Information 1985: 4). Two years later, 
both sides agreed to set up a Joint Study Group (JSG), which met regularly from June 
1975, to explore all possible areas of future cooperation (European Commission, DG for 
Information 1976: 3).  
                                                 
46 Until the end of 1972, Malaysia and Singapore (along with other Asian members of the 
Commonwealth, e.g. India and Pakistan) had enjoyed tariff preferences on the British market under the 
Commonwealth system (European Commission, DG for Information 1976: 2).   
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was to supplement the activities carried out by the JSG. At these two meetings, ASEAN 
also pushed for a ministerial conference, which it had already conducted with Japan, 
Australia and New Zealand in 1977, and there was a favourable response from the EC 
(European Commission, DG for Information 1979a: 5; 1981: 4). Subsequently, the first 
conference of the foreign ministers of the EC and ASEAN, known as the ASEAN-EC 
Ministerial Meeting (AEMM), was held in November 1978 in Brussels. This meeting, 
often considered to be the real birth of interregionalism because it was the first time a 
ministerial meeting between two regional organisations was held (European 
Commission 1979b: 2),47 gave EC-ASEAN relations greater political significance.48
As explained, ASEAN initiated links with the EC because it wished to gain 
greater access to European markets for its primary and manufactured products. It also 
wanted to receive more investment and development aid from Europe (Harris and 
Bridges 1983: 28). Equally, economic interests, e.g. better access to Southeast Asia’s 
natural resources and markets, were also an impetus for the EC’s institutionalisation of 
relations with ASEAN (European Commission, Information Memo 1978: 1; Nuttall 
1990: 149-50). However, as acknowledged by the European Commission’s President 
Roy Jenkins (1978: 5) at the first AEMM, their cooperation “goes wider than trade”. 
From ASEAN’s perspective, a formal partnership with the EC conferred tremendous 
prestige on ASEAN (Wannamethee 1989: 21). For the EC, it was also of great interest 
to promote ASEAN and to assist the development of links between the two 
organisations (Genscher 1978: 113-4). ASEAN countries actively sought an increased 
European interest in their region because they wanted to limit economic presence of the 
 
Notably, at this meeting, the ministers decided to launch negotiations for a formal 
cooperation agreement (Drury 1979: 19). These negotiations were opened in November 
1979 and rapidly led to the conclusion of a Cooperation Agreement (CA), formally 
signed at the second AEMM in Kuala Lumpur in March 1980 (European Commission, 
DG for Information 1985: 5). The signing of the CA marked the beginning of a new 
stage in the EC-ASEAN linkage because not only did it form the basis for their 
cooperation but also formally institutionalised their relations (Yeo 2009a: 47).  
                                                 
47 In 1974, when the EC sounded out ASEAN countries as to whether they wished to establish agreements 
similar to those that the EC had concluded with India in 1973, ASEAN governments indicated that they 
all preferred to establish their relations with the Community on a regional basis, i.e. a region-to-region 
relationship (European Commission 1979b: 1).  
48 The EC’s first ministerial conference with ASEAN had been held before the agreement was signed. In 
contrast, the first ministerial meeting between the EC and EFTA (European Free Trade Agreement) took 
place 12 years after the EC-EFTA Free Trade Agreement was signed (Lukas (1989: 108). 
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US and Japan’ (European Commission, Information Memo 1978: 1; Rüland 2001c: 9). 
For European countries, their presence in Southeast Asia offered them the chance to 
reassert their position in a geo-strategically relevant region (European Commission, 
Information Memo 1978). The political-strategic dimension was even of incomparably 
greater relevance than economic one (Mols 1990: 72). For this reason, the EC-ASEAN 
relationship was regarded as economic in form but political in intent (Indorf 1983: 119; 
Harris and Bridges 1983: 73; Mols 1990: 69; Nuttall 1990: 150).  
A defining security factor that accelerated their cooperation was communism. In 
the years when it deliberately courted the EC, ASEAN was very concerned about 
communism, especially after North Vietnam’s victory over US-backed South Vietnam 
in 1975 (Tasker 1987: 106). To respond to this threat, in 1976 ASEAN’s leaders held an 
unprecedented summit, during which they signed the ASEAN Concord I and the TAC. 
As will be shown in Chapter 5, these documents highlighted ASEAN’s commitment to 
the principles of non-national sovereignty and interference. They also highlighted 
ASEAN’s commitment to preserve the stability of the region and its member states, 
particularly against the threat of subversion. This posture was strongly supported by the 
EC (European Commission, DG for Information 1979b: 1; 1981: 1). After the Bali 
summit, they also sought to forge special links with major powers (Mols 1990: 66). It 
was in this context that the EC became a vital partner for ASEAN, even though the EC 
was basically an inward-looking player without much actor capacity in foreign and 
security areas (Rüland 2001c: 12).  
Vietnam’s intervention in Cambodia (then Kampuchea) and the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan in 1978 and 1979 respectively brought the EC and ASEAN even closer 
together in late 1970s and during the 1980s (Rüland 2001c: 12). As both of them were 
anti-communist blocs, they feared that those expansionist postures could destabilise 
their respective region (Regelsberger 1989: 82-83; Soon 1989: 61). That is why their 
relationship was seen as “a bulwark against communism” (de Flers 2010: 4). The first 
AEMM placed a strong focus on the Cambodian matter. The 1980 Cooperation 
Agreement, also the first formal agreement that the EC concluded with another regional 
group, was signed at the second AEMM, during which the Afghanistan issue became 
prominent (European Commission, DG for Information 1981: 8). At this conference, 
they also issued a Joint Statement on Political Issues (AEMM 1980b), which was the 
first time that the two groups publicly adopted a joint stance on major political issues 
(Harris and Bridge 1983: 53; Hull 1984: 22; McMahon 1998: 235). At the ninth AEMM 
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in 1991, Luxembourg’s Foreign Minister Jacques Poos recalled this statement and 
stressed its importance because it was the first time the EC and ASEAN spoke with one 
voice to condemn the invasions of Cambodia and Afghanistan (Poos 1991). The issues 
of Cambodia and Afghanistan continued to dominate the AEMMs throughout the 1980s 
(AEMM 1981; 1983; 1984; 1986; 1987).  
 
 
3.2.2. Political success and desire to enhance economic cooperation 
The united posture of the EC and ASEAN vis-à-vis communism considerably 
enhanced their interaction in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s, especially at the 
political level, which was regarded as remarkably successful (Hull 1984: 22; Mols 
1990: 1966; Luhulima 1992: 317; Yeo 2009a: 47). They worked closely in coordinating 
and supporting each other’s position on a number of international matters – notably the 
issues of Cambodia and Afghanistan – in international fora such as the UN (AEMM 
1985; Rüland 2001c: 12; Yeo 2009a: 47). A study of the votes of the UN General 
Assembly Resolution from 1979 to 1984 indicated that the EC and ASEAN voted as a 
bloc in support of the calls for the Soviet Union from Afghanistan and Vietnam from 
Cambodia (Robles 2004b: 34). The argument that invasions of Cambodia and 
Afghanistan played a significant part in enhancing their cooperation is also supported 
by the responses to the survey undertaken by the author. When asked to express their 
views on the statement ‘the Soviet-backed Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia in 
1978 and the Soviet Union invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 strengthened EC-ASEAN 
relations’, of the 21 responses, two indicated ‘completely agree’, 10 ‘agree’, five 
‘neutral’ and four ‘disagree’. The significance of the political element of EC-ASEAN 
relations was also reflected in their dense network of dialogue.49 For instance, until the 
early 1990s, the high-ranking officials of the EC and its members were always present 
in the AEMMs as well as other meetings that ASEAN held with its major partners.50
                                                 
49 In terms of institutional links, ASEAN had the most extensive contacts with the EC of any regional 
grouping of developing countries (European Commission, DG for Information 1991: 14). The AEMM, 
held every 18 months, was the most important mechanism in their cooperation. The second type of high-
level political exchange took place in the form of the ASEAN Post-ministerial Conference (PMC), which 
ASEAN organised annually with its international partners. The third significant link established by the 
CA was the JCC, made up of senior officials, met annually to discuss economic issues. 
  
50 One of the ASEAN ambassadors to the EC in Brussels said, “[t]here is no other ASEAN relationship to 
match this in intensity” (quoted in Mols 1990: 67). However, as will be shown in Chapters 6, 7 and 8, in 
the post-Cold War period, compared to China, India, Japan and other major partners of ASEAN, the EU 
was much less involved in its region-to-region dialogue with ASEAN as well as other meetings that 
ASEAN held with its major partners. 
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The achievement of their political relations laid a strong foundation for a closer 
cooperation in the economic area (Wannamethee 1989: 23). By the mid 1980s, both the 
EC and ASEAN realised that they needed to expand the scope of cooperation, 
especially in the economic-related areas.51 This is why at the fifth AEMM in January 
1984, they agreed to organise a ministerial meeting to discuss economic matters 
(AEMM 1984), which was held nine months later in Bangkok (AEMM 1985).52 The 
desire for an enhanced partnership was reiterated at the eighth AEMM, during which 
the ministers agreed that “greater efforts should be made to enhance cooperation 
between the two regions” (AEMM 1990, point 2). Chief among these efforts was to 
review the CA (AEMM 1990, point 18). At the ninth AEMM in May 1991 they made 
clear that “the revision of the [1980] Agreement was now necessary and they decided 
that the new Agreement be broadened in scope to cover all domains of cooperation 
between the two regions so as to better reflect the new conditions and priorities in both 
regions” (AEMM 1991, point 37).53
By providing a summary of EC-ASEAN relations since 1972 to 1991, this section 
wants to underline three important points because they enable the thesis to explicate 
better their post-Cold War interaction – or more exactly, why and how their divergent 
normative factors affected their relationship since 1991.  
 This illustrates that by the late 1980s and the early 
1990s, given the fact that “economic motivations feature strongly in the development” 
of their cooperation (Luhulima 1992: 313), the EC and ASEAN realised it was time to 
revise their cooperation framework.  
From a modest beginning in the early 1970s, EC-ASEAN relations grew stronger 
in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s. Both regional organisations regarded each 
other as an important partner. While the EC’s link with ASEAN became a solid and, on 
the whole, a reliable element in its foreign relations, ASEAN considered its cooperation 
with the EC a successful enterprise that became an indispensible part of its international 
engagement (Mols 1990: 66). Coupled with other factors, e.g. ASEAN’s impressive 
                                                 
51 Another key factor that prompted the EC to seek to strengthen its economic cooperation was the high 
economic growth of ASEAN countries in the 1970s and 1980. While during that period, ASEAN did not 
achieve a great deal in terms of its economic integration, individually five ASEAN economies enjoyed 
impressive growth, which was much bigger than the EC’s (see Appendix 11). 
52 This first ever meeting of ASEAN-EC Economic Ministers, which was also the first the EC held with 
any other regional groupings, “signifies the growing convergence of views and interests between the EC 
and ASEAN” (Wannamethee 1989: 23). 
53 In his opening statement at the ASEAN PMC in July 1991, the European Commissioner for North-
South Relations Abel Matutes reiterated the need to modify the agreement taking into account the 
significant changes in both regions since 1980 (Manutes 1991). The statement was made available to the 
author by courtesy of Ms. Jocelyne Collonval, Historical Archives of the European Commission. 
65 
 
economic growth, their political successful cooperation prompted them to enhance their 
economic cooperation by agreeing to revise the 1980 Cooperation Agreement in the late 
1980s.  
They managed to forge a strong political partnership because they had similar 
international outlooks. In his speech at the first AEMM, Genscher (1978: 112) said that 
both the EC and ASEAN “have many basic convictions and many interests in 
common”. A central and shared element, as the comment of Yeo quoted at the 
beginning of this section illustrates, is that both of them were fundamentally capitalist 
and anti-communist regional groups. While other factors, e.g. economic interests, 
brought them together, their shared Western capitalist and especially anti-communist 
character was the main reason for the success of their political cooperation.54 Their 
shared views were also clearly expressed in the 1980 Joint Statement on Political 
Issues, in which they both emphasised the need for all states to observe strictly the 
principles of national sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference others’ 
internal affairs (AEMM 1980b, point 1). As will be shown in Chapter 5, these principles 
are the core of the ASEAN way, strongly upheld by ASEAN and its members.55
Finally, until the late 1980s, the EC did not strong focus on the protection and 
promotion of democratic values, e.g. human rights and democracy, in its external 
activities in general and its relations with ASEAN. As will be shown in Chapters 6 and 
7, until the early 1990s, East Timor and Myanmar were not a concern in its dialogue 
with ASEAN even though gross human rights violations took place in East Timor since 
1970s and Myanmar’s military regime widely abused human rights in the 1970s and the 
1980s. Like ASEAN, in those years of the bipolar confrontation, the EC’s external 
relations and its security policy were mainly viewed and approached in a realist sense. 
In other words, it adopted a traditional security policy, which was based on defence of 
borders and the containment of threats. Consequently, it lent its support for authoritarian 
regimes in Southeast Asian countries as elsewhere, regardless of the consequences for 
  
                                                 
54 This was confirmed by the responses to the author’s survey. The respondents were asked to give their 
views on the statement ‘the capitalist and anti-communist stance of the EC and ASEAN bonded the two 
regional organisations together and prompted them together and work closely in supporting each other 
position on the Afghanistan and Cambodian issues in the international fora, e.g. the UN, in the late 1970s 
and throughout the 1980s’. Of the 21 responses received, two indicated ‘completely agree’, 11 ‘agree’, six 
‘neutral’ and only two ‘disagree’.   
55 The EC’s recognition and emphasis of the core principles upheld by ASEAN as the fundamental 
principles of international relations strengthened ASEAN and its norms. In other words, as explained in 
Chapter 2, when ASEAN (i.e. the self) and its identity discourses were recognised and supported by the 
EC (i.e. the other), ASEAN felt more secure and confident in its dealing with external challenges, such as 
the Cambodia issue. This, in turn, enhanced their cooperation. 
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people living in those countries. Overall, until the late 1980s, in terms of their way of 
viewing and conducting their external relations, the EC and ASEAN were largely 
similar and this why did have any major disagreements. The questions arise now are 
whether they can maintain a good partnership and whether they can successfully agree a 
new cooperation agreement in the 1990s as they planned and wished in the late 1980s. 
More importantly, what are the reasons for this success or failure? The next section as 
well as Chapters 6, 7 and 8 will look at these two questions.  
3.3. EU-ASEAN relations after 1991:  An uneasy partnership 
“I should like to express our concern to incorporate respect for human 
rights and the promotion of democracy into our relations with third States 
and into our development aid policy [...] It is not a matter of our interfering 
in the internal affairs of a given country, but of implementing the moral 
obligation on the international community to act on the issues, which affect 
both the dignity of human beings and the maintenance of peace” 
(Luxembourg’s Foreign Minister Jacques Poos 1991).56
 
 
3.3.1. A new and mixed era 
The collapse of the Soviet Union radically changed world politics because not 
only was it a watershed in the structure of international politics and in multilateral 
international organisations, it was a turning point in the relationship between states and 
regional organisations (Crockatt 2005: 112). The EC, ASEAN and their relationship 
were no exception. In fact, it led to a new and mixed era in their internal and external 
relations as well as their interaction. On the positive side, the end of the bipolar rivalry 
gave them more freedom to revitalise themselves and develop their external relations.   
With respect to the European side, the signing of Maastricht Treaty or the Treaty 
on European Union (TEU) in 1992, which transformed the EC into the EU, enabled the 
EU to deepen and broaden its regional integration as well as expand and strengthen its 
external relations. In fact, this transformation, considered one of the greatest milestones 
in the history of European integration (Baun 1995: 605), introduced a number of far-
reaching changes to the EU’s internal and external relations, which in turn enhanced its 
actorness and signalled that the EU aspired to an enhanced global role (European 
Commission 1991; Forster 1999: 474; Guay 1999: 63). One of these was the 
establishment a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), whose aim was to give 
the Community a strong and coherent voice in its international affairs (European 
                                                 
56 Speech was given at the ninth AEMM in May 1991. Both the speech (in French) and its draft (in 
English) were made available to the author by the courtesy of Historical Archives of the European 
Commission.  
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Council 1991e; 1991f). In addition, following the end of the Cold War, the EU also 
expanded its membership, with Austria, Finland and Sweden, who remained neutral in 
the Cold War, joining the EU in 1995. Furthermore, as underlined in Chapter 1, the EU 
had a strong desire to foster interregionalism, making it a major feature of its foreign 
policy. All these developments significantly increased the EU’s influence in the world. 
It was even regarded as a powerful economic competitor of the US in a new emerging 
world order (Baun 1995: 605).  
Regarding ASEAN, the Paris Peace Agreement on Cambodia, signed on 23 
October 1991, in which ASEAN had played a major role (Poos 1991; Funston 1998: 
25), marked the end of the Cold War in Southeast Asia. Freed from the threat from the 
communist Indochinese countries, ASEAN also sought to extend its membership 
(AMM 1992, points 14, 15 and 16).57
In the context of the deepening and widening of their respective regional 
integration as well as their efforts to increase their external relations, the EU and 
ASEAN had strong reasons and solid foundations for strengthening their cooperation. In 
other words, their respective actor capability was significantly enhanced; the 
 In addition, after a particularly slow period of 
internal cooperation, especially on an economic level, ASEAN decided to “move 
towards a higher plane of political and economic cooperation to secure regional peace 
and prosperity” (ASEAN Summit 1992, point 2). A significant development and by far 
the most important regional economic endeavour of ASEAN was its decision to 
establish an ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA, Chng 1993). Compared with the 
European integration, ASEAN’s integration remained far behind. Yet, this move by 
ASEAN demonstrated that it sought to increase its economic integration (ASEAN 
Summit 1992, point 5; Haudeville 2000: 106). At the external level, ASEAN sought to 
develop and reinforce its links with major partners (ASEAN Summit 1992, point 6). 
Furthermore, with the aim to shape its strategic environment as well as to play a greater 
role in the region, ASEAN created the ARF in 1994, which includes many global and 
regional powers to deal with the Asian security in the post-Cold War era. With these 
developments, ASEAN became an economic and political force to be reckoned with and 
it could become the focal point of Europe’s political presence in Asia (McMahon 1998: 
238).  
                                                 
57 Vietnam, which was once a major threat to ASEAN, joined the Association in 1995. Two other 
communist countries, i.e. Laos and Cambodia, were admitted in 1997 and 1999 respectively. Myanmar 
was also allowed to join ASEAN in 1997. 
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international environment was more favourable; and both regional organisations found 
new confidence and willingness to play a greater role in the international scene. These 
factors, together with their success of their political dialogue during the Cold War 
period, could pave the way for them to significantly enhance their cooperation by 
establishing a new and far-reaching cooperation framework – a move that had already 
been considered and desired by the EC and ASEAN in the late 1980s and the early 
1990s (AEMM 1988; 1990; 1991). 
3.3.2. The emergence of contentious issues 
However, a desire for a stronger interregional partnership was not realised 
because besides the positive factors mentioned, there were other major issues, which fed 
into – and, consequently, averted – their interaction. Chapter 6 will explore in more 
detail these factors. Yet, it is worth briefly mentioning two of them here. First, with the 
collapse of the bipolar rivalry, the common threat, i.e. communism, which had bonded 
them together during the Cold War years, no longer existed. Consequently, the basic 
convergences in views and approaches in the politico-strategic sphere they had forged 
and enjoyed during the Cold War period began to waive (Bridges 1999: 150) and their 
inherent normative differences and other related problems emerged (Forster 1999: 750). 
This also means the initial success of their relations in the political arena was confined 
to the context of the Cold War and the earlier convergence of their strategic interests 
over the Cambodian and Afghanistan issues did not lay the foundation for a greater 
politico-cultural alignment in the post-Cold War era. Second, with the end of the Cold 
War, in both regional organisations, new questions of ‘who are we’ were raised and this 
debate even compounded their normative divergences. On the European side, the EU’s 
transformation from the EC gave it a new identity and a new agenda, whose one of the 
cornerstones was to defend and spread its ‘European values’, e.g. human rights and 
democracy (European Council 1991a; 1991b; Europa Press Releases 1993). With this 
new mission, it introduced and applied a human rights clause into its cooperation 
agreements with third parties, be they states or regional organisations. On the ASEAN 
side, thanks to their economic growth in the 1970s and 1980s, ASEAN and its member 
states were more confident in their way of conducting their regional affairs, and even 
more willing to oppose European value-based policies. As will be shown in Chapter 5, 
against this background, the so-called ‘Asian values’ emerged. Given these factors, the 
EU and ASEAN clashed with each other and their disputes even posed the greatest 
threat to their relationship (Tay and Goh 1999: 39). Overall, if the political dialogue 
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between the two regional organisations was the strongest part of their Cold War ties, it 
became the weakest element in their link in the post-Cold War period. In fact, due to 
their normative differences, a number of contentious issues emerged in their interaction, 
and because of them, the EU and ASEAN entered what was termed a ‘value-system 
friction’ (Dent 1999: 51), which was seen as the ‘dark side’ of their relationship (Dosch 
2001: 64).  
The first signs of their disagreements appeared at the eighth AEMM in February 
1990 in Kuching, Malaysia. The main reason for their disputes was not anything related 
to their cooperation, but the Tiananmen Square massacre in June 1989, when the 
Chinese military attacked the students’ pro-democracy movement. As this event came at 
a time when it paid attention to the human rights issue in general and was already 
critical of China’s human rights record, the EC strongly condemned the attacks and 
called for a tough stance against Beijing (European Council 1989; Bridges 1999: 106-7; 
Tay and Goh 1999: 45; Kreutz 2005: 26). However, at this meeting as well as during its 
ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference (PMC) in July 1990 in Jakarta, ASEAN rejected 
the EC’s proposal to impose economic sanctions on Beijing (Palmujoki 1997: 273; 
Forster 1999: 751; Pattugalan 1999: 55). ASEAN countries rejected this move because, 
besides their effort to (re-)normalise and engage with China in those years (Lee 2001: 
62), they opposed external interference into other countries’ domestic politics.  
Following the tense exchange at the eighth AEMM, it was hoped that the next 
meeting in Luxembourg in May 1991 would be more cordial. Officials on both sides 
realised that their relationship was “entering an important new phase and efforts must 
now be made to ensure that it will be positive” (Merritt 1991: 31). However, the 
political climate at the ninth AEMM was not as friendly as expected. Actually, it was 
even worse because the disagreements between the two organisations over human rights 
became even more evident. In his opening speech, Jacques Poos said that the EC was 
saddened by the oppression in China (Poos 1991). Moreover, as the quotation the 
beginning of this session illustrates, he stated that the EC sought to include respect for 
human rights and democracy in the EC’s relations with third countries. In response, 
Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas argued that since developing countries, e.g. 
ASEAN ones, “are still struggling to overcome the blights imposed by past colonialism 
and new exploitation”, they were more concerned about basic needs (quoted in Cerna 
1995: 203). Consequently, ASEAN countries disliked the way European officials 
insisted on human rights, accusing them of “a tendentious application of Western norms 
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and values in inter-state relations” and of “creating standards and criteria by which to 
judge people and condemn countries” (quoted in Vatikiotis 1991: 35). Overall, by the 
early 1990s, the EU and ASEAN emerged as two different normative powers. While the 
former focused on the promotion of its liberal norms, the latter emphasised its core 
principles of non-interference. These normative differences were the main reason 
behind their disputes over the two major issues, namely East Timor and Myanmar. 
3.3.3. The issues of East Timor and Myanmar 
East Timor only became a major issue the EU’s relations with ASEAN in 1991 
though Indonesia’s invasion of this territory took place in 1975 and from then there 
were reports about widespread human rights violations by Indonesian army forces.58
In an attempt to boost its relations with Asia as a whole, the EU – and especially 
its four major powers, namely France, Germany, Italy and the UK – decided to put aside 
sensitive political issues and return to a pragmatic course of focusing on economics 
(Yeo 2005). That consensus decision was also the result of the EU’s general shift in 
policy towards Asia in the early 1990s. In fact, in July 1994 the European Commission 
issued Towards a New Strategy in Asia, which also emphasised the EU’s relations with 
ASEAN as the cornerstone of its engagement with Asia (European Commission 1994). 
This strategy, which also set the stage for the creation of ASEM, which will be 
examined in Chapter 7, was the EU’s response to the growing economic and political 
importance of Asia. Thanks to the optimism created by the Commission’s New Asia 
 
The Dili killing, which took place on 12 November 1991, when several hundred East 
Timorese pro-independence demonstrators in the Santa Cruz cemetery in the capital, 
Dili were shot by Indonesian troop (Defert 1992: 120; Amnesty International 1994: 50-
54; Singh 1999: 498), became a focal point of European criticism (Bridges 1999: 171). 
It brought East Timor in EU-ASEAN relations and compounded their already existing 
disagreements over the EU’s human rights clause. In fact, these divergences, coupled 
with Portugal’s veto in July 1992 were the reason behind their failure to negotiate a 
more advanced cooperation framework, even though they had desired and planed this in 
the late 1980s and the early 1990s. Chapter 6 will examine in-depth why, from a non-
issue in the 1970s and 1980s, East Timor became a major – and indeed obstructive – 
factor in EU-ASEAN relations in the 1990s. 
                                                 
58 According to a report of Amnesty International in 1994, about 200,000 people, one third of East 
Timor’s population, were killed or died of starvation or disease after Indonesia invaded in 1975 (Amnesty 
International 1994: 5). Others believe that the 1970s and 1980s between 100,000 to 250,000 East 
Timorese lost their lives out of a population of 650,000 (Smith 2001: 29). 
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Strategy, the foreign ministers of both sides came to the 11th AEMM, held in Karlsruhe, 
Germany on 22-23 September 1994, with a determination to leave behind the disputes 
about human rights and find new ways to enhance their cooperation. More precisely, 
they adopted a pragmatic approach by sidestepping the issue on a new agreement that 
was blocked by Portugal. Given this, unlike the past few AEMMs, the Karlsruhe 
meeting was congenial. The East Timor issue was not raised and human rights were 
only briefly mentioned in this meeting. According Rüland (1996: 31), this revealed that 
ASEAN has gained the upper hand in determining the topics, style and procedure of the 
meeting. At this meeting, they agreed to establish an ad hoc Eminent Persons Group 
(EPG), also known as an ASEAN-EU Senior Officials Meeting (1995), with members 
drawn from both regions, whose task was to develop a comprehensive approach to EU-
ASEAN political, security, economic and cultural relations towards the year 2000 and 
beyond (AEMM 1995; Villacorta 2009: 8). Nearly two years later, in June 1996, the 
EPG produced a report entitled A Strategy for a New Partnership, which called for an 
increase in mutual trust and a better understanding between the two regions. The 
strategy also suggested other measures to foster economic and political cooperation. 
The EPG’s proposals were complemented and supported by a communication of the 
European Commission, called Creating a New Dynamic in EU-ASEAN Relations, which 
was aimed at revitalising the EU’s relations with ASEAN (European Commission 1996; 
Mierlo 1997). The Commission also proposed that this ‘new dynamic’ should be 
endorsed by the next AEMM, due to take place in Singapore in 1997. 
However, this new and optimistic spirit or a new dynamism did not last long. In 
fact, the recommendations in both the EPG’s report the European Communication’s 
Creating a New Dynamic in EU-ASEAN Relations did not produce any concrete results 
and, consequently, failed to revive EU-ASEAN relations (Yeo 2008b: 87;  2009a: 45). 
While both sides thought they had found a new way to move their relationship forward 
after being held hostage by the human rights issue and the East Timor problem, they 
faced new and even bigger challenges. One of these was the 1997/1998 Asian financial 
crisis, which did not weakened many Asian economies but also negatively impacted 
upon ASEAN’s relations with the EU. Another significant – if not the defining – factor 
that hindered their interaction in the late 1990s was the Myanmar issue. While it had 
already a major point of disagreement between the two organisations in the early 1990s, 
Myanmar became an obstacle to the EU-ASEAN dialogue when it was allowed to join 
ASEAN in 1997 despite the EU’s objection. The disputes over Myanmar led the EU and 
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ASEAN to postpone their AEMM and JCC for several years in the late 1990s. The 
Myanmar issue also overshadowed some summits and ministerial meetings of ASEM, 
which was established partly because of the desire of the EU and ASEAN to overcome 
the deadlock they faced in the 1990s. Chapter 7 will examine in-depth why the 
Myanmar jeopardised not only EU-ASEAN relations but also the ASEM process.  
 
3.3.4. New efforts to strengthen relations and ASEAN-EU FTA 
By the early 2000s, both the EU and ASEAN realised that they needed to revive 
their relations and their economic cooperation in particular.59
Coupled with those global transformations, the EU and ASEAN also experienced 
major changes. For the EU, a significant move it made was to alter its trade policy. 
Instead of focusing on the establishment of political and security-oriented agreements as 
it did in the 1990s,
 This was motivated by a 
number of important changes at different levels during the first years the 21st century. 
Globally, as underlined by the EU’s Global Europe Strategy, the world witnessed 
developments that “are as significant for the world economy and international relations 
as the end of the Cold War” (European Commission 2003a: 3). One of these was the 
rise of Asian countries, notably that of China (Fukuyama 2008; Zakaria 2009; Moore 
2011). Another is the intensification of the process of regionalisation (Hurrell 2007: 
130), which resulted in the proliferation of FTAs (Sen 2008b; Senti 2010). A major 
cause of this shift was the failure of the Doha Development Agenda (Woolcock 2007: 
2). Another reason is that in this post-American world, each country, and maybe each 
regional organisation, planned to shape its own future in its own way (Gardels 2007; 
2008; Grugel et al. 2008; Khanna 2008).  
60
                                                 
59 Yeo (2009b: 45) regards as the fourth and current phase, which was one of re-discovery because both 
sides have been seeking to rebuild their relations. 
 it now paid attention to the negotiation and conclusion of primarily 
commerce-oriented ones (Aggarwall and Fogarty 2004; Woolcock 2008). This shift was 
aimed at taking advantages of huge opportunities, e.g. new markets, and meeting 
challenges, e.g. increasing competition for access to markets and raw materials for its 
members that the major transformations in the world economy brought about (European 
Commission 2006a: 3). Consequently, the EU sought to establish FTAs with major 
emerging economies and regions (European Commission 2006a: 7). In this context, it 
60 These included cooperation agreement with CEE countries (European Commission 1995c; Inotai 
1995), and with countries surrounding its borders, e.g. the Euro-Med Association Agreement (Attinà 
2004; European Commission 2006a: 10-1; Woolcock 2007: 3; Boening 2009). 
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wanted to enhance economic cooperation with ASEAN by seeking to establish an FTA 
with it (Camroux 2010: 67; Cremona 2010: 247; see also Gavin and Sindzingre 2009).  
ASEAN also witnessed significant changes (Neves 2004: 4-10), which helped to 
transform itself into a coherent grouping (Prado 2010: 362). After being heavily 
affected by the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis and other issues, e.g. the ecological crisis 
caused by the haze in 1999, the humanitarian crisis in East Timor (Yeo 2007b: 180), 
ASEAN as a whole and its members sought to recover their economies and to rebuild 
their organisation.61
Together with, and thanks to, the global changes and the developments within the 
EU and ASEAN, their relationship also experienced positive changes. Unlike in the 
 One of the moves it took was the agreement to create an ASEAN 
Community, based on three pillars, namely political and security, economic and socio-
cultural, during its ninth summit in Bali in October 2003 (ASEAN Summit 2003). 
Moreover, with the aim of competing with countries like China and India, ASEAN 
countries realised that they needed to transform their organisation, making it formal, 
legalistic and rule-based (ASEAN official, interview, 2009). For this reason, from 2005 
ASEAN began to discuss forming an ASEAN Charter, which was eventually signed in 
2007. They also agreed to create a Human Rights Body (HRB) to deal with this 
sensitive issue, and two years later, at their 42nd AMM, ASEAN Foreign Ministers 
adopted the Terms of Reference for this HRB (AMM 2009; ASEAN Secretariat 2009d). 
The creation of the HRB is a significant step in the ASEAN’s evolution because “five 
years ago, we could not even talk about anything called ‘human rights’” (ASEAN 
official, interview, 2009). According to an EU official, the process of democratisation 
began to take place in some ASEAN countries, e.g. Indonesia and Malaysia, and 
ASEAN’s efforts to accelerate its integration, for example through the creation of the 
ASEAN Charter, which was welcomed by the EU, contributed to the improvement of 
the EU-ASEAN relationship. Moreover, with the aim of maintaining its relevance, 
ASEAN sought to advance its relations with its major Asian neighbours, especially 
China, Japan and South Korea, as well as India, Australia and New Zealand (Smith 
2004: 416-33). This resulted not only in creating the EAS in December 2005 (Malik 
2006: 207), but also in leading ASEAN to enter into negotiations FTAs with these 
regional powers (Sen and Srivanstava 2009; Kawai and Wignaraja 2008; 2010; 
Wignaraja 2010; Senti 2010; see also Appendix 8).  
                                                 
61 During and after the AFC, ASEAN as an institution was widely criticised because it was unable to help 
its members manage the crisis (Narine 2008: 420). 
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1990s, it was now less confrontational. Instead of expressing their disagreements 
bluntly, as they used to, they now tried to avoid or accommodate their differences. 
Indeed, as explained by the officials of the EU and ASEAN that the author interviewed 
in 2009, EU-ASEAN relations were much better than in the 1990s. Major changes in 
ASEAN mentioned contributed to this improvement. In addition, there was a better 
understanding on the part of ASEAN about what the EU wanted to achieve in its 
integration and its relations with ASEAN (EU official, Interview 2009). There was also 
the change of attitude on the EU side because after a very tense period in the EU-
ASEAN relationship because of what happened in East Timor and Myanmar, the 
Europeans realised that the EU others may operate  different from the (ASEAN official, 
Interview, 2009). These changes in perceptions helped improve the relationship. 
Consequently, after being disrupted by the disputes over human rights and the Myanmar 
problem, the AEMM was resumed in Vientiane, Laos in December 2000 (Kazmin and 
Williamson 2000). Even though the EU sent only low-ranking officials to the meeting, 
the fact that it was held again was a significant development for their relations.  
In 2001, the EU also published Europe and Asia: A Strategic Framework for 
Enhanced Partnerships, in which it emphasised that strengthening of its partnership 
with ASEAN “will be a key priority in the coming years” (European Commission 2001: 
22). In 2003, in an attempt to revise its partnership with ASEAN, the EU issued A New 
Partnership with South East Asia, covering a wide number of areas.62
                                                 
62 It identified six areas as strategic priorities in its relation with ASEAN, which also included promoting 
human rights, democratic principles and good governance (European Commission 2003: 3-4).   
 The 14th AEMM 
in 2003 also injected a new momentum into EU-ASEAN relations since at this meeting 
the ministers extensively discussed how to reinvigorate their relationship, notably 
commercial cooperation. Concretely, with the aim to revive their relationship, with the 
objective of revitalising their relations and their economic cooperation in particular, 
they initiated a number of mechanisms. One of these was the establishment of the 
Regional EC-ASEAN Dialogue Instrument (READI) in 2005, which covers a wide 
variety of non-trade issues, ranging from transport, home affairs and justice concerns 
(e.g. human trafficking, transnational crimes, and money laundering), and the 
environment. Another initiative was the creation of the ASEAN-EC Project on Regional 
Integration Support (APRIS), which was set the process of regional integration in 
ASEAN. Along with the EU’s participation in the Initiatives for ASEAN Integration, 
APRIS was expected to contribute to narrowing the huge development gap among 
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ASEAN members, which consequently would promote further regional economic 
integration (Yeo 2009a: 54). Since APRIS’s establishment, which was also aimed at 
strengthening the institutional capacity of the ASEAN Secretariat, the EU made 
significant assistance towards ASEAN to support its regional integration efforts. 
Around €1.3 billion was committed for development cooperation to support the creation 
of the ASEAN Economic Community (Yeo 2009b: 16). 
The third initiative was the Trans-Regional EU-ASEAN Trade Initiative 
(TREATI). This programme, which was launched during the third ASEAN Economic 
Ministers and EU Trade Commissioner Consultation (AEM-EU Consultation) in 2003, 
was aimed at enhancing trade relations between the two regions (AEM-EU Consultation 
2003). Since its creation, several workshops and meetings were held in Brussels and 
ASEAN countries (Abbate et al. 2008: 10). These activities were aimed at preparing the 
foundation for a potential ASEAN-EU FTA. Besides these schemes, at their 16th 
AEMM in 2007 in Nuremberg, Germany the EU and ASEAN adopted the Nuremberg 
Declaration on an EU-ASEAN Enhanced Partnership. In this Declaration, both sides 
pledged to enhance EU-ASEAN dialogue and agreed to step up cooperation in the fields 
of political, security, economic, social and development cooperation (AEMM 2007a; 
2007b). In addition, to implement the Nuremberg Declaration in the medium term 
(2007-2012), they also agreed to develop a Plan of Action (AEMM 2007b, point 28). 
This plan was endorsed by the Heads of State/Government of the EU and ASEAN at 
their Commemorative Summit in Singapore in November 2007, which was held to mark 
the 30th anniversary of the formal relationship between the two organisations. 
These developments and initiatives, notably the TREATI, paved the way for the 
two regions to launch negotiations towards a region-to-region FTA in 2007. Yet, despite 
significant perceived strategic and economic benefits such an FTA would bring to the 
two organisations, as well as great enthusiasm of both sides before the FTA negotiations 
(Geest 2004; Andreosso-O’Callaghan et al. 2006; Andreosso-O’Callaghan 2008; 2009; 
Andreosso-O’Callaghan and Nicolas 2007; 2008; 2009), they decided to halt the FTA 
talks in 2009. The third section of Chapter 7 will explore in more detail the factors that 
led them to open talks and the reasons behind the collapse of the talks. Since then, the 
EU decided to negotiate FTAs with individual ASEAN countries. In fact, it already 
opened negotiations with Singapore and Malaysia in 2010, Vietnam in 2011, and is 
planning the similar move with other ASEAN countries (Doan 2012a). One of the 
causes of the failure of the FTA negotiations was their differences over Myanmar with 
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the EU refusing the participation of this country in the FTA whereas ASEAN insisted 
on its inclusion. This means Myanmar still negatively affected their relations in the 
2000s. More precisely, it shows that while their relationship in the period 2001-2009 
was less conflictual than in the 1990s, in terms of their ways of conducting regional and 
international affairs, the EU and ASEAN were still divergent and this prevented them 
from moving their economic and political relationship to a more substantial level.  
3.3.5. Security cooperation and the Aceh Monitoring Mission 
At the security level, the EU was a full member of the ARF when it was 
established. However, compared to ASEAN’s other major partners, e.g. the US, China, 
Japan, India or Russia, the EU was much less involved in the ARF and its overall 
contribution was lacklustre (Yeo 2009c: 16-7). The EU has still been excluded from the 
East Asia Summit (EAS). The EU’s exclusion is notable because it is one of the oldest 
dialogue partners of ASEAN, who is the lead organisation of the EAS, which is 
regarded as the prime multilateral security arrangement in the Asia-Pacific region. 
Chapter 8 will explain why the EU and ASEAN did not have substantial cooperation in 
the security area, especially regarding traditional security issues.  
There were only two areas or issues, in which the two organisations had some 
notable cooperation and these took place in the 2000s. The first was about their 
cooperation to fight against terrorism following the terrorist attacks in the US on 11 
September 2001 and subsequent terrorist bombings in some ASEAN and EU 
countries.63
                                                 
63 These include the bombings in Bali (October 2002), Jakarta (August 2003 and September 2004), the 
Philippines (October 2002; February 2003; February 2004) in the ASEAN region and the bombings in 
Madrid (March 2004) and London (July 2005). 
 At the 14th AEMM in January 2003, they adopted a Joint Declaration on 
Cooperation to Combat Terrorism affirming their “commitment to work together and 
contribute to global efforts to stamp out terrorism” (AEMM 2003). Through its Rapid 
Reaction Mechanism, the EU provided assistance to a number of ASEAN countries in 
their fights against terrorism. For instance, the EU assisted the Philippines in the fields 
of border and money laundering and Indonesia in the field of juridical capacity building 
and fight against the financing of terrorism (European Commission 2003: 14). Until 
summer 2003, the EU supported counterterrorist measures in Southeast Asia with a total 
of 21 million Euros (Umbach 2004). Even though, this amount was much less 
significant than the aid the US offered to ASEAN countries in the aftermath of the 9/11 
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events (Lim 2003: 6),64
The second area, in which the two organisations had tangible cooperation, was 
their joint operation to monitor the implementation of the peace agreement between the 
Free Aceh Movement, or Geraka Aceh Merkeda (GAM), and the Indonesian 
Government, signed in 2005. Though this EU-led venture, known as the Aceh 
Monitoring Mission (AMM), also involved two non-EU countries, namely Norway and 
Switzerland, and only five ASEAN members, it was largely a joint EU-ASEAN effort 
(Solana 2005b). It is arguably the most important contribution of the EU to Southeast 
Asia security and the most concrete and successful collaboration between the EU and 
ASEAN in the security area so far. At their meeting in 2007, the ministers of the EU 
and ASEAN also commended it “as a success in a unique political environment and 
noted with appreciation that for the first time, EU and ASEAN member countries 
worked together closely in the field of crisis management” (AEMM 2007a, point 9). 
This raises a key question regarding the reasons behind their successful collaboration in 
the AMM. In other words, why did the EU and ASEAN could successfully work 
together in the AMM whereas not only did they fail to solve the issues of East Timor 
and Myanmar but also let these two problems jeopardise their cooperation? Chapter 8 
will address in more detail this question. Yet, while the Aceh peace agreement and the 
AMM were commonly hailed in and by the EU, they were rarely mentioned in and by 
ASEAN. In fact, until the involvement of five ASEAN countries in the AMM, the Aceh 
conflict was never an issue in ASEAN. Thus, the Aceh issue raises two other important 
questions. First, why did the EU proactively get involved in the Aceh peace whereas it 
 it showed that the EU considered the ASEAN region as one of 
the important fronts in its fight against terrorism. According to Moeller (2007: 474), the 
EU had some considerable cooperation with ASEAN in this area because after the 9/11 
events, for the EU, “it was an eye opener that Southeast Asia was of strategic 
importance outside the realm of economics and trade”. In fact, the EU identified 
cooperating in the fight against terrorism as one of the priorities of its relations with 
ASEAN and its members (European Commission 2003: 13). For ASEAN and its 
members, the EU’s interest in their regional security “signifies that the EU was finally 
coming to realize the importance of Southeast Asia in the context of global security” 
(Moeller 2007: 474).  
                                                 
64 After the 9/11 events the US offered a $660 million aid package to Indonesia (Chow 2005: 312) and the 
Philippines a $100 million military aid package and direct military assistance to fight against terrorism 
(Asia Times 2001). 
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was absent from the other regional security mechanisms led by ASEAN, such as the 
ARF and the EAS? Second, why was ASEAN much less concerned about the Aceh 
conflict than the EU even though this deadly conflict occurred – and lasted for several 
years – in its region? Again, these are the key questions that Chapter 8 will address 
because such an examination will enable the thesis to explain and illustrate the 
normative differences of the EU and ASEAN, the reasons behind their normative 
dissimilarities and the negative impact of those divergences on their relations in general 
and their cooperation in the strategic and security area in particular.  
Overall, despites their realisation that they needed to enhance their cooperation, 
especially in economic-related areas, e.g. trade in order to meet the new realities of the 
two regions since the late 1980s, their relations were not improved significantly. In fact, 
while the scope of their post-Cold War cooperation was much broader than their Cold 
War interaction, their overall relations were not substantially strengthened. For instance, 
commercial relations, which were the strongest aspect and the centrepiece of their ties, 
were largely unchanged. The share of ASEAN’s three major trading countries, i.e. 
Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia, in the EU’s total trade increased very slightly from 
3.1 % in 1992 to about 3.4 % in 2009 (EUROSTAT 2010).65 In 1983, the EC was 
ASEAN’s third biggest trading partner, accounting for 11.1 % of its total trade, in 2011, 
while remaining its third largest trader, the EU represented only 10.5 % of ASEAN’s 
overall trade (European Commission, DG for Trade 1985; 2012) even though the two 
organisations have enlarged considerably since then. In other words, while the EU had a 
wide range of initiatives, e.g. READI and APRIS, to help ASEAN’s integration and 
foster EU-ASEAN relations,66 it failed to establish grand projects or far-reaching 
cooperation agreements with ASEAN.67
                                                 
65 In contrast, the share of China’s trade in the EU’s trade rose dramatically, from 2.5 % to 12.7 % in the 
same period. 
 Its failure to agree a more advanced 
cooperation framework with ASEAN in the early 1990s and to negotiate an FTA with 
the later in 2009 was an example. Given this, the 1980 Cooperation Agreement remains 
their legal binding cooperation framework, even though it is regarded as outdated. The 
latest and most significant document on their relations was the 2007 Nuremberg 
Declaration, in which both sides promised to enhance their cooperation. Yet, as its 
66 In addition, with the aim of providing information to European and Southeast Asian firms on trade, 
infrastructure, costs, regulation and standards, the first European Business Information Centre was 
established in Manila in 1993, followed by others in other ASEAN countries, e.g. Thailand, Malaysia and 
Singapore. 
67 According to Lim (2012: 57), ASEAN wanted the EU to invest in concrete projects and not just 
funding workshops, seminars, the talking sessions. 
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name implies, it was merely a declaration, which expressed the intent of the two 
organisations. It was not a legal document or a cooperation agreement. At the political 
and security levels, though it had some notable collaboration with ASEAN, e.g. their 
cooperation to fight against terrorism and to monitor the Aceh peace process, their 
cooperation in this area was relatively insignificant as illustrated by the EU’s feeble 
participation in the ARF and its exclusion from the EAS. A key reason for this under-
developed relationship between the EU and ASEAN was their conflicting norms. 
In summary, this chapter has given a broad overview of not only the ties between 
the EU and ASEAN since 1991 but also the long linkage between the two regions prior 
to that date. In doing so, besides offering a historical background as well as an 
assessment of their relations, it has drawn attention to a number of important points, 
which this thesis aims to illustrate. As they are central to the study, this chapter 
concludes by pointing out some of these main points. First, right from the beginning, the 
core norms on, which the two organisations were respectively based, were significantly 
different from each other. Yet, given both of them were established in the Cold War and 
shared an anti-communist and capitalist posture, not only their foundational norms were 
diminished but also that overriding similarity facilitated their Cold War interaction. 
Second, because the two organisations and their relationship were considerably defined 
by Cold War politics, the end of the Cold War significantly shaped the EU, ASEAN and 
their interaction. Third, their normative dimensions were always determined by their 
own temporal and spatial context. For instance, the EU and its norms were significantly 
shaped by Europe’s war-torn past whereas Southeast Asia’s colonial legacy 
characterised ASEAN and its norms. Fourth, their ideational and normative dimensions 
were the fundamental components that constitute them as actors in world politics and, 
consequently, they significantly defined their international relations. As it is founded on 
a set of liberal and democratic norms, e.g. democracy and human rights, the EU’s 
foreign policy and its relations with ASEAN are influenced by those norms. In contrast, 
the set of traditional/Westphalian principles, e.g. national sovereignty and non-
interference, on which ASEAN is premised, define ASEAN’s raison d’être, its regional 
and international relations. Fifth, both the EU and ASEAN are norm entrepreneurs and 
normative powers as they strongly uphold and promote their norms. Sixth, ideational 
and normative factors are not always a force for cooperation; they can be a source of 
conflict in world politics. International actors are better to cooperate with each other 
when their norms and worldviews converge and their relations are conflictual when 
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their ideational and normative diverge. EC-ASEAN relations during the Cold War were 
relatively friendly because their overall worldviews converged whereas their post-Cold 
War link, especially in the 1990s, was rather strained because their norms diverged from 
each other. Finally, since the end of the Cold War, the EU and ASEAN became two 
different norm entrepreneurs and normative powers and their normative differences 
significantly hindered their post-Cold War interaction. The next five chapters will 
illustrate in more detail these seven points. 
4. The EU: A cosmopolitan normative power 
 “[W]e must ask ever anew what holds Europe together also in 
this century, what the essence of its identity is. For me the answer is 
clear. The source of Europe’s identity are our shared, fundamental 
values. They are what holds Europe together (Angela Merkel, 
Germany’s Chancellor 2007). 
 
This chapter examines the nature of the EU as an international actor with a strong 
focus on its normative basis and role in world politics.68
                                                 
68 The EU’s international role generally refers to its international behaviour and influence. It is often 
treated as interchangeable with references to its identity. This thesis maintains that the EU’s international 
identity and role are interrelated because its identity defines its role in world politics.  
 From the outset, it has to admit 
that it is not an easy task because the EU and its international identity in particular are 
contested. They are perceived differently by different people (Caporaso and Kim 2009: 
19). A key reason for this controversy is that the EU does have not a single identity, but 
many identities, which remain “open to multiple interpretations” (Katzenstein and 
Checkel 2009: 226). Another important reason for this puzzlement lies in the fact that 
the EU itself remains largely an “unidentified international object” (Elgström and Smith 
2006b: 1-2). In fact, as will be shown shortly, in the current literature, there exist many 
descriptions of the EU as an international actor. Yet, among these portrayals of the EU, 
normative power is the most popular one and despite its limitations, it captures quite 
well the essence of the EU (Forsberg 2011: 1184). It is for this reason that the thesis 
adopts it as a typology to examine the EU. Furthermore, with the aim of distinguishing 
it from other normative powers, notably ASEAN, it depicts the EU as a cosmopolitan 
normative power. More precisely, by using this portrayal as a framework for the 
analysis, this chapter aims to (1) identify the EU’s normative foundation, (2) the sources 
of its normative premises and differences and (3) why the EU’s normative preferences 
affect its relations with other political actors, especially those who do not share or 
highly regard its normative premises. The current chapter mainly focuses on the two 
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first of these three issues. Yet, it also briefly looks at the EU’s links with some actors in 
world politics because such an examination will enable the thesis to explain more 
adequately the EU’s relationship with ASEAN, which will be investigated in more 
detail in Chapters 6, 7 and 8.  
 
 
 
4.1. The EU’s identity and normative foundation  
4.1.1. The EU: A multifaceted identity 
In recent years, scholarship on the EU has abundantly focused on the exploration 
of “the nature of the beast” (Risse-Kappen 1996) or the characteristics of its 
international identity and role (Sjursen 2006a). Yet, this kind of research can be traced 
back to the early 1970s, when Duchêne (1972; 1973) depicted the EU as a particular 
actor that used economic and political rather than military means to deal with 
international affairs (Larsen 2002: 289; Sjursen 2006a: 169). Consequently, even 
though Duchêne did not directly use the term ‘civilian power’ in his works (Orbie 2006: 
123), the concept of civilian power Europe is used to describe the EU and he is often 
seen as the precursor of this concept.69 However, a civilian power Europe advocated by 
Duchêne was criticised by Bull (1982), who pleaded for a military power Europe, i.e. 
militarily self-sufficient Europe. Nonetheless, the question of the EU assuming a 
military dimension had remained unthinkable until the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, 
when the EU wished to move beyond a civilian power and to develop a military 
dimension to its international identity (Whitman 1998: 135-6). Again, the expectation 
that the EU could develop a common compelling foreign and defence policy, which 
could help it make a fundamental shift from civilian to military power, was not fulfilled 
because there existed what Hill (1998; 1993) called a ‘capabilities-expectation gap’.70
                                                 
69 The depiction of civilian power Europe remains one of the main portrayals used by scholars to describe 
the EU because the key components of that interpretation of the EU are still relevant to the EU (Telò 
2001b; 2006; Whitman 1998; Manners and Whitman 2003; Whitman 2006; Börzel and Risse 2009). 
 
Besides these two concepts, the EU is given other images, e.g. an ethical power 
(Aggestam 2008), a realist power (Zimmerman 2007; Seeberg 2009), a pragmatic power 
(Wood 2011). The next section on normative power Europe will explain in more detail 
these depictions because they are conceptualised to challenge the portrayal of the EU as 
70 This lack of military capabilities prompted Kagan (2002; 2003) to depict the EU as coming from 
‘Venus’, which focuses on civilian means to international affairs. Yet, some scholars, e.g. Sangiovanni 
(2003) and Treacher (2004) still regard the EU as an emerging military power. 
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a normative power. By referring to them, a point made here is that there are different 
typologies of the EU and while each of these depictions captures a particular aspect of 
the EU’s identity, with the exception of the concept of ethical power Europe, they all 
have a major limitation. That is they do not considerably take into account the 
normative quality of the EU and its foreign policy, which is probably the most defining 
feature of the EU and its international identity. The typology that considers this most 
prominent character of the EU is normative power Europe (NPE).  
4.1.2. Normative power Europe 
NPE or the EU as a normative power is a concept, which was first coined by 
Manners (2002).71
                                                 
71 Manners’ work also marked to a shift in the scholarship on the EU’s international influence since his 
inception of the concept of normative power Europe, scholarly debate has largely shifted to its ‘software’ 
constituents, e.g. norms and values. For decades, debates about its external relations more or less focused 
on “the question of whether or not there was such a thing as a European foreign policy” (Sjursen 2006a: 
169). That is why the ‘hardware’ dimensions of its foreign policy, e.g. institutional infrastructure and 
military equipment, were emphasised and the ‘software’ dimensions of its foreign policy were often 
ignored (Lucarelli 2006a: 1).  
 His key objective in introducing this concept was to tackle what is 
crucial but missing or underdeveloped in the concepts of civilian and military power 
Europe depicted by Duchêne and Bull respectively – that is the EU’s normative 
character. Since then, NPE has become a well-known concept in both policy debates 
and academic studies on the EU and its foreign policy in recent years (Forsberg 2011: 
1184). A huge number of works have been undertaken to expand, refine or criticise the 
concept. These include Diez (2004), Youngs (2004), Sjursen (2006a; 2006b), Hyde-
Price (2006) and Scheipers and Sicurelli (2007), Whitman (2011) and Forsberg (2011). 
Manners himself has published many to revise and further his thesis (2006a; 2006b; 
2006c; 2008a; 2008b; 2009a; 2009b). Yet, while it is popular, NPE is a contested 
notion. Its controversy is related to the letter ‘N’ in NPE. In his original work, Manners 
(2002: 239) defines NP as the “ability to shape conceptions of ‘normal”’ (emphasis 
added). In a later article, entitled “The Normative Ethics of the European Union”, 
Manners (2008a) furthers his thesis by focusing more on the ethical/moral meaning of 
the ‘N’. By doing so, he assumes that the EU is a NP not simply because it is 
constituted by, and seeks to promote, normative values. It is also because the practices 
through, which it promotes them and the impact they have are normative, i.e. morally 
good. In this article, the EU is not directly affirmed as such an ethical power. Rather, it 
is advised to become and live as a virtuous power, which should “live by example”, “be 
reasonable” and “do least harm” (Manners 2008a: 60). The ethical aspects of the EU’s 
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action in world politics are advanced by Aggestam (2008), who introduces the concept 
of ethical power Europe. Her aim is to provide “a conceptual shift in the EU’s role and 
inspiration from what it ‘is’ to what it ‘does’: from simply representing a ‘power of 
interaction’ and a positive role model to proactively working to change the world in the 
direction of its vision of the ‘global common good’” (Aggestam 2008: 1). Thus, unlike 
the concept of NPE, the ethical power Europe thesis predominantly focuses on the EU’s 
proactive role in the world and its action should be a force for good for the world.  
However, the argument that the EU is an ethical power is contentious because 
“what is usually projected is not the EU as is, but an EUtopia” (Nicolaïdis and Howse 
2002: 767).72
                                                 
72 For a more critical understanding of the NPE thesis, see Nicolaïdis and Howse (2002), Youngs (2004), 
Diez (2005), Sjursen (2006a; 2006b), Bicchi (2006) and Scheipers and Sicurelli (2007). 
 In other words, such a picture of the EU in the international arena does not 
really represent what the EU actually is, but represents an ideal Europe. For that reason, 
it is often argued that instead of exporting what it is, the EU tries to export what it 
would like to be to the world (Scheipers and Sicurelli: 2007: 438). That means there is a 
gap between the EU’s rhetoric and its action (Smith 2001). Some scholars even argue 
that the EU sometimes put economic and security interests over values (Youngs 2004). 
This seems very true in the case of the EU’s relations with China, in which its stance 
vis-à-vis the latter is not always consistent with its ideals (Eriksen 2006; Balducci 
2010). That is why Zimmerman (2007) regards the EU as a ‘realist power’ whilst for 
Wood (2011: 256), it is a ‘pragmatic power’ because “while EUrope displays 
normative, ethical and realistic instincts and features, the self-interested pragmatism of 
its members states, pressured by domestic imperatives, is the crucial characteristic of its 
external relations”. Söderbaum et al. (2005: 373-7) argue that along with the promotion 
of its values in its foreign policy, the EU seeks to strengthen its economic power and its 
strategic interests, which are not fully compatible with the high ideals and normative 
agenda so often emphasised in its official language. According to Bretherton and Vogler 
(1999; 2006), besides being depicted as a NP, the EU is also seen as a ‘fortress Europe’; 
they believe that there are contradictions in the EU’s collective identity. On the one 
hand, the EU is portrayed as a principled actor, who promotes universal principles and 
high ideals to others; on the other hand, it is seen as a selfish actor, who seeks to 
strengthen its interest and power. Hettne and Söderbaum (2005: 535-52) also underline 
that on the one hand, the EU seeks to pursue a norm-driven foreign policy, which stems 
from the values promoted within the Union, e.g. the rule of law and democracy. On the 
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other, it practices ‘soft imperialism’, which is “an asymmetric form of dialogue or even 
the imposition or strategic use of norms and conditionalities enforced for reasons of 
self-interest rather than for the creation of a genuine dialogue” (Hettne and Söderbaum 
2005: 539). Balfour (2006: 115) underlines that this dichotomy, i.e. principles vs. 
interests or idealism vs. realism, appears tenuous and suggests that it should be 
challenged on a continuum’, which implies that the EU’s promotion of its values is not 
totally derived either from its genuineness or from its selfishness.  
These arguments show that if a NP is defined as a virtuous power that always 
behaves in an ethical manner in world politics, the EU – and, perhaps, no power in 
world politics – is universally regarded as a NP. This is because ethics in international 
politics are deeply contested because “it tends to be closely associated with particular 
worldviews and each with its own assessment of the feasibility of change in the 
international system” (Aggestam 2008: 5). What the EU regards as an ethical way to 
conduct international affairs, e.g. the respect of human rights, may not be perceived in 
the same manner by other actors, e.g. China and ASEAN, and vice versa. Another 
contested point relating the NPE thesis is the contention that an ideal-type of normative 
power should have a normative identity, normative interests/goals, normative means 
and normative impacts and behave according to norms (Forsberg 2011). However, if a 
NP is defined as a power that possesses all these characteristics, there exists no such a 
type of power on earth. Tocci et al (2008: 25-6) use only three criteria: normative goals, 
normative means and normative impacts, to examine the EU’s relations with eight 
different countries to see whether the EU is a normative actor. By doing so, they 
discover that its foreign policy has at times been normative while at other times has 
been realist, imperialistic and status quo-oriented.  
Thus, like other images of the EU, the depiction of it as a NP is also contested, 
especially when that description is used to illustrate it as an ethical power or a power 
that has the five characteristics identified by Forsberg (2011). However, under the 
interpretation of De Zutter (2010: 1122), the EU is aptly qualified as a normative power. 
While one may question the motives, the consistence and the ethical aspects of its norm-
motivated practices, the EU is probably the most noticeable normative power if judging 
by its efforts to shape the normal in world politics through its norm-driven practices. Its 
norms are also adopted by some others, e.g. those who seek its membership. The next 
part, which examine in-depth the EU’s norms, will illustrate the integral role of the 
norm-driven practices in the EU’s internal and external relations. There is another 
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reason why the EU’s norms are examined in more detail is that it makes little sense to 
attribute a normative quality to the EU and its international identity if one does not 
identify the norms that constitute it. Manners (2002: 240), Diez (2005: 614) and Diez 
and Manners (2007: 180) acknowledge that although the concept of NP in IR is largely 
developed in relation to the EU, it is not novel and unique because throughout history 
different actors seek to advocate their own normative preferences. 
 
4.1.3. The EU’s norms and their importance in its foreign policy 
According to Manners, over the past five decades, through a great number of 
declarations, treaties, policies, criteria and conditions (2002: 242), the EU has 
developed a series of founding values and wider objectives that contribute to its 
constituting the normative elements of its international identity (2006a: 32). Within this 
vast body of EU laws and policies, he identifies nine norms, which comprise the EU’s 
acquis communautaire and acquis politique (2002: 42). They are: (sustainable) peace, 
(social) liberty, (consensual) democracy, (associative) human rights, (supranational) 
rule of law, (social) solidarity, (inclusive) equality, i.e. anti-discrimination, (sustainable) 
development and good governance. In one description, Manners (2002: 242) regards the 
first five norms as ‘core’ norms and the last four as ‘minor’ norms. In the other account, 
he does not distinguish the core norms from the minor ones; and while the order of the 
first five norms remains the same, the order of the last four changes slightly (2006a: 32-
8). In a collaborative work, Lucarelli and Manners (2006b: 202), classify peace as the 
EU’s prime value and categorise human dignity/rights, freedom/liberty, democracy, 
equality, justice/rule of law and solidarity as its core values. In addition, they identify a 
number of derived or more recent values of the EU, e.g. regulated liberalism and 
ecological modernisation. However, they regard these as complex interpretations of 
good governance and sustainable development. Thus, though naming and classifying 
them differently, Manners and Lucarelli refer to the same nine norms. For Manners 
(2002; 2006a; 2008a; 2008b), those substantive normative principles “are constitutive of 
the EU as a hybrid polity and as part of its international identity in world politics” as 
well as those that are promoted by the EU in world politics.  
The EU’s value of peace is found in key symbolic declarations such as that of 
Schuman in 1950, the preambles to the European Coal and Steel Treaty in 1951, and 
the Treaty of European Communities in 1957, the Treaty on European Union (Manners 
2002: 242; 2006a: 33; 2006d: 70). Article 3-1 of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty 
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on European Union states that the EU’s “aim is to promote peace, its values and the 
well-being of its people”. The focus on sustainable peace, which is central to the 
European project, is aimed at addressing the causes of conflicts to ensure that war 
“becomes not merely unthinkable but materially impossible” (Manners 2006b: 185; 
2008a: 48). It is worth noting here in its European Security Strategy the EU identifies 
failure states, e.g. bad governance and civil conflict within a country, one of the key 
dangers to its peace or security and the world’s. It also argues that the best way to create 
and protect peace is to build a world of well-governed democratic states and to achieve 
that it needs to spread good governance, the rule of law and human rights (European 
Council 2003: 6, 16). For this reason, as examined in Chapter 8, the EU’s way of 
security differs from ASEAN’s. The EU’s values of liberty, democracy, the rule of law 
and human rights, as well as its values of social solidarity, anti-discrimination, 
sustainable development and good governance also are strongly expressed in the key 
document of the EU. In short, as explicitly stated by the Consolidated Version of the 
Treaty on European Union (Articles 2 and 3-5), these norms are the values, on which 
the EU is founded and which it upholds and promotes in its relations with the wider 
world. 
While those norms constitute the EU as well as are championed by it, democracy 
and especially human rights are the EU’s most visible and promoted values in the post-
Cold War era (Manners 2006a: 34; see also Smith 2003: 97-120). They are also the 
norms that the EU faces challenges and opposition when it insists on them in its 
relations with the countries e.g. China, which do not highly regard these democratic 
norms (Panebianco 2006). As will be illustrated in Chapters 6 and 7, the EU’s insistence 
on the respect of those norms and ASEAN’s resistance to them was the reason behind 
their disagreements over the issues of East Timor and Myanmar. Thus, they should be 
explored in more detail. Compared to the EU’s other norms, human rights were less 
focused in the EC’s internal and external relations during its first period. In fact, until 
the 1980s, they were not strongly included in the EC’s key documents. However, in the 
1990s, they became an essential part of the EC/EU’s relations with third countries and 
1991 marked an important turning point in this shift because in June that year, it issued 
a Declaration on Human Rights. This document unequivocally stated that “respecting, 
promoting and safeguarding human rights is an essential part of international relations, 
and one of the cornerstones of European cooperation as well as of relations between the 
Community and its member States and other countries” (European Council 1991a). It 
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also underlined that expressing concerns about human rights violations and requesting 
to secure those rights “cannot be considered as interference in the internal affairs of a 
state” (European Council 1991a). In November 1991, it issued a Resolution on Human 
Rights, Democracy and Development, which introduced for the first time the principle 
of conditionality, whereby it reserved the rights to adopt negative measures “in the 
event of grave and persistent human rights violations or the serious interruption of the 
democratic process” (European Council 1991b).  
Other documents issued by the EU’s different institutions also underline the 
fundamental importance of human rights and democracy in the EU’s external 
relations.73
A reference to some of the EU’s key documents shows that the pursuit of 
democracy and human rights has become a transversal objective of the EU’s external 
activities. This is reflected by its use of a wide variety of measures, which include both 
positive and negative incentives, to achieve this objective. The two most famous legal 
means that it uses to them are the ‘Copenhagen criteria’, i.e. the membership criteria, 
 These include Communication on the Inclusion of Respect for Democratic 
Principles and Human Rights in Agreement between the Community and Third 
Countries” (European Commission 1995a) and the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
(European Council 2000). Furthering Human Rights and Democracy across the Globe, 
which is another significant document, clearly stated that the EU “has made human 
rights and democracy a central aspect of its external relations: in the political dialogue it 
holds with third countries; through its development cooperation and assistance; or 
through its action in multilateral fora” (European Commission 2007). In its relations 
with Asia in general and with ASEAN, the EU regards the promotion of human rights 
and other democratic values as a priority. Europe-Asia: A Strategic Framework for 
Enhanced Partnerships states that one of the core objectives of the EU’s relations with 
Asia is to “work to contribute to the protection of human rights and the spreading of 
democracy, good governance and the rule of law” (European Commission 2001). A New 
Partnership with Southeast Asia also identifies “human rights, democratic principles 
and good governance” as one of the six strategic priorities of the EU’s relations with 
Southeast Asian countries (European Commission 2003).  
                                                 
73 The role of human rights and other democratic norms in the EU’s internal and external policies was 
strongly enshrined in the Treaty on European Union (European Union 1992) and were reaffirmed, 
clarified and extended in the other treaties of the EU, e.g. the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) and the Treaty 
of Nice (2001). 
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and the ‘human rights clause’, i.e. the conditionality.74
An overview of the EU’s norms shows that while the EU does not always behave 
as an ethical power as pictured by Manners (2008a) and Aggestam (2008), because in 
some cases, it acts as a realist power or a pragmatic power, it is clear that “there are 
always constitutive elements of the EU political identity at work” (Lucarelli 2006b: 
56).
 Concerning the second, which is 
also the reason for the disagreements between the EU and ASEAN, it is applied when 
the EU negotiates or includes economic and political cooperation agreements with its 
partners (European Council 1991b). It has been strengthened and widely practised by 
the EU since the publication of the Inclusion of Respect for Democratic Principles and 
Human Rights in Agreement between the Community and Third Countries in 1995 
(European Commission 1995a). In fact, by 2008, there were more than 120 agreements 
between the EU and third parties, i.e. countries or groupings, which contain such a 
clause (Balme 2008: 144). This clause implies that in the event that democratic 
principles are breached, the EU may take a wide number of measures. These include 
modification of the contents of cooperation programmes, postponement of joint 
committee meetings, refusal to grant visas to senior government members, suspension 
of high-level bilateral contacts, postponement of new projects and suspension of 
cooperation agreements (European Council 2003a). In addition, since 1994, the EU has 
a large budget, i.e. about 100 million euro, each year, for the promotion of human rights 
(European Commission 2004: 2; Diez 2005b: 618). No country or regional organisation 
in the world spends such efforts and resources to promote human rights. 
75 These constitutive elements are the nine norms that the EU has developed to 
guide its internal and external relations. They are peace, liberty, democracy, the rule of 
law, respect for human rights, social solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable 
development and good governance.76
                                                 
74 With regard to the first, it stated that in order to be allowed to join the EU, the candidate country must 
have met three criteria. The first among these is to have achieved stability of institutions that guarantee 
democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities (European Council 
1993). 
 This set of normative premises greatly differs 
from ASEAN’s norms, as will be shown in the next chapter. These norms, notably 
human rights and democracy, are also those that the EU attempts to promote abroad. 
75 Lucarelli (2006b: 48) distinguishes political identity from cultural identity, with the former being a 
construct that is not, and should not be, derived from a common culture. This thesis maintains that the 
EU’s identity and the norms that constitute its identity are a political construct. Yet, as will be shown 
later, they are also influenced by Europe’s historical and cultural background. 
76 To those founding norms, others, e.g. harmony with nature or multilateralism, have been added 
(Lucarelli 2006b: 56). 
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Indeed, the defence and spread of those values plays an integral role in its external 
relations. The following statements made by the European Commission’s Vice 
President Manuel Marin during a meeting with ASEAN in 1993 and an official at the 
European Commission in an interview with the author summarise that argument.  
“As you know one of the prime objectives of European foreign policy 
is precisely to strengthen democracy, the rule of law and the respect for 
human rights and individual freedoms. This objective is not intended to 
apply to any one group of countries, but to all countries, both in Europe and 
outside it” (Marin 1993).  
 
“As human rights are one of the corners of the EU and its foreign 
policy we have not only the obligation but also the task to pursue the 
protection of human rights in all our cooperation agreements and other 
external relations, including with ASEAN” (Interview, 2009). 
 
The argument that the EU possesses an official political culture that strongly 
supports and promotes human rights and democratic governance is widely 
acknowledged by scholars. For instance, according to Wunderlich (2012a: 138), the 
EU’s norms and its self-understanding is constructed on broad liberal values, e.g. 
“adherence to political and individual human rights, democracy as the only acceptable 
form of government and the rule of law as the organising principle. The EU strongly 
identifies with these principles and promotes them in its external relations”. A survey of 
analysts in Europe undertaken in 2006 found that 85.2 % of its respondents said that the 
EU was trying to export its norms (Murray 2008: 204).77 Therefore, despite the fact that 
in some cases, e.g. its relations with China and Russia, the EU can be either realist or 
pragmatic as some assume, it is clear that overall the EU cherishes its democratic norms 
and seeks to promote them. Even in its interaction with China, which has considerable 
advantage – and because this, the EU’s ability to extend its values is very limited – the 
EU is not always silent about China’s human rights record. For example, at the seventh 
ASEM summit in Beijing in 2008 José Manuel Barroso stated clearly “[w]e should 
underline our commitment to cooperate in the promotion and protection of Human 
Rights globally”. According to him, “Human Rights are universal by nature and we all 
have a responsibility to uphold them” (Barroso 2008).78
                                                 
77 Keohane (2002: 746) contends that while proposals for military action tend to divide the EU, the issues 
with high symbolic value e.g. the protection of human rights, provide it with common ground for 
reinforcing its cohesion and emphasising its role in international relations.  
  
78 These two words were capitalised in the original text. It is possible that they were capitalised to 
underline the importance of human rights in the EU’s foreign policy. For that reason, in this quotation, 
they are kept as originally put.  
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The overview also illustrates that, from a European perspective, a key factor that 
prompts the EU to highly value as well as to advocate its normative principles both 
within the Union and externally, is its belief that it is the best way to promote peace and 
well-being in the world. In an article published in the Jakarta Post in 2005, the 
Commissioner for External Relations Benita Ferrero-Waldner stated clearly that “[t]he 
EU believes that respecting democracy, human rights and the rule of law is crucial for 
attaining any lasting security and prosperity”. For that reason, she added: “[w]e cannot 
condone those countries where these values are not respected, not only as a matter of 
principle, but also because we consider such countries to be serious security threats” 
Ferrero-Waldner (2005). According to a former ambassador of an EU member to an 
ASEAN country, European countries seek to advance those values because they “are 
convinced that their core values are the best ones” (Interview, 2009). For a former 
ASEAN General-Secretary, “Europeans strongly focus on the democratic values 
because they are convinced that those values are good for human kind. Some European 
officials even believe that these values are so good that others have to follow” 
(Interview, 2009). Furthermore, due to its strong belief in and, consequently its focus on 
the promotion of, liberal and democratic norms, the EU uses both positive measures, 
e.g. socialisation, persuasion and emulation, and negative means, e.g. the human rights 
clause, to promote its norms. Given its widespread usage of the conditionality, the EU’s 
norm-driven practices are questioned and it is depicted as a ‘soft imperialist’ (Hettne 
and Söderbaum 2005). As underlined, the thesis does not aim to assess whether the 
EU’s exercise of this tool is morally justified or in line with the image of a virtuous 
power as advocated by Aggestam (2008) and Manners (2008a). The point made here is 
that, from the EU’s perspective, it has a responsibility – for some a moral obligation – 
to promote those norms. Furthermore, the EU’s strong belief in its normative values and 
its zealous promotion of them are a key reason behind its difficulty to interact with other 
actors in world politics, e.g. ASEAN, who have divergent normative preferences and 
(consequently) resist the EU’s norms.   
Judging by its huge efforts to create and promote norms, the EU as a whole is 
undoubtedly a norm entrepreneur. Indeed, norm generation and diffusion is an integral 
part of its actorness. As seen above, its different institutions, e.g. the Council, the 
Parliament and notably the Commission, and the officials from those institutions are 
strongly committed to norm entrepreneurship. Furthermore, judging by the role of its 
norms in its internal and external relations and by the norms that define its international 
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role/identity, the EU can be depicted as a cosmopolitan normative power. Under a 
normative theory interpretation, cosmopolitanism is a view that the world politics 
should focus either on humanity as a whole or on individuals (Jackson and Sorensen 
2003: 260; Smith and Owens 2005: 279). Moreover, a cosmopolitan perspective is also 
inclined to favour every extensive account of universal human rights. In addition, given 
their strong emphasis on human rights, cosmopolitans are willing to interfere into 
others’ domestic politics to promote those democratic norms. Again, whether and when 
it is right for the EU to interfere into the internal affairs of others, e.g. ASEAN and its 
members, to promote human rights goes beyond the purpose of this thesis.79
In short, this section has identified the nine norms that constitute the EU as well as 
are promoted by it. While the EU’s motives behind the promotion of these norms may 
be questioned, it is clear that from its perspective, those norms are very important to its 
internal and external relations. They inform “EU institutions, its policies, its approach to 
global governance and its actorness” (Wunderlich 2012a: 138). This point not only 
illustrates that the EU’s norms are integral parts of its actorness but also explains very 
well that the EU is a notable norm entrepreneur and normative power. As the set of 
norms it espouses predominantly focuses on the rights of the individuals, it is aptly seen 
as a cosmopolitan normative power. The last section of this chapter and especially 
Chapters 6, 7 and 8 will illustrate in more detail the argument that not only is the EU 
founded on a set of cosmopolitan normative values but it is also predisposed to act as a 
 Yet, it 
chooses to describe the EU as a cosmopolitan normative power because such a portrayal 
enables it to identify three key characteristics of the EU and its norms. First, the EU’s 
key norms, e.g. liberty are human rights, are predominantly individual-focused. Second, 
the protection and promotion of human rights play an integral role in the EU’s internal 
and external relations. Maybe with the exception of the US, no actor in world politics 
can match the EU’s enthusiasm and efforts in human rights promotion. Third, the EU’s 
zeal to advocate human rights leads it to use negative means, e.g. the conditionality, 
which is regarded as some kind of interference into others’ internal affairs. As will be 
shown in Chapter 5, non-interference is the central principle of ASEAN’s regional and 
international relations.  
                                                 
79 Cosmopolitanism is also understood as a proactive attempt to create an international or ‘cosmopolitan’ 
community of diverse communities, which is based on ‘universal’ values, e.g. human rights. This is often 
found in literature on EU, e.g. Taylor (1999) Beck (2006), Habermas (2006), Smith (2006) because it is 
often argued that the EU is an institution, in which human rights policies are deliberately identity-based 
and which strongly promotes universal values. For an understanding of the EU as a cosmopolitan polity 
and its critics, see for instance Eriksen (2006), Baban and Keyman (2008). 
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cosmopolitan normative power in world politics in general and its relations with 
ASEAN. The question is why the EU has developed that particular set of norms and 
strongly focused on them in its internal and external relations. In other words, what 
makes the EU’s norms differ from those of other powers in world politics? The next 
section of the chapter will focus on this question. 
 
 
 
4.2. The sources of the EU’s normative premises 
Chapter 2 has identified a number of factors that define the normative premises of 
a power and make it differ from other powers in world politics. They are very helpful in 
explaining the normative foundation and differentiation of the EU. 
 
4.2.1. Europe’s historical and cultural background 
The first among those factors is a power or an entity’s historical background. This 
is very true in the EU’s case because Europe’s past or more exactly Europe’s tragic-war 
legacy has determined not only the process of European integration but also the raison 
d’être of the EU. Europe’s experience with war caused by nationalism, which was 
regarded as “insular, wasteful and ultimately destructive” (O’Neil 1996: 21) as an 
overriding reason behind the project of European integration is strongly highlighted by 
accounts on European integration, such as Nicoll and Salmon (2001: 9), McCormick 
(2002: 63), and Bache and George (2006: 84). According to these authors, the aim of 
European integration was to restrain or at least pool sovereignty in order avoid wars that 
shattered Europe.80
                                                 
80 This point is very noteworthy because it highlights the contrasting difference between European 
integration and regionalism in ASEAN, which will be examined in-depth in the next chapter. 
 Duchêne (1972: 43) advocated a civilian power Europe because he 
wanted Europe to overcome “the age-old processes of war and indirect violence”. Other 
scholars, such as Manners (2002), Gillingham (2003) and Lucarelli (2006a), also argue 
that European integration was aimed at surmounting the disastrous wars that Europe 
suffered in the past. For instance, Manners (2002: 240) points out that “the EU was 
created in a post-war context which reviled the nationalisms that had led to barbarous 
war and genocide”. Because of it, the rationale of Europeans behind the creation of the 
Community institutions and policies was to pool “their resources to preserve and 
strengthen peace and liberty” (Manners 2002: 240). The Europe of the past as the other 
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of the Europe’s of today is underlined by Waever (1998: 90), who points out that 
Europe’s ‘other’ of today is not ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ or ‘the Russians’, or anything 
similar but rather Europe’s own war-torn past, which should not be allowed to become 
its future. According to him, it is against this past – or the threat of a relapse of the EU 
into antagonistic fragmentation that defined the Westphalian Europe of sovereign 
nation-states – that European integration was able to identify itself as a peace project 
(Waever 1998: 90). This peace project is to construct “an identity of the ‘new’, i.e. post-
World War II, Europe as one in which peace and the respect for human rights prevail 
over the use of force and pure power politics” (Diez 2005: 634). Europe’s bitter past has 
also been repeatedly highlighted and narrated by EU officials to justify not only the 
process of European integration.81
Another factor that has somehow led the EU to regard highly democratic norms is 
Europe’s cultural or philosophical heritage. While not sharing the view of complete 
dependence of political values on cultural/religious values, Lucarelli (2006b: 56-7) 
acknowledges that culture provides one of the most important frameworks in which 
values are interpreted. In other words, how norms and values are perceived depends on 
the cultural background of their viewers. The influence of Europe’s cultural background 
on the EU’s adoption of its values is maintained by a number of scholars, such as Tocci 
and Manners (2008: 311), who argue that the emphasis of the EU on individual rights 
and freedoms is linked to the legacy of Enlightenment. For Pettman (2010: 294-5), the 
Enlightenment has radically defined how Europe and its offshoots think and behave. He 
also points out that one of the results of this rationalist revolution is that Europe has a 
 Lucarelli (2006b: 56) also maintains that their 
dramatic experiences, notably dictatorship and the Holocaust, had reinforced 
Europeans’ faith in the values of democratic systems, human dignity and solidarity. 
According to an EU official, “the fundamental reason for the EU’s strong focus on these 
values is that the EC/EU was founded in the aftermath of the WWII. The foundation on 
which it based, and continues to base itself, is peace, justice, democracy and human 
rights” (Interview, 2009). Therefore, there is no doubt that Europe’s (pre-EU) war-torn 
past has radically defined European integration as well as the modus vivendi and modus 
operandi of the EU’s internal and external relations. 
                                                 
81 These include the former President of the European Commission Romano Prodi (2004) and German 
Chancellor Angela Merkel (2007). In referring to the speeches made by key European politicians, such as 
German’s (former) Foreign Minister Joschka Fisher in 2000 and Great Britain’s (former) Prime Minister 
Tony Blair in 2003, Diez (2004: 325; 2005: 634) maintains that “[t]his ‘past as other’ logic is still part of 
many Sunday speeches on European integration, and continues to legitimise the integration project”. 
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particular way of organising its affairs, which is based on and emphasises 
individualism. Bretherton and Vogler (1999: 34) maintain that the values and beliefs, 
which the EU seeks to maintain within – and to extend beyond – the Western countries, 
are the products of an essentially European culture or more exactly of European 
Enlightenment. These values and beliefs include the respect for the dignity of the 
human individual and liberal-democratic political arrangements (Wiessala 2006: 30). 
While it is difficult to assess the extent, to which Europe’s cultural and philosophical 
elements have defined the EU and its normative values, especially its individual-centred 
norms, they are undoubtedly one of the sources, on which the project of European 
integration/construction and the EU’s norms have been based and built. According to 
Checkel and Katzenstein (2009b: 1), for many Europe elites, especially those who are 
deeply committed to the EU as a political project, the EU as an institutional machinery 
for the solution of problems that had shattered Europe’s peace and destroyed its 
prosperity “is a project that rooted in the European Enlightenment”. Fligstein (2009: 
138) also points out that there are key European scholars, such as Habermas (1992), 
who regard a European identity as part of the idea of completing the Enlightenment 
project and maintain that a European state would be democratic. Therefore, it can be 
said that not only does this common heritage, or the ‘we-ness’, that European countries 
share, favour their rapprochement and cooperation. It also leads them to build a regional 
organisation, i.e. the EU, which radically differs from other regional organisations, 
notably ASEAN, which strongly focuses on a communitarian understanding of politics.  
 
4.2.2. Other factors and actors 
Besides Europe’s war-torn past and the philosophical/cultural legacy – or the ‘we-
group’ – that European countries experienced and inherited respectively, other external 
factors and actors defined and continue to shape the collective identity of the EC/EU. 
While peace and liberty were the defining features of Western European politics in the 
immediate post-war period, the norms of democracy, rule of law and human rights were 
reinforced because Western Europe (i.e. EC and its members) wanted to distinguish 
itself from the Soviet Union and communist Eastern Europe, which lacked these values 
(Risse-Kappen 1995; Manners 2002: 243). In this sense, an illiberal and non-democratic 
Soviet Union/Eastern Europe was an external other, or a ‘they-group’, against which a 
liberal and democratic Europe was defined and constructed. With the end of the Cold 
War, the Soviet Union, which used to be a good or powerful candidate for Europe’s 
95 
 
‘other’, no longer has a similar impact on the EU (Caporaso 2005: 71; Katzenstein and 
Checkel 2009: 224). Yet, in the existing literature on the EU and its identity, Turkey 
and contemporary Russia are often seen as key external/spatial others that define the 
EU’s identity (Morozov and Rumelili 2012: 32).82
There are other spatial, i.e. geographical and/or geopolitical others, against which 
the EU can be defined. One of these is the US, which “European identities crystallize in 
relation to” (Katzenstein and Checkel 2009: 225). Under the George W. Bush 
Administration, the US was pictured as a realist or semi-realist power whereas the EU 
was portrayed as a promoter of internationally accepted norms (Manners 2002: 236; 
Adler and Crawford 2004; Lightfood and Burchell 2005; Scheipers and Sicurelli 2007; 
Smith 2009; 2011). Europe’s social model, which is more concerned about the 
environment, is also differentiated from the US’s model of ‘laissez-faire’ or ‘jungle’ 
capitalism (Diez 2004: 330; Caporaso 2005: 71-2). With the exception of Robison 
(2011), in the current literature, there is no major work that refers to ASEAN as an 
other, against which the EU is defined, it is no doubt that ASEAN can be seen as a 
notable other of the EU. This is because, when building a community, which is 
predominantly based on cosmopolitan norms, e.g. human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, the EU, directly or indirectly, differentiates from ASEAN, which relies on 
communitarian norms, e.g. sovereignty and non-interference. Thus, like any identity in 
world politics, the EU and its norms are always constructed in relation to (multiple) 
others and their norms. Furthermore, the presence of, and its relations with, these 
spatial/external others also reinforce its identity and its norms. As maintained by some 
scholars on interregionalism, the EU’s relations with other regional organisations, such 
as ASEAN, reinforce its collective identity. In other words, the sources of the EU’s 
 For instance, Turkey is differentiated 
from Europe/EU in terms of its geography and religion (Hülsse 1999; Erkem 2009). The 
views that Turkey is a non-European and Muslim country are also maintained by EU 
officials, e.g. Herman van Rompuy and France’s (former) President Nicola Sarkozy 
(Morozov and Rumelili 2012: 38). Others see Turkey’s divergence as stemming from 
deficiencies in liberal-democratic values, which are the core values of the EU (Diez 
2007: 416; Morozov and Rumelili 2012: 38).  
                                                 
82 The representation of Russia and Turkey as the others of Europe (’s Latin Christendom) can be traced 
back to centuries (Neumann 1996; 1999). The presence of the Ottoman and Muscovite empires to the 
East gave Western (Christian) Europe a degree of coherence that would otherwise have been lacking 
(Katzenstein and Checkel 2009: 224).  
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normative differences come not only from within, i.e. Europe’s (pre-EU) war-torn past, 
and its cultural/philosophical tradition, but also from outside, i.e. external/spatial others.  
There are other important factors reinforcing the EU’s normative foundation and, 
consequently, led it to focus more on the promotion of its set of normative values. 
Chapter 2 has already underlined that the rapidly changing environment often leads 
political actors to generate, reinforce, change their norms (Kowert and Legro 1996: 
470). This is very true in the EU’s case because following the collapse of the Soviet 
bloc, like other Western countries, the EU strongly focused on a value-based foreign 
policy, which sought to export its preferred norms to the other parts of the world. This is 
reflected in the fact that human rights became treaty-based and policy-centred in the 
early 1990s as previously illustrated. The EU’s concentration on the spread of its liberal 
and democratic values following the end of the Cold War was also because the West 
and the EU considered the collapse of the communist bloc as their victory over the 
latter. In other words, the power political configuration, in which the EU found itself in 
the post-Cold War international system (Tocci and Manners 2008: 312), was also 
another important factor that prompted the EU to fortify its normative foundation as 
well as to seek to import them to the non-European/Western world. Furthermore, the 
EU’s desire to advocate its norms coincided with the prominent emergence and 
influence of normative and cultural elements in world politics (Huntington 1993; 1996).  
Coupled with, or because of, the factors and actors mentioned, the normative 
differences of the EU are also found in its own supranational and international forms of 
governance, which transcends Westphalian norms (Manners 2002: 24). As noted by 
Diez (2005: 614), the argument “[t]hat the EU is such a different type of international 
actor, and represents a new kid of power in international politics is not much disputed”. 
Its normative differences are expressed in its political-legal constitution, which has 
largely occurred as an elite-driven, treaty based and legal order (Manners 2002: 241). 
The combination of these factors has led its to espouse a set of liberal and democratic 
norms to guide its regional and international relations in the post-Cold War period as 
identified above.  
Briefly, it is clear that like other actors in world politics, the EU and its norms are 
shaped by its own temporal and spatial factor backgrounds. Precisely, the EU and its 
norms are different from other political actors and their norms because it has 
experienced its own ‘we-group’ factors, e.g. Europe’s war-torn past and cultural 
traditions, as well as ‘they-group’ actors, e.g. Turkey and Russia, that are different from 
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other actors in world politics, e.g. ASEAN. The question is whether its relations with 
other actors in world politics is always cooperative or peaceful when it conducts its 
external relations based on those norms – and particularly when it seeks to project them 
to the latter. In other words, does the interaction between the EU, i.e. the self, and other 
political actors, i.e. the others, generate the othering? If so, why does this happen?83
 
  
4.3. The EU’s relations with spatial/external and cultural others 
In their respective study, (Manners 2002: 244) and Forsberg (2011: 1185) 
maintain that a key mechanism used by EU to spread its norms to others is contagion – 
that is the EU leads by virtuous example and others, including regional organisations, 
e.g. MERCOSUR and ASEAN, replicate it and adopts its norms. Yet, a look at the EU’s 
relations with different countries and organisations shows that while some recognise 
and adopt the EU’s norms some others do not always accept and follow the EU’s 
normative system. They even resist to the EU’s norms and its use of conditionality, 
which is another notable tool employed by the EU to diffuse its normative preference. 
The question is why the EU’s normative values are accepted by some whereas they are 
refused by others. This section will briefly address this question. Another important 
issue, which is often ignored by the works on the NPE concept, is that they focus 
mainly on the EU’s norms and its promotion of its norms, without considerably 
examining how other political actors, especially those whose normative basis differs 
from the EU, reacts to the EU’s norms and its insistence on the promotion of those 
norms. For those who advocate a NPE, the EU’s norms are universal and ideal and they 
should or even must be exported to other states and groups. However, by building a 
regional community based on those values, and more importantly, by seeking to export 
such a model to other countries and regional organisations, the EU and its members 
somewhat engage in discursive practices of naming, marking, and articulating of others 
as different or even inferior (Rumelili 2007: 7; De Zutter 2010: 1112). Such discursive 
practices also make it hard for the EU to interact with those political actors, whose 
normative preferences diverge from the EU’s. By examining the EU’s relations with a 
varying numbers of countries and regional groupings, this section illustrates these two 
important issues.  
                                                 
83 As noted at the beginning of the chapter, an examination of these questions enables the thesis to explain 
adequately why the EU and ASEAN disagreed with each other over political issues, e.g. human rights, 
East Timor and Myanmar. 
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Central and Eastern Europe 
As noted earlier, during the Cold War, the communist countries in Central and 
Eastern Europe (CEE) were represented and constructed as a key other of democratic 
Western Europe. During that period, the CEE was often regarded as either inferior or as 
an existential threat to Western Europe. The collapse of the communist rule not only 
ended that threat but also paved the way for the EEC countries to transform from the 
‘they-group’ of Western Europe to the ‘we-group’ with the latter through the EU’s 
membership process. According to Diez (2004: 326), a key factor that facilitated that 
transformation was the EU’s concern about the post-communist CEE could become an 
incardination of Europe’s pre-EC/EU past, i.e. a zone of war and nationalism,84
                                                 
84 This is because in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, territorial disputes and nationalism 
became prominent in former communist and newly independent Central and Eastern countries. 
 which 
threatened not only the CEE’s peace but also the EU’s. In this context, the EU regarded 
its enlargement to CEE countries as a necessity to maintain peace in Europe. However, 
as Rumelili (2004: 41) argues, a defining factor that made the EU’s enlargement to the 
CEE possible was the shared identity, i.e. culture, history and even geography, between 
Eastern and Western Europe. In other words, these inherent characteristics of the CEE 
countries favoured their entry to the EU. What the CEE countries lacked and they had to 
acquire in order to become the EU’s members was stable institutions that guaranteed 
democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection off minorities – 
the first requirement of the Copenhagen criteria. In this sense, the EU-CEE interaction 
was regarded as a superior/inferior one, in which the former regarded itself as having 
stable and mature democratic institutions and the latter as lacking these. Nevertheless, 
while their relationship was unbalanced, it was not conflictual because the CEE 
countries recognised their insufficiency and were willing to acquire those requirements. 
Furthermore, by doing so, they also acknowledged the superior identity of the EU and 
its members, and consequently, enhanced the EU’s norms. Such an acceptance even 
makes the self even more secure. In short, the EU’s relations with the CEE countries 
were not conflictual because they shared the same identity. Furthermore, thanks to this, 
the CEE countries were willing to accept the EU’s norms. The efforts of the EU and the 
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CEE to associate with each other in the post-Cold War years also facilitated their 
interaction.85
 
 
Turkey 
While the CEE countries were quickly allowed to join the EU, Turkey has not yet 
given that permission even though it expressed its interest in becoming a member of the 
EC in 1959. Turkey is often considered as to be different from Europe/EU, in terms of 
its geography, culture and religion (Morozov and Rumelili 2012: 38). Such a difference 
is a reason for its exclusion from the EU. The arguments that Turkey is a non-European 
and Muslim country, and because of this, it should not be allowed to join the EU, are 
also maintained by EU officials. For instance, in 2004, Herman van Rompuy, who is the 
current EU President, maintained that “the universal values which are in force in 
Europe, and which are also the fundamental values of Christianity, will lose vigour with 
the entry of a large Islamic country such as Turkey” (Phillips 2009). France’s (former) 
President Nicola Sarkozy also repeatedly said that his preference for a geographically 
fixed Europe was the one that did not include Turkey (Morozov and Rumelili 2012: 38). 
Another key EU figure, who referred to geography, history and culture to question 
Turkey’s Europeanness, and consequently, objected Turkey’s membership, is France’s 
former President Valery Discard D’Estaing (Baban and Keyman 2008: 116-7). Thus, it 
is clear that from the view of these European figures, Turkey is inherently different 
from Europe/EU (Rumelili 2004: 44) and given this, it is not allowed to join the EU. 
Furthermore, as the remark of Herman van Rompuy illustrates, besides its inherently 
different characteristics, which preclude its admission to the EU, Turkey is also 
perceived as lacking ‘universal’ values or norms, e.g. human rights and the rule of law, 
which the EU embraces. European Commission’s Regular Reports on Turkey’s 
Progress towards Accession often highlight Turkey’s significant differences from the 
EU, such as economic underdevelopment, the instability of political system and poor 
human rights record, and consider these shortcomings as a reason for Turkey’s omission 
(Diez 2005: 632; Rumelili 2004: 44). In this sense, the EU regards Turkey as not only 
                                                 
85 Based on Rumelili (2004; 2007), Chapter 2 has identified three conditions, under which the self/other 
relations can be cooperative or conflictual, namely (1) nature of normative difference or identity, (2) the 
response of the other to the self and its norms, i.e. acceptance or refusal, and (3) the social distance 
between the self and the other. 
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inherently different from but also inferior to it.86
 
 Overall, from the EU perspective – or 
more exactly, in the view of some key European leaders – Turkey’s differences from 
European countries in terms of its geography and culture and its lack of liberal and 
democratic values are the two main explanations for its exclusion from the EU. In other 
words, these cultural and normative divergences are a major reason why until now 
Turkey has not been permitted to join the EU. With the same rationale, Morocco was 
given an absolute no when it applied for membership in 1987 (Rumelili 2004: 42-4). 
Other countries and regional organisations 
While the EU has rather successfully promoted its norms to the CEE countries 
and in its enlargement policy in general, it has not achieved a great deal in its efforts to 
export its normative values to other countries or regional organisations (Le Gloannec 
and Rupnik 2008: 51). For instance, the EU’s promotion of its democratic norms to 
Mediterranean countries through the so-called Barcelona Process established in 1995 
has not made any major normative impact on the latter (Panebianco 2006; Martinez 
2008). Among these Arab and Mediterranean countries, only Turkey has made some 
changes towards a democratic regime due to its desire to join the EU. Other countries, 
while formally adhering to the principles of democracy and human rights because the 
EU attaches so much importance to them, do not implement them at the domestic level 
(Panebianco 2006: 151). A key reason for this is that the Barcelona Process is very 
different from the enlargement process, which requires candidate countries to adopt the 
EU’s acquis communautaire or the Copenhagen criteria in order to be allowed to join 
the EU. This difference reveals another fundamental divergence between the EEC 
countries and Mediterranean ones. While the former is culturally closer to the EU, the 
latter radically differs from it in terms of culture, history and, consequently political 
culture. In fact, in terms of political rights and civil liberties, like some ASEAN 
countries, many Mediterranean countries in the Barcelona Process, such as Algeria, 
Egypt, Libya, Syria and Tunisia, were not free (Freedom House 2010). Despite this, 
unlike its relations with ASEAN, the EU’s interaction with the Mediterranean countries 
was much less conflictual because while these countries voluntarily accepted the EU’s 
human rights clause in their cooperation agreement with the EU, ASEAN strongly 
resisted such conditionality. A key factor for this is that the grouping of Mediterranean 
                                                 
86 Whether the two above reasons are justified or whether Turkey should (or should not) be allowed to 
join the EU is debatable. On this issue, see for instance, Diez (2007) and Baban and Keyman (2008). 
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countries did not have a set of collective norms, such as the principle of non-
interference, strictly maintained and fervently upheld by ASEAN. The subsequent 
chapters of the thesis will examine in-depth the reasons behind ASEAN’s resistance to 
the EU’s normative values. The point made here is that not all countries and regional 
organisations wholeheartedly accept to import the model of political development based 
on democratic norms and practices, and human rights protection in particular 
championed by the EU.87
To sum up, describing the EU as a ‘normative power’, or more precisely a 
‘cosmopolitan normative power’, can be problematic because the EU is a multifaceted 
entity, which acts rather differently in its relations with different actors, at different 
points in time. Yet, such a depiction captures quite well the EU’s international identity 
and role. More specifically, this chapter uses this concept because it enables it to 
explain three fundamental arguments maintained by the thesis.  
 Some of these, such as ASEAN, even opposed the EU’s 
insistence on the protection and promotion of human rights and democracy. 
It allows it to identify the key norms of the EU. In fact, drawing on different key 
documents of the EU and scholar works, notably Manners (2002), it has identified nine 
norms, which constitute the EU as a particular actor in world politics. They are also the 
normative values that the EU upholds and promotes in its external relations. For 
instance, the European Commission (2004) clearly states that not only “[l]liberty, 
democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law are 
founding principles of the European Union” but also “[h]uman rights and democratic 
values factor in all areas of the EU’s activities, and have become a cornerstone of its 
external policy”. This set of norms, as will be shown in the next chapter, greatly differs 
from ASEAN’s. This point illustrates well the (1) proposition made by the thesis. 
There are many internal and external factors and actors, e.g. Europe’s war-torn 
past, its cultural heritage, illiberal and non-democratic Eastern European countries 
during the Cold War and the collapse of the communist bloc, that have prompted the 
EU to espouse those norms. In other words, the EU’s normative underpinnings are 
rooted in European history and culture (Wunderlich 2012a: 138). This second point 
demonstrates that shared historical, cultural and geopolitical settings are of significant 
importance because they can lead a regional organisation to develop a particular way of 
conducting its internal and external relations, which diverges from others, which live in 
                                                 
87 For a more understanding why other countries and regional groupings refused to embrace democratic 
norms advocated by the EU, see Smith (2006), Balme (2008), Martinez (2008), Parmentier (2008).  
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different settings. Indeed, the next chapter will illustrate that since it was established 
and evolved in a different temporal and spatial context, ASEAN has developed a 
different way of organising its regional and international affairs. Again, this is another 
important argument, i.e. the (2) position, maintained by the thesis. 
Finally, which is also the central point made in the (3) hypothesis, given its strong 
focus on the promotion of human rights the EU “felt that it had an obligation – for some 
a moral obligation – to promote human rights, including the obligation to interfere in the 
domestic politics of other countries” (Moeller 2007: 474). Yet, the EU’s promotion of 
those norms was not always accepted by actors in world politics. Some countries or 
regional organisations, e.g. ASEAN, strongly resisted the EU’s insistence on the respect 
and promotion of its norms because by interfering into others’ internal affairs to 
promote its norms, intentionally or unintentionally the EU goes in the opposite direction 
to the principles upheld by the latter. The next chapter will explore these norms and 
principles in great depth. 
5. ASEAN: A communitarian normative power 
 
 As underlined in Chapter 2, this thesis depicts ASEAN as a communitarian 
normative power. A key reason for this is that such a portrayal summarises fairly well 
what ASEAN is in terms of its normative underpinnings. Furthermore, it enables the 
thesis to differentiate ASEAN from the EU, which is a cosmopolitan normative power. 
In other words, like the EU, ASEAN can be seen as a normative power. The difference 
is that while the former is based on a set of liberal and democratic or cosmopolitan 
norms as illustrated in detail in Chapter 4, the latter relies on a set of communitarian or 
Westphalian norms. The chapter examines in-depth ASEAN’s norms, i.e. what they are, 
and the reasons behind its norms, i.e. why it has developed and adopted them. These 
two issues will allow the subsequent chapters of the inquiry to explain why its identity 
as a communitarian normative power negatively affects its relations with a 
cosmopolitan normative power Europe/EU. 
 
5.1. ASEAN’s identity and its normative foundation 
5.1.1. Multiple perspectives on ASEAN 
Compared to the EU, ASEAN is institutionally less complex. Yet, this does not 
mean that ASEAN is easily defined and consensually agreed. In effect, “ASEAN has 
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been, will remain, an essentially contested institution” Acharya (2009: 493) because its 
analysts “still disagree about what it is” (Emmerson 2005b: 165). Indeed, a scan of the 
literature on it reveals that there is no consensus among scholars on the questions of 
ASEAN’s nature (Eaton and Stubbs 2006; He 2006; Kivimaki 2008a; Acharya 2009; 
Kuhunta 2009; Beeson 2009). A major point of contention is related to the question of 
whether ASEAN is a ‘security community’ (Emmerson 2005b: 155-6; Rüland and 
Jetschke 2008: 399; Acharya 2009: 497). It is widely acknowledged that security has 
always been ASEAN’s main raison d’être (Snitwongse 1995; Busse 1999; Feddema 
2000; Wanandi 2001; Narine 2002; Dosch 2003; 2009; Sharpe 2003; Kivimaki 2008a). 
It was at the heart of ASEAN’s Bangkok Declaration (1967) Declaration of ASEAN 
Concord and Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (1976) and the ASEAN Charter (2007).88 
Yet, scholars disagree over whether it has a security identity (Sharpe 2003) or a security 
community that acts on the basis of a collective identity (Nischalke 2002; Emmerson 
2005b).89
With regard to realism, which is the oldest perspective on Southeast Asian 
security (Peou 2002: 120), dominated works on Southeast Asian politics during the 
Cold War and remains a major trend in the current international politics in Southeast 
Asia. Chief among those who maintain a realist perspective on ASEAN is Leifer (1989; 
1992; 1993; 1995; 1996a; 1996b; 1999; 2000; 2001), who was also regarded as the dean 
 The disagreement over ASEAN is also reflected by – or more precisely, due 
to – the fact that different scholars interpret it through different theoretical lenses, 
ranging from a realist perspective, through an English School viewpoint, to a 
constructivist view (Emmerson 2005a; 2005b; Acharya and Stubbs 2006; Rüland and 
Jetschke 2008). Consequently, they give different, and even competing, understandings 
of ASEAN. Of these perspectives, realist and constructive accounts are the dominant 
ones (Emmerson 2005b: 166; Nesadurai 2009: 91). These two perspective, which “have 
now been established as the key intellectual competitors in Southeast Asian security 
studies” (Peou 2002: 119), offer two opposite views of ASEAN. 
                                                 
88 One may argue that concern about security in Western Europe, e.g. confrontation between France and 
Germany, was also behind European regionalism (Rodrigo 2002: 335-6). Yet, its nature and notably 
approach to it by the EU radically differs from ASEAN’s. Later, the chapter will explain in more detail 
what security is in the context of Southeast Asia.  
89 (Pluralistic) security communities were introduced by Deutsch et al. (1957) and a number of great 
works has been undertaken to refine it. Broadly speaking, a security community is defined as the one, in 
which states become integrated to the point that they have a sense of community, or a ‘we-feeling’. This 
we-feeling, whose components include common historical experience and shared norms, creates the 
assurance that they will settle their differences without resort to war (see also Deutsch 1961; Adler and 
Barnett 1998; Acharya 2009).  
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of Southeast Asian security studies (Peou 2002: 121).90
Leifer’s pessimistic views of ASEAN are also maintained by other scholars, e.g. 
Buzan and Segal (1994), Ganesan (1995), Huxley (1996), Denoon and Colbert (1998), 
Narine (1999; 2002), Rüland (2000), Jones and Smith (2002), Khoo (2004) and du 
Rocher (2006). For instance, Huxley (1996: 231) points out that the literature on 
international relations of Southeast Asia was “permeated with implicit realist 
assumptions”, whereas Rüland (2000: 433) notes that for ASEAN “the early twenty-
first century will still be the period of realism”. Jones and Smith (2002: 108) argue that 
instead of strengthening regional cooperation and a regional identity in the organisation, 
ASEAN’s principle of non-interference “negates any expression of regional identity. 
 In his eyes, Southeast Asia 
faced ‘real-world’ problems, e.g. territorial disputes, external interventions, which 
threatened not only the survival of the region’s newly independent states but also the 
regional stability as a whole. Another important reason for his pessimistic view of 
ASEAN was the Association’s lack of a genuine corporate interest, a sense of 
community, or the ‘we-group’, which is an essential part of Deutschian security 
communities. For him, ASEAN’s key norms, e.g. mutual respect for national 
sovereignty and non-interference, did not provide the basis for enduring cooperation in 
ASEAN or the achievement of a robust regional identity. ASEAN was simply an 
instrument for its members to pursue their own interests. Furthermore, while being 
aware of norms, identity and socialisation in ASEAN and the ARF, he did not regard 
them as important to regional cooperation and security. In his view, the primacy of the 
US military presence was the main source of the stability in Southeast Asia and the 
Asia-Pacific region. Given these factors, he argued that ASEAN did not qualify as a 
security community. Instead, he described it as a ‘diplomatic community’ (Leifer 1989: 
139; 1995: 132; 1999: 30). According to Acharya (2005: 107), Leifer’s view of ASEAN 
as a diplomatic is not very far from a minimalist notion of a pluralistic security 
community, namely a ‘nascent security community’ identified by Adler and Barnett 
(1998) mentioned above. However, for Leifer, ASEAN achieved that status not thanks 
to ASEAN’s shared norms. Rather, it was the product of informal intergovernmental 
dialogue (Leifer 1999: 26). In other words, according to him, ASEAN’s normative 
contribution to cooperation in ASEAN and the wider region’s security was unimportant.  
                                                 
90 For a more comprehensive understanding of Leifer’s works on – and his views of – ASEAN and its role 
in the wider region, see The Pacific Review, vol. 18, no. 1 (2005), which includes the articles of Acharya 
(2005), Emmerson (2005a), Khong (2005) and Tan (2005). 
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ASEAN’s irresoluble paradox is that while it is intended to establish the notion of 
Southeast Asia, it calls its members to recognize that there is no such an entity”. That is 
why Khoo (2004: 35) does not regard ASEAN as a ‘nascent security community’,91
By contrast, the constructivist point of view, which takes into account non-
material factors, e.g. identity and norms, to explain ASEAN, contends that ASEAN 
states have “evolved some useful tools of diplomacy” (Vatikiotis 1999: 80) or 
“diplomatic security culture” (Haacke 2005: 7) to promote common security (Ciorciara 
2008). If realist works maintain that Southeast Asia’s real-world problems work against 
meaningful cooperation in ASEAN, constructivist ones highlight the role of ASEAN’s 
norms in managing these conflicts and fostering stability in the region (Jetly 2003). 
Chief among these is Acharya (1991; 1997; 1998a; 1998b; 2000; 2005; 2006; 2009). 
While acknowledging the ‘realist’ challenges faced and facing Southeast Asian 
countries and the practice of balance of power politics in Southeast Asia, Acharya 
differs from realists by arguing that even though ideational forces, e.g. norms and 
identity, are not the only factor, they are a central determinant of regionalism in 
Southeast Asia. More precisely, he maintains that in dealing with those problems, 
ASEAN chose to develop and promote a number of key norms, which have gradually 
become the mode of conduct for its members in their dealings with one another. In his 
view, thanks to this, not only did ASEAN succeed in moderating intraregional conflicts 
and significantly reducing the likelihood of war. It was also successful in forging a 
degree of common identity among its members. For him, given ASEAN’s capability to 
manage intra-regional conflicts without resort to war and its ability to foster a collective 
identity despite the cultural diversity of its members, it can be regarded as ‘a nascent 
security community’ or as moving toward an ‘ascendant security community’ (Acharya 
2001: 208; 2005: 108). Overall, Acharya (2005: 112-3) argues that norms are central to 
ASEAN because ASEAN’s material resources and organisational make-up are very 
thin.  
 let 
alone a ‘security community’. 
                                                 
91 Adler and Barnett (1998) identify three stages of the development of a security community, namely 
nascent, ascendant and mature. At the first stage, which is marked by common threat perceptions, 
expectations of mutual trade benefits and some degree of shared identity, a group of states coordinate 
their relations in order to increase their mutual security. The ascendant stage is marked by tighter military 
cooperation and a deepening of mutual trust. At the mature level, the security community has greater 
institutionalisation, a high degree of trust and low or no probability of military conflicts (see also Acharya 
1998; 2001; 2009; Collins 2007; Tusicisny 2007).  
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Other scholars, who adopt a constructivist perspective to explain ASEAN, include 
Higgott (1994), Alagappa (1998a), Busse (1999), Kivimaki (2001), Peou (2002), Ba 
(2005), Haacke (2005), Tan (2006) and Rumelili (2007). These scholars, like Acharya, 
emphasise the importance of norms in ASEAN. For example, Kivimaki (2001) and Ba 
(2005) maintain that through their socialisation, ASEAN states see themselves as 
belonging to a regional grouping, i.e. a ‘we-group’, which shares a common life-world 
and fate. According to them, ASEAN’s norms, which its ruling elite have consciously 
constructed since its foundation, become the focal point for ASEAN regional identity. 
This, in turn, fosters stronger regional cooperation and a more secure regional order. 
Rumelili (2007: 126) maintains that despite their great political, economic and cultural 
diversities, ASEAN members have “fostered a collective Southeast Asian identity 
around the norms of non-interference, mutual respect for sovereignty and consensus-
building”. For Busse (1999: 55), “ASEAN states see military pact as providing less 
rather than more security”, and from a realist viewpoint, “this makes no sense. But seen 
through the lens of the ASEAN norms, we are able to understand this attitude”. 
Furthermore, for those who opt for a constructivist view of ASEAN, e.g. Eaton and 
Stubbs (2006) and Stubbs (2008), not only do ASEAN norms guide and enhance its 
intra-regional interaction. They also inform ASEAN’s external relations and enable it to 
shape the wider regional order.   
As noted, besides realism and constructivism, scholars also use other theoretical 
perspectives to explain ASEAN. One of these is the English School which has great 
appeal to ASEAN’s observers (Rüland and Jetschke 2008: 400) and which also shares 
some elements of a constructivist interpretation of ASEAN (Acharya and Stubbs 2006: 
129). Like constructivists, those who adopt this approach, e.g. Khong (2005), Narine 
(1997; 2006; 2008; 2009) and Collins (2007), recognise the importance of ASEAN and 
its norms, including its ability to get other states to adopt its rules of acceptable regional 
behaviour. However, unlike constructivists, they contend that ASEAN’s core norms 
often work against the development of a cohesive regional organisation. For instance, 
Narine (2006; 2008) maintains that ASEAN members’ preoccupation with preserving 
their security is at odds with the building of an ASEAN identity. They also point out 
that though ASEAN elites may enjoy a sense of belonging to a larger community, the 
people of the ASEAN states do not exhibit much of the ‘we-feeling’, which is a crucial 
part of Deutschian security communities (Collins 2007: 217; Narine 2008: 412). That is 
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why, for them ASEAN is best described as a ‘security regime’, not a ‘security 
community’ (Collins 2007: 215; Narine 2008: 412).  
Looking back at ASEAN’s foundation, evolution and its regional and 
international relations, this author believes that not a single theoretical perspective 
captures all the important elements of ASEAN. As Nesadurai (2009: 91) underlines, 
ASEAN’s nature, its role, behaviour and achievements or failures “cannot be fitted into 
any neat theoretical categories that emphasize either material or ideational variables in 
explanation”. Each of the three perspectives examined can be used to highlight some 
key features of ASEAN. For example, realist accounts rightly single out the real-world 
problems that ASEAN member states faced and continue to face. The insights offered 
by the English School approach are also very useful for explaining the fact that the ‘we-
feeling’ that exists in ASEAN is primarily elite-centred as will be shown later. Yet, of 
these three perspectives, the author thinks that a constructivist approach has more 
advantages in explaining – if not, is the most suitable for analysing – ASEAN’s raison 
d’être and its way of functioning.92
5.1.2. ASEAN: A normative power 
 Consequently, the thesis adopts this perspective. 
In fact, there are a number of reasons this thesis adopts a constructivist view of 
ASEAN. One of these is that this perspective takes into account the vital role of 
ASEAN’s norms in its internal and external relations. In other words, it adopts a 
constructivist perspective because its claim that ASEAN has, for the better or the worse, 
developed its own set of norms to guide its internal and external affairs. Indeed, it 
agrees with Acharya (2005: 113) that “ASEAN regionalism has been primarily a 
normative regionalism” and Kivimaki (2001: 7) that ASEAN as “a normative 
community”, which is somehow similar to the community, constructed by liberal 
democracies.93
                                                 
92 While proposing an English School perspective to explain ASEAN, Narine (2008: 412) also 
acknowledges that constructivism offers the most useful, though limited, analysis of ASEAN. 
 Put differently, like the EU, ASEAN is a community building 
institution, which has developed its own norms to “mediate disputes and guide 
interaction between its members, and to underpin a process of identity construction” 
(Haacke 2005: 4) as well as to respond to external challenges and forces (Acharya 2006: 
157). 
93 Yet, he distinguishes ASEAN’s ‘normative community’ from a ‘normative community’, which is 
constructed by liberal democracies that is premised on liberal and democratic norms. Later, the chapter 
will develop in more detail this difference. 
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The second reason the thesis opts for a constructivist approach to ASEAN is that 
it recognises the contribution of ASEAN and its norms to security in Southeast Asia. 
While it debatable to argue that ASEAN is a security community, it is plausible to 
maintain that ASEAN and its norms have significantly contributed to regional security. 
This position is upheld by many scholars on ASEAN. Kivimaki (2001) maintains that 
ASEAN’s founding nations were able to cope with their intra-regional conflicts and 
achieved a long peace, because they respected the principle of non-interference into 
each other’s domestic politics. In a later work, he also shows that ASEAN has pacified 
its members as well as intra-ASEAN interstate relations (Kivimaki 2007). Another 
important point he makes is that to assess the success or failure of ASEAN and its 
norms, one should not do so from the viewpoint of European mechanisms and 
objectives of integration. ASEAN is an instrument for Southeast Asian, not European, 
integration, and consequently, it needs to be explained against the backdrop of 
Southeast Asian objectives, not European ones (Kivimaki 2007: 432). Premised on 
ASEAN’s 1967 Bangkok Declaration, he points out that one of ASEAN’s two major 
goals is regional stability (Kivimaki 2007: 434).94 Judging by this objective, ASEAN 
has achieved its goal because Southeast Asia is more peaceful – or more exactly, less 
conflictual – than its pre-ASEAN period.95
Moreover, ASEAN has played a lead role in the creation and maintenance of 
wider regional institutions, e.g. ARF, APT and EAS, which involve major powers, e.g. 
China, Japan, Russia and the US, even though economically and militarily ASEAN is 
weaker than these powers.
 Kivimaki (2001; 2007) also argues that 
ASEAN’s normative agenda contributed to this stability. This view is also held by other 
scholars, e.g. Dosch and Mols (1998), Acharya (2001; 2005a; 2005b) Tan and Cossa 
(2001), Jetly (2003) and Caballero-Anthony (2005). For instance, Caballero-Anthony 
(2005: 22) underlines ASEAN’s success in terms of its conflict management and 
avoidance and maintains that its norms contribute its achievements. Similarly, Dosch 
and Mols (1998: 172) highlight the success of the ASEAN’s norms and its model.  
96
                                                 
94 ASEAN’s other declared goal is economic development. However, security is more important because 
security was the rationale behind ASEAN’s foundation and remains the defining feature that determines 
ASEAN and its role in the region.   
 ASEAN is the central axis of the regional collaboration 
(Park 2012: 270) and it has this ‘disproportionate regional influence’ because it 
95 For him, the absence of a war between ASEAN’s founding members was a significant success because 
prior to its establishment the outlook for regional security was particularly grim. 
96 No other regional organisations in the developing world, not even MERCOSUR, have managed such 
high-level engagements with major external powers (Dosch and Mols 1998: 171). 
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possesses a set of principles that are accepted by other regional powers (De Castro 
2000; Higgott 2000b; Dieter and Higgott 2002; Stubbs 2002; Eaton and Stubbs 2006; 
Desker 2008; Stubbs 2008). Thus, not only do ASEAN’s norms guide its internal and 
external relations. They are also accepted by other regional countries and chosen as the 
mode of function for ASEAN-plus institutions. The ARF adopted the norms of the TAC 
and the ASEAN way as its basic legal framework (ARF 1994; Busse 1999: 53; Khong 
and Nesadurai 2007: 34). The ADMM-Plus too accepted the ASEAN way as its modus 
operandi (ADMM 2007; 2009; Teo 2010). The accession to TAC is a precursor to 
membership of the EAS.97 Indeed, based on its efforts to develop norms to guide its 
internal and external relations as well as its attempts to encourage – and, to some extent, 
its success in persuading – other wider regional organisations to adopt its preferred 
norms, ASEAN is a notable norm entrepreneur (Katsumata 2003; Acharya 2004; 
Rüland 2011). Moreover, it can be seen as a normative power because it fits very well 
the conceptualisation of normative power made by Manners (2002) and De Zutter 
(2011).98
                                                 
97 ASEAN’s preference for informality and non-binding mechanisms even prevailed American and 
Australian preferences in the institutional design of APEC (Khong and Nesadurai 2007: 32). 
 For Manners (2002: 252), the concept of NPE is built on the crucial 
observation that the most important factor shaping the EU’s international role is what it 
is. Similarly, it can safely be argued that the most crucial factor defining ASEAN’s role 
in the wider Pacific-Asia region and its actorness in general is its raison d’être. Loder et 
al. (2011: 83) convincingly argue that ASEAN has played a central role in the 
development of East Asian regionalism because has been able to develop widely 
accepted regional norms. Robinson (2011: 49) even goes further contending “that 
ASEAN may in fact be much closer to the EU’s own aspiration for normative power 
than the EU is itself”. For this reason, he concludes that “ASEAN’s [normative] 
framework has importance in terms of the very edifice on which the normative power 
Europe thesis has been constructed” (Robinson 2011: 50). While it is debateable to 
maintain that the EU should learn from ASEAN as Robinson suggests, it is clear that, 
like the EU, ASEAN is an active norm entrepreneur and an influential normative power. 
It illustrates well a key argument maintained by the thesis – that is norm entrepreneurs 
in world politics are not always Western and powerful actors as much of the literature 
98 For Manners (2002: 239) normative power is defined as its ability to shape conceptions of normal while 
De Zutter (2010: 1122) regards it “as the identity of a power in the international system that shapes the 
normal in world politics through its norm-driven practices and the adaption of its norms by others”. 
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on norms assumes. Non-Western and weak countries or regional organisations also 
actively engage in norm entrepreneurship.  
It is very important to note that not only do constructivist-minded scholars 
highlight the central part of ASEAN’s norms in its regional and international relations 
and its active role in norm generation and diffusion. They also underline that the set of 
norms advocated by ASEAN differ from and even compete with those promoted by 
other Western powers and the EU in particular. For instance, Stubbs (2008) maintains 
that by fostering a distinct way of conducting its internal and external relations, which is 
accepted by regional countries, ASEAN offers an alternative normative model to global 
governance, which is often dominated by the liberal paradigm advocated by the West. 
More precisely, ASEAN’s normative paradigm, which centres around the principle of 
non-interference, diverges from and even opposes the Western model, which focuses on 
the norm of intervention (Kuhonta 2006: 344; Dunn et al 2010). In other words, the 
codes of conduct or standards of acceptable behaviour in international relations that 
ASEAN and its members uphold and promote are not intervention but non-intervention. 
This point should be underlined because it enables the thesis to explain why the EU and 
ASEAN disagreed with each other over human rights, East Timor and Myanmar. It also 
shows that normative power is not always a force for good as it is often maintained by 
scholars on NPE, e.g. Manners (2002), who regard the EU as something positive in 
world politics; it can be a source of rivalry and conflict (Steinkohl 2010). 
Another important issue underlined by constructivists, e.g. Stubbs (2008), for 
which a constructivist perspective is adopted, is that the historical context of Southeast 
Asia significantly shapes ASEAN’s norms. According to this, while norms might have a 
universal significance, they are often locally interpreted and practised. In one of his 
works, Leifer (1999: 28-9) argues that ASEAN’s norms are “part and parcel of the 
standard working practice of international society writ large and not in any way 
particular and exclusive to the Association or its regional locale”. This is somehow true 
because ASEAN’s core norms are widely recognised by the international system and 
strongly upheld by many regional organisations, notably those in the developing world 
(Kuhonta 2006: 344-5). Yet, his argument is unable to explain why those norms are not 
fervently advocated by the EU. This point is also very important because it allows the 
thesis to explain adequately the reason behind ASEAN’s set of norms, which is 
radically different from the EU’s and why the EU and ASEAN find it difficult to 
interact with each other.  
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In short, a constructivist approach is very useful in describing ASEAN and its 
norms. Indeed, anchoring its argument in this theoretical perspective and judging by the 
way ASEAN has espoused norms to inform its internal and external relations and by the 
fact that its norms have been adopted as the mode of function for other broader regional 
institutions, the thesis holds that ASEAN is a ‘norm entrepreneur’. As noted, that view 
is already maintained by some scholars, e.g. Katsumata (2006) and Rüland (2011). 
Stubbs (2008: 455) labels ASEAN as a ‘norm guardian’ because according to him 
ASEAN took on boards the norms that had been widely discussed in Asia from the late 
1940s through to the 1960s. For Acharya (2011), ASEAN engages in norm subsidiarity. 
In the current literature, with the exception of Robinson (2011: 51), who maintains that 
ASEAN embodies the characteristics, e.g. the presence and influence through form and 
being, of normative power, no work goes further arguing that ASEAN is a normative 
power. Adopting Manners (2002: 239, 252), who regards a normative power as a power 
that has the ability to shape the normal in world politics or the power whose influence 
lies in its being, i.e. what it is, and notably De Zutter (2010: 1122), this thesis contends 
that, like the EU, ASEAN is a normative power. Yet, such a depiction of ASEAN raises 
a number of important issues. One of these is, if it is a normative power, what type of 
normative power it is. In other words, how different is it from a normative power 
Europe, or more exactly, a cosmopolitan normative power Europe examined in Chapter 
4. To answer this, it is vital to examine its norms.  
5.1.3. ASEAN’s normative foundation 
As it has been examined so far, the principles that have become ASEAN’s modus 
vivendi and modus operandi as well as the mode of function for other wider regional 
institutions predominantly lie in the ASEAN way. Like the concept of European values 
in European studies, the ‘ASEAN way’ is probably one of the most discussed issues in 
the literature on ASEAN. Yet, while there are a great number of accounts on it, e.g. 
Acharya (1997; 2001), Ravenhill (1998), Askandar et al. (2002), Sharpe (2003), 
Katsumata (2003), Haacke (2005), Nishikawa (2007), it is often interpreted differently 
because there is no official definition of the term. Acharya (2001: 47) makes a 
distinction between the ‘ASEAN norms’ and the ‘ASEAN way’, by arguing that the 
ASEAN norms derive from international documents whereas the ‘ASEAN way’ comes 
from the local social, cultural and political milieu. Among the ASEAN norms, Acharya 
(2001: 47-62) identifies four core categories to which the ASEAN norms and principles 
belong: (1) the non-use of force and pacific settlement of disputes, (2) regional 
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autonomy and collective self-reliance, (3) non-interference in other states’ internal 
affairs and (4) the rejection of an ASEAN military pact in favour of a bilateral defence 
cooperation. These norms, also known as the legal-political norms, are the fundamental 
principles enshrined in the UN Charter. With regard to the ASEAN’s social-cultural 
norms, Acharya (2001: 63-70) identifies a number of attributes. Among these, there are 
three, which are of particular importance for ASEAN, namely: a preference for 
informality, a related aversion to institutionalisation and consensus building, which 
focuses on consultation based on equality and tolerance. 
However, Haacke (2005: 5) argues that Acharya’s distinction between the 
ASEAN norms and the ASEAN way is unnecessary. According to him, Acharya 
attempted to distinguish the latter from the former because he thought it made little 
sense to consider the universal norms, e.g. non-use of force or non-interference, as 
typical to ASEAN, because “the leaders and officials of most, if not, all countries 
subscribe to them” (Haacke 2005: 5). Nevertheless, he points out that while it may be 
true that politicians around the world tend to endorse those norms, “the relevance and 
significance of these principles to individual states is likely to depend on the context of 
interaction in which leaders operate. The legal principles thus have varied political 
meanings” (Haacke 2005: 5). To demonstrate the contextual condition in the 
understanding and application of these norms, Haacke refers to Acharya’s own 
explanation of the obligations imposed by ASEAN’s doctrine of non-interference on its 
members. One of these is refraining from criticising the actions of a member 
government towards its own people, including violations of human rights and from 
making the domestic political system of states and the political styles  of governments a 
basis for deciding on their membership in ASEAN (Acharya 2001: 58; Haacke 2005: 5). 
Undoubtedly, the EU does not have such an interpretation and application of the 
principle of non-interference. In other words, this principle has been ASEANised. That 
is why instead of distinguishing the ASEAN norms, i.e. the legal-political norms, from 
the ASEAN way, i.e. social-cultural norms, Haacke (2005: 214) combines and calls 
them the ‘ASEAN way’. In doing so, he identifies six norms as making up the core of 
the ASEAN way: (1) sovereign equality, (2) non-use of force and the peaceful 
settlement of conflict, (3) non-interference and non-intervention, (4) the non-
involvement of ASEAN to address unsolved bilateral conflict between members, (5) 
quiet diplomacy and (6) mutual respect and tolerance.  
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This author thinks that Haacke’s argument is more plausible because, as 
Katsumata (2003: 111) comments, while many of ASEAN’s core principles are not 
peculiar to Asia,99 ASEAN states adopted these principles in their particular regional 
politics.100 Yet, the argument here is not whether or not the ASEAN norms, i.e. the 
legal-political norms, such as non-intervention and non-interference, can be seen as part 
of the ‘ASEAN way’. Rather, by referring to Acharya and Haacke, this section aims to 
identify the key norms that ASEAN states have developed to guide its regional and 
external relations. In this light, it is clear that even though Acharya and Haacke 
categorise ASEAN’s norms differently, they identify almost the same six core norms of 
ASEAN.101
If respect for human rights is the most promoted principle in the EU’s the internal 
and external relations, non-interference is “the single most important principle 
undermining ASEAN regionalism” (Acharya 2001: 3). It has been elevated into “a 
central pillar of Southeast Asian regionalism” Jones (2010: 479) and remains “central to 
regional governance” (Nesadurai 2009: 91). Dosch (2008: 525) regards it as “the sine 
qua non of regional cooperation”. This principle is always present in ASEAN’s main 
key documents.
 That means the six norms, which constitutes the ASEAN way, radically 
differs from the EU’s nine constitutive norms. There is not a single norm, which is 
advocated by both organisations. This is the key reason why this thesis maintains that in 
terms of their normative premises, the EU and ASEAN are fundamentally different 
from each other. An in-depth examination of ASEAN’s principle of non-interference 
demonstrates more clearly the normative differences of the EU and ASEAN. 
102
                                                 
99 According to an ASEAN official, “the non-interference is the foundation of the entire inter-state 
system. Thus, this principle is not special for ASEAN states. Every regional and international 
organisation has it as a principle” (Interview, 2009). 
 The 1967 Bangkok Declaration stated that ASEAN members “are 
determined to ensure their stability and security from external interference in any form 
or manifestation” (AMM, para. 5). The emphasis on non-interference was also obvious 
in the TAC because the first three clauses of Article 2 of this treaty are related to it 
100 Having said that, it is important to underline that a particular feature, which makes the ‘ASEAN way’ 
typically Asian and special, is its socio-cultural norms, also known as the procedural norms. 
101 Stubbs (2006: 456-7), identifies five ideas that lie at the heart of ASEAN’s approach to its regional and 
international relations. They are: (1) neutrality in the Cold War context, (2) sovereignty, territorial 
integrity and non-interference, (3) peaceful settlement to disputes, (4) informality, consultation and 
compromise and (5) the promotion of domestic stability and harmony.  
102 According to Kuhonta (2006: 343), there is such emphasis on non-interference because “[i]n theory 
and in practice, ASEAN has relentlessly underscored the belief that stability and progress in the region 
can only be built upon the legitimacy of state boundaries”. 
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(Kivimaki 2007: 434).103
According to Acharya (2001: 58), this non-interference obliges ASEAN members 
to do (or not to do) a number of things. First, they have to refrain “from criticising the 
actions of a member government towards its own people, including violations of human 
rights, and from making the domestic political systems of states and the political styles 
of governments a basis for deciding on their membership in ASEAN”. As will be shown 
in Chapter 7, this is reflected by ASEAN’s admission of Myanmar despite the latter’s 
poor human rights record in 1997. This example also shows radical differences between 
ASEAN and the EU, which sets political criteria, i.e. respect for human rights, for 
countries seeking membership. Second, they must criticise “the actions of states which 
were deemed to have breached the non-interference principle”. Third, they are obliged 
to deny “recognition, sanctuary, or other forms of support to any rebel group seeking to 
destabilise or overthrow the government of a neighbouring state”. Finally, they have an 
obligation to provide “political support and material assistance to member states in their 
campaign against subversive and destabilising activities”. Again, these four elements 
are totally absent in – and at odds with – the EU’s set of norms.  
 The preamble of the ASEAN Charter (ASEAN Summit 2007) 
reaffirms this principle. In other words, ASEAN states believe in the principle that they 
have the right to build their own political system without outside interference.  
5.1.4. ASEAN: A communitarian normative power 
The examination of ASEAN’s normative preferences and its core principle of 
non-interference show that norms are predominantly state-centric. For this reason, it is 
more suitable to describe it as a communitarian normative power. To illustrate why such 
a typology summarises well ASEAN and its core norms, it is worth examining the 
concept of security in Southeast Asia context. Security is a critical and often contested 
concept (Bellamy 2004: 175) because it has many facets, which vary depending on 
“whose security is threatened, the nature and gravity of the threat, the source of the 
threat, and the authority responsible for identifying and describing the entity, the threat 
and the source” (Emmerson 2009b: 5). This remark is very apt in the context of 
Southeast Asia. Bellamy (2004) identifies three forms of security in Southeast Asia 
(Bellamy 2004). The first and broadest level is regional security. The second level is the 
                                                 
103 They are (1) mutual respect for independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial and national identity of 
all nations, (2) the right of every state to lead its national existence free from external interference, 
subversion or coercion and (3) non-interference in each other’s internal affairs. They are also the first 
three of the six core principles of the TAC (1976, Article 2). The other three are: (1) settlement of 
differences or disputes by peaceful means, (2) renunciation of the threat or use of force and (3) effective 
cooperation among regime. 
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territorial integrity and sovereignty of its member states.104 The third level of security is 
that of the regimes or the ruling elites in the region (Bellamy 2004: 166; Kivimaki 2007: 
434; Stubbs: 2008: 459). Furthermore, in Southeast Asia, as Bellamy (2004: 158) notes, 
three sources of threats to security can be identified. The first form threats emanates 
from other regional states. The second form comes from outside the region. For 
instance, in the 1950s and 1960s, China actively supported communist insurgents in 
many Southeast Asian countries (Yahuda 1983: 219; Narine 2002: 76-7; Storey 2002: 
205; Katsumata 2003: 112).105 Another external force, perceived as posing challenge to 
the security of the regional states or, more specifically, to the security of particular 
regimes/governments, is liberalism, which mainly emanates from the West, especially 
years just after the Cold War.106
A brief overview of the forms and sources of security in Southeast Asia shows 
that security in this region is primarily state-centred. It is also very regime-focused. For 
Bellamy (2004: 165-6), “it is not the state per se that is considered to be the primary 
referent of security by political leaders, but particular ruling regimes and elites”. This is 
because, in his view, “throughout much of the Cold War and still today for many of the 
region’s states (...), the paramount concern has been the consolidation, legitimatisation 
and security of particular regimes and ruling elites”. Bellamy’s argument is reasonable 
because it is widely acknowledged that “ASEAN’s primary concern has been with 
regime survival” (Acharya 1999: 428) and “[m]ost ASEAN states remain dominated by 
narrow elites” (Narine 2008: 425).
 The third form of threat stems from within individual 
states. In the early period, the destabilising forces were almost exclusively related to 
communist insurgences, supported by China. In recent years, a major internal threat, 
which some regional regimes and governments consider to be destabilising, is the 
activists and movements for human rights and democracy (Bellamy 2004: 168).  
107
                                                 
104 The two first forms are underlined in ASEAN’s key documents, e.g. the Bangkok Declaration (AMM 
1967), the ASEAN Concord I (ASEAN Summit 1976a), the TAC (ASEAN Summit 1976b) and the 
ASEAN Charter (ASEAN Summit 2007).  
 Kivimaki (2007: 434) also maintains that security 
was interpreted in an elitist manner, almost identical to security of the regimes. Such a 
105 Other perceived external threats during the Cold War were Vietnam and the Soviet Union. In the post-
Cold War era, China is still perceived as a great challenge to Southeast Asian countries (Grant 1993; 
Tenorio 1997; Goldstein 1997/98; Baviera 2004; Ravenhill 2006). 
106 For instance, in his speech to the UN General Assembly in 1999 Malaysia’s Prime Minister Mohamad 
Mahathir said: “Before, it was the Communists who stirred up rebellion everywhere, including Malaysia. 
Now we have the liberal democrats doing exactly the same in the same manner (...). Whether it is 
communist or liberal democratic insurrection, the people suffer not one bit less” (Mahathir 1999). 
107 For an in-depth understanding of the lack of democracy in ASEAN countries, see Case (2004) and 
especially the issue of The Pacific Review, vol. 22, no. 3 (2009) that focuses on the contemporary 
authoritarianism in Southeast Asia. 
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prioritisation of regime security over individual security plays an important part in 
ASEAN states’ marginalisation of human rights and democracy. For instance, the 
obligations that ASEAN states have to follow with regard to the principle of non-
interference, e.g. refraining from criticising the actions of a member government 
towards its own people, including violation of human rights, are aimed at protecting 
regimes/governments (Acharya 2001: 58; Haacke 2005a). Because of this, Katsumata 
(2009: 620) believes that ASEAN diplomacy has been state-centred and designed to 
address the interests of governments. Arguments like those of Bellamy and Katsumata 
are justified if one looks at the region’s political systems and situations. According 
Freedom House, in 2010 most of the ASEAN countries were either ‘not free’ or only 
‘partly free’ (see Table 5.1).  
Furthermore, as Table 5.1 illustrates, the level of freedom in Southeast Asian 
countries has not improved during the last eight years. While the average score of the 
political rights of the ten ASEAN countries slightly increased, from 4.8 in 2002 to 5.3 in 
2010, the average score of the civil liberties decreased from 4.8 in 2002 to 4.6 in 2010. 
The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Index of Democracy 2010 also shows that most of 
the ASEAN countries have either ‘hybrid regime’ or ‘authoritarian regime’ (see 
Appendix 9; Case 2004; 2009). In fact, compared to the EU members, the ASEAN 
members are far behind in terms of freedom and democracy. According to this Index, in 
2010 the highest ranked ASEAN country was Thailand, which ranked 57th of 167 
countries surveyed, whereas Bulgaria, which had the lowest core among the EU 
members, ranked 51st (see Appendix 10). It is also worth noting that, according to this 
index, the average score of nine ASEAN countries surveyed is 4.77. In contrast, the 
average score of the 27 members of the EU is 8.02. Thus, if based on this score, nine 
ASEAN countries were classified as ‘hybrid regimes’ whereas the 27 EU members 
were full democracies.  
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Given that reality, from a liberal perspective, ASEAN hardly qualifies as a 
security community because it is not underpinned by a liberal collective identity.108
                                                 
108 Adler (1992: 293) argues that, in a security community its members “hold dependable expectation of 
peaceful change not merely because they share just any kind of values, but because they share liberal 
democratic values”. 
 
According to Kuhonta (2006: 339-40), by emphasising sovereignty and non-
interference in order to protect regime security and political stability in the region, 
ASEAN neglects democratic norms. However, he maintains that given the relative 
peace in the region since ASEAN’s foundation, ASEAN can be defined as “a nascent 
security community” (Kuhonta 2006: 341). Nevertheless, as liberalism is obviously 
absent in the building of an ASEAN security community, the peace that ASEAN as a 
security community has brought about was built on an ‘illiberal’ foundation (Kuhonta 
2006: 340). Kuhonta’s argument is also supported by Kivimaki (2001: 5). Whether 
ASEAN should be seen as an illiberal security community is debatable. Nevertheless, is 
clear that the normative foundation on which ASEAN is primarily based is not the 
liberal and democratic norms that constitute the EU. Instead, it is premised on a set of 
state-centred norms. In this sense, ASEAN can be probably best described as a 
‘communitarian normative power’ because ASEAN and its normative underpinnings fit 
Table 5.1: The level of freedom in ASEAN countries 
Source: Freedom House (2002; 2010) 
According to Freedom House’s method, each country is assigned on a scale of 1 to 7 
for political rights (PR) and a similar rating for civil liberties (CL), with a rating of 1 
indicating the highest degree of freedom and 7 the lowest level of freedom. Each 
pair of political rights and civil liberties ratings is averaged to determine an overall 
status of “Free”, “Partly Free”, or “Not Free” Those whose ratings average 1.0 to 
2.5 are considered “Free”, 3.0 to 5.0 “Partly Free” and 5.5 to 7.0 “Not Free”. 
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very well the characteristics of a communitarian normative powers, e.g. its strong focus 
on state sovereignty, underlined in Chapter 2.  
To illustrate why ASEAN is best viewed as a ‘communitarian normative power’, 
it is worth briefly examining the concept of Asian values. This is because even though 
the Asian values discourse is neither confined to ASEAN nor officially present in its 
main documents, it is strongly advocated by the former leaders of two of ASEAN 
members, Malaysia’s Mahathir Mohamad and Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew (Lee 2000). 
As maintained by Nesadurai (2009: 108; see also Kraft 2001: 33-55), not a single 
ASEAN country, not even the democratic Philippines, challenged the notion. This 
means ASEAN states tacitly supported it. In fact, a number of ASEAN countries, 
notably Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia, asserted the Asian values to resist the 
human rights and democracy discourse promoted by the West in the 1990s (Mauzy 
1997: 211-2). The Asian values discourse was even regarded as “a prominent and 
distinctive part of Southeast Asia’s identity during the boom years” (Beeson 2002: 561). 
Therefore, it is of significant importance to note some key points of this concept.109
To begin with, it must be acknowledged that the discourse on Asian values is 
controversial (Levine 2007a: 1). One of the reasons for its controversy is the difficulty 
to determine whether such a set of values, which is distinctively Asian in character, 
exists (Levine 2007b: 106). Yet, the fact that there is a debate about it implies that there 
must be ‘something’ in it. This ‘something’ is another major reason for the controversy. 
On the one hand, its advocates, like Malaysia’s Mahathir Mohamad or Singapore’s Lee 
Kuan Yew, maintain that Asian people put the ‘rights’ of the community (i.e. family, 
society or state) ahead of their individual rights (Lee 1993). According to an ASEAN 
official, unlike Europeans, who are more relaxed about authority, “Asians are still very 
much family/society-oriented and respectful toward authority” (Interview, 2009). For a 
former ambassador of an EU country to an ASEAN country, Asian values exist in many 
ways. “For examples, in Asia, you have the rule of man more than rule of law while in 
Europe there is the rule of law more than rule of man. That is basically an Asian 
value”.
  
110
                                                 
109 For more about ‘Asian values’ and the debates on this concept, see Moody (1996), Mauzy (1997), 
Öjendal and Antlöv (1998), Bauer and Bell (1999), Barr (2000), Bell (2000; 2006), Hill (2000), Langguth 
(2003), Chong (2004), Huat (2004), Thompson (2004), Levine (2007a; 2007b) and Huang (2007). 
 In contrast, others argue that Asian values are simply the instruments that 
110 According to this official, now working as visiting professor in Singapore, “the fundamental reason 
behind this is that in Confucianism, Hinduism, and maybe in Islam, people are educated to believe that 
they have emperors or the sons of heaven, who are capable of making good decisions for them. 
Consequently, they should trust them” (2009, author’s interview). 
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Asian governments use to justify their human rights abuses and undemocratic practices 
(Barr 2000: 309). Whether “Asian traditions typically entail respect for authority and 
hierarchy” (Pettman 2010: 301) or that Asian values are just self-serving arguments of 
Asia’s paternalistic and illiberal governments (Barr 2000: 312) is a question of debate. 
Yet, whatever the ulterior motives behind Asian values are, Asian and ASEAN states 
tend to put the state – and in some case, the ruling elite – before the individual. In this 
sense, Asian values sharply contrast with, if not are at odds with, Western/European 
values, which emphasise the rights of the individual. This divergence is illustrated by 
the fact that regionalism in Southeast Asia does not seek to “generate the kind of ‘we-
feeling’ and concerns for values such as human rights, democratization and social 
justice that help support the building of a people-centred ASEAN community” 
(Nesadurai 2009: 105). In other words, the advocate for the Asian values by some 
ASEAN’s leaders makes ASEAN approximate a ‘communitarian normative power’, 
which radically diverges from a predominantly individual-focused or cosmopolitan 
normative power Europe. Furthermore, as will be shown in Chapters 6 and 7, these 
normative divergences are the main reasons for the clashes between the two 
organisations over human rights and the issues of East Timor and Myanmar in the 
1990s. 
Finally, it is worth noting that the ‘Asian values’, the ‘ASEAN way’ and its core 
principle of non-interference have been greatly challenged, especially after the 1997/8 
Asian financial crisis. It is believed that these principles, notably non-interference, 
prevented ASEAN from taking important actions over economic crises and problematic 
members like Myanmar (Jones 2010: 479). Whether it is because of those criticisms or 
because of their awareness that they needed to change in order to facilitate economic 
and political integration, in 2007, at ASEAN’s 40th anniversary, its members signed the 
ASEAN Charter and established a regional Human Rights Body (HRB). The agreement 
to sign the Charter and create the HRB is a landmark for ASEAN because marked its 
“liberal turn”, which now “explicitly identifies the rule of law, good governance, 
democratic principles and constitutional governments as essential elements of political 
order” (Dosch 2008: 527). However, that turn was a hesitant one as “it is a long way 
from the cautious acceptance of general democratic values to the active promotion and 
regional enforcement of rules based on these norms” (Dosch 2008: 527). Despites 
including these ‘liberal norms’ in its Charter, ASEAN reiterated its traditional norms as 
its core principles. In fact, the “fundamental importance” of “sovereignty” and “non-
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interference” still comes before any talk of ensuring democracy in the Charter. Given 
ASEAN’s refusal to modify or abandon its cardinal principle, it is difficult, if not 
impossible, for ASEAN’s HRB to produce anything of substance (Jones 2008: 737; 
Nesadurai 2009: 05; see also Chalermpalanupap 2008; Caballero-Anthony 2008; 2009). 
This is reflected by the fact that, despite approving the terms of reference for its HRB in 
2009, due to this body’s weak mandate and ASEAN’s strong insistence on the principle 
of non-interference, ASEAN has not made any concrete results in the human rights area 
(International Federation of Human Rights 2010; Doan 2012b). 
Briefly, from what it has examined, it is clear that maintaining security was and 
remains a preoccupation of ASEAN countries. To achieve this goal they have evolved 
and promoted the ASEAN way, which they regard as the ‘normal’ way of conducting 
their regional and international affairs. That means although the goal that ASEAN states 
have sought to achieve is very ‘realist’, i.e. state-centred and sovereignty-focused, the 
instruments they have employed to attain this objective are primarily ‘soft’ means, i.e. 
norms. In other words, like the EU, ASEAN upholds and promotes norms in its internal 
and external relations. Indeed, like the EU, ASEAN is a norm entrepreneur and 
normative power. The difference is the standards of acceptable behaviour developed 
and promoted by ASEAN radically differ from the EU’s. This section also noted that 
some ASEAN countries have advocated Asian values. Whether some cultural elements 
exist in the concept remains an open question. Yet, whatever the reason behind the 
concept, most of the region’s governments did not cherish democratic norms. For this 
reason, despite its recent attempt to create a HRB, ASEAN remains a state-centric 
organisation, which hesitantly moves towards a community based on a liberal and 
democratic foundation. For this reason, it is apt to describe ASEAN as a communitarian 
normative power. The question arises is why ASEAN states have been concerned about 
security and advocated the ASEAN way to conduct their internal and external affairs. 
This leads to the second section of the chapter. 
5.2. The sources of ASEAN’s state-centric norms 
Chapter 2 identified a number of factors and actors that define the normative 
underpinnings of a political entity, e.g. its historical legacy, its economic and political 
situation, the external/geopolitical actors and factors it has to deal with. Chapter 4 has 
illustrated how these have defined the EU’s normative premises and differences. 
Similarly, this section uses these to explain ASEAN’s normative foundation and 
differentiation (from the EU’s).  
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5.2.1. Southeast Asia’s historical background 
Chief among those factors is its historical context. In fact, like European 
integration, the EU’s identity and its norms, ASEAN regionalism, its identity and 
normative underpinnings have been influentially shaped by Southeast Asia’s historical 
background. The primary difference is that for the former, it is Europe’s war-torn past 
whereas for the latter, it is its colonial experience. Such difference is also a defining 
factor that makes the EU and its norms radically differ from ASEAN and its normative 
foundation. It also makes regionalism in (Western) Europe and Southeast Asia diverges 
from each other. As noted by Yeo (2009b: 195), for the former, “regionalism is seen as 
a restraining force against ultranationalism and a building block towards a new level of 
governance through the pooling of sovereignty”. In contrast, for the latter, “regionalism 
will be tailed to complement and strengthen nationalism not replace it”. 
Southeast Asia’s colonialism as a defining factor leading to ASEAN’s formation 
and its ‘ASEAN way’ is widely recognised (Beeson 2002: 550; Katsumata 2003: 112; 
Nishikawa 2007: 44; Yeo 2009b: 194). In Southeast Asia, all countries, except 
Thailand, had been colonised and had recently gained their independence. As they had 
never experienced sovereign statehood (Wunderlich 2007: 73), and even for them, “the 
concept of a frontier was uncommon, if not unknown” (Tarling 1998: 47), sovereignty 
has been obviously cherished (Gilson 2011: 236). Furthermore, as they had to fight very 
hard – in some cases, bloody and deadly wars – against their colonial masters to gain 
their independence (Yeo 2009b: 194), it is unsurprising that “the region’s first and 
foremost principle is protection of sovereignty” (Nishikawa 2007: 44). In other words, 
perhaps like other countries in the Third Word, ASEAN states’ particular commitment 
to the norm of sovereignty was first developed out of a drawn-out struggle for 
independence and sovereign equality in international society (Busse 1999: 46; Haacke 
2003: 31). Indeed, the genesis of the ASEAN way “is best conceived as both a 
nationalist struggle and the outcome of a longstanding struggle for recognition and 
security” (Haacke 2005: 51). It is for this reason that ASEAN states placed a particular 
emphasis on the principle of non-interference (Katsumata 2003: 112), which has 
become a guiding principle for ASEAN (Henderson 1999: 16-17), and that 
“institutional design in ASEAN remains wedded to state sovereignty” (Khong and 
Nesadurai 2007: 33). Briefly, given their preoccupation with sovereignty, ASEAN 
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states were and are still unwilling to allow other member states or external powers to 
interfere into their internal affairs.  
Coupled with their particular emphasis on sovereignty, Southeast Asian countries 
were also concerned about their domestic stability. This factor defined their interaction 
and their adoption of the ASEAN way as the mode of function for their relations 
(Katsumata 2003: 113). The fundamental reason behind their preoccupation is that 
colonialism left these newly independent nations with great challenges (Elson 2004: 15-
29). One of these was the weakness of their internal infrastructures and institutions. 
During the colonial period, institutional structures and economic developments had 
depended on colonial powers and when they left, the newly-independent states faced 
huge problems of nation-building (Beeson 2002: 550). In addition, each country faced 
deeply ethnic and cultural divisions (Nesadurai 2008: 225). Another major issue was 
related to long-standing territorial disputes between regional countries (Dixon 1991: 9; 
Henderson 1999: 15). Given these challenges, the ultimate objective of the post-colonial 
leaders was to consolidate their fragile and newly acquired statehood (Tilman 1989: 12). 
For them, nation building and domestic developments were far more important than 
region building (Yeo 2009b: 194-5). As they were too weak physically to defend their 
statehood against other regional states or domestic problems, ASEAN states knew that 
they could only survive if others would respect their sovereignty (Jackson 1993). 
Consequently, “the normative ideal of sovereignty became the standard prescription for 
almost every political disease in the region and the cornerstone of ASEAN’s attempt at 
creating a regional order” (Busse (1999: 47). As summed up by Ghazali Shafie,111
It is also imperative to underline that despite major changes in the international 
system during the last decades, the challenges that ASEAN states faced 40 or 50 years 
ago have not been completely resolved.
 
ASEAN states “were recommending a special kind of relationship conscious of the fact 
that the modern state entities in the region were the product of colonial designs, which 
had left a number of thorny residual problems, particularly in relations to national 
border” (quoted by Leifer 1996: 12). 
112
                                                 
111 He was Malaysia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and present at ASEAN’s Bangkok conference in 1967. 
 As put by Katsumata (2003: 104), “the 
political factors which affected the development of the “ASEAN Way” have not 
changed much”. For this reason, the ASEAN way has remained a constant feature of 
112 For instance, intra-regional territorial disputes, which were unsettled but largely dormant (Dixon 1991: 
9), have become salient recently. 
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ASEAN as well as its ASEAN-plus institutions (Khong and Nesadurai 2007: 33-4; Yeo 
2009: 195). During the interviews with the author, when asked why ASEAN states still 
strongly uphold the ASEAN way and especially its principle of sovereignty and non-
interference, an ASEAN official and a former ambassador of an EU member, referred to 
Southeast Asia’s colonial past and the reality that whatever they are, ASEAN states 
remain very young nations (Interview, 2009). These comments also illustrate well the 
argument that the background, location and perspective of a political entity influence its 
normative foundation and differentiation. Unlike Western countries, which acquired 
their statehood for centuries and had solid and established economic and political 
institutions, ASEAN states did not have those luxuries. Most ASEAN members remain 
fragile entities because they are still locked in a struggle to become – and, consequently, 
very preoccupied with creating – stable nation-states (Narine 2004; 2008: 425; 
Weatherbee 2005). Therefore, it is unsurprising that they are still strongly committed to 
the sovereignty norm (Rüland and Jetschke 2008: 406). Furthermore, unlike post-War 
World II European leaders, ASEAN elites were revolutionary leaders, i.e. they came to 
power not through free and democratic elections and stayed in power for decades (Tan 
2005: 9). Accordingly, they did not hold the liberal democratic ideals that (Western) 
European countries had long embraced.113
Another important factor, which is identified by Henderson (1999: 16) as one of 
the three reasons behind ASEAN’s adoption of the non-interference principle as its 
guiding tenet, is its members’ sheer diversities. Compared with Western Europe, 
Southeast Asia is a much more heterogeneous region in terms of politics, economy and 
culture (Zhu 2007: 156). Politically, unlike the EU, which is a club of liberal 
democracy, ASEAN includes a wide spectrum of political systems, ranging from an 
 Chapter 4 has maintained that the emphasis 
of the EU on individual rights and freedoms is also linked to the legacy of 
Enlightenment. Asia did not have such a philosophical heritage. Instead, some ASEAN 
leaders promoted the Asian values, which preferred collective rights to individual rights. 
Whether there are some cultural elements behind the Asian values is open to debate. 
Yet, the point made is that Asia’s non-experience of a Europe-like Enlightenment is a 
reason for ASEAN’s scant attention to the individual’s rights and its absence of liberal-
democratic political arrangements.  
                                                 
113 Western Europe countries have more or less the same political system, i.e. liberal democracy (Zhu 
2007: 157). According to Wallace (2000: 50), “[t]he EC and later the EU were in part devised to 
contribute to democratic stabilization as the club of European liberal democracies”. 
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authoritarian military regime in Myanmar and authoritarian communist governments in 
Vietnam and Laos through a hybrid regime in Cambodia to flawed democracy in other 
countries (see Appendix 9). Economically, the disparity between ASEAN members is 
huge. For example, in 2009, Singapore’s GDP per capital was US$ 36,379 whereas the 
Myanmar’s was only US$ 571 (see Appendix 4). Culturally, unlike Christian Europe,114
 
 
Southeast Asia is a polyglot region of many different religions: Confucianism, 
Buddhism, Islam and Christianity (Chopparapu 2005: 135; Fong 2005: 8). Given these 
immense diversities, ASEAN states need to respect their diversity and create some unity 
among them. The ASEAN way is a feasible means of attaining that unity and promoting 
cooperation. In other words, the ASEAN way may be not desirable but it is a workable 
way of promoting regional cooperation (Zhu 2007: 156) because it allows its members 
to participate in a cooperative endeavour (Jetschke 2009: 413). 
5.2.2. External factors and actors 
In addition to their internal factors or weaknesses, Southeast Asian countries are 
always vulnerable to external challenges and threats. This vulnerability significantly 
influences them in their approach to, and compliance with, the ‘ASEAN way’. In fact, a 
key and declared goal of non-Communist Southeast countries when establishing 
ASEAN in 1967 was to foster and strengthen their collective position against a 
threatening external environment: the rise of communism in their region and communist 
insurgencies in their own countries (Jorgensen-Dahl 1982: 73; Jetschke 2009: 411). 
This communist threat also defined ASEAN’s evolution in the 1970s and 1980s (Tasker 
1987: 106; Stubbs 2008: 456). For instance, their concern about a victorious Vietnam 
after the end of the Vietnam War in 1975 was the main reason behind unprecedented 
summit in Bali in 1976, during which they signed two major documents, i.e. the 
ASEAN Concord I and the TAC (Ganesan 1995: 214; Tenorio 1997; McDougall 2008: 
46; Narine 2008: 415). In these two texts, which remain ASEAN’s important 
documents, notably the latter, ASEAN leaders were strongly determined to ensure their 
region and their respective countries from external interference in any form or manner. 
Vietnam’s intervention in Cambodia in 1978 made ASEAN more committed to its key 
norms, notably non-interference (Busse 1999: 48-50). In fact, these norms enabled 
                                                 
114 Even though it is increasingly becoming a multi-religious space, Europe remains a Christian continent. 
In fact, Christianity has significantly shaped European integration, identity and politics (Leustean and 
Madeley 2009; 2010; Leustean 2013). 
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ASEAN to sustain the Cambodian conflict on the international agenda despite its 
limited material capabilities and the marginal international interest in its region at that 
time (Khong and Nesadurai 2007: 35). For example, as noted in Chapter 3, in the Joint 
Statement on Political Issues with the EC in 1980, ASEAN states emphasised the need 
for all states to observe strictly the principles of national sovereignty and non-
interference, which they regarded as vital importance to inter-state relations (AEMM 
1980b, point 1). In this sense, ASEAN’s principle of non-interference is aimed at 
restraining interference not only from a member state but also from major powers 
outside the region. That is why Yeo (2009b: 195) argues that ASEAN was also built on 
the need to restrain any interference from external powers.  
With the end of the Cold War and the resolution of the Cambodian conflict, 
ASEAN states no longer faced communist threats. Yet, other challenges have emerged. 
China’s rise and the recent tensions between China and some ASEAN members over 
the territorial disputes in the South China Sea are among the major security issues that 
ASEAN and its members have to face (Busse 1999: 51; Baviera 2004). To deal with the 
region’s volatility and its members’ vulnerability, ASEAN has attempted to shape the 
wider regional environment by engaging with China and other major powers to discuss 
and address shared regional problems, but based on its principles and practices 
(Nesadurai 2008: 227). In reality, as noted early, since the end of the Cold War, 
ASEAN has become more active in its dealing with the outside world (Busse 1999: 54). 
For instance, ASEAN’s TAC has become one of the strongest symbols of ASEAN’s 
influence in the Asia Pacific region (Narine 2008: 415). Chapter 2 underlines that the 
ecological process, i.e. the pattern of relations between actors and their environment, 
leads political actors to generate or maintain their norms (Kowert and Legro 1996: 470-
82). This is very true in ASEAN’s case because the regional and international setting 
during and after the Cold War has played a key role in prompting ASEAN to maintain 
and advocate its core norms. 
ASEAN’s strong focus on its ASEAN way and some ASEAN leaders’ promotion 
of Asian values in the first years of the 1990s were also due to the West’s insistence on 
the promotion of human rights following the collapse of the communist bloc. These 
principles and values became a useful means for them to deflect calls by the western 
powers to fully democratise, respect individual human rights (Nesadurai 2008: 228). As 
will be shown in the next chapter, ASEAN states often referred to these two sets of 
norms and values to resist the respect and promotion of democratic norms insisted by 
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the West and the EU in particular in the early 1990s. ASEAN states opposed the EU’s 
insistence on the promotion of human rights in the early 1990s, i.e. prior to the 
1997/1998 Asian financial crisis, partly because by the early 1990s, they were no longer 
the junior partners vis-à-vis the European countries. According to Manners (2002: 240), 
the EU’s hybrid polity and its political-legal constitution also make the EU’s normative 
premises differ from those of political actors. These two elements also exist in ASEAN. 
While ASEAN is much less institutionalised and legalised than the EU, it is an elite-
driven polity or entity, whose normative constitution is defined by its key documents. If 
the EU’s core norms, e.g. democracy and human rights, are enshrined in its main 
treaties and declarations, in the same vein ASEAN’s fundamental norms are preserved 
in its main documents.  
In short, a number of ‘we-group’ factors define ASEAN’s normative foundation 
and make it differ from the EU’s. Chief among these is Southeast Asian countries’ 
common colonial past. Though they are culturally, politically and economically 
heterogeneous, all Southeast Asian countries, but Thailand, shared colonial experiences 
and consequences. Another notable reason behind the ASEAN way is that before and 
ASEAN’s foundation and even now, ASEAN members always have to deal with 
different external powerful forces or ‘they-groups’ actors and factors. The promotion 
and prolongation of their ASEAN way are a feasible way for them to cope with those 
external challenges. Due to these ‘we-group’ and ‘they-group’ factors, ASEAN and its 
members had – and continue to embrace – shared objectives, namely protecting their 
respective national sovereignty and the region as a whole (from any external 
interference and intervention) and enhancing the stability of their respective countries 
and the region as a whole. In other words, like the EU and its normative underpinning, 
ASEAN its and ASEAN way are defined by both their ‘we-group’ factors, e.g. their 
shared colonial experience, and their ‘they-group’ ones, e.g. the communist threats 
during the Cold War, China’s rise and the West’s promotion of liberal values.  
As a way of concluding, this chapter compares ASEAN’s normative foundation 
with the EU’s one examined in the last chapter. Such a comparison enables the thesis to 
illustrate the differences between ASEAN’s norms and the EU’s, the reasons behind 
their normative differences, and most importantly, the impact of their normative 
divergences on their interaction, which will be the focus of its subsequent chapters. By 
doing so, three important points can be drawn here.  
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First, while norms play an integral part in the internal and external relations of the 
EU and ASEAN, the key normative premises that constitute them as actors in world 
politics fundamentally differ from each other. The EU espouses a set of liberal and 
cosmopolitan values, e.g. human rights and democracy. These values, which lie at the 
heart of the EU, define its international identity and role. In fact, promoting those values 
has been a key objective of its foreign policy, its interregionalism and its relations with 
ASEAN since the end of the Cold War. Furthermore, given its strong focus on the 
promotion of its normative framework, the EU is even willing to interfere, to varying 
degrees, in others’ domestic politics (bold for emphasis). In contrast, ASEAN is 
premised on a set of communitarian/Westphalian norms, e.g. national sovereign and 
non-interference. Indeed, in its regional and international relations, ASEAN has 
fervently maintained and promoted its ASEAN way and notably its core principle of 
non-interference, which strongly discourages any external interference in its internal 
affairs, in any form or manifestation (bold for emphasis). This means their respective 
standardised ways of regulating activities and perceiving the world are radically 
different from each other.  
Second, the defining factor that led the EU and ASEAN differ to develop and 
promote two contradictory sets of norms is that they were born and evolved in two 
contrasting historical, cultural and geopolitical contexts.115
“because their ideological starting point is very different. As ASEAN 
countries acquired sovereignty only 50 years ago, they emphasise the 
traditional attributes of national sovereignty and independence. In contrast, 
as European countries have sovereignty for centuries, it is much easier to 
pool and delegate sovereignty” (Interview, 2009).  
 In other words, the ‘we-
group’ and ‘they-group’ factors and actors that define their respective collective identity 
and their normative underpinnings differ. In fact, with the exception that they were born 
and developed in the context of the Cold War and that they both faced communist 
threats until the end of the collapse of the Soviet bloc, the contexts, in which the two 
organisations were established and developed, were essentially different. The officials 
and experts the author interviewed all strongly highlighted that fundamental difference. 
For instance, according to an EU official, the EU and ASEAN have different ways of 
perceiving a number of issues  
 
                                                 
115 It is for this reason that the EU and ASEAN followed “two different and contradictory models” of 
regionalism (Neves 2004: 16-7). 
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This second point illustrates well that, like other actors in world politics, the EU, 
ASEAN and their respective norms are always shaped by their own context-specific 
conditions. It is also for this reason that, as underlined in the previous chapters, this 
study strongly focuses on the temporal and spatial backgrounds of the EU and ASEAN 
to explain and illustrate their normative foundation and differentiation. 
Finally, as illustrated in the preceding chapters and this one, both the EU and 
ASEAN are norm entrepreneurs and normative powers in world politics. As seen in 
Chapter 4 different actors in the EU, e.g. its Commission and Parliament, engage in 
norm entrepreneurship. In contrast, as shown in this chapter, the key norm entrepreneurs 
in ASEAN are its member states because the Bangkok Declaration, the TAC and the 
ASEAN Charter were agreed at ASEAN’s ministerial meetings and summits. Chapter 4 
has also shown that the EU promoted its norms to former communist CEE countries, 
which willingly accepted the EU’s norms. Thanks to this, the EU’s relations with these 
CEE countries did not experience any normative clash or division. This chapter has 
highlighted that ASEAN also sought to disseminate its norms in the Asia-Pacific region 
and many regional powers, e.g. China and India, embraced ASEAN’s normative 
preferences because ASEAN’s core norms are similar to those of these regional powers. 
That recognition is reflected by the fact that they admitted to ASEAN’s TAC and 
accepted the ASEAN way as the mode of function for the wider regional mechanisms, 
e.g. the ADMM-Plus and the EAS, of which they are also members. Given this, there 
was no major normative conflict between ASEAN and its regional partners. However, 
as illustrated by the EU’s relations with Turkey, when their norms differ with other 
countries or regional organisations, they will find it difficult to interact with the latter. 
Indeed, such normative differences can become a source of conflict. The next chapter, 
which examines the East Timor issue, will further illustrate the normative dissimilarities 
of the EU and ASEAN, the sources of their normative divergences, and especially the 
reasons why such divergences become a disruptive factor in their interaction. 
6.  The East Timor issue in EU-ASEAN relations 
 
Chapter 3 has already mentioned that in the 1990s, the EU and ASEAN neither 
sustained the same harmonious political dialogue they had enjoyed in the 1970s and 
1980s nor reached a new far-reaching cooperation framework they had desired and 
planned since the late 1980s. It has also explained that a major reason for these failures 
was the emergence of contentious issues in their relationship. One of these was the issue 
129 
 
of East Timor.116
 To do so, the chapter begins by providing a description of why the East Timor 
question turned from a non-issue in their relationship in the 1970s and 1980s into a key 
issue – and indeed a major obstacle – in EU-ASEAN links in the 1990s. This section is 
quite descriptive. Yet, it is very important because it enables the second section of the 
chapter to explain adequately why many changes at the global and regional levels 
brought about by the end of the Cold War led to the emergence of the norm-based 
policy in EU-ASEAN relations, which was totally absent in their interaction in the 
1970s and the 1980s. Moreover, it allows the chapter to illustrate why the involvement 
of their respective norms into their relations hindered their cooperation in the 1990s. In 
other words, based on the first, the second section of the chapter gives an-depth 
elucidation of the reasons for what their normative differences became a major 
hindrance in their cooperation in the 1990s. 
 This chapter will elaborate extensively the involvement of the East 
Timor question in EU-ASEAN relations to explain why it became a divisive and 
disruptive factor in EU-ASEAN cooperation in the 1990s. By doing so, it will test and 
illustrate the (3a), (3b), (3c), (3e) and (3f) hypotheses, which have been formulated at 
the end of Chapter 2. It also illustrates the (1) and (2) propositions, which are two of the 
central arguments maintained by the thesis and which have already been examined in-
depth in the two preceding chapters. 
 
6.1. From a non-issue to a major obstacle 
6.1.1. Exclusion from EC-ASEAN relations (1976-1991) 
East Timor, also known as Timor-Leste, was a colonial outpost for the 
Portuguese, who arrived in the early 16th century and kept the territory until 1974,117
                                                 
116 There were a great number of accounts on the East Timor issue, e.g. East Timor’s invasion and 
occupation by Indonesia, the international reactions to Indonesia’s actions and the role of the UN in East 
Timor. These include Jolliffe (1978), Ramos-Horta (1987), Taylor (1990; 1991), Roff (1992), Turner 
(1992), Defert (1992), Carey and Bentley (1995), Dunn (1995; 2003), Inbaraj (1995), Jardine (1995; 
1998; 2000), Gunn (1997; 2011), Hainsworth (1997), Fox and Soares (2000), Hainsworth and McCloskey 
(2000), Ward and Carey (2000); Chawla (2001), Smith (1999; 2001), Martin (2001), Smith and Dee 
(2003), Nevins (2005),). Yet, the involvement of East Timor in EU-ASEAN relations was only referred 
to, or examined to some extent, in some works on EU-ASEAN cooperation, e.g. Robles (2004b). In other 
words, there is not a major work on why the issue fed into and impacted upon EU-ASEAN cooperation in 
the 1990s. 
 
when Portugal acknowledged the territory’s right to self-determination (Dunn 1995; 59; 
2003 13; Jardine 2000: 49). However, a civil war broke out between those favouring 
117 Japanese briefly occupied the territory from 1942 to 1945. After the WWII, Portuguese control was 
reinstated. 
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independence and those wishing integration with Indonesia. The Revolutionary Front 
for an Independent East Timor (Fretilin), a left wing and pro-independent movement, 
managed to control the territory and on 28 November, it declared the independence of 
the territory (Singh 1999: 499; Smith 2001: 28). Nevertheless, East Timor’s 
independence did not last long as Indonesia invaded it on 7 December 1975 and 
formally annexed the territory as its 27th province on 2 June 1976 (Taylor 1990; Singh 
1999: 499; McCloskey 2000: 5). Indonesia occupied it until 30 November 1999 when 
an UN-supported referendum was held and East Timorese voted for independence 
(Gilson 2002b: 126).  
Indonesia’s invasion of East Timor was perceived differently by the international 
community. The UN never recognised East Timor as a part of Indonesia (Chawla 2001: 
2292) and continued to regard Portugal as the administering power in East Timor after 
Indonesia’s annexation (The Economist, 1994). The UN General Assembly and Security 
Council passed ten resolutions between 1975 and 1982, deploring Indonesia’s invasion, 
calling it to withdraw its troops and supporting East Timor’s right to self-determination 
(Singh 1999: 499; Jardine 2000: 48). Among those that strongly supported East Timor 
were newly independent former Portuguese colonies in Africa. Most Latin American 
countries and all communist states but Yugoslavia also sided with it (Dunn 2003: 317). 
By contrast, Western countries either voted ‘no’ on the annual resolutions condemning 
Indonesia or abstained from the voting (Jardine 2000: 51; Nevins 2005: 72). The reason 
behind Western countries’ posture was that the event took place at the height of the 
Cold War, especially in the wake of the April 1975 Communist victory in Vietnam. The 
fear that an independent East Timor under the Fretilin could become another haven for 
communist subversion in Southeast Asia prompted Western countries to lend tacit 
support to Indonesia (McCloskey 2000: 4; Dunn 2003: 306; Nevins 2005: 51).  
Like other Western countries, the EC and its members did not condemn 
Indonesia’s assault. In fact, until 1986, all of its members, with the exception of 
Ireland,118
                                                 
118 Ireland changed its vote to support East Timor in the November 1982 UN General Assembly 
resolution. 
 abstained from votes on East Timor within the UN General Assembly. There 
were a number of reasons for their abstention. One of these was that Indonesia’s 
invasion took place in the Cold War context. The EC feared that East Timor would fall 
victim to forces of the far left following the fall of South Vietnam in 1975. Furthermore, 
until Portugal’s 1986 accession, no country within the EU championed for East Timor’s 
131 
 
cause. Indonesia was also a major economic partner of many European countries. 
Consequently, they allowed economic interests to override concerns about human rights 
abuses in East Timor. Finally, until the end of the Cold War, human rights were a low-
key issue in the EC’s external relations. In fact, while human rights promotion was an 
issue of the EC’s foreign policy cooperation almost right from the start, during the first 
two decades of its European Political Cooperation (EPC), human rights were promoted 
primarily through declaratory diplomacy with minimal impact (Simma et al. 1999: 575; 
Smith 2003: 101). Moreover, in its relations with Third World countries, the EC and its 
members maintained a neutral posture vis-à-vis the human rights records of these 
countries (Smith 2003: 103). Because of these factors, the EC ignored the human rights 
issue in Southeast Asia and human rights violations in East Timor (Harris and Bridges 
1983: 47). Its position changed slightly following its admission of Portugal in 1986 
because once this country became a member, it raised the East Timor issue within the 
European Parliament and the Council of Ministers, and pressed the EC to reconsider its 
posture. By mid-1980s, the European Parliament began to raise the human rights issue 
in the world and pressed the European Commission to link EC aid with conditions of 
human rights protection. Given this criticism from the European Parliament, the EC’s 
human rights policy began to change slightly in the second half of the 1980s (Smith 
2003: 105). For instance, in the European Parliament, Portuguese members of the 
various parties joined all the main party groups and called them for supporting their 
position on East Timor (Ward and Carey 2001: 54). Nevertheless, the concerns about 
human rights abuses in Southeast Asia and East Timor raised by the European 
Parliament never featured in the agenda of EC-ASEAN meetings (Snitwongse 1989: 
256). In other words, until the early 1990s, East Timor remained a non-issue in the EC’s 
relations with ASEAN.  
Concerning ASEAN, it ignored completely Indonesia’s invasion and occupation 
of East Timor even though the conflict took place in its region and there were reports 
about worst human rights violations (Inbaraj 1995: 7; Singh 1999: 500; Dupont 2000: 
163; Dunn 2003: 305). For instance, at their ninth meeting on 24-26 June 1976 in 
Manila, ASEAN Foreign Ministers only “heard with appreciation the explanation given 
by the Foreign Minister of Indonesia on the question of East Timor” (AMM 1976, point 
23), without commenting on, let alone condemning, Indonesia’s actions. The Joint 
Communiqué of the first ASEAN Heads of Government/State on 23-24 February 1976 
in Bali did not mention Aceh at all (ASEAN Summit 1976). ASEAN members even 
132 
 
supported Indonesia’s posture and this was reflected by their voting against the UN 
resolutions criticising this country’s invasion of East Timor (Villegas 1996b; Henderson 
1999: 21). Only Singapore abstained in the UN resolutions condemning Indonesia’s 
occupation in 1975 and 1976. Its abstention was consistent with its voting record at the 
UN General Assembly because as a newly independent country, Singapore always 
voted against intervention by bigger powers. However, though abstaining from the votes 
in those two years, it did not publicly criticise Indonesia’s invasion and annexation of 
East Timor. By 1977, it chose to vote against UN resolutions condemning Indonesia 
(Ortuoste 2011: 9). After that, Indonesia was never again troubled by any ASEAN 
member over its actions in East Timor (Inbaraj 1995: 51) because all ASEAN members 
consistently voted against the UN resolutions condemning Indonesia’s occupation 
(Dunn 2003: 318). One of the key reasons for their staunch support of Indonesia’s 
actions (Inbaraj 1995: 10; Dunn 2003: 305; Ortuoste 2011: 8) was that they considered 
East Timor as Indonesia’s internal matter. Consequently, ASEAN as a whole and its 
members restrained from interfering into Indonesia’s domestic politics. As will be 
shown, given their commitment to this principle, ASEAN continued to be silent over the 
issue until the late 1990s despite the international outcry. Besides their commitment to 
their core principle of non-interference into a member state’s internal affair, they also 
wanted to show their solidarity with Indonesia, which was ASEAN’s most powerful 
member. Moreover, given their strong anti-communist character, they feared that East 
Timor could become a communist country, which could destabilise Indonesia and the 
region as a whole. Because of these reasons, at their first summit in 1976, when they 
issued two key documents, namely the TAC and the ASEAN Concord I that have 
already mentioned, they completely ignored Indonesia’s invasion of East Timor. 
The overview of the posture of the EC and ASEAN vis-à-vis Indonesia’s invasion 
of East Timor shows that until the early 1990s, East Timor was absent in the EC’s 
external relations and its interaction with ASEAN. With the exception of Portugal’s 
refusal to participate in the EC-ASEAN meetings during its first year of its membership 
in 1986,119
                                                 
119 Portugal regarded this boycott as a way to force the East Timor issue into the EU’s internal and 
external affairs (Taylor 1999: 173; Ward and Carey 2011: 52). 
 the question was never raised in the meetings between the two organisations, 
e.g. the AEMMs. The matter was excluded from the EC-ASEAN relationship because 
Indonesia’s invasion and occupation of East Timor took place in a period when 
international affairs were predominantly defined by Cold War politics, divisions and 
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loyalties. As explained in Chapter 3, the anti-communist character of the EC and 
ASEAN and their concerns about communist threats bound them together in the late 
1970s and throughout the 1980s. Seen in this context, the idea that East Timor could 
become a communist country compounded their apprehension, prompting them to be on 
Indonesia’s side. This point illustrates well the argument that sharing the same identity, 
e.g. the anti-communist character, can enhance the interaction between actors, e.g. the 
EC and ASEAN. Indeed, until the late 1980s the EC and ASEAN were on the same 
‘we-group’, i.e. the anti-communist and Western capitalist bloc. Thanks to this 
overriding common posture, their differences were diminished, resulting in preventing 
any major disagreement in their interaction. It is also a good example to demonstrate 
that the external environment, e.g. the Cold War setting, plays a key role in defining 
political actors’ identities and their relations. Due to the geopolitical overplay of the 
Cold War confrontation, the EC and its members put political interests and security 
concerns over moral principles and human rights in its dealings with ASEAN and the 
East Timor issue. In other words, the valued-based policy was not a prominent part of 
the EC’s external relations. It is for this reason that until the late 1980s, issues such as 
human rights and democracy, remained totally absent in the EC’s ties with ASEAN. For 
ASEAN members, their commitment to the principles of national sovereignty and non-
interference was another important reason behind their staunch support of Indonesia’s 
actions. While the EC members abstained from the UN resolutions condemning 
Indonesia’s invasion of East Timor, ASEAN members voted against them because they 
regarded East Timor as a purely internal matter of Indonesia.  
 
 
6.1.2. A divisive issue in EU-ASEAN relations (1991-1999) 
From what has been examined, due to different reasons, until the late 1980s, 
despite being discussed at the UN and raised by rights groups over common and huge 
abuses of human rights by Indonesia since 1975,120
                                                 
120 According to a report of Amnesty International in 1994, about 200,000 people were killed or died of 
starvation or disease after Indonesia’s invasion (Amnesty International 1994: 5). 
 East Timor aroused very little 
attention from Western countries, including the EC and its members (Martin 2001: 7). 
However, by the early 1990s, Western perceptions of the Indonesian rule in East Timor 
began to change. As noted in Chapter 3, a key event that contributed to this shift was the 
Dili massacre in 1991. This dramatic occurrence raised the international awareness of 
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human rights abuses in this territory and led many Western countries to criticise and 
condemn Indonesia’s actions (Defert 1993: 120; Ishizuka 2004: 271). Following the 
incident, several Western countries, e.g. Canada and the US, decided to suspend aid to 
Indonesia (Inbaraj 1995: 103; Robles 2004b: 155). There were two major factors behind 
the West’s radical change of attitude vis-à-vis the East Timor issue after the Dili 
massacre. First, unlike previous atrocities, which had been relatively unknown to the 
outside world, the Dili massacre was captured on film by a British journalist Max Stahl 
and then shown by many television stations in many countries (Gunn 2011: 74). This 
film helped expose human rights abuses in East Timor and transformed East Timor 
from a relatively ignored issue to a major international news story (Inbaraj 1995: 88; 
O’Shaughnessy 2000: 36). Second, as they were no longer constrained by the strategic 
imperatives of the Cold War, democratic Western countries now felt free to advance the 
global agenda for human rights. Consequently, they began paying attention to human 
rights violations in countries and territories, such as East Timor (Amnesty International 
1994: 8). In fact, having overlooked human rights violations by Indonesia during the 
Cold War, they now took human rights seriously because these issues became important 
in their foreign policies (Suryadinata 2000b: 56-7). Among those who were critical of 
Jakarta were the EU and its members. In fact, as will be illustrated in more detail in this 
chapter and the next one, the winding down of the Cold War was the defining reason 
behind the disagreements between the EU and ASEAN over human rights issue and 
East Timor. It played a key role in bringing the issue of East Timor into EU-ASEAN 
relations, which eventually hindered their cooperation because by the early 1990s, the 
posture of the EU and ASEAN vis-à-vis the issue became radically different from each 
other. 
The EU and ASEAN: Two opposing normative postures 
While the EC had already taken notice of the East Timor issue and discussed it in 
the late 1980s, it was the Dili massacre that led it to issue its first statement of outright 
condemnation of Indonesia (Ward 2000: 155). At their informal meeting on 13 
November 1991, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the EC issued a declaration on East 
Timor. In this declaration, they stated that the EC and its member states “are greatly 
concerned at reports that members of the Indonesian armed forces in Dili opened fire on 
a group of demonstrators on 12 November, killing and wounding a considerable 
number”. They also “vehemently condemn such violence, which is in clear 
contravention of the most fundamental human rights” (European Council 1991c). Later, 
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at their meeting on 3 December 1991, they reiterated “their condemnation of these 
unjustifiable actions by the armed forces of Indonesia” (European Council 1991d). 
Furthermore, they stressed once again the paramount importance they attached to the 
full respect of human rights as expressed in particular in the two key documents of the 
European Council issued earlier in 1991 and referred to in Chapter 4, namely 
Declaration on Human Rights (European Council 1991a) and Resolution on Human 
Rights, Democracy and Development. As referred to in Chapter 4, the latter clearly 
stated that “respecting, promoting and safeguarding human rights is an essential part of 
international relations and one of the cornerstones of European cooperation as well as of 
relations between the Community and its Member States and other countries” 
(European Council 1991b). On 13 February 1992, the EU issued another statement on 
East Timor. In this, while viewing favourably the Indonesian government’s positive 
responses to the massacre and expressing the hope that these developments “will be 
followed by concrete and effective steps to improve significantly the human rights 
situation in East Timor, the Community and its member states remain concerned about 
other aspects” in this territory (European Council 1992). This point demonstrates that by 
the early 1990s, human rights became prominent in the EU’s foreign policy. It also 
illustrates that, as explained in Chapter 2, international norms, e.g. the respect and 
protection of human rights, only come into existence if, first and foremost, there are 
agents who call attention to issues, e.g. the violation of human rights in East Timor, by 
using language that names, interprets, and dramatises them (Finnemore and Sikkink 
1998: 897). In this case, the European Council played a key role in calling for the 
protection of human rights in East Timor. In fact, as noted in Chapter 3 and will be 
further developed in this chapter, by the early 1990s, the EU, its key institutions and 
member states, acted as key human right norm entrepreneurs. 
To raise its concern about human rights abuses in East Timor, in January 1992, 
under the presidency of Portugal, the EU submitted a resolution to the UN Human 
Rights Commission criticising Indonesia for its conducts in East Timor. This resolution 
was not passed that year. However, a new one was presented and adopted in March 
1993. In this resolution, the 12 EU members expressed their preoccupation about severe 
and continuing human rights violations in East Timor (Inbaraj 1995: 116). In this case, 
Portugal and other member states of the EU played a key role in calling for the 
protection of human rights in East Timor. The European Parliament, which had already 
been critical of Indonesia’s actions, even urged the 12 EU members and the UN to 
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impose an arm embargo on Indonesia and to consider limiting or suspending aid and 
cooperation agreements with it (Wise 1991). Later, the chapter will examine in-depth 
why East Timor and human rights now became a major issue for the EU and its member 
states. The point made here is that having largely ignored the matter in the 1970s and 
the 1980s, in the early 1990s, the EU and its members seriously took the East Timor 
issue and strongly linked this matter to its human rights agenda. Put differently, unlike 
in the 1970s and 1980s, when its relations with ASEAN were dominated by commercial 
interests and security concerns, the EU now genuinely focused on the normative 
principles, e.g. human rights and democracy, that defined its identity and its role in the 
world. The European Parliament and particularly Portugal, as will be shown, played a 
salient role in the EU’s policy change vis-à-vis East Timor. 
While the EU as a whole and its different institutions and member states 
condemned the Dili Massacre and sought to raise this issue at multilateral fora, e.g. UN 
Human Rights Commission, ASEAN and its individual members remained virtually 
silent over it (Inbaraj 1995: 179; Rocher 2006: 235). ASEAN’s dialogue partners 
criticised the Association for condoning Indonesia’s actions and pressed it to act. Yet, 
again, it was unmoved by these criticisms and demands, choosing to follow its core 
principle of non-interference (Ortuoste 2011: 11). For instance, the Joint Communiqué 
of the 25th meeting of the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) in July 1992 in Manila, 
which took place after the Dili massacre, did not mention the incident. At the individual 
level, ASEAN members also avoided the issue. This is explained by the muted posture 
of official media reactions in ASEAN countries to the massacre (Inbaraj 1995: 90). 
ASEAN members even curbed dissent in their countries to Indonesia’s advantage 
(Singh 1999: 500; Ortuoste 2011: 12). For instance, in the early 1990s, some opposition 
parties and NGOs, notably the Asia-Pacific Conference on East Timor (APCET), took 
advantage of the relatively political openness in three ASEAN countries, namely 
Philippines, Thailand and Malaysia, to criticise Indonesia’s actions in East Timor. Yet, 
their governments tried to stop those criticisms. In the aftermath of the Dili massacre, 
Malaysia’s opposition attempted to raise the East Timor issue in the Malaysian 
parliament, however, they were told that the country did not want to interfere into other 
members’ internal affairs (Inbaraj 1995: 92). In September 1992, Malaysia’s 
Information Minister had to go to Indonesia to apologise after Malaysia’s state-run 
radio and TV had aired an unedited footage of the Dili massacre. He explained that it 
was a mistake and assured Indonesia that the mistake would not happen again (Inbaraj 
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1995: 92; Ortuoste 2011: 12). Philippine President Ramos banned foreigners, including 
France’s former first lady Danielle Mitterrand, from participating an APCET meeting in 
Manila in 1994. At the occasion of the 27th AMM in Bangkok in 1994, a human rights 
conference was held. However, the Thai government blacklisted 11 Timorese seeking to 
attend it and deported three foreigners associated with a Timorese leader (Singh 1999: 
500).  
The EU and ASEAN not only viewed and approached the Dili massacre 
differently. Their postures vis-à-vis the East Timor issue as a whole continued to 
diverge in the years afterwards. In Europe, the Dili massacre and East Timor in general 
were widely reported and had a profound impact on public opinion. In 1996, the Nobel 
Peace Prize was given to the Archbishop of Timor, Carlos Félipe Belo and José Ramos-
Horta, East Timor’s then overseas representative and its current President. Three years 
later, the European Parliament awarded the Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought to 
Xamana Gussamao, East Timor’s independence leader. These prizes made the East 
Timor issue highly prominent on the European political agenda (Camroux 2010: 19). Of 
these two, the latter was of great significance because it was an esteemed prize given by 
the European Parliament to an independence leader of East Timor. Furthermore, the 
European Parliament repeatedly called on Indonesia to end its oppression (Piening 
1997: 148). Therefore, even though they recognised that they needed to establish closer 
economic relations with ASEAN as noted in Chapter 3, the EU and its institutions did 
not ignore the human rights situation in Southeast Asia because the promotion of those 
liberal values now became an integral part in its foreign policy (European Commission 
1994). That is why the EU insisted on the human rights issue in its relations with 
ASEAN (European Report, 1996a; 1996c). Within this context, the East Timor issue 
was always present in the EU’s affairs and this was reflected by the publication of its 
Common Position on East Timor on 25 June 1996. By adopting this position, which was 
aimed at improving “the situation in East Timor regarding respect for human rights in 
the territory” (European Council 1996), the EU asserted that East Timor was no longer a 
national (i.e. Indonesia) and regional (i.e. ASEAN) issue; it was a matter of 
international concern (Ward and Carrey 2001: 59). It also expressed support for the 
talks, which were taking place under the aegis of the UN and urged Indonesia to take 
effective measures to improve the human rights situation in East Timor (European 
Council 1996). Yet, though what the EU suggested in its Common Position was 
regarded as relatively muted criticisms because it did not raise East Timor’s self-
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determination nor regarded Indonesia’s occupation as illegal, the EU’s Common 
Position drew a sharp reaction from Indonesia and ASEAN. Indonesia denounced it as 
tantamount to a declaration to war whereas ASEAN considered whether the EU should 
continue to participate in the ARF (King 1999: 333; Robles 2004b: 157).121
Such reactions of Indonesia and ASEAN towards the EU’s Common Position 
clearly illustrate that ASEAN perceived and approached the East Timor issue 
divergently from the EU. Indeed, as they were strongly committed to their principle of 
non-interference, ASEAN as a whole and its individual members completely closed 
their eyes to the issue until the late 1990s (Hayes 2000; Sebastian and Smith 2000; 
McDougall 2001; Narine 2005; Rocher 2006). As a former ASEAN’s General-Secretary 
comments, for ASEAN states, until the end of the Suharto era,
  
122
For Jones (2010: 492), by the late 1990s, some ASEAN members, e.g. Malaysia, 
voiced their concern about the East Timor situation and stated that the referendum 
outcome must be respected, not overturned. Judging by this, he maintains that ASEAN 
states did not unanimously respect the principle of non-interference as it was commonly 
assumed. As underlined in Chapter 2 and will be shown below, this thesis acknowledges 
that, like in the case of the EU, e.g. the relatively different postures of Portugal and 
other EU members vis-à-vis the East Timor issue, there are inherent tensions in the 
processes of norm creation and maintenance within ASEAN. Yet, it is clear that in its 
official and common posture vis-à-vis the East Timor issue, ASEAN as a whole was 
silent. With the exception of the call for a cessation of violence by a few ASEAN 
countries, e.g. Thailand, Singapore and Malaysia, when the situation in this territory had 
 East Timor was an 
internal matter (Interview, 2009). They even determinedly backed Indonesia’s rule in 
East Timor to the very end despite the international outcry in the 1990s (Weatherbee 
and Emmers 2005: 235). It was also believed that some ASEAN members, e.g. 
Malaysia, tried to block Western efforts to launch a humanitarian intervention in East 
Timor (Dupont 2000: 165; McDougall 2001: 176; Eldon 2004: 554).  
                                                 
121 ASEAN Foreign Ministers also made clear that the first Asia-Europe summit, which will be examined 
in the next chapter, that ‘sensitive, controversial and irrelevant issues’ should be avoided and Indonesia’s 
Foreign Minister sought to extract a guarantee that the East Timor issue would not be raised (King 1999: 
333). 
122 The fall of President Suharto in May 1998 opened the way for significant progress on the diplomatic 
front because unlike his successor, President Habibie was more willing to find a solution to the conflict. 
He first agreed offer East Timor a wide-ranging autonomy, however, under the demand of pro-
independence movement and pressure of the international community, he eventually agreed to hold a 
referendum to allow East Timorese to self-determine. This paved the way for the referendum on 30 
August 1999 (Martin and Mayer-Rieckh 2005). 
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become worse by 1999, ASEAN states were virtually unresponsive. Collectively, the 
East Timor crisis “was never part of ASEAN’s discourse” (Weatherbee and Emmers 
2005: 235). For instance, despite the dire situation, caused by several weeks of 
widespread killing and destructions organised by Indonesian army and pro-Indonesian 
militias after the referendum in August 1999 (Martin 2001: 94-7; Martin and Mayer-
Rieckh 2005: 125), ASEAN did not mention the issue in its summit or the ASEAN Plus 
Three summit held three months later (ASEAN Summit 1999). It also resisted Canada’s 
attempt to convene a special meeting on East Timor during the APEC meeting in 
September 1999, insisting that APEC should focus on its trade agenda (Ortuoste 2011: 
12). This clearly shows that unlike the EU, ASEAN and its members were unresponsive 
to the East Timor crisis, regarding it as a purely internal affair of Indonesia. 
In short, it is evident that the EU and ASEAN had opposing postures vis-à-vis Dili 
massacre and the East Timor issue as a whole. While the EU was concerned about the 
problem, criticising Indonesia’s actions and calling for the respect of human rights as 
well as the peaceful solution to the conflict, ASEAN ignored the matter, with some of 
its members even lending their strong support to Indonesia’s actions. As will be 
developed later, the reason behind their contrasting positions towards East Timor was 
that by the early 1990s, the EU and ASEAN became radically different in terms of their 
normative underpinnings. The EU insisted on the protection and promotion of human 
rights to the point of being willing to interfere into others’ internal affairs to make sure 
that its cherished values were respected. In contrast, ASEAN was inclined to safeguard 
and promote the principle of non-interference at the cost of ignoring human rights and 
even the gross violations of these norms by Indonesia in East Timor. 
The impact of their normative differences on their cooperation 
The normative differences between the EU and ASEAN led to a period of uneasy 
relations between the two organisations, especially at the political level. For instance, 
the East Timor matter almost led to the failure of the 10th AEMM in Manila in 1992 
because at the insistence of Portugal, the EU expressed its desire that the issue be 
explicitly referred to in the Joint Declaration. However, ASEAN strongly objected to it 
as it maintained that East Timor was an Indonesia-Portugal matter and should not be 
mentioned (Balaoing 1997: 24; Ortuoste 2011: 11). Though, due to ASEAN’s instance, 
the official Joint Declaration did not mention the East Timor issue (AEMM 1992), it 
revealed the tensions in EU-ASEAN relations. The East Timor issue was even seen as 
the origin of a crisis in the EU-ASEAN relationship because it eventually impeded the 
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attempts of the two organisations to enhance their ties and their economic cooperation 
in particular in the early 1990s (Inbaraj 1995: 106; Gupwell 2003: 64; Smith 2003: 78). 
On the ASEAN side, despite Indonesia’s human rights violations in East Timor, its 
members continued to support Indonesia and maintain their core principle of non-
interference even though they knew that such a stance would delay or block any joint 
projects with the EU (Ortuoste 2011: 11). In contrast, following the Dili event, Portugal 
tried to raise the issue. More critically, it sought to stop the EU’s plan to negotiate a new 
cooperation agreement with ASEAN because of what its Foreign Minister Jaos de Deus 
Pinheiro condemned as Indonesia’s “unacceptable violation of human rights” in East 
Timor (quoted by Islam 1992: 9). Because of this, at a meeting of the EU’s General 
Affairs Council in July 1992, Portugal vetoed an agreement to authorise the European 
Commission to begin negotiations with ASEAN on the new agreement (Desker 2002; 
Gupwell 2003: 65). That veto effectively killed a new cooperation pact between the two 
organisations when they just began to negotiate it (Tay and Goh 1999: 46).  
The disagreements between the EU and ASEAN over human rights and the East 
Timor issue continued to damage their cooperation throughout the 1999s. This is despite 
the fact that privately Portugal’s veto was not always supported by some EU members 
and the European Commission,123 who really wanted to establish a wide-ranging 
cooperation agreement with ASEAN (Islam 1992: 9) and to strengthen their relations 
with Asia in general from the early to the mid-1990s. For instance, in early 1993 
Germany’s Chancellor Helmut Kohl made his first visit to Asia and following this trip, 
Germany issued its Concept of Asia, which urged the political and business community 
to take into account Asia’s excellent prospects in the 21st century (Gaens 2008c: 15). 
Based on this paper, the European Commission issued Towards a New Asia Strategy 
(NAS), in July 1994, which called the EU to enhance its relations with Asia. French 
President Jacques Chirac also visited Singapore in February 1996 during which he also 
stressed the need for the EU to strengthen relations with Asia (Chirac 1996).124
                                                 
123 As noted earlier, this point also illustrates that there were tensions in the processes of norm creation 
and diffusion within the EU. However, in this case, Portugal’s stance prevailed because other EU 
members did not want to have open confrontation within the EU (Bridges 1999: 172).  
 
Nevertheless, despite the significant efforts by both sides to enhance their economic 
cooperation and the fact that some EU members, e.g. the UK, continued their business 
with Indonesia as usual (Robles 2004a: 156), until the late 1990s, East Timor remained 
124 These efforts and desires eventually paved the way for the establishment of ASEM, which will be 
further examined in Chapter 7. 
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a divisive and destructive matter in EU-ASEAN relations. It significantly reduced their 
appetite for cooperation. For example, in the 11 years following their failure to 
negotiate a new cooperation framework in 1992, only four AEMMs were convened 
whereas in the eleven years from 1981 to 1992, eight meetings were held (see Appendix 
7). While, as will be shown in the next chapter, the Myanmar problem also contributed 
to this lack of interaction and cooperation between the two organisations, it was 
undoubted that the East Timor matter played a key role in holding back their relations. 
Furthermore, the question of whether it should be raised in their meetings, e.g. the 
AEMMs, or should be mentioned in the final declarations of those meetings, was a 
point of disagreement. For instance, at the 12th AEMM in Singapore in February 1997, 
Indonesia threatened not to attend the meeting if East Timor was on the agenda (Lim 
1999: 16). As a compromise, it was not formally raised at this meeting but only briefly 
referred to in the opening speech by the head of the European delegation. However, 
both sides were aware of its shadow (Bridges 1999: 172). Its continued presence in the 
EU-ASEAN interaction was the main reason why the 11th and the 12th AEMMs, held in 
Karlsruhe (Germany) and Singapore in 1994 and 1997 respectively, they were unable to 
make any progress regarding the negotiations of the new cooperation agreement 
(Piening 1997: 148; Bridges 1999: 172; Hill and Smith 2000: 437). At a conference on 
EU-ASEAN relations in 2004, Pierre Amilhat, then Head of Unit, Directorate Asia and 
South East Asia, European Commission, spoke of the need to renew the 1980 
Cooperation Agreement in the 1990s. However, according to him, talks on the 
agreement had stalled because of East Timor (European Policy Centre, 2004). Balaoing 
(1997: 24) also maintains that the issue was a persistent thorn in their relations and “the 
principal, if not the only, obstacle to the negotiation of a new Cooperation Agreement” 
between the two organisations. Thus, though the East Timor issue did not completely 
stall EU-ASEAN cooperation in the 1990s as both sides tried to cultivate other channels 
to maintain their relationship in a period when they desired to enhance their economic 
cooperation,125
                                                 
125 For instance, with the aim of providing information to European and Southeast Asian firms on trade, 
infrastructure, costs, regulation and standards, the first European Business Information Centre was 
established in Manila in 1993, followed by others in other ASEAN countries, e.g. Thailand, Malaysia and 
Singapore. More significantly, the establishment of ASEM was seen as an effort to enhance not only EU-
ASEAN relations but also the EU’s interaction with Asia as a whole.  
 it was definitely an obstructive factor in their ties. In other words, their 
divergent views and approaches vis-à-vis the East Timor issue negatively affected their 
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links because it hampered their enthusiasm and efforts to strengthen their relationship in 
those years.  
Yet, it is worth noting that while East Timor was a defining factor, it was not the 
only reason that hindered EU-ASEAN relations in the 1990s. As already highlighted in 
Chapter 3, it can be said that the fundamental cause of their conflict-laden interaction 
and their failure to agree a new cooperation framework was the radical shift in the EU’s 
foreign policy, which now strongly focused on human rights and democracy in its 
relations with third countries (Balfour 2006: 15). In fact, Portugal’s veto coincided with 
the EU’s efforts to establish a political dialogue with ASEAN that covered human rights 
(Robles 2004b: 156). In other words, when the Union and Association realised that they 
needed to enhance their cooperation, the former also began to insist on the respect of 
human rights and sought to link it to aid assistance and economic cooperation (Europa 
Press Releases 1992). More precisely, having already successfully incorporated the 
‘human rights clause’ in its economic cooperation agreements with African and Latin 
American countries in 1989 and 1990, the EU now wanted to include the respect for 
human rights and democratic values as the basis for its new cooperation agreement with 
ASEAN (Manea 2008: 376). For instance, during his intervention in the European 
Parliament’s debate on economic and trade relations between the EU and ASEAN on 10 
April 1992, European Commissioner Abel Matutes acknowledged that “preparations are 
under way to re-negotiate the 1980 cooperation agreement taking into account both 
changes in Europe and in the ASEAN region” (Europa Press Releases 1992). However, 
he also stated that the Commission “is in agreement with the Parliament’s view point 
that greater emphasis should be put on the protection of the environment and on the 
respect of human rights” (Europa Press Releases 1992). Such an insistence on the 
respect of human rights and on the inclusion of the human rights clause in the new 
agreement the EU intended to negotiate with ASEAN irritated ASEAN’s officials 
because they considered it as “Western attempts to impose foreign values on Asia” 
(Islam 1991: 9). At their meeting in July 1992 in Manila, Philippines, ASEAN Foreign 
Ministers made clear that they did not accept the conditionalities included in economic 
and development cooperation (AMM 1992, point 18). These disagreements over human 
rights between the EU and ASEAN created an unfriendly mood in their interregional 
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interaction in the 1990s.126
In short, having been absent from the EC-ASEAN linkage in the 1970s and much 
throughout the 1980s, the East Timor issue heavily got involved into and negatively 
impacted upon their interaction in the 1990s. Indeed, it contributed to an acrimonious 
atmosphere in their relations and was the fundamental factor that led to their failure to 
negotiate a new and far-reaching cooperation agreement. A deep-rooted reason behind 
its unconstructive involvement in EU-ASEAN cooperation during that period was the 
emergence of the value-based policy, which had been absent, in their correlations. 
Specifically, the East Timor issue became a divisive and obstructive factor in their 
relationship because the EU began strongly to focus on its core values of human rights 
and democracy, considering the respect of those democratic values as a condition of 
cooperation. In contrast, ASEAN emphasised its prime principles of non-interference 
and national sovereignty and resisted to the EU’s position on the human rights issue and 
the East Timor matter. In other words, in the 1990s, the EU and ASEAN emerged as 
two different regional organisations whose normative nature differed. Given this 
normative difference, not only did they disconnect from each other but also opposed 
each other in terms of their normative dimensions. Consequently, their relations, which 
had been largely conflict-free in the 1970s and the 1980s, now became conflict-ridden. 
Thus, it is not their lack of actorness but rather their conflicting norms hindered their 
post-Cold War cooperation. As they are central to this inquiry, the next section will 
illustrate in-depth why their normative elements became prominent and indeed different 
from each other and why such normative differences led to disruptions in their 
interaction in the 1990s. 
 Against this background, the East Timor problem simply 
compounded the already existing tensions between the two organisations.  
6.2. Reasons behind their disagreements  
Chapter 2 has established a number of factors to explain the normative differences 
of the EU and ASEAN. These include – but are not limited to – the ecological (i.e. 
between actors and their environment), social (i.e. between actors) and internal (i.e. 
within actors) processes, their historical and cultural conditions, their perspective and 
the power political configuration in which they find themselves in the international 
system. It has also theorised three conditions to explain why the normative differences 
of the EU and ASEAN led them to dispute with each other over issues, such as East 
                                                 
126 As will be shown in the next chapter, the Myanmar problem also contributed to the tensions between 
the two regional organisations in the 1990s. 
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Timor, which consequently hindered their cooperation. Using these factors and 
conditions, this section will explain and demonstrate why the East Timor matter and the 
human rights issue in general got involved into the EU-ASEAN relationship and, 
eventually, hold back their cooperation in the 1990s. 
 
6.2.1. The emergence of inherent normative differences 
As explained in Chapter 3 as well as underlined in the first section of this chapter, 
until the early 1990s, i.e. the end of the bipolar system, the EC and ASEAN were two 
Western-oriented and anti-communist organisations. That prevailing shared outlook not 
only diminished the salience of multifaceted differences between the two organisations 
(Forster 1999: 750; 2000: 790). It was also an enabling factor because it facilitated their 
interaction. However, with the end of the Cold War, that shared bond – or the ‘we-
group’ that the two organisations and their respective members felt they belonged to 
throughout the Cold War period – no longer existed. Consequently, their inherent 
normative differences began to surface. In this sense, the collapse of the communist 
bloc played a defining role in bringing the value-based policy in the external relations of 
the EU and ASEAN as well as their interregional interaction.  
During the Cold War period, as earlier noted, the EC and its members did not 
strongly focus on the promotion of liberal cosmopolitan values, e.g. human rights and 
democracy, in its external relations and especially in its dialogue with ASEAN. Yet, this 
does not mean that the EC did not value those values. Indeed, they have always been 
important elements of European politics and European integration. As Pattugalan (1999: 
55) highlights, human rights have been at the core of European development. An EU 
official also underlines that values such human rights, fundamental freedoms, 
democracy “became a central element in the European integration” from the beginning 
(Interview, 2009). Palmujoki (1997: 270) noted that besides functionalist economic 
model, the EC pursued its own politico-ideological model in regional cooperation, 
which was based on shared liberal values. In other words, for the EU those values are 
essential in national and international politics because not only do they give them 
legitimacy to govern but also because they establish the conditions for social stability 
and economic progress (Tay and Goh 1999: 43).  
On the other hand, for Southeast Asian countries and the regionalism in ASEAN, 
human rights, democracy and fundamental freedoms were not essential. As explained in 
Chapter 5, these liberal values would be even seen as a direct threat to many regimes in 
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Southeast Asia because none of these countries was a liberal democracy. In fact, as an 
EU official aptly observes, “human rights only appeared in the ASEAN Charter in 
2007” (Interview, 2009). Looking at the main documents of ASEAN, e.g. the Bangkok 
Declaration and the TAC, one can easily see that such liberal ideals were almost 
ignored. Instead, ASEAN’s organising principle since its establishment was and 
continues to be its ASEAN way, which includes non-interference and national 
sovereignty. The absence of liberal cosmopolitan norms in ASEAN and the 
Association’s strong attachment to its state-centric or communitarian ones was reflected 
by the fact that only at their 26th ministerial meeting in 1993, did ASEAN Foreign 
Ministers officially discuss human rights. Yet, their discussion about this issue was seen 
as their reaction to the World Conference on Human Rights, which took place a few 
months before. On this occasion, they stressed that national and regional particularities 
should be considered when addressing human rights. They also emphasised that the use 
of human rights as a conditionality for economic cooperation was detrimental to 
international cooperation and that the protection and promotion of human rights in the 
international community should take into account the principles of respect for national 
sovereignty and non-interference in other states’ domestic politics (AMM 1993, point 
17).  
The posture of ASEAN not only highlights the fundamental differences of the EU 
and ASEAN regarding the importance (or non-importance) of democratic principles in 
their internal and external relations as well as in their interaction, in which the former 
strongly regarded them to be essential while the latter considered them to be of little 
value, if not at all. It also reveals that there were other aspects relating to human rights 
issues that prompted a clash between the two organisations over the East Timor matter. 
These concern their understandings of the nature, character and role of human rights. It 
can be said that these differences between the EU and ASEAN were the primary reason 
why the former was so concerned about human rights whereas the latter was not. 
Actually, the debate or the clash between the two sides over the so-called 
Western/European values and the Asian values was related to these differences in 
understanding of and approach to the issue of human rights. Thus, it is worth briefly 
mentioning these.  
Based on a communication of the European Commission (1995c: 5-6), a 
declaration of ASEAN members and other Asian countries on human rights, known as 
the Bangkok Declaration (1993), at least five points of disagreement between the EU 
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and ASEAN on the human rights issue could be identified (see also Hernandez 1995: 3-
7). First, they had different understanding of the nature of human rights, with one 
believing that human rights were universal, while the other argued that each country had 
its own culture. The EU and its members strongly believed in the universality of human 
rights because individual rights and democratic principles were so deeply rooted in 
European political culture that they were seen as natural and universal. In contrast, the 
ASEAN states, like other Asian countries, stressed the cultural relativity of human 
rights because they argued that human rights were defined by each country’s specific set 
of cultural experiences. Second, they differed over the character of human rights. For 
the West human rights had an international character not only because they were 
universal but also because they were inscribed in international treaties, e.g. the United 
Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). ASEAN 
states, like many other Asian countries, maintained that those documents were produced 
by the West and, consequently, they did not reflect the reality of the newly independent 
countries, whose primary concern is state sovereignty. Third, they diverged over the 
dichotomy between individual and communitarian rights with European countries 
firmly emphasising the former, whereas ASEAN countries put their stress on the latter. 
Fourth, they disagreed over the indivisibility of human rights. The EU maintained that 
aspects of human rights, e.g. political and civil rights, should not be treated separately 
from each other. ASEAN leaders, e.g. Malaysia’s Mahathir Mohamad, argued that their 
people could not meaningfully enjoy those rights without a certain level of economic 
prosperity. Finally, they disputed over the human rights clause. While the EU argued 
that respect of democratic values was a condition of aid assistance and economic 
cooperation, ASEAN contended that such an approach, e.g. the withdrawal and 
withholding of aid, did not hurt the ruling elites but the ordinary people. 
From what has been seen, it is also clear that though the disagreements between 
the EU and ASEAN over the issues of human rights were a post-Cold War artefact, 
some major sources of their normative divergences could be traced back to the pre-
establishment of the two organisations. For the EU’s strong focus on liberal values, 
notably human rights, has been deeply rooted in Europe’s pre-EU cultural traditions and 
notably its history. Chapter 4 has examined in-depth how Europe’s war-torn and bitter 
past shaped European integration in general and the EU as a normative power, which is 
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based on and seeks to promote a set of liberal and democratic values.127 In this sense, 
the demise of the Cold War simply made the EU focus more genuinely on the defence 
and spread of those norms. In other words, the EU’s strong adherence to them was not 
something new that the EU only embraced after the end of the Cold War. They did not 
get involved in the EC’s external relations and its dialogue with ASEAN simply due to 
the predominance of Cold War politics. Similarly, as shown in Chapter 5, ASEAN’s 
normative principles have predominantly embedded in pre-ASEAN Southeast Asian 
historical background, notably the region’s colonialism, as well as other regional 
factors, e.g. communist threats from Vietnam and China. This also implies that 
ASEAN’s norms were formed right from the Association’s inception and/or reinforced 
during the first decades of existence. Nevertheless, as the bipolar confrontation 
prevailed during the Cold War, the EC and its members did not have any problems in 
interacting with a regional organisation that strongly upheld those state-centric 
principles and ignored individual-centred norms.128
 
 Now, with the removal of the 
bipolar confrontation, the inherent normative differences of the EU and ASEAN began 
to appear. These made them two very divergent actors with dissimilar and even 
incompatible ways of perceiving their regional and international affairs in general, 
human rights and the East Timor matter in particular. In other words, they were now 
two different normative powers, with divergent norms and values. Those intrinsic 
normative differences were augmented by other developments within the EU and 
ASEAN after the end of the Cold War as will be shown in the next point. 
 
6.2.2. The EU’s new identity and ASEAN’s newfound confidence 
The perspective and the power political configuration in which the EU and 
ASEAN found themselves in the international system (Tocci and Manners 2008: 312-4) 
following the end of the Cold War was another important factor that significantly 
contributed to their normative differences. For the EU, the triumphant mood in the West 
after the fall of Berlin Wall and the wave of democratisation movements in former 
communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe played a key role in pushing it to 
                                                 
127 For example, to justify why they greatly attach to those liberal values in its post-Cold War foreign 
policy, the EU and its officials often refer to Europe’s war-torn and bitter past (Forchtner and Kølvraa 
2012: 387-8).  
128 As noted in Chapter 3, ASEAN strongly emphasised those norms in its dealing with the Cambodia 
issue and to support ASEAN, the EC even stressed the need to respect those fundamental principles of 
international relations. 
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press developing countries towards democratisation (Tay and Goh 1999: 44; Rüland 
2001c: 17; Yeo 2009a: 48). In other words, the strong self-belief and, to some extent, 
the sense of superiority that the European countries had after the collapse of 
communism made them more confident in seeking to export its liberal norms in Europe 
and globally. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the transformation of the EC into the EU also 
significantly enhanced the EU’s actorness, which inspired it to play a greater role as a 
political actor on the international scene. Furthermore, that transformation brought with 
it a new identity based on a set of liberal and democratic norms and prompted it to 
anchor the promotion of those values as a central objective of its foreign policy. During 
a meeting with ASEAN members in 1993, the European Commission’s Vice President, 
Manuel Marin, clearly stated that strengthening democracy, the rule of law and respect 
for human rights and individual freedoms was one of the primary objectives of the EU’s 
foreign policy (Marin 1993). As shown in Chapter 4, most of the EU’s key documents 
on human rights and democracy were issued in the 1990s. Coupled with an enhanced 
actorness, a new mission and a triumphant mood, the collapse of the Soviet Union and 
its allies also meant that the EU no longer needed to court authoritarian governments in 
developing countries in general and authoritarian and pro-Western regimes in Southeast 
Asia (Smith 2003: 105). Subsequently, it sought to push for democratisation in this 
region by introducing a policy of conditionality (Tay and Goh 1999: 44; Yeo 2009a: 
48). Because of this, the human rights issue and the East Timor matter fed into its 
relations with ASEAN in the 1990s. Overall, it is apt to say that the construction or self-
presentation of the EU as a normative power in world politics as examined in Chapter 4 
began due to the transformation within the EU and the change at the internal level 
following the end of the Cold War. 
On the ASEAN side, it became more confident of its normative underpinnings 
and thereby strongly relied on them in its dealing with the EU because it also 
experienced internal dynamics in the 1990s. In fact, as an Asian scholar aptly points out, 
thanks to the impressive economic development of its members and its recognition as a 
successful diplomatic community after the Cambodian conflict, by the early 1990s, 
ASEAN and its individual members had become more assertive (Interview, 2009). 
Economically, in the 1980s and the 1990s, the average annual GDP growth of the 
ASEAN countries was much bigger than that of the EU members. With the exception of 
Ireland, which enjoyed high economic growth (i.e. 7.5), the average annual GDP growth 
of the EU members was below 2.8 % in the years 1990-1998. In contrast, with the 
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exception of the Philippines, the average annual GDP growth of ASEAN members was 
above 5.5 % (see Appendix 11). Given this impressive growth, until the 1997/8 Asian 
financial crisis, the ASEAN region was one of the world’s fastest-growing economic 
regions; and such economic dynamism gave ASEAN states more confidence in dealing 
with regional and international affairs (European Commission 1994; Brunn and 
Jacobsen 2000).  
At the political and diplomatic level, the self-belief and dynamism of ASEAN was 
also reflected in a number of proactive measures that it took to respond to the new 
challenges that arose in the post-Cold War era. These included the establishment of the 
ARF, a mechanism, which includes all major global and regional powers and deals with 
security and political issues in the Asia-Pacific region, and which adopted the ASEAN 
way as its mode of function. If the EU began to emerge as a global actor and strongly 
advance its liberal values of human rights and democracy in Europe and globally 
following the end of the Cold War, ASEAN also became an active actor in fostering 
cooperation as well as promoting its core Westphalian principles of sovereign and non-
inference in the wider Asia-Pacific region. In fact, given such economic successes and 
political achievements, ASEAN and its members believed that they could manage their 
domestic and regional affairs in their own way. More precisely, they felt that their 
development model, which emphasised stability and economic growth and which 
favoured the community or state’s rights over the individual’s rights, was vindicated. It 
is for this reason that some ASEAN leaders championed the Asian values. Their 
development and endorsement of the Asian values, which were such a prominent and 
distinctive part of Southeast Asia’s identity during those boom years, not only showed 
that ASEAN’s normative nature became divergent from the EU’s. It also illustrated that 
ASEAN members sought to disconnect from the EU in terms of values and were willing 
to oppose what they regarded as the Western imposition of foreign values (Tay and Goh 
1999: 46). Such a resistance led to tensions in its relations with the EU. 
6.2.3. The EU’s insistence and ASEAN’s resistance 
Indeed, the EU and ASEAN disputed over human rights and the East Timor issue 
not only because their normative natures became divergent from each other after the end 
of the Cold War. They clashed also because one group’s core norms were refused or 
violated by the other. From what has been examined so far, it is evident that the more 
the EU insisted the promotion of human rights, the firmer ASEAN was in its response 
to the EU’s posture. ASEAN was firmly resisted to the EU’s demand partly because, as 
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noted by an Asian scholar, it “had leaders such as Mahathir Mohamad, who did not 
want the West to impose their values on them and were not afraid to stand up against 
the EU” (Interview, 2009). It questioned why the EU had become so preoccupied with 
democracy and human rights because “these same European countries had paid scant 
attention to democracy or human rights to their Asian subjects during the colonial 
period. Much the same could have been said about the Cold War period, when Western 
countries supported authoritarian regimes as long as they were opposed to communism” 
(Gupwell 2003: 67). 
 As noted, ASEAN even went further and challenged the whole notion of human 
rights by disapproving of the UDHR as a Western document because it was formulated 
when many Asian/ASEAN nations did not even exist (Tay and Goh 1999: 46). This is 
reflected by the fact that prior to the World Conference on Human Rights in June 1993, 
ASEAN members sought to bring other Asian countries, notably China, for an 
intergovernmental meeting in March 1993 in Bangkok (Freeman 1996; 1999). At that 
meeting, they formulated a Declaration on Human Rights, known as the Bangkok 
Declaration (1993). In this declaration, while reaffirming their commitment to 
principles contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, they emphasised 
their particular understanding of, and approach to, human rights (Freeman 1999: 104-5). 
For instance, though recognising that the universality of human rights, they stressed that 
human rights “must be considered in the context of a dynamic and evolving process of 
international norm-setting, bearing in mind the significance of national and regional 
particularities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds” (Bangkok 
Declaration 1993; point 8). More importantly, they emphasised the principles of respect 
for national sovereignty, non-interference in other states’ internal affairs, as well as the 
non-use of human rights as an instrument of political pressure (Bangkok Declaration 
1993, points 4 and 5).  
ASEAN’s effort to socialise with other Asian countries as well as its reliance to its 
core norms of national sovereignty and non-interference to defy the EU on the human 
rights issue not only showed ASEAN’s confidence in its norms to guide its external 
relations and its relations with the EU. It also illustrated that it succeeded in creating a 
broader Asian ‘we-group’ based on its preferred normative framework, which was state-
focused, e.g. national sovereignty and non-interference, to distinguish it from as well as 
to resist a ‘they-group’, i.e. the West and the EU, which was individual-centred, e.g. 
human rights and fundamental freedoms. More significantly, this example clearly 
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demonstrated that the EU and ASEAN were now in a ‘we-group’ versus ‘they-group’ 
relationship, in which the EU considered, either intentionally or unintentionally, 
ASEAN as a violator of universal principles or inferior to it and, consequently, sought 
to export its liberal norms to ASEAN. In contrast, ASEAN vigorously opposed the EU, 
regarding its assertion on human rights as a new moralism or a neo-colonialism (Yeo 
2009a: 48). That insistence versus resistance dichotomy was the fundamental reason 
behind their disputes over human rights and the East Timor matter, which resulted in 
creating a stalemate in their cooperation.  
Overall, there were three related reasons why the EU and ASEAN clashed over 
human rights and the East Timor issue in the 1990s. The first concerns the differences 
of their normative natures, which became salient in the aftermath of the end of the Cold 
War. The EU was fundamentally premised on a set of liberal cosmopolitan or 
individual-centred values, e.g. human rights whereas ASEAN was founded on a set of 
communitarian or state-centric principles, e.g. non-interference. Second, given their 
own normative nature, the EU was willing to promote its norms to the point of 
interfering into others’ domestic politics to make sure that its preferred norms were 
respected. ASEAN was opposed to the EU because that posture of the EU violated the 
core of its normative cultural. Such opposing postures compounded the disagreements 
between the two organisations and led them to clash. A third reason for their disputes 
was the fact that the end of the Cold War not only made their inherent normative 
differences surface. It also broke the anti-communist bond they shared during the Cold 
War. Consequently, the two organisations were, to a certain degree, politically 
disconnected from each other. In fact, as seen, not only did some leaders of ASEAN 
members, e.g. Malaysia’s Mahathir Mohamad and Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew reject 
the liberal values promoted by West and the EU. They also promoted their own values, 
namely the ‘Asian values’, to challenge the Western/European values. 
In brief, the examination of the East Timor issue has highlighted a number of 
important points. Some of these are worth mentioning here. First, by the early 1990s, 
the EU and ASEAN emerged as two remarkable norm entrepreneurs and normative 
powers, whose regional and international policies were predominantly norm-based and 
guided. The defining difference was that the value-systems, which they were founded 
on as well as sought to advocate were divergent from each other. While the former 
espoused a set of individual-oriented values, the latter preferred a set of state-centred 
principles. Second, their normative differences became salient in the 1990s because the 
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end of the Cold War not only made their inherent differences, which were rooted in 
their own historical and cultural background, surface. Many changes within the EU and 
ASEAN as well as at the international level after the winding down of the Cold War 
also compounded their normative differences. This means that their regional and 
international factors defined their respective normative underpinnings and made them 
divergent from each other. Third, such differences were the reason behind their 
disagreement over the human rights issue and the East Timor matter in particular and 
these disputes eventually hindered their interaction. In other words, they disputed partly 
because of the differences of their normative natures. The EU primarily emphasised 
individual rights and freedoms whereas ASEAN stressed the importance of collective 
rights and state sovereignty. Coupled with – or more precisely because of – the 
differences of their normative premises, they did not accept each other’s preferred 
norms and this intensified their tensions. While the EU fervently insisted on the respect 
of its liberal and democratic norms, ASEAN firmly opposed that insertion because it 
regarded such an act violated its core norm of non-interference. Because of this, they 
could not find a common solution to the East Timor issue, which resulted in 
jeopardising their relations in the 1990s. Fourth, the negative consequences that their 
normative differences brought to their relations illustrate that their conflicting norms 
were conducive to preventing their cooperation. In addition, it demonstrates that not 
only EU-ASEAN relations reinforced the identities or norms of the EU and ASEAN. 
The normative dimensions of the two organisations also shaped the nature, form and 
outcome of their interregional interaction. In short, the East Timor case supports very 
well the key hypotheses of the thesis, notably the (1), (2), (3a), (3b), (3c), (3e) and (3f) 
propositions, which were formulated at the end of Chapter 2. The next chapter, which 
focuses on the Myanmar problem, will further illustrate these points. 
7. The Myanmar problem in EU-ASEAN relations 
 
This chapter examines the Myanmar issue in the interaction between the EU and 
ASEAN. It is probably the most reported aspect of the EU’s relations with ASEAN and 
Asia in general as it is referred to, or examined to varying degrees, in almost all 
academic works on the EU-ASEAN relationship and on Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM). 
These include those of Tay and Goh (1999), Robles (2004b), Smith (2006) and 
Petersson (2006). Yet, the thesis studies the Myanmar matter in-depth in this chapter not 
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only because it was a dominant problem in their correlation for several years. The 
inquiry investigates it also because, like the East Timor issue, it is a concrete case to 
illustrate the normative differences of the EU and ASEAN, the sources of their 
normative dissimilarities and the impact of their normative differences on their 
relations. In other words, like the East Timor case, it is a very suitable case to 
demonstrate that the EU and ASEAN are two unalike norm entrepreneurs and 
normative powers, which uphold and promote two opposing ways of building their own 
community and conducting their respective regional and international relations. 
Furthermore, because of these normative differences, they find it difficult to cooperate 
with each other, especially in the economic and political areas.  
It is worth noting that, like the East Timor issue, the Myanmar problem became 
involved into and negatively affected upon EU-ASEAN relations since the early 1990s. 
However, while the East Timor issue was removed from their ties by the late 1990s, the 
latter continued to affect their links, such as their negotiations towards a region-to-
region FTA, in the 2000s. The Myanmar issue also fed into and consequently 
jeopardised progress of the ASEM process. Given these factors, the Myanmar matter 
provides greater evidence for the thesis to demonstrate comprehensively and 
convincingly its principal arguments, notably the (1), (3a), (3b), (3c), (3e) and (3f) 
propositions that have been formulated and put forwards in Chapter 2.  
In terms of structure, the chapter looks at the involvement of the Myanmar issue 
in EU-ASEAN relations in four key periods and areas. They are (1) prior to Myanmar’s 
admission to ASEAN in 1997, (2) after its entry to ASEAN, (3) in the negotiations 
towards an interregional FTA between the EU and ASEAN and (4) in the ASEM 
process. 
 
7.1. Prior to Myanmar’s admission to ASEAN 
Myanmar gained its independence from the British in 1948, under the name of the 
Union of Burma.129
                                                 
129 For more information on Myanmar, see Silverstein (1992), Fink (2001), Taylor (2001) and Dittmer 
(2010). 
 In the early 1950s, a parliament was formed and multi-party 
elections were held in the 1960s. However, democracy in Burma was short-lived 
because in 1962, a military coup d’état took place.  From then to the dramatic changes 
that began in 2010, the country was ruled by the military and almost cut off from the 
outside world. The military regime’s political repression and economic mismanagement 
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led to widespread discontent frustration. On 8 August 1988, mass demonstrations 
(mostly students) for democracy took place and they were violently suppressed by the 
security forces. The State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) was 
established and in 1989, it declared martial law and changed the country’s official 
English name from the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma, which had existed 
from 1974, to the Union of Myanmar. It also set out plans for the People’s Assembly 
elections, which were freely held for the first time in almost 30 years on 27 May 1990. 
The National League for Democracy (NLD) won by a landslide even though its leader 
Aung San Suu Kyi was under the house arrest. The Western countries and the EC 
welcomed the election results. However, they were annulled by SLORC, which refused 
to step down (Petersson 2006: 569; du Rocher 2012: 168). 
Until 1988, when the regime violently curbed pro-democracy protesters, 
Myanmar was not a major concern for European countries though from 1962 it was 
under the military rule, which had one the worst human rights records (Petersson 2006: 
568). Even during that period, they were among the most generous donors to 
Myanmar’s military regime (Egreteau 2010: 16).130
The EC’s reaction towards Myanmar in the late 1980s and the early 1990s 
highlights that if the Dili massacre led the EC to change its posture vis-à-vis the East 
Timor issue, the military regime’s 1988 suppression and its refusal to accept the 1990 
election results were the reason behind its change of attitudes towards Myanmar. In 
other words, these events played a key role in prompting it to act as an entrepreneur of 
human rights norm, calling for the respect of those democratic norms in Myanmar. It 
also demonstrates that, like in the case of East Timor, the EC was concerned about 
human rights violations in Myanmar because by the early 1990s, the promotion and 
 The 1988 suppression brought 
Myanmar into the international spotlight and dramatically changed the EC’s relations 
with the regime. Like other Western countries, it strongly condemned the SLORC’s 
killing of pro-democracy demonstrators (Bridges 1999: 88). The EC also applied a wide 
range of sanctions against the regime (Egreteau 2010: 19). In July 1990, the European 
Parliament awarded Ms Aung San its Sakharov human rights prize (Bridges 1999: 88; 
Gupwell 2003: 66).  
                                                 
130 This illustrates well that, as underlined in the previous chapter, until the late 1980s, the EC and its 
members did not pay attention to human rights violations in Southeast Asia. For this reason, unlike 
“Vietnam and Cambodia, which had been regular topics of political discussion between the EC and 
ASEAN in the 1980s, Burma rarely figured in European deliberations on Southeast Asia” (Bridges 1999: 
87). 
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protection of human rights and democracy became a priority of its foreign policy. In this 
context, the EC and its members raised the issue its meetings with ASEAN even though 
at that time this country was not a member of ASEAN (Bridges 1999: 87; Petersson 
2006: 569). In his opening speech at the eight AEMM in May 1991, Jacques Poos 
recalled “the distressing events in Burma”, which he regarded as “no longer acceptable 
today to the international community” (Poos 1991). At the ASEAN Post-Ministerial 
Conference (PMC) in Manila in July 1992, the EC also bluntly attacked Myanmar’s 
regime because for the EC and its members, not only did human rights now become a 
major aspect in its foreign policy. They should also become a matter of international 
concern that interregional and regional forums, e.g. EC-ASEAN dialogue and the PMC, 
should discuss. In contrast, ASEAN and its members were completely indifferent to the 
political situation and human rights abuses in Myanmar. This illustrates that the EC and 
ASEAN adopted opposing postures towards Myanmar.  
Divergences were increased – and reflected in the fact that – when the EU sought 
to punish Myanmar’s military leaders, ASEAN attempted to welcome them. For 
instance, in a concerted effort to condemn and sanction its military regime, on 28 
October 1996, the EU produced a Common Position on Burma/Myanmar (European 
Council 1996b). This Common Position, which was renewed and revised several times, 
applied a wide range of sanctions on Myanmar’s military regime. These include visa 
bans for Myanmar’s high-level officials, the marginalisation of its representatives in 
international gatherings.131
From now on, Myanmar became a disruptive subject in EU-ASEAN relations not 
only because of the different nature of their normative premises but also because while 
one regional organisation fervently defended and promoted its desired norms, the other 
 In contrast, ASEAN did not regard other countries’ political 
systems or styles of their governments as a basis for cooperation – let alone apply any 
political conditionality in its relations with them. This is why while the EU tried to 
isolate Myanmar’s military officials from international forums, ASEAN sought to bring 
them into its regional mechanisms. At its 29th AMM in 1996, ASEAN officially granted 
it observer status and allowed its foreign minister to deliver a speech at the opening 
session of the meeting. ASEAN also implied that it would grant membership to 
Myanmar, together with Laos and Cambodia (AMM 1996).  
                                                 
131 Other measures are banning defence cooperation with Myanmar and its military personnel from EU 
territory, suspending bilateral/multilateral partnerships and non-humanitarian programmes, restricting 
import/exports of Burmese-made product and freezing its leaders’ financial assets within the EU.   
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resisted them. For the EU, given its poor human rights record, Myanmar’s participation 
as an observer at the AMM and its potential admission to ASEAN were unacceptable. 
In his statement at the PMC, which was held at the same time with the 29th AMM, Dick 
Spring, Ireland’s Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, who held the EU’s 
presidency, said that the EU was deeply concerned about the human rights situation in 
Myanmar (Spring 1996). He also warned that EU-ASEAN cooperation could diminish 
and even suffer if ASEAN moved to reinforce ties with the military junta (Asiaweek, 
1996; Kynge 1996b; Othman 1996b). ASEAN responded to the EU by arguing that 
integrating Myanmar into its regional framework and constructively engaging with it 
was a more appropriate way of resolving the problem. It believed that once Myanmar 
had joined its rank, it could be influenced by ASEAN in the way that “in Asia, we 
marry first and expect the bride to adapt her behaviour after marriage” (Philippines 
Foreign Minister, Domingo Siazon, quoted by Business Times, 1997b). ASEAN also 
made it clear that it would not accept any external pressure, especially from the EU, 
because they had no business airing opinions on its internal affairs (Kynge 1996a; 
Othman 1996a). Domingo Siazon bluntly put it this way: how ASEAN dealt with 
Myanmar was “our business” and the EU and any other external powers had no right to 
interfere (Business Times, 1997b). Such reactions clearly demonstrated that not only did 
ASEAN strictly maintain its ASEAN way but also used it as a means to resist the EU’s 
criticism and demand. Furthermore, they showed that the more the EU pushed for the 
protection of human rights and the more ASEAN was opposed to it.  
Such an assertion/opposition dichotomy was also evident at the 12th AEMM in 
February 1997 in Singapore, which also marked the 20th anniversary of EU-ASEAN 
relations. At this meeting, Netherlands’ Foreign Minister Hans van Mierlo wanted to 
discuss frankly, openly and in the spirit of searching for a compromise about “things 
which we disagree” (Mierlo 1997). With a frank openness, he expressed that “what’s 
happening in Burma is unacceptable” (quoted in Lee 1997) and made it clear that the 
EU was counting on ASEAN to do more to push for the democratisation of this country 
(Lee 1997; Bridges 1999: 173; Loewen 2008: 16). Furthermore, on this occasion, 
Gwynn Morgan, head of the EU department for relations with South East Asia, said that 
Myanmar was “the issue that presents the greatest challenge in our relations in the 
foreseeable future” and “a thorn in the foot that has got to be clinically removed” 
(quoted in Satthiah 1997). Indeed, it was expected that the Singapore meeting would 
discuss and endorse the ‘new dynamic’, which had been proposed during the last 
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AEMM in Karlsruhe in 1994. However, the Myanmar matter dominated this meeting, 
during which “the senior officials and their ministers discussed nothing else but human 
rights down to the last comma, while topics on economic cooperation were left almost 
untouched” (Pastor 1997). That means the Myanmar problem greatly jeopardised EU-
ASEAN cooperation (Business Times, 1997a; du Rocher 2012: 165). 
Disagreements between the EU and ASEAN over Myanmar since the early 1990s 
illustrate three important points. First, by the early 1990s, the EU and ASEAN became 
two different regional organisations, with conflicting cooperation cultures (Lee 1997). 
As it was premised on a set of liberal cosmopolitan values, the EU considered human 
rights as an important issue in its relations with ASEAN. For this reason, it strongly 
urged ASEAN to put pressure on Myanmar and even wanted it to adopt the same 
posture vis-à-vis Myanmar. In contrast, ASEAN was a regional entity that was based on 
a set of traditional communitarian norms, notably the principle of non-interference. This 
means that while both of them were norm-based organisations, their norms were 
divergent from each other. Second, given such normative differences, it was inevitable 
that their interaction was prone to tensions. Indeed, their relationship was primarily a 
‘we-group’ versus ‘they-group’ one, in which one group not only disconnected from the 
other and its core norms but also challenged and infringed the other’s norms. That 
normative dissociation and especially normative opposition was the key reason behind 
their disagreements over human rights and the Myanmar issue. Finally, these disputes 
jeopardised their cooperation, especially in the economic area because, due to the 
overwhelming presence of the Myanmar issue, the AEMM did not have time to discuss 
other important matters of their relations, such as economic cooperation (Pastor 1997). 
These three points are also among the key propositions of the thesis, which have already 
been illustrated in the previous chapter. The next section will illustrate them in more 
detail. 
7.2. After Myanmar’s admission to ASEAN 
One year after Myanmar was invited to its ministerial meeting as an observer, at 
the 30th AMM in Malaysia, which also marked its 30th anniversary, ASEAN formally 
admitted Laos and Myanmar (AMM 1997). Within ASEAN, there were some 
reservations over Myanmar’s membership. The member that was most concerned about 
Myanmar was Thailand, who proposed that ASEAN should put more pressure on its 
government for political reform. However, as noted by Petersson (2006: 572), going 
against the ASEAN way was never a popular approach in ASEAN and the proposal was 
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not backed by its other members. Yet, the main opposition to Myanmar’s admission to 
ASEAN was not from the Association but from the EU, which strongly criticised 
ASEAN’s decision. In fact, while Myanmar had already posed a problem to EU-
ASEAN relations, ASEAN’s admission of Myanmar was a turning point in their 
relationship. The Europeans were furious at its accession to ASEAN and following its 
admission, they decided to take a firm stance on Myanmar (Bardacke and Kynge 1997; 
European Report, 1997a). In his speech at a meeting with ASEAN members in July 
1997 in Kuala Lumpur, Jacques Poos recalled that “[t]he EU has, on various occasions 
over the last year, expressed its serious concerns regarding the political and human 
rights situation in Burma/Myanmar” (Poos 1997). Notably, he reminded ASEAN that 
the EU had maintained its Common Position on Burma/Myanmar in April 1997, which 
prevented the EU from opening negotiations with Myanmar for an accession protocol to 
the 1980 Cooperation Agreement. This also implied that Myanmar could not sit at the 
table with the rest of ASEAN in negotiations with the EU on an equal footing in the 
framework of the CA. For that reason, Myanmar was not given a seat at the Joint 
Cooperation Committee (JCC). Later, the section will illustrate why the EU’s 
opposition to Myanmar’s participation in the JCC led to a stalemate in their relations. 
What is worth looking at here is why the EU opposed ASEAN’s admission of Myanmar 
and why despite the EU’s opposition, ASEAN allowed it to join because it allows the 
thesis to explain more fully why their normative differences of the EU and ASEAN 
negatively affected their relations. 
From the EU’s viewpoint, Myanmar was not of any significant strategic interest 
(Petersson 2006: 571) and this could be a reason behind its tough position on Myanmar. 
Yet, there was another more important reason for such a posture – that is in the 1990s, 
the promotion of human rights and democracy became an important element of the 
EU’s international identity and role (Smith 2003: 121). As examined in Chapter 4 and 
illustrated in the previous chapter, it was strongly attached to those values and sought to 
defend and spread them due to its historical and cultural backgrounds as well as other 
changes and conditions that it experienced after the end of the Cold War. For ASEAN, 
Myanmar was strategically important. In fact, its admission of Myanmar was driven by 
a security concern that isolating it could force this country towards China whose 
regional hegemonic ambitions were increasing and about which ASEAN states were 
more and more concerned. That is why, as noted by Rüland (2001d: 143-4), though 
ASEAN states’ “differences over how to deal with Burma were simmering under the 
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surface, suspicions of China forged an early consensus that the grouping should not give 
in to Western pressure to isolate the junta or impose any sanctions on the SLORC”. 
Another reason behind ASEAN states’ friendly posture towards Myanmar’s regime was 
that Myanmar provided them with raw materials (du Rocher 2012: 166). Yet, the 
defining reason behind its support for Myanmar was that as liberal cosmopolitan values 
were not really established in most ASEAN countries, ASEAN did not make the respect 
for those principles as its key objective or organising principle. Instead, as examined in 
Chapter 5 and illustrated in the last chapter, due to Southeast Asia’s past and other 
related domestic and regional factors, the fundamental principles that guided its regional 
and international relations were its ASEAN way, notably that of non-interference. These 
prevented domestic concerns, e.g. Myanmar’s human rights and political situations, 
from being an issue in ASEAN’s internal and external cooperation (Smith 2003: 165). 
This illustrates ASEAN’s stark normative divergences from the EU.132
In a letter sent to the European Commission, ASEAN had insisted that Myanmar 
should be given full observer status in the Bangkok meeting, which meant that the 
Myanmar’s officials would sit with other ASEAN participants at the negotiating table 
and actively take part in the talks (European Report, 1997b). However, the Commission 
did not accept this demand of ASEAN and would only accept a ‘passive presence’ of 
Myanmar (Islam 1997b). More specifically, Myanmar could be allowed to come to the 
meeting but without a flag, nameplate, or any authority to participate in the discussions; 
it even refused mention of its presence in any press release. In other words, it could 
come but only to sit at the back of the room (The Economist, 1997). ASEAN did not 
accept such a treatment by the EU vis-à-vis one of its member because its “stance is 
non-discriminating and ASEAN won’t drop one of its members from the meeting” 
(Thai official quoted by the European Report, 1997b). Because of this deadlock, the 
Bangkok meeting was cancelled, putting EU-ASEAN cooperation in even greater 
jeopardy (Bardacke 1997; European Report, 1997a; 1997b). It is worth mentioning that 
this meeting was also expected to discuss and endorse the ‘new dynamic’, which was 
designed to facilitate cooperation between the two organisations and approved in 
 In fact, these 
normative discrepancies were the cause of their disagreements over Myanmar’s 
participation in the JCC, whose next meeting was due to take place in Bangkok on 17-
19 November 1997. 
                                                 
132 For some scholars, e.g. du Rocher (2012: 166), ASEAN’s policy towards Myanmar was fundamentally 
a challenge to European values and their pretended universality. 
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principle at the 11th AEMM in 1994. Their disagreements over whether Myanmar 
should or should not joint the JCC reveal that not only did they opt for opposing 
postures vis-à-vis the Myanmar issue but also their differences became now an 
inhibiting element in their cooperation. This illustrates well a central point of the thesis 
– that is not only the EU and ASEAN differ from each other in terms of their normative 
preferences but also such divergences undermine their cooperation. 
Indeed, the postponement of the JCC’s Bangkok meeting marked a major 
deadlock in – and, to some extent, paralysed – EU-ASEAN relations because the JCC 
was one of their main channels of dialogue. As both sides failed to agree on whether 
and how Myanmar should join the JCC, another JCC meeting, due to take place in 
January 1999 to prepare the agenda for the up-coming AEMM, scheduled to take place 
in Berlin in March, was also postponed (Lim 1999: 24). The postponement of the JCC 
meeting led to the cancellation of the AEMM because the Union and the Association 
could not agree on the participation of Myanmar’s Foreign Minister. As previously 
explained, given its Common Position, which applied visa bans on Myanmar’s high-
level officials, the EU did not grant visas to Myanmar’s high-ranking officials. Some 
EU officials, such as Robin Cook, clearly stated that they did not want to sit down with 
a minister from Myanmar (Abram 1999). Thus, the EU only allowed Myanmar’s low-
ranking officials to attend the conference. The EU’s pre-condition about Myanmar’s 
involvement was not accepted by ASEAN countries because, for them, Myanmar was 
now an ASEAN member and should receive equal treatment from ASEAN’s dialogue 
partners. Because of these disagreements over the manner of Myanmar’s participation, 
the meeting was cancelled.  
Following the cancellation of the 1999 AEMM, ASEAN blamed the EU for 
causing the abandonment, citing the EU’s tough position on Myanmar as the main 
obstacle in their relationship. For ASEAN countries, as Malaysia’s Foreign Minister, 
Syed Hamid Albar clearly stated, the meeting was between two organisations and not 
between two countries, and the EU could not dictate which country should be in 
ASEAN and which should not (Harun 1999). That is why ASEAN’s diplomats regarded 
the EU’s refusal to grant a visa to Myanmar’s Foreign Minister as “absurd” and 
“unacceptable” and even “humiliating” (Harun 1999). Furthermore, in the eyes of 
ASEAN, given the EU’s tough posture vis-à-vis Myanmar and its refusal to accept it as 
part of ASEAN, the EU-ASEAN dialogue would eventually come to a standstill. The 
AEMM was postponed until 2000, when the EU hesitantly agreed that Myanmar could 
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participate in the AEMM in December 2000 in Vientiane, Laos. Yet, this gathering after 
a three-year interruption was overshadowed by the total absence of the EU’s foreign 
ministers. While all 10 ASEAN foreign ministers attended the meeting, not a single 
foreign minister from the EU was present. The EU sent only low-ranking 
representatives to the meeting. It is unclear whether they could not come because the 
Vientiane meeting coincided with the EU summit in Nice or whether the Europeans 
intentionally chose to do so because they did not want to sit at the same table with 
Myanmar’s officials.  
Whatever the reason behind the EU’s low attendance, it is evident that the 
Myanmar issue damaged EU-ASEAN relations. According to a former ambassador of 
an EU member, it “was a stumbling block in the EU-ASEAN cooperation in the 1990s, 
and it remains a contentious issue” (Interview, 2009). This was confirmed by the 
responses to the author’s survey. When asked to give their views on the statement ‘the 
Myanmar issue became a stumbling-block in the EU-ASEAN cooperation’, of the 21 
responses, 12 indicated ‘completely agree’, six ‘agree’, two ‘neutral’, and only one 
‘disagree’. In fact, together with the East Timor issue examined in the previous chapter, 
the Myanmar problem jeopardised their relations in the 1990s. It can be said that if the 
Cambodian and Afghanistan issues bonded them together and facilitated their 
interaction in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s, the problems of East Timor and 
Myanmar set them apart in the 1990s. This was confirmed by the responses to the 
author’s survey.133
In brief, what has been explored in this section further supports the three 
conclusions drawn at the end of the previous section, namely 7.1. Besides illustrating 
those three points, the fact that the Myanmar issue significantly deterred EU-ASEAN 
cooperation after Myanmar’s accession to ASEAN demonstrates well other key 
propositions maintained by the thesis.  
   
First, it is evident that the norms of the EU and ASEAN play an influential role in 
defining their intraregional and interregional relationship. Put differently, the factors 
that really shape their regional and international affairs are not purely the institutional or 
                                                 
133 The respondents were asked to express their opinions on the statement ‘if the Cambodian and 
Afghanistan issues united the EC and ASEAN and strengthened their relations during the Cold War, the 
East Timor issue and the Myanmar problem divided them and undermined their cooperation in the post-
Cold War era’. Of the 21 responses, four indicated ‘completely agree’, 15 ‘agree’ and only two ‘neutral’. 
Furthermore, when asked to give their views on the statement ‘compared to their interaction in the 1990s, 
the relationship between the EC and ASEAN in the 1980s was quite smooth, especially on a political 
level’, of the 21 responses, one indicated ‘completely agree’, 13 ‘agree’, five ‘neutral’ and only two 
‘disagree’. 
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material dimensions of their actorness. Rather, it is the normative components of their 
actorness – or simply their raison d’être or their actorhood – that influence their way of 
perceiving and conducting their intraregional and interregional activities. Their own 
norms – or their respective codes of conduct or established practices – defined their 
posture vis-à-vis the Myanmar issue. 
Second, while the normative constituents of the EU and ASEAN matter, they do 
not necessarily matter in a positive and progressive manner. In fact, as demonstrated so 
far in this chapter as well as in the previous one, they became an obstacle in EU-
ASEAN relations. Their normative dimensions became a divisive and disruptive source 
because they competed or conflicted with each other. Thus, like the East Timor issue, 
the Myanmar problem demonstrates that norms are not always a force for cooperation. 
They can be a source of rivalry and conflict. This point counters the argument often 
maintained by the normative power Europe (NPE) thesis that regards NPE as a force-
for-good or something positive in world politics that contributes to defence of human 
rights or the spread of democracy.  
Finally, while it is probable that the exchanges or disagreements between the EU 
and ASEAN over the Myanmar issue shaped and consolidated the norms and values of 
the Union and the Association, it is clear that their respective norms also played a key 
role in determining (the nature, shape and outcome of) their interregional relationship. 
This point illustrates well another key argument held by the thesis: that is not only do 
interregional relations define the collective identities of the regional organisations 
involved. The collective identities or the norms and values of the participant 
organisations also significantly shape their interregional relations. The next section will 
further illustrate these arguments. 
7.3. The Myanmar issue in the ASEAN-EU FTA negotiations 
As have been seen so far, both the East Timor issue and the Myanmar problem 
hindered EU-ASEAN cooperation in the 1990s. However, unlike the former, the 
Myanmar problem continued to be an obstructive factor in the EU-ASEAN interaction 
in the 2000s. In fact, it was one of the main reasons behind the collapse of their 
negotiations towards a region-to-region FTA. This section looks at why it remained a 
divisive issue in their relations. The overall aim of the section is to provide more 
evidence to the arguments made earlier in the previous sections.  
 
7.3.1. The reasons behind the FTA 
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Chapter 3 has pointed out that by the early 2000s, many transformations, at the 
global, interregional and regional levels encouraged and/or forced the EU and ASEAN 
to revive their relations, especially their commercial cooperation. Trade was, “is and 
will continue to be the centrepiece of ASEAN-EU relations” (Balaoing 1997: 65) and 
“it is perhaps this area more than any other that binds the two regional groupings 
together” (Crozier 2008: 69). It brought them together in the 1970s and prompted them 
to upgrade their cooperation framework in the early 1990s. However, given their 
disputes over human rights and East Timor, the plan failed. Now, they realised the need 
to enhance their cooperation in this area and to achieve this, they initiated a number of 
mechanisms. One of these was TREATI, which was established in 2003. After its 
creation, several workshops and meetings were held (Abbate et al. 2008: 10) with the 
aim to prepare the foundation for a potential ASEAN-EU FTA. In 2005, both sides 
agreed to establish an ASEAN-EU Vision Group (AEVG) to explore the feasibility of 
that FTA (AEM-EU Consultation 2005). 
Following its formation, the AEVG commissioned two studies to examine the 
viability of the AEFTA, with one being led by Boumellassa et al. (2006) and the other 
by Andreosso-O’Callaghan et al. (2006). According to the first, if such an FTA were 
concluded it would increase EU export of goods to ASEAN by 24.2 % and of services 
by 29.0% (Boumellassa et al. 2006: 24; European Commission, DG for Trade 2007a). It 
would also increase ASEAN’s exports to the EU by 18.5% and add up to more than 2% 
of its GDP in 2020 (Boumellassa et al. 2006: 24-5). The other suggests that the FTA 
could help the EU to “consolidate the commercial presence of its firms in one of the 
most dynamic markets in the world” (Andreosso-O’Callaghan et al. 2006: 120, 187). 
Equally, the FTA would facilitate ASEAN’s access to a major export market (AEVG 
2006: 8-9). The agreement would also bring other political and strategic advantages for 
each side. For the EU, as its firms had lost ground to other competitors, especially after 
ASEAN’s proactive FTA strategy in East Asia and beyond,134
                                                 
134 As noted in Chapter 3, until 2006, while ASEAN was actively involved in the negotiations and 
conclusion of the FTAs with its major partners, the EU remained absent from this network of FTAs (see 
Appendix 8). 
 the cost of not creating 
an FTA with ASEAN would be high (Andreosso-O’Callaghan et al. 2006: 187-8). Thus, 
to avoid potential discrimination, it needed to start negotiations with ASEAN (AEVG 
2006: 9). The major benefits that ASEAN was expected to gain from the FTA included 
an increase in its credibility vis-à-vis its partners (Andreosso-O’Callaghan et al. 2006: 
164 
 
188). For instance, it could be a significant element in ASEAN’s strategy to compete 
with China (AEVG 2006: 9). For ASEAN states establishing FTAs with major powers 
was also seen as a way of cementing stronger political links with them that could open 
the doors to other strategic and security-related agreements (Sally 2006: 5; Dosch 2009: 
67; Sen and Srivastava 2009: 207). Interpreted in this way, an FTA with the EU could 
enable ASEAN to enhance its political and strategic links with the latter.  
In short, an FTA between the two organisations was justified economically and 
strategically as concluded by the Vision Group (2006: 7). In the interview with the 
author, an EU official was also convinced that that FTA would bring significant benefits 
to both the EU and ASEAN.  
“If an FTA is signed it will increase trade between the two regions. 
From the EU’s point of view, a comprehensive FTA with ASEAN can help 
balance the imbalance of its trade with ASEAN as the EU has a trade deficit 
with ASEAN. It will also help the EU compete with ASEAN’s other major 
partners, e.g. China, India. For ASEAN, an FTA can increase its import to 
the EU. In a number of sectors, ASEAN’s exports to the EU remain below 
their potential. An FTA with the EU will enable ASEAN to further 
integration and to become a more important economic power to counter-
balance the growing importance of China and India, for example, and 
diversify its economic relations” (Interview, 2009). 
 
Given the perceived benefits, in May 2007, the EU and ASEAN confirmed “their 
shared desire to enhance economic relations by establishing a FTA providing for 
comprehensive trade and investment liberalisation” (AEM-EU Consultations 2007) and 
FTA negotiations were officially launched afterwards. Yet, the question is whether they 
could surmount their normative divergences and their differences over the Myanmar 
issue to reach an FTA.  
 
7.3.2. Negotiations, their collapse and reasons for the failure 
Following the launch of FTA negotiations, an ASEAN-EU Joint Committee (JC) 
was established. The JC planed nine rounds of negotiations and hoped that negotiations 
on a comprehensive agreement could be reached within two years (Pratruangkrai 2007; 
Astuto 2012). The two first rounds, held in Vietnam in July 2007 and in Singapore in 
October 2007, did not produce any concrete results. Only until the third one, held in 
Brussels from 30 January to 1 February 2008, that saw an open frank and constructive 
exchange of views by the parties on the various issues that the EU wanted to be 
included in the final agreement (European Commission, DG for Trade 2008). Though 
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during the fourth round, held in Thailand in April 2008, both sides had some substantive 
discussions in a number of areas, progress was less than the EU expected (Aquino and 
Domingo 2008; Berenguer 2008; Ganjanakhundee 2008). This fourth round also 
coincided with the adoption by the Committee on International Trade of the European 
Parliament (2008) of a report on trade and economic relations with ASEAN. The report, 
while believing that a high quality agreement was more important than a rapid 
timetable, expressed concerns about the slow pace of negotiations. In recalling that 
“human rights and democracy are core EU values and demands that they form an 
integral part of the negotiations with ASEAN”, it also underlined that the protection of 
human rights in general and the regime change in Myanmar as well as other issues, e.g. 
sustainable development, were necessary conditions for negotiating an FTA with 
ASEAN. More precisely, it believed “that the current situation in Burma makes it 
impossible for that country to be included in the agreement” (European Parliament 
2008). This stance was also repeated in the remarks on the adoption of the report made 
to the European Parliament by Peter Mandelson, the EU’s then Trade Commissioner 
(Mandelson 2008). Given the involvement of the Myanmar issue and other matters, the 
fifth and sixth rounds of negotiations were unable to make any significant progress. The 
seventh meeting in March 2009 in Kuala Lumpur faced a similar situation and because 
of this at that meeting both sides agreed to halt the negotiations (Adamrah 2009; Kurczy 
2009). Since then, the EU opened negotiations with Singapore and Malaysia in 2010, 
Vietnam in 2011, and is planning the similar move with other ASEAN countries (Doan 
2012a. The question raised is why, despite significant potential benefits, the EU and 
ASEAN decided to halt negotiations towards an interregional FTA. There were a 
number of factors for the collapse of the talks.  
 
Discrepancies and incoherencies in ASEAN  
During an interview with the author in May 2009, when asked to explain why the 
EU and ASEAN decided to halt the negotiations even though it was perceived that the 
FTA would bring great benefits to the two regions, an EU official gave two fundamental 
reasons for the collapse of the negotiations towards an FTA between the EU and 
ASEAN. One is political and one is economic-related. According to this official, in 
economic terms, there existed big differences in ASEAN. Some ASEAN countries were 
very advanced and more reform-oriented whereas others were inward looking. For this 
reason, he believed that ASEAN countries were not in the position to negotiate a 
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number of issues where their economies were not yet prepared. Furthermore, given such 
huge diversities, there were different ways, options and philosophies within ASEAN to 
address the opening of trade. Most ASEAN were not ready to discuss issues, e.g. 
intellectual property rights, which were the priorities for the EU. These affected the 
ASEAN position during the negotiations. Consequently, “the EU concluded that there 
was a gap in the degree of ambition and willingness to conclude a deep and 
comprehensive agreement” (Interview, 2009). Indeed, a glance at the 10 ASEAN 
members will show huge disparities among ASEAN countries, in terms of the GDP per 
capital (see Appendix 4), the share of Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) of its members 
(see Appendix 12). Their great differences in terms of their level of economic 
development also made it difficult for the negotiations and the possibility of concluding 
an FTA. During his visit to Thailand, in June 2008, Karel De Gucht, Belgium’s then 
Foreign Minister and currently the European Trade Commissioner, underlined that 
because there was not a homogenous bloc of ASEAN countries, “you need many rules 
and provisions adapted to meet various national conditions” (quoted in 
Ganjanakhundee, 2008). The responses to the survey also show that the divergences of 
ASEAN members were one of the reasons for the collapse of the talks. Six of the 21 
responses ranked this cause first and six second (see Table 7.1). 
Given these disparities, ASEAN countries had different priorities in trade, 
investment and economic development (Burton 2007). As a result, their motivations and 
interests in FTAs and the FTA with the EU in particular also differed from one another. 
While the EU wanted to establish an FTA-plus, i.e. a broader and comprehensive 
agreement, some ASEAN countries were not ready or willing to do so. In an interview 
with the author in May 2009, another EU official maintained that the differences 
between the EU and ASEAN over the level of ambitions or the scope of the agreement 
were another major inhibiting factor. Unlike ASEAN, the EU did not want a purely 
goods-FTA; it wanted to include other issues, e.g. labour standard, intellectual property 
rights, and climate change (Interview, 2009). Two of the 21 responses to the author’s 
survey also identified these differences as the main cause of the collapse of the talks 
(see Table 7.1). This also illustrates the differences of the EU and ASEAN in terms of 
their perceptions and approaches vis-à-vis economic policies. 
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There were also other factors, which hampered the progress of negotiations and 
eventually led to their collapse. One of these was the lack of cohesion in ASEAN, 
which made it hard for the negotiation process itself and any future implementation of 
an FTA. At the negotiating level, while the European Commission was mandated to 
negotiate with ASEAN on behalf of the 27 EU members, the latter did not have such an 
institution because neither the ASEAN Secretariat nor the ASEAN rotating president 
was given the mandate to negotiate for all ASEAN members. ASEAN’s incoherence as 
a reason for the collapse of the talks is confirmed by the author’s survey (see Table 7.1). 
Another issue that was somewhat seen as a setback to the progress of ASEAN’s 
negotiations with the EU was that, at the time of the ASEAN-EU FTA being negotiated, 
ASEAN was also in the process of negotiating and concluding FTAs with other 
partners. This was backed up by Peter Mandelson in remarks to the European 
Parliament. According to him, given this stretch on ASEAN’s capabilities, “it is hard to 
see the timeframe for a full region-to-region agreement as less than three to four years, 
and it is difficult to see us achieving a consistent high level of ambition” (Mandelson 
2008).  
 
Differences over the Myanmar issue 
Concerning the political reason, the EU official interviewed mentioned earlier 
explained that ASEAN wanted to include every country, including Myanmar and other 
two less developed countries, namely Cambodia and Laos, in the FTA with the EU. In 
other words, as a matter of regional solidarity, ASEAN preferred a family approach, i.e. 
a region-to-region agreement, which included all of its ten members. In contrast, the EU 
Table 7.1: Reasons for the collapse of ASEAN-EU FTA negotiations 
 
Reasons for the collapse*\Rankings of reasons 1st 2nd  3rd  4th 5th 
ASEAN’s preoccupation with FTA talks with others  1x 8x 8x 2x 
Discrepancies of ASEAN members 6x 7x 4x 1x 1x 
Lack of cohesion in ASEAN  6x 7x 2x 3x  
Disagreement over the inclusion of Myanmar in FTA  7x 5x 2x 4x  
Other: (Disagreements over the scope of FTA)** 2x     
Source: Taken from the survey undertaken by the author 
Note: * Some respondents did not rank some of the reasons named. This also applies 
to some other questions of the questionnaire, which are referred to later. 
** One respondent specified that ASEAN wanted only-goods FTA, e.g. 
ASEAN-China FTA whereas the EU wanted a comprehensive one, including service. 
The other respondent noted that the EU wanted to include labour issues and 
environment. 
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maintained that due to the political situation in Myanmar, this country was not allowed; 
and given their respective level of economic development, Cambodia and Laos did not 
justify their participation in the region-to-region FTA. This is why the European 
Commission was authorised by the 27 members to negotiate formally a trade agreement 
with only the ASEAN 7, i.e. without Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar (Interview, 2009). 
Another EU official also maintained that the difference between the EU and ASEAN 
over the exclusion of Myanmar in the FTA was a key reason for the failure of the 
negotiations (Interview, 2009). Indeed, it is widely recognised that the issue of human 
rights violations in Myanmar loomed large over these rounds of negotiations and 
became a persistent stumbling-block to the talks (Adamrah 2009). 
As seen in 7.1 and 7.2, Myanmar had been a thorny issue in EU-ASEAN relations 
before their decisions to open FTA talks. Despite the improvement of the EU-ASEAN 
relations in the early years of the 2000s, the issue was not completely removed. In 2006, 
when the EU planned to start FTA negotiations with ASEAN, it already raised concerns 
that it could hold up talks. An EU Trade counsellor, Jean-Jacques Bouflet, said in 2006 
that they felt the political situation in Myanmar “is the main issue that we have to 
consider as we decide whether to proceed on free-trade association negotiations with” 
ASEAN (quoted by Pratruangkrai 2006). Eventually, it came up during the negotiations. 
Just a month after the first round of negotiations, the disagreements over whether the 
negotiation process should include all of ASEAN’s members emerged when Javier 
Solana played down the prospect of Myanmar joining the talks (Oxford Analytica Daily 
Brief Service, 2007). During a meeting with ASEAN Foreign Ministers at the 14th ARF 
in Manila, Philippines on 2 August 2007, he said that the FTA “would not be an 
agreement with ASEAN as such. It would be with member states of ASEAN” (quoted 
in Landingin 2007). From the EU’s viewpoint, its relations with ASEAN and its 
negotiations towards an FTA were significantly defined by the human rights situation in 
Myanmar. It also wanted ASEAN to pressure its member to improve the situation. Such 
an assertion hindered the progress of the negotiations.  
ASEAN’s insistence on Myanmar’s inclusion made it even more difficult to 
overcome the impasse brought about by the Myanmar issue. From the beginning, 
ASEAN stressed a preference for a region-to-region FTA with the EU (Cuyvers et al. 
2010: 281). Alberto Romulo, Philippines’ Foreign Secretary, said that Myanmar should 
participate in any trade deal with the EU (Landingin 2007). Gloria Arroyo, Philippines’ 
President, who at the time held ASEAN presidency, also insisted that Myanmar would 
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be included in the talks despite the EU’s opposition to dealing with the military 
autocracy. According to her, it was agreed in ASEAN “that there would be negotiations 
between the EU and ASEAN as a bloc” (quoted by Beattie 2007). Some days before the 
seventh and last round of negotiations in March 2009, Mari Pangestu, Indonesia’s Trade 
Minister, also maintained that ASEAN wanted to negotiate as a group with the EU. 
According to her, “if there’s going to be an ASEAN-EU FTA then it has to be region to 
region. ASEAN has not changed on that position” (quoted by Channel News Asia, 
2009). ASEAN’s persistence on a region-to-region FTA meant that it wanted Myanmar 
to participate in the negotiations and to be included in an eventual interregional FTA. 
For the EU, given Myanmar’s human rights record, such an inclusion was unacceptable. 
As both sides did not give up their own positions vis-à-vis the exclusion/inclusion of 
Myanmar, the collapse of the talks was inevitable. The Myanmar problem as an obstacle 
for the FTA negotiations between the EU and ASEAN was confirmed by Karel de 
Gucht at the conference of the ‘EU in International Affairs’, in Brussels in April 
2010.135
To sum up, despites their strong desire and efforts to enhance their economic 
relations and the great benefits that an FTA would bring to them, the EU and ASEAN 
failed to negotiate and conclude an FTA. While there were a number of factors 
contributing to the collapse of the negotiations, the differences between the EU and 
ASEAN over the participation of Myanmar in the FTA was a defining one.
 When asked to explain the reasons behind the halt of the talks, he said the 
disagreement over Myanmar was the main reason. The responses to the author’s survey 
also confirmed that the disagreement between the EU and ASEAN over the inclusion of 
Myanmar in the FTA was a major cause of the collapse of the talks. Of the 21 
responses, seven ranked such a disagreement the first reason for the failure of the 
negotiations (see Table 7.1).  
136
                                                 
135 The author attended this conference and presented a paper on the EU-ASEAN relationship. 
 The fact 
that the EU’s insistence on the exclusion of Myanmar due to Myanmar’s poor human 
rights record and ASEAN’s opposition to the EU’s demand contributed to the collapse 
of the FTA negotiations illustrate very well many key arguments of the thesis. Three of 
them are worth highlighting here. First, it shows that though the developments in 
ASEAN, e.g. the progress towards democratisation in some of its members and 
ASEAN’s adoption of a regional human rights body, and a better understanding 
136 Other differences that are worth noting are their disagreements over the scope of the FTA mentioned 
by two EU officials interviewed and two respondents of the author’s survey. 
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between the two organisations, brought the EU and ASEAN closer in the early 2000s, 
they did not have a major and positive impact on their relationship. In other words, even 
though the EU and ASEAN no longer clashed with each other as they had done in the 
1990s because the EU no longer bluntly insisted on the promotion of its values, their 
normative differences still existed and remained a problematic factor in their relations. 
This is because their relationship remained primarily a ‘we-group’ vs. ‘they-group’ 
dichotomy, in which one group’s norms were still challenged and opposed by the other. 
This lack of response to each other’s norms made it difficult for them to interact. 
Second, it demonstrates that the EU and ASEAN remained two divergent normative 
powers with dissimilar ways of viewing and conducting their regional and external 
relations. The fact that human rights and the Myanmar matter became issues in EU-
ASEAN relations and their FTA negotiations, whereas they were absent from ASEAN’s 
relations and FTA negotiations with its other major partners, e.g. China and Japan, was 
another example of this. Third, it clearly shows that their conflicting norms significantly 
hindered their efforts to strengthen their relations and their economic cooperation in 
particular. In other words, this point illustrates that not only the lack of their actorness 
but also the divergences of their norms prevent them from establishing an influential 
partnership. In maintaining this position, the thesis also acknowledges that sharing 
similar normative premises is not sufficient for the two organisations to negotiate 
successfully an FTA.137
7.4. The Myanmar issue in the ASEM process 
 Nevertheless, in the EU-ASEAN negotiations, while 
recognising that other major factors prevented them from effectively negotiating an 
FTA it is evident that their disagreements over the political issues, e.g. the Myanmar 
problem, were a defining one. The next section, which looks at the Myanmar issue 
within the broader Asia-Europe relations, will illustrate in more detail these three points 
as well as other key assumption of the thesis. 
This section begins by briefly looking at what ASEM is and why it was 
established. It then examines whether, and if so, why ASEM failed to achieve its 
objectives. The overall aim of the section’s examination of the ASEM process is to offer 
more evidence to the core assumptions of thesis, especially those that have been 
illustrated in Chapter 6 as well as the three previous sections of this chapter.   
                                                 
137 The failure of the EU and MERCOSUR – two regional organisations, which share common liberal and 
democratic values (Santander 2005: 291) – to negotiate an interregional FTA is an example of this. A key 
reason for the failure of the FTA negotiations was the disagreement over agricultural policies (Doctor 
2007: 29; Robles 2008b: 336). 
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7.4.1. Characteristics and rationales of ASEM 
Officially established in 1996, in Bangkok, Thailand, ASEM is an interregional 
dialogue between ‘Europe’, represented at that time by the 15 EU members plus the 
European Commission and ‘Asia’, represented by a group of ten Asian countries. It has 
been enlarged three times and it now consists of 48 members (see Appendix 13). Given 
the diverse membership of the ‘Asian’ side of ASEM, the question of whether ASEM is 
an interregional dialogue or an intergovernmental forum is often raised (Gaens 2008f: 
173; Tiilikainen 2008: 135-48; Loewen 2010: 25; Yeo 2010a: 9). Nevertheless, despite 
this lack of a coherent and compelling agency on the Asian side, there are significant 
interregional elements in the ASEM process. Between 1996 and 2008, ASEM involved 
the EU on one side and the ATP, i.e. ASEAN plus China, Japan and South Korea, on 
the other side. Moreover, as will be shown later, during that period both sides took 
distinctive collective stances vis-à-vis a number of issues, notably human rights, 
democracy and the Myanmar issue in particular. Furthermore, as the EU insisted that no 
non-EU countries could join ASEM on the EU side, Australia, New Zealand and Russia 
had to join ASEM via the ‘Asian door’, i.e. joining ASEM as ‘Asian states’ (Loewen 
2010: 33; Murray 2010a: 66; Appendix 13). Thus, overall ASEM is an interregional 
process whereby the ‘self’, i.e. the EU, interacts with the ‘other’, i.e. the grouping of 
‘Asian’ countries.138
Another noteworthy characteristic of ASEM is that though it involves a wide 
range of institutions, including the biannual summits of Heads of State/Government, 
and covers a broad spectrum of issues,
 Because of this, it is argued that interregional relations shape or 
reinforce the formation of the collective identity of the regions involved (Gilson 1999; 
2002b; 2005; Higgott 2000a). Indeed, by interacting with the EU, ASEAN and other 
countries on the Asian side of ASEM, either by an intended or unintended way, form 
what can be referred to as ‘Asianness’ or ‘we-ness’, or ‘we-group’ that not only makes 
it distinct from the EU but also enables it to act as a distinct regional actor vis-à-vis the 
EU.  
139
                                                 
138 Given the diversity of ASEM’s Asian side, some also raise the question of whether ASEM is an 
interregional dialogue or an intergovernmental forum (Tiilikainen 2008: 135-48; Gaens 2008f: 173). 
 e.g. economic, security, political, social and 
cultural matters (Shin and Segal 1997: 138; Fort 2004: 357), it is an informal and non-
binding arrangement (Fort 2004: 356). In other words, ASEM adopted ASEAN’s social-
139 This means ASEM differs from the APEC and the ARF, which focus on economic and security issues 
respectively. 
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cultural norms, which prefer informality, non-confrontation, consultation and consensus 
based on equality and tolerance and which averse institutionalisation and other legalistic 
decision-making procedures (Busse 1999: 47; Acharya 2001: 63-70; Kivimaki 2007: 
435). The fact that European countries accepted – or perhaps, were forced – to work 
almost like the Asian (Gilson 2002b: 60) not only illustrated that in the ASEM process 
there existed an exclusively ASEAN or Asian way of doing things in international 
relations that differed from the EU’s (Gilson 2001: 117). It also showed that the norm 
promoter in this case was not the EU but ASEAN. In other words, in ASEM, or at least 
when it was established, the EU was a norm follower or taker. As will be shown later, 
these different ways of perceiving and conducting international affairs between the EU 
and the Asian side of ASEM, notably ASEAN members, eventually emerged in the 
ASEM process and averted its progress. The question arises was why the EU and 
ASEAN/Asian countries wanted to establish such a broad (i.e. not purely limited to the 
EU and ASEAN) interregional forum, which was based on informality and focused a 
wide range of issues, in the mid-1990s.  
A great number of reasons led to the creation of ASEM.140 Chief among these was 
Europe’s rediscovery of Asia and its change of view vis-à-vis Asia in the early 1990s 
(Godement 2008: 28). By the early 1990s, Europe, which had largely ignored Asia for 
several decades,141
                                                 
140 Other factors include ASEAN’s desire to foster wider regional mechanisms to meet post-Cold War 
challenges and ASEAN’s concern about the EU becoming a fortress. The EU also underwent major 
changes that favoured its closer relations with Asia, e.g. its desire to play a greater global role and its 
focus on interregionalism. For more information on ASEM’s rationale, see Shin and Segal (1997), Forster 
(1999), Gilson (2002), Dent (2003), Yeo (3003), Gaens (2008a), Godement (2008), Park and Kim (2008). 
 realised that East Asia was fast becoming a major force in the world 
economy (European Commission 1994: 1; Cammack and Richards 1999: 1; Godement 
2008: 28). Consequently, it “needs as a matter of urgency to strengthen its economic 
presence in Asia in order to maintain its leading role in the world economy” (European 
Commission 1994: 1). The need to create its own links with Asia was even compounded 
given the US’s a proactive economic policy towards the region and that fact that the US 
was much faster than Europe in realising Asia’s economic importance (Pelkmans 1997: 
23-25; Forster 1999: 748; Dent 2003: 227-229; Yeo 2003: 14; Gaens 2008c: 14; Gaens 
et al. 2012: 92). Coupled with Europe’s rediscovery of Asia, there was a consensus in 
both regions that, compared to transpacific and transatlantic relations, the link between 
Europe and East Asia was weak and that it should be strengthened (Hänggi 1999: 56). 
141 From the end of the WWII to the late 1980s, European countries were not very interested in Asia 
(Bridges 1999: 18; Richards and Kirkpatrick 1999: 688). 
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For instance, Goh Chok Tong (1995a; 1995b), regarded as ASEM’s spiritual father, and 
Jacques Chirac (1996), who considered ASEM as part of his Asian policy (Gilson 1999: 
737), underlined this weakness and called for a strong partnership between Asia and 
Europe. They believed that a closer cooperation would reduce their dependency on the 
US and prevent it from pursuing a unilateral policy (Higgott 2000a: 29; Dent 2006: 117) 
as well as enhance their international influence (Shin and Segal 1997: 140).  
Finding a way out of the stalemate that the EU and ASEAN faced in the early 
1990s was another important factor that pushed them to establish ASEM. As seen in the 
previous chapter, at a time when the EU needed a gateway to access Asia’s emerging 
markets and ASEAN sought to engage with a newly transformed EU to diversify its 
economic relations as well as intensify its political weight, they disputed over human 
rights and East Timor (Villegas 1996a). Consequently, EU-ASEAN cooperation was 
brought to a standstill and the 1980 CA was not upgraded even though many had been 
calling for this for a long time. The great hope was that ASEM could offer a way to 
revitalise EU-ASEAN relations and be a way of renegotiating the agreement (Forster 
1999: 753; 2000: 795; Wiessala 2002: 75; Gaens 2008c: 24). As Loewen (2008: 24) 
puts it, the desire to intensify cooperation between the two regions  
“was based not only on the potential welfare gains to be realized but 
also on the grounds that the informal ASEM dialogue might help soften 
value clashes and ideological confrontations that had previously obstructed 
the interregional cooperation between the EU and ASEAN”. 
 
From the EU’s perspective, such an informal approach could allow it to discuss 
with ASEAN and other Asian countries about human rights and other democratic values 
as they now became a cornerstone of its foreign policy. In its Position Paper on ASEM, 
the European Council (1995) clearly states that  
“[h]uman rights, the rule of law and good governance play a key role 
in furthering harmonious social development. In this respect, the ASEM 
participants should reflect on the close links between the political and 
economic aspects involved in building a secure, stable and democratic 
society”. 
7.4.2. Reasons behind ASEM’s underachievement 
Given their desires to strengthen Europe-East Asia cooperation and to find a way 
out of the deadlocked situation that the EU and ASEAN faced in the early 1990s, the 
EU and its ASEAN/Asian partners came to their first summit with huge expectations 
and enthusiasm. President of the Commission Jacques Santer regarded this 
unprecedented meeting  as a “historical turning point” in the relations between Asia and 
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Europe (quoted in Richards and Kirkpatrick 1999: 684), Yet, all these high hopes and 
optimism turned out to be short-lived because the ASEM process did not produce 
tangible results as originally expected (Gaens 2008b: 2; Yeo: 2008a: 115). The report of 
the two research teams commissioned by the ASEM ministers to evaluate the ASEM 
process on its 10th anniversary concluded that ASEM’s achievements were modest. 
According this report, the ASEM summit remained at the information sharing level and 
has not moved into substantial cooperation (Joint Report 2006: 6).142 The failure of 
ASEM is also confirmed by the results of the author’s survey. When asked to give their 
view on the statement ‘the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) process has stayed at the 
information-sharing level had not moved into a substantive cooperation’, of the 21 
respondents, three answered ‘completely agree’, 16 ‘agree’, one ‘neutral’ and only one 
‘disagree’. The activities and the issues it deals under its three pillars also yielded 
modest concrete outcomes.143
A number of factors contributed to ASEM’s under-achievement. One of these was 
the fact that ASEM was created at a time when the economies of Southeast and East 
Asia enjoyed impressive growth. However, the 1997/98 AFC not only destroyed that 
economic dynamics but also made the European countries doubt the miracle of the 
Asian economies and, consequently, became less interested in Asia (Cammack and 
Richards 1999; Gilson 2011: 240). The existence of numerous asymmetries between the 
EU, Asia and the US, as well as between the EU and Asia also prevented Asia and 
 Among its three pillars, only the social and cultural pillar 
achieved some significant and tangible results. Its political and economic cooperation 
agenda failed to generate any substantial performance despite having a number of 
initiatives (Joint Report 2006: 8). Overall, two major failures of ASEM should be 
underlined here. First, even though it bridged the Asia-Europe link, ASEM could not 
strengthen that link. That link remained the weakest one in the triangle of North 
America, Europe and East Asia. From the US’s viewpoint, “ASEM does not exist” 
(May 2005: 38). Second, not only did ASEM fail to help the EU and ASEAN come out 
of the deadlocked situation that they faced in the early 1990s due to their disagreements 
over the value-based issues. These controversial matters were injected into the ASEM 
framework and eventually jeopardised its progress. The question is why despite great 
interest and expectation at the beginning, ASEM failed to achieve its objectives. 
                                                 
142 This biennial summit of Heads of State and Government is the most important because it is not only 
“the centre piece of ASEM” but also “the most obvious manifestation of ASEM to the outside world” 
(Yeo 2010a: 7). 
143 ASEM’s activities are grouped into three pillars: political/security, economic and socio-cultural. 
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Europe from strengthening their weak link. ASEM was established partly to limit US 
dominance (Higgott 2000). However, given their weak military capabilities, both the 
EU and East Asia primarily depended on the US (Hänggi 2004). That is why from the 
outset the US paid little attention to ASEM (Bobrow 1998; May 2005). Furthermore, 
though pledging to strengthen its relations with Asia (European Commission 1994; 
2001), the EU did not look beyond Europe and its immediate neighbourhood to engage 
East Asia seriously (Yeo 2004; Park and Kim 2008). This means geographical distance 
was also a reason behind the EU’s low political activity towards Asia was (Smith 2008). 
The informality of ASEM, which was preferred by ASEAN and other Asian 
countries, was also a drawback (Rüland 2000; Yeo 2004; Loewen 2007). Though it 
enabled the two regions to dialogue on a wide range of issues, it prevented them from 
making tangible decisions. For instance, while European leaders wanted to formulate 
precise and concrete proposals to deal with 2007/2008 global financial crisis, Asian 
countries opposed it and preferred informal measures, e.g. information sharing and 
policy exchange (EUROPE Magazine, 2008). This also reflects very different 
approaches to international relations of the EU and its Asian partners with the former 
wanting deep institutionalisation and legalistic cooperation whereas the latter preferred 
an informal and non-binding approach. This was one of many differences between the 
two sides. For instance, to foster their economic cooperation, both sides decided to 
establish a number of mechanisms and one of these was Asia-Europe Business Forum. 
However, this forum could not produce concrete results because both sides viewed it 
differently. The Asians regarded it as a networking one whereas their European 
counterparts saw it as a forum to facilitate the working environment and achieve a more 
binding code (Gaens 2008d: 37). 
In fact, the EU and its ASEAN/Asian partners had different perspectives and 
approaches when establishing the ASEM and these divergences played a key role in 
hindering their cooperation within the ASEM framework. According to Petersson 
(2006: 576), it was not the informality of ASEM but rather the differences of the 
fundamental values (between the EU and its Asian partners) that was the main obstacle 
in ASEM. Indeed, in its relations with Asia, the EU wanted to focus on political issues, 
notably human rights and democracy, which was of great importance to it (European 
Council 1995). In contrast, its Asian partners wanted to avoid them. Their disagreement 
over the Myanmar issue was a symbol of their divergences. A look at some ASEM 
summits reveals these disputes. Despite the efforts of both sides to focus on economic 
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matters, human rights still loomed at the first summit. This meeting involved what 
McMahon (1998: 250) refers to as “a confusion of the two sets of objectives. Europe 
was primarily interested in the human rights issues whereas the Asian participants 
wanted to talk about trading conditions. The result was an agreement to exchange 
students”. Before the second summit, held in London in 1998, the UK’s Foreign 
Secretary, Robin Cook, made it clear that Myanmar’s officials would not be granted 
visas to attend the summit (Kynge 1997). In response, Mahathir Mohamad, Malaysia’s 
Prime Minister warned that Malaysia and other ASEAN members would not attend the 
meeting because he maintained that the discrimination against Myanmar was also 
discrimination against ASEAN (European Report, 1997b; Gabriel 1997; Kynge 1997; 
Camroux 2006: 13; Petersson 2006: 574). Despite that warning, the host did not grant 
any visas to Myanmar’s senior officials because for the UK and its European partners, 
ASEM was not just about economics; political issues also had to be discussed. 
Eventually, ASEAN’s leaders attended the meeting without their Myanmar counterpart 
after Thailand suggested that joining ASEAN did not automatically imply ASEM 
membership (Loewen 2008: 20; Manea 2008: 379). Yet, the Myanmar issue was not 
completely solved, as it would return – and to some extent overshadow – subsequent 
summits (Ashayagachat 2000; Donnan and Mallet 2004; Petersson 2006; Loewen 2008; 
Manea 2008; Doan 2010b). For instance, before the Hanoi summit in 2004, the division 
on Myanmar’s admission to ASEM led to the postponement of ASEM’s finance and 
economy ministerial meetings scheduled for July and September 2004 respectively. The 
disputes over Myanmar’s membership were only resolved after both sides reached a 
compromise, which allowed Myanmar to participate in the Hanoi summit, only with 
low-level representation. This shows how the EU and its Asian partners viewed human 
rights differently and how such disagreements could damage ASEM. In fact, given the 
heavy and negative involvement of human rights and the Myanmar issue, ASEM did 
not have enough time or energy to concentrate on other important matters, e.g. 
economic-related issues. According to Gaens (2008c: 41), “the human rights discussion 
has seriously impeded progress in the dialogue on trade and economy” and the 
Myanmar issue “remains problematic and is likely to continue influencing ASEM’s 
course in the near future”. The Joint Report on ASEM (2006: 8) also acknowledged that 
Myanmar issue turned into a problem that jeopardised the ASEM process. 
While recognising that different views existed within the EU and ASEM’s Asian 
side vis-à-vis the Myanmar matter, it is evident that the EU and its Asian partners, 
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notably ASEAN members and China, held two contrasting positions towards the 
Myanmar issue as well as the ASEM process in general. Due to its insistence on the 
protection and promotion of democratic values, the EU maintained a tough position on 
Myanmar and wanted the ASEM process to focus on issues, such as human rights and 
democracy (AFP 2008). In contrast, given their principle of non-interference, the 
ASEAN members and other Asia countries, notably China, were reluctant to put 
pressure on Myanmar. Moreover, they were much less interested than the EU – if not at 
all – in discussing human rights and other related political issues. According to Goh 
Chok Tong, who was regarded as ASEM’s spiritual father (Gaens 2008c: 19), “because 
the EU is obliged to profess a common position, Myanmar has become an obstacle to 
seeking common ground on other more strategic issue” (Goh 2004: 324). In his view, 
like the EU-ASEAN framework, the ASEM process was held hostage by this single 
issue, which paralysed and overshadowed other more important issues of the Asian-
European relationship (Goh 2004: 324). Most of the responses to the author’s survey 
also agree the negative effects of these issues on ASEM. When asked to give their 
views on the statement that ‘the controversial and sensitive issues, e.g. human rights and 
the Burma/Myanmar problem, overshadowed some of ASEM summits’, of the 21 
respondents, six said ‘completely agree’, eight ‘agree’, five ‘neutral’, and only one 
‘disagree’. As an Asian official at the AEF confirmed, the controversial issues always 
came up either before or during the ASEM summits, and sometimes distracted the 
meetings and even overshadowed them (Interview, 2009). Cultural differences existed 
not only at the official level but also in the business circle (Gaens 2008d: 37).  
The different postures of the EU and its Asian partners vis-à-vis Myanmar, the 
ASEM process as well as regional and international affairs in general explain very well 
why the collective identity, i.e. shared norms and values, of the regional groupings 
involved defines the interregional relations they form. As previously mentioned, the 
ASEM process is a ‘we-group’/‘they-group’ interaction, in which the EU interacts with 
a group of ASEAN/Asian countries. This author agrees with the argument made by 
some major scholars on interregionalism that ASEM shapes the collective identity of 
the participant regions, i.e. the EU on one side and an Asian ‘we-group’ on the other 
side. However, from what has been examined, it is clear that the collective identity of 
the two sides involved also defined the shape and outcome of ASEM. The EU entered 
the relations with Asia as a regional actor, which, besides its economic interest, wanted 
to promote liberal and democratic norms, e.g. democracy and human rights. In contrast, 
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in entering a partnership with the EU, ASEAN and other members of the Asian side of 
ASEM were not interested in human rights and democracy because these did not feature 
prominently, if not at all, in their normative discourse and practice. For instance, even 
though it is seen as a Westernised country, Japan tried to keep human rights off the 
agenda at the first ASEM summit and “was pursuing an Asian line on human rights, one 
which eschewed direct discussion o the subject at summit meetings” (Gilson 1999: 742-
3). For other Asian members, e.g. India and Pakistan, human rights and democracy did 
not rank as high on their respective agendas as they did for the EU. Instead, the 
principle of non-interference was central to their internal and external relations. Another 
difference was that ASEAN and Asian states opted for loose and non-binding 
institutionalisation of international affairs, which not only distinguished from but also 
opposed to deep institutionalisation and legalistic cooperation preferred by the EU. 
Thus, like the EU-ASEAN framework, the ASEM process is a ‘we-group’ vs. a ‘they-
group’ interaction, in which each group promoted its own normative premises, which 
were not only divergent from those of the other but also resisted by the other. Indeed, as 
explained in Chapter 2 and illustrated in Chapters 6 as well as in this chapter, such an 
insistence/resistance pattern was the reason why the EU and ASEAN/Asian countries 
found it difficult to interact with each other. An assessment of ASEM made in 2001 
concluded that “[u]ntil the two regions can arrive at a joint solution to divided interests, 
ideas, and identity on issues such as human rights, democracy, and environmental 
protection, the long-term prospect of ASEM cooperation may be seriously limited” (Lee 
and Park 2001: 31). The view that Asia and Europe were hardly able to find common 
ground to advance their cooperation was maintained by Goh Chok Tong, who said that 
“[t]oo often Asia and Europe are talking at and not with each other” (Goh 2004: 324, 
emphasis added). Yeo Lay Hwee, a key scholar on Asia-Europe relations, also noted 
that, “[t]here is a perception in Asia that there is more of a monologue, rather than a 
dialogue” between the EU and its Asian partners (Friends of Europe 2011: 8).  
In summary, it is clear that since 1988 when Myanmar became an issue in EU-
ASEAN relations to recent notable changes in this country, which began in 2010, the 
EU and ASEAN could not find a common position vis-à-vis the issue. In fact, like in the 
East Timor case, the two organisations failed to work together to reach a common 
policy that could produce positive and significant impacts on Myanmar and their 
relations. In other words, EU-ASEAN cooperation did not contribute anything to the 
changes in both East Timor and Myanmar. Instead, as illustrated in this chapter, they 
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had opposing views of and approaches to the Myanmar issue and such divergences 
jeopardised their political and economic cooperation, not only within their interregional 
relations but also within the broader ASEM framework. Thus, the Myanmar problem is 
a convincing example to illustrate a number of important propositions assumed by the 
thesis. One of these is the argument that the EU and ASEAN are different norm 
entrepreneurs and normative powers with one being founded on and seeking to 
individual-centred values whereas the other champions state-centric principles in their 
regional and international relations. Another is the view that their focus on two different 
sets of norms was the main reason for their disagreements over human rights and 
Myanmar, which resulted in hindering their relations. Their normative divergences 
became a major hindrance in their cooperation when one organisation strongly 
promoted its preferred norms and the other opposed them. Indeed, they disputed over 
human rights and Myanmar because the EU insisted on the promotion and protection of 
its liberal cosmopolitan values whereas ASEAN resented the EU’s insistence. This also 
means their conflicting norms jeopardised their cooperation, especially at the political 
and economic levels. 
Yet, while holding that the EU and ASEAN are radically different from each other 
in terms of their normative premises and such differences significantly deter their 
cooperation, this thesis does not maintain that they differ from each other all the time 
and in every aspect. Neither does it argue that that their normative differences always 
lead them to clash. The next chapter, which examines the Aceh matter, will show that 
they sometimes manage to accommodate their differences,144
8. The Aceh issue and EU-ASEAN security cooperation 
 or even find some 
common ground, to work together and whenever they achieve this they are better to 
cooperate with each other. 
 
Chapters 6 and 7 have shown that the EU’s strong insistence on the protection and 
promotion of its normative values and ASEAN’s firm resistance to that assertion 
(because it violated its core norms) and the normative disconnection between the EU 
and ASEAN was the fundamental reason behind their disputes over East Timor and 
Myanmar, which consequently jeopardised their overall relations. This chapter looks at 
                                                 
144 As shown above, in the early 2000s, they managed to compromise their differences and that paved the 
way for them to take a number of initiatives to revive their relationship and economic cooperation during 
the first half of the last decade.  
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the Aceh matter, which, unlike the two first, did not witness any disagreements between 
the EU and ASEAN even though it was a long-lasting and deadly conflict in the 
ASEAN region. Instead, they were able and successful to work together and complete a 
joint operation, namely the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM). A key factor 
contributing to their successful collaboration was that they found some common ground 
to deal with human rights, which were a controversial issue in their relations. Thus, by 
examining the Aceh issue the chapter aims to illustrate a key argument, that is whenever 
their views and norms converge – or whenever they limit or compromise their 
normative differences – they have a better chance to cooperate with each other. Yet, this 
chapter also notes that while they were successful to work together in the AMM, the EU 
and ASEAN had different attitudes towards the AMM and its achievements. The EU 
repeatedly hailed the AMM and its success whereas ASEAN rarely mentioned it. This 
can be explained by their different ways of perceiving and dealing with security issues. 
Given these difference, coupled with the EU’s lack of military capabilities, though it 
made a major contribution to the Aceh peace process, the EU’s role in Southeast Asian 
security is relatively irrelevant. Therefore, by examining the Aceh issue, the chapter 
aims to support the central argument of the thesis – that overall the EU and ASEAN are 
two different normative powers. While their normative differences did not lead them to 
clash with each other over the Aceh issue as they did it in the cases of East Timor and 
Myanmar, they were the main reason behind the EU’s lacklustre contribution to the 
ARF, its exclusion from the EAS145
   
 and, consequently, its insignificant role in 
Southeast Asian security. Overall, the aim of this chapter is to illustrate the (1), (2) and 
(3d), (3e) and (3f) propositions of the thesis. 
8.1. The conflict and peace process 
The conflict in Aceh, Indonesia’s westernmost province, with a population of 
about 4.2 million,146
                                                 
145 Together with the ADMM-Plus, the ARF and the EAS are the key ASEAN-led institutions, which deal 
with political and security issues in Southeast Asia the Asia-Pacific region. These two institutions will be 
briefly examined in this chapter. 
 between the rebel fighters of the Free Aceh Movement or Gerakan 
Aceh Merdeka (GAM) and the Government of Indonesia (GoI) was regarded as one of 
Asia’s longest-running internal conflicts (Feith 2007: 1). It could be traced back to 
1976, when Indonesian rule over the territory was contested by the GAM. The conflict 
146 For a general understanding of the conflict and peace process in Aceh, see Aspinall and Crouch 
(2003), Reid (2004), Braud and Grevi (2005), Gunaryadi (2006), Askandar (2007), Schulze (2007a; 
2007b), Aspinall (2008), Burke (2008), Törnquist (2011) and Tholens (2012).  
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intensified in 1989, when a larger rebellion was met by a massive military 
counterinsurgency operation of the GoI. Since then to 1998 Aceh was known as a 
military operations area and during this period Indonesian security forces in their 
pursuit of the GAM fighters perpetrated human rights abuses against the Acehnese 
population (Schulze 2007b: 3). Compared to the East Timor conflict, the Aceh one was 
less severe. Nevertheless, it claimed an estimated 12,000 lives as of 2003 (Burke 2008: 
50). Following the fall of the authoritarian regime of President Suharto in May 1998, 
the situation in Aceh changed. Faced with potential conflict in other parts of Indonesia 
and pressured by a public outcry at human rights violations in Aceh, the new 
government of President Abdurrahman Wahid, elected in October 1999, was willing to 
consider political rather than military means to resolve the issue. This paved the way for 
the dialogue between the GoI and GAM (Aspinall and Crouch 2003: 2). Facilitated by 
Henry Dunant Centre (HDC), a Geneva-based advocacy group, the GoI and the GAM 
signed a Joint Understanding on Humanitarian Pause for Aceh on 12 May 2000 in 
Switzerland. However, this Humanitarian Pause, which was hailed by the UN, the US 
and the EU, generated only a temporary halt to the violence (Aspinall 2005: vii). Two 
years later, on 9 December 2002, the two parties signed a Cessation of Hostilities 
Agreement (COHA) in Geneva (Reid 2004: 312). Again, the COHA collapsed when the  
Government of President Megawati Sukarnoputri imposed martial law in Aceh in May 
2003 and allowed the Indonesian armed forces to launch a major military offensive in 
this province (Aspinall 2005: vii). There were several reasons for the collapse of these 
two peace initiatives and chief among these was the huge gap between the goals of both 
parties (Aspinall and Crouch 2003: 46; Reid 2004: 313; Strategic Comments 2005).147
With the failure of the COHA, Aceh seemed destined to endure many more years 
of armed conflict (Aspinall 2005: vii). Yet, the tsunami at the end of 2004, which killed 
150,000 people, left half a million homeless and destroyed livelihoods and 
infrastructure in Aceh (Solana 2005b), brought Aceh into the international spotlight and 
offered ways of linking the reconstruction effort and peace process (Wiryono 2008: 26; 
Törnquist 2011: 832).
   
148
                                                 
147 The GAM repeatedly insisted it would settle for nothing less than independence whereas the GoI 
insisted that negotiations had to occur within the framework of the unitary state. 
 In fact, under great pressure from international donors, who 
maintained that their promised reconstruction aid for Aceh could only be effectively 
delivered if security was restored, the two parties decided to commence new peace talks 
148 Yet, other factors, e.g. political changes in Indonesia, which had preceded it, also played a key role in 
facilitating the negotiations (Schulze (2007b: 3). 
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(Strategic Comments 2005). Among those key international donors was the EU,149 who 
saw this as an opportunity to engage the GoI and the GAM in talks towards a peace 
agreement (Solana 2005b). Funded and facilitated by the EU, this time, the peace talks 
were mediated by the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI), chaired by Finland’s former 
President Martti Ahtisaari. Unlike the peace talks negotiated under the aegis of the 
HDC, the intention of the CMI was to achieve a final agreement that would cover a 
wide range of issues. These included Aceh’s long-term development and reconstruction, 
Indonesia’s security arrangements for Aceh, human rights and monitoring of both sides’ 
undertakings after the agreement (Strategic Comments 2005; Ahtisaari 2008: 11). After 
five rounds of talks in Helsinki, on 15 August 2005, the GoI and the GAM signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in Helsinki, also known as the Helsinki Accord, 
ending the three-decade continuous armed conflict in Aceh (Kingsbury 2006; Schulze 
2007a; Ahtisaari 2008). This peace agreement, under which the GAM agreed to give up 
its armed struggle for independence and demobilise and in exchange, the GoI offered 
far-reaching autonomy for Aceh and an amnesty for the GAM fighters (Solana 2005b), 
was clearly more advanced and concrete than the two failed attempts mediated by the 
HDC. More precisely, as noted earlier, besides providing the broad outlines of a 
political and security settlement,150
By giving an overview of the conflict and peace process in Aceh, this section 
highlights three important points that will be examined in more detail in the subsequent 
sections of the chapter. The first is about the Aceh Monitoring Mission. It was the first 
time that the EU and ASEAN closely and successfully worked together to undertake an 
operation. The question raised is why they were able to cooperate in Aceh whereas they 
failed to do so in the case of East Timor and Myanmar as examined in the two previous 
chapters. The next section will look at the AMM, its achievement and the reasons 
behind its success. The second is related to the postures of the EU and ASEAN towards 
the Aceh issue as a whole. Though the conflict took place its region, ASEAN was not 
 it agreed the establishment of an international team, 
known as the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM), composed of the EU and five ASEAN 
members, to oversee the implementation of the peace agreement (Ahtisaari 2008: 13). 
                                                 
149 The European Commission had committed $720 million to Aceh’s reconstruction (Strategic 
Comments 2005). 
150 The MoU (2005) consisted of six sections, namely (1) the governing of Aceh, (2) human rights, (3) 
amnesty and reintegration into society, (4) security arrangements, (5) the establishment of an AMM to 
oversee the implementation of the peace agreement and (6) dispute settlement. 
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concerned about it. In fact, with some minor exceptions,151
 
 until their participation in 
the AMM, ASEAN as a whole and its members largely ignored the conflict. In contrast, 
together with UN, the US and Japan, the EU encouraged the peace initiatives brokered 
by the HDC (Aspinall and Crouch 2003) as well as expressed its concern about the 
Aceh situation after the failure of COHA (Joint Statement on Aceh 2003). Furthermore, 
as shown, it played a crucial role in facilitating the Helsinki peace talks. In other words, 
while the EU acted as a peace promoter by seeking to end the conflict and bring a 
sustainable peace to Aceh, ASEAN was largely indifferent to the Aceh conflict. Their 
differing attitudes were clearly manifested by the fact that while the EU proudly and 
repeatedly mentioned the Aceh peace process, the AMM and its achievement, ASEAN 
rarely talked about these. The fundamental reason behind their different postures was 
the EU acted as a cosmopolitan normative power, which strongly focused on the 
promotion of liberal peace and other individual-centred norms, whereas ASEAN 
behaved as communitarian normative power, which stressed the importance of national 
security. The third section will demonstrate in more detail their different stances vis-à-
vis the Aceh issue and the reason behind their divergences. To illustrate why their 
dissimilar ways of viewing and dealing with the Aceh issue and other regional and 
international affairs hinder their relations and their security cooperation, the last section 
of the chapter will look at the ARF and the EAS, which are two of the key ASEAN-led 
security institutions.  
 
8.2 The AMM and EU-ASEAN cooperation 
One of the reasons for the collapse of the two earlier peace Aceh initiatives 
mediated by the HDC was the lack of strong diplomatic support for their 
implementation. Thus, the key lesson learnt from the previous failures made it crucial to 
identify a credible international partner to oversee the implementation of the eventual 
agreement (Braud and Grevi 2005: 21; Solana 2005b). In fact, the belief that the success 
of any peace agreement required a stronger political backing was raised and discussed 
during the first talks in Helsinki. The GAM representatives wanted international 
peacekeeping forces, while the delegates of the GoI did not accept any traditional UN 
                                                 
151 Thailand’s former Minister Surin Pitsuan was among a few mediators that participated in the renewed 
peace talks meditated by the HDC in 2001. Thailand and the Philippines participated in the Joint Security 
Committee to monitor the COHA (Aspinall and Crouch 2003: 27). 
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peacekeeping operations in Aceh,152 preferring a monitoring team consisting of only 
ASEAN members (Schulze 2007b: 3; Burke 2008: 56). In the end, they agreed to set up 
the AMM, which comprised of the EU and ASEAN members (MoU 2005, point 5.3; 
European Council 2005; Solana 2005b; Feith 2007: 2). The five ASEAN members, 
which participated in this EU-led mission,153
As the composition of its participants illustrates, the AMM was not purely an 
interregional cooperation between the EU and ASEAN because, in addition to the EU 
and the five ASEAN countries, there was also the contribution of two other non-EU 
European countries, namely Norway and Switzerland. Nevertheless, the EU’s 
cooperation with ASEAN states to monitor the execution of the Aceh peace agreement 
was unique and very noteworthy in many aspects (Solana 2006d). For ASEAN and its 
members, whether they sought to ignore it or not, they could not forget that the Aceh 
conflict was an enduring and deadly one that took place in their member state, namely 
Indonesia. Moreover, half of ASEAN members participated in the AMM.
 were Brunei, Malaysia, Philippines, 
Singapore and Thailand. Besides the EU and the five mentioned ASEAN members, it 
also included Norway and Switzerland (Schulze 2007b: 3; Burke 2008: 56; Ashton 
2010; Anderson 2012: 2). The AMM’s mandate, which lasted from 15 September 2005 
until 15 December 2006, was to monitor the implementation of both parties’ 
commitments. Among AMM’s eight tasks are the monitoring human rights situation 
and providing assistance in this fields and the investigation and ruling on complaints 
and alleged violations of the peace agreement (MoU, point 5.2; European Council 2005, 
article 5; Solana 2005b).  
154
                                                 
152 For the GoI as the negative experience of the international intervention in East Timor was still fresh, 
the presence of international forces in its territory was a sensitive issue. Similarly, for ASEAN states, due 
to their principle of non-interference, they were not always comfortable to participate in a peace process 
in one member state was a sensitive matter (Braud and Grevi 2005: 21). 
 For the EU, 
the AMM was the first-ever mission that it pursued under its European Security and 
Defence Policy (ESDP) in Asia (Solana 2006d; Feith 2007: 3) and its involvement was 
appreciated in the region (Cameron 2010: 280). Even though there were other factors 
and actors, which played their part in resolving the conflict, the EU’s role was of 
significant importance, especially its leading role in the AMM (Solana 2005b; 2006d; 
Ashton 2010). According to Gunaryadi (2006: 88-9), the EU’s support for the CMI, 
153 The mission was headed by Pieter Feith, who reported to the European Council and directly to Javier 
Solana, the EU’s then High Representative for CFSP (European Council 2005, article 5; Schulze 2007b: 
3; Burke 2008: 56). 
154 That means only four new and less developed members of ASEAN, namely Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar 
and Cambodia did not engage in this process.  
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which enjoyed the its exclusive and full support legally and financially, was 
indispensable in initiating and nurturing the Helsinki Accord. Most importantly, EU-
ASEAN cooperation was remarkable because, as underlined by an EU official, the 
AMM was the unprecedented mission that EU and ASEAN members joined together 
with forces on the ground to monitor a peace process (Interview, 2009; see also Solana 
2006d; 2009). It was also the first time, the EU and ASEAN members “worked together 
closely in the field of crisis” (AEMM 2007, point 9). In every part of its work, the 
AMM fully integrated teams of EU and ASEAN monitors (Feith 2006; 2007). Indeed, 
from the top level to that of field inspections, the AMM was “really a joint EU-ASEAN 
effort” (Solana 2005b; 2006d). 
With regard to the MoU, it was widely seen as a notable achievement not only 
because it was reached in a relatively short time but also because of its successful 
implementation. According to Feith (2006; 2007), a number of factors contributed to 
this success and one of these was the credibility and role of the AMM.155
                                                 
155 The other factors included the clarity of the agreement’s provisions and timelines, the strong political 
of both parties to make the process work and the timing of the peace process (Feith 2007: 3). 
 Unlike the two 
previous agreements which failed due to the lack of a strong and credible monitoring 
team, the implementation of the Helsinki Accord was supervised by a team of states 
from the EU and ASEAN that both the rebel fighters and the GoI accepted (Braud and 
Grevi 2005: 36; Solana 2005b). Thanks to this, the AMM had significant influence on 
the two parties (Feith 2007: 3). For Schulze (2007a: 49; 2007b: 13), who considers the 
AMM and the transition from conflict to peace in Aceh as ‘mission not so impossible’, 
the AMM was a clear achievement because without its monitors and expertise the 
implementation of the MoU would have been much more difficult and the Aceh peace 
process may have collapsed early on. In his view, there were five key reasons behind 
the accomplishment of the AMM. They were: (1) the full commitment of both the GAM 
and the GoI to the peace process, (2) the leadership and impartiality of the mission, (3) 
the support of EU member states during the set-up phase, (4) the quick amnesty and the 
committee on security arrangements and (5) the AMM’s lack of focus on implementing 
the human rights elements at the beginning of the process (Schulze 2007a: 49; 2007b: 
14). This author agrees with such an assessment of the AMM, especially the last point, 
which is examined in more detail below because it is very useful in explaining EU-
ASEAN relations in general and their cooperation in the AMM in particular as well as 
illustrating some key arguments maintained by the thesis. 
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The MoU had a number of specific clauses relating to human rights and one of the 
eight tasks of the AMM was “to monitor the human rights situation and provide 
assistance in this field” (MoU, point 5.2). However, the AMM did not focus on this 
task, especially at the beginning. In fact, in the implementation of the peace agreement 
the human rights issue was generally overlooked because the in the end the human 
rights court and the commission for truth and reconciliation were not established even 
though in the MoU both sides agreed their establishment and the AMM had to monitor 
that establishment. The lack of the AMM’s focus on human rights and its success in this 
area resulted in criticism by human rights organisations. Some European circles were 
also disappointed about this lack of progress on human rights and even GAM was 
critical of this deficit (Schulze 2007b: 9). Yet, the AMM’s relative ignorance of the 
human rights issue was essential because such an approach “made it possible for the 
AMM to ultimately complete its mission in the highly sensitive context of Indonesian 
domestic politics” (Schulze 2007b: 1; 14). As seen in Chapters 6 and 7, human rights 
had become a highly politicised and disruptive issue in the EU’s relations with ASEAN 
and Indonesia. For this reason, if the AMM had focussed on the respect of human 
rights, which was one of six points of the peace agreement, too early and too 
obsessively, the GoI could have become very uncomfortable and decided to withdraw 
from the peace concord. As acknowledged by Justin Davis, the AMM’s Chief-of-Staff, 
“[i]f we had gone in 2005 and had said that we will focus on human rights we would 
have been finished’ (quoted in Schulze 2007a: 22; 2007b: 9). That view also shared by 
an Indonesian diplomat, who made it clear that “[i]t was a simple choice of facilitating 
the end of armed conflict in Aceh or losing this opportunity by talking about human 
rights, which would not have brought about results anyway” (quoted in Schulze 2007b: 
9). These two comments illustrate that not only the AMM’s strong focus on human 
rights would have led to the collapse of the peace agreement but also that such an 
approach would not created any concrete results in the human rights area. Thus, it is 
possible that the monitors involved in the EU-led mission had learnt the lesson from the 
issues of East Timor Myanmar that the EU’s emphasis on the promotion of human 
rights not only jeopardised EU-ASEAN relations but prevented it from achieving any 
results at all in that area.  
Another crucial factor that encouraged the GoI’s peace negotiations and 
settlements with the GAM to solve the Aceh conflict in the early 2000s, notably the 
Helsinki talks and the MoU, and led it to allow the EU to participate in monitoring the 
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implementation of the MoU was Indonesia’s transition from autocratic rule to a 
vigorous multiparty system. It is probable that the Aceh conflict would not have been 
peacefully solved if Indonesia had not started its democratisation process in the late 
1990s and gradually strengthened it in the early 2000s. This democratic evolution not 
only encouraged Jakarta to find a peaceful solution to the Aceh conflict but also enabled 
to it to be more receptive to the fundamental values, e.g. democracy, human rights, rule 
of law, good governance – the values that the EU strongly promoted. Indeed, as noted 
by the European Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood 
Policy Benita Ferrero-Waldner, “[i]t is surely no coincidence that the dramatic 
breakthrough in the Aceh conflict has come as Indonesia’s democracy has grown 
stronger” (Ferrero-Waldner 2006). This point also shows that, as highlighted by a 
constructivist perspective, the change of identity of a political actor also prompts it to 
modify its domestic and foreign policy. Furthermore, the fact that the EU did not 
criticise Indonesia’s handling of Aceh as it had done in the East Timor case was also of 
importance because it paved the way for the GoI to accept the EU’s involvement in the 
Helsinki talks and eventually invite the EU to lead the AMM. In reality, the EU did not 
issue any statement criticising human rights violations in Aceh despites the long-
standing and violent conflict in this province.  
From what has been examined, some major points should be drawn. It is clear that 
through its strong support for the Helsinki talks and especially its leading role in the 
AMM, there is no doubt that the EU played a key part in bringing a lasting peace to 
Aceh after 30 years of armed conflict (Solana 2005b; 2006d). As identified by 
Gunaryadi (2006: 93-7), there were a number of economic, political and strategic 
reasons behind the EU’s support for the Helsinki talks and its participation in the 
AMM.156 Chief among these was that its involvement in Aceh fit into very well its 
commitment to promoting peace, security and justice in the world through its ‘soft 
power’ means, e.g. its political and economic weight, resources and especially its shared 
values (European Council 2003; Solana 2005b; 2006c; 2006d; Feith 2007: 3).157
                                                 
156 These included the EU’s desire to play a greater global role. Economic interest was another factor. The 
EU perceived that the rebuilding of a post-tsunami Aceh, with the cost of construction being forecast to 
be €4,169 billion, would generate huge economic opportunities for its firms (Gunaryadi 2006: 94-5). 
 As will 
be further developed in the third section, the EU was willing to conduct a complicated 
157 After the US-led military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq following the 9/11 terrorist events, by 
supporting the two parties to reach a peace agreement and helping them to implement it, the EU wanted to 
voice a moral message that conflicts could be solved by peaceful means (Gunaryadi 2006: 94; Ashton 
2010). 
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mission, which was far from its traditional geographical sphere of interest (Wong 2012: 
41, because that engagement suited its international identity and role as a normative 
power that sought to promote its prime norm of peace and other core norms to other 
regions in the world (Rynning 2003; Kaldor et al. 2007; Biava et al. 2011). Indeed, as 
noted by Gunaryadi (2006: 94), the EU’s involvement in the Aceh peace process 
because supporting good governance, local democracy and sustainable development 
was an important part of the mainstream agenda of its foreign policy.  
The EU’s cooperation with ASEAN regarding the Aceh issue was remarkable 
because for the first time the two organisations could work together and make a 
significant contribution to the security in Aceh and Southeast Asia in general. Though 
they had successfully forged a united posture vis-à-vis political and security matters, 
e.g. the issues of Afghanistan and Cambodia and their cooperation to fight against 
terrorism in the aftermath of the 9/11 events, it is probably safe to say that never before 
did the EU and ASEAN have such a close, tangible and successful cooperation in any 
field. Moreover, it is evident that they could do so because they found some common 
ground in terms of their approaches vis-à-vis the Aceh peace process and its 
implementation. Indonesia’s mere willingness to invite the EU and five ASEAN 
members to participate in the AMM was already an achievement. As noted earlier, for 
the GoI, in the aftermath of the international intervention in East Timor in the late 
1990s, the involvement of international forces on its soil was always seen as a risky and 
susceptible matter. For ASEAN countries, given their core and long-standing principle 
of non-interference, getting involved to solve a member state’s internal problem was not 
something they were willing or happy to undertake. Thus, their overcoming this 
sensitivity in order to work together to monitor the peace process was by itself a 
noteworthy success. The common and plausible approach to the controversial issue of 
human rights of the EU and ASEAN monitors also facilitated their cooperation. Without 
delicately dealing with this contentious matter, the AMM would had have failed and, 
consequently, the peace agreement would have collapsed. One of the key hypotheses of 
the thesis is the premise that whenever the EU and ASEAN try to avoid, limit or 
accommodate their normative differences their tensions are significantly decreased and 
this paves the way for some substantial cooperation. This point illustrates very well that 
proposition.  
Indeed, the EU wanted to engage in the Aceh peace process because such a 
commitment was an integral part of its international role as a normative power that was 
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keen to transfer its core norms to other countries and regions in the world. By mid-
2000s, thanks to its democratic transition, the GoI was also more willing to embrace 
those norms, making it no longer regard the EU’s involvement as interfering into its 
internal affairs. Furthermore, unlike the cases of East Timor and Myanmar, in which the 
EU strongly, if not bluntly, insisted ASEAN and its members to respect the democratic 
norms it cherished, in its dealing with the Aceh issue, the EU did not take that tough 
posture. This not only diminished their differences but also enabled them to cooperate. 
Thus, the Aceh issue is an example to illustrate that whenever their views and 
approaches vis-à-vis international affairs converge, the EU and ASEAN are better able 
to cooperate with each other. In contrast, as seen in the two previous chapters, whenever 
their normative elements diverge from or compete with each other, they find it difficult 
to interact.  
Yet, though finding some common ground to oversee successfully the AMM, the 
EU and ASEAN still view the EU-led mission and its achievement rather differently. 
The EU repeatedly and proudly talks about the success of the mission and its 
significance to the EU’s foreign policy and its relations with ASEAN whereas the 
AMM and its achievement were much less mentioned in and by ASEAN. The next 
sections will develop in more detail these differences, the reason behind them as well as 
their implication to the relations between the EU and ASEAN and their cooperation in 
the security in particular. An examination of these issues will show that overall the EU 
and ASEAN remain two different regional actors or normative powers with divergent 
ways of perceiving and conducting regional and international affairs. This prevents 
them from substantially cooperate with each other, especially the strategic/security area.  
 
8.3. Two different attitudes towards the AMM  
As singled out earlier, though the violent and long-standing conflict took place in 
their region, ASEAN and its members were not concerned about it. In fact, until the 
participation of the five ASEAN members in the AMM, the Aceh conflict was never a 
relevant issue in ASEAN as the Association and its members saw it as solely an internal 
affair of Indonesia and did not interfere. This was reflected in the fact that it was barely 
mentioned in the ASEAN summits and ASEAN Ministerial Meetings (AMM) and 
rarely referred to in the communiqués of these meetings. If ASEAN states referred to it 
in the final statements of their meetings, they did so in order to show their support for 
Indonesia’s unity. For instance, in their AMM in 2000, ASEAN Foreign Ministers 
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expressed their support for Indonesia’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and national 
unity and commended the efforts and measures taken by the Indonesian Government to 
restore peace and order (AMM 2000, point 22). In their meeting in 2003, which took 
place after the collapse of the COHA and Indonesia’s subsequent military campaign in 
Aceh, they reaffirmed their continuing support for Indonesia’s sovereignty, territorial 
integrity and national unity and recognised its efforts to restore peace and order in Aceh. 
They also “pledged our support to deny the separatist movement access to means of 
violence through, among all, preventing arms smuggling into the Aceh province” 
(AMM 2003, point 17). Notably, despites their significance, the MoU and the Aceh 
Monitoring Mission barely appeared in ASEAN’s official discourse. In fact, to the 
author’s knowledge, the MoU and the AMM were mentioned twice by ASEAN. The 
first was during the 11th ASEAN summit in December 2005, held after the signing of 
MoU, when ASEAN leaders welcomed the conclusion of the MoU (ASEAN Summit 
2005, point 33). The second reference to it was made by Ong Keng Yong, ASEAN’s 
then Secretary-General, during a lecture at the Polish Institute of International Affairs 
during his visit to Poland, in 2007, which was also the year that marked 30th anniversary 
of EU-ASEAN relations (Ong 2007). There was not a single separate statement issued 
by ASEAN or its officials on the MoU or the AMM. 
In contrast, the Aceh issue was present in the EU’s policy. As noted earlier, while 
ASEAN as a whole was silent over the two agreements between the GAM and the GoI 
brokered by the HDC in the early 2000s, the EU voiced their support for these 
initiatives (Aspinall and Crouch 2003). Though it did not criticise Indonesia and human 
rights in Aceh as it had done in the case of East Timor, together with the US and Japan, 
the EU issued a Joint Statement on Aceh on 6 November 2003, expressing its concern 
for the extension of state of military emergency in this territory. In that statement, while 
reiterating their commitment to Indonesia’s territorial integrity, the EU, Japan and the 
US believed that “the conflict in Aceh can only be ended with a political solution” and 
that “good governance reforms, autonomy and development plans are critical to resolve 
the conflict” (Joint Statement on Aceh, 2003). Surely, ASEAN would not issue such a 
statement. In fact, Indonesia regarded that joint statement as a foreign ‘meddling’ in its 
affairs and worked diligently within ASEAN to obtain declarations of support for its 
national unity as mentioned earlier (Weatherbee and Emmers 2005: 142). More 
remarkably, while the Aceh peace agreement, the AMM and its achievement were 
scarcely brought up in and by ASEAN, they were repeatedly mentioned by the EU. The 
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EU had official and unofficial statements that referred to or exclusively focused on the 
Helsinki Accord, the AMM and its success. These include – but are not limited to – 
those of the European Council (2005; 2006a; 2006b), the European Commissioner for 
External Relations, Benita Ferrero-Waldner (2006), the Head of the AMM, Pieter Feith 
(2006; 2007), the EU’s High Representative for the CFSP, Xavier Solana (2005a; 
2005b; 2006a; 2006b, 2006c; 2006d; 2006e; 2007; 2009). In 2010, the EU even marked 
the fifth anniversary of the signature of the MoU (Ashton 2010).   
In those statements, the EU often hailed the Aceh’s peaceful evolution and its 
contribution to that progress (Solana 2005b; 2006b; Ferrero-Waldner 2006; Ashton 
2010). It also commended its collaboration with ASEAN in the AMM, regarding the 
joint mission as a comprehensive political and security cooperation between the two 
organisations (Solana 2005b; 2006b; 2007). In addition, its officials believed that the 
“outstanding way” the EU and ASEAN worked together in Aceh was the most 
significant boost for their relations and opened the ground for possible further EU-
ASEAN cooperation (Solana 2005b; 2006b; 2006d; 2007; Feith 2007). Later the chapter 
will see whether the AMM could pave the way for the EU and ASEAN to advance their 
strategic and security cooperation as the EU envisaged and hoped. The point being 
made here is that the EU repeatedly and proudly spoke about the AMM and its 
achievement and highlighted its significance to the EU’s foreign policy and its 
cooperation with ASEAN, especially in the strategic and security area. This view of the 
EU is very different from ASEAN’s because the Aceh issue in general and its 
cooperation with the EU in the AMM did not figure prominently in its internal and 
external policies as well as its relations with the EU.  
The differing postures of the EU and ASEAN vis-à-vis the MoU, the AMM and 
its achievement were manifested not only at the official level but also at other unofficial 
ones. In fact, the Aceh conflict, the Helsinki Accord as well as the AMM were mostly 
covered and studied in Europe and to some extent in the US. They were much less 
talked about in Southeast Asia. For instance, in her study, based on World News 
Connection dataset, Anderson (2012: 7) discovers that among the worldwide coverage 
of the Aceh Monitoring Mission, 37.7% of articles from EU countries and only 1.0% 
from ASEAN countries.158
                                                 
158 51.0 % were from Indonesia and this was not surprising because the Aceh issue was an Indonesia one.  
 She also finds it astonishing that the Lexis/Nexis and World 
News Connection uncovered next to no articles published in English in ASEAN 
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countries about the AMM. More precisely, according to her research, the Bangkok Post 
(Thailand), the Manila Times and the Daily Inquirer (Philippines) and the New Light of 
Myanmar had no coverage whatsoever. Malaysia’s New Straits Times had eight articles, 
but three were written by Javier Solana and the rest were on the peace process in 
general with little mention of mission. Singapore’s Straits Times had nine articles. 
However, as in Malaysia, three were written by Javier Solana, one by the Commissioner 
for External Relations, one from the UK High Commissioner and the rest were on the 
peace process without referring to the AMM (Anderson 2012: 7-8). The question is why 
the EU and ASEAN had contrasting postures vis-à-vis the AMM and its achievement. 
In explaining why the press in ASEAN countries rarely mentioned the AMM, 
Anderson (2012: 8) aptly points out that the ASEAN way, notably the principle of non-
interference, was the reason behind the absence of the AMM in ASEAN media. Indeed, 
due to their core principle of non-interference in other states’ internal affairs and given 
the sensitive nature of the peace agreement, it was inevitable that ASEAN countries’ 
governments chose to ignore the mission. For them, as she noted, “even praise of the 
mission might sound like an endorsement of EU interference in the region and a tacit 
criticism of Jakarta” (Anderson 2012: 8). Yet, it was only the tip of the iceberg. The 
root of their dissimilar postures vis-à-vis the Aceh issue is that the security environment 
in Europe and Southeast Asia and the way the two organisations perceive and deal with 
security are fundamentally divergent from each other.  
Thanks to its members’ commitment to dealing peacefully with disputes and 
cooperating through common institutions and the progressive spread of the rule of law 
and democracy that transformed authoritarian regimes into secure and stable 
democracy, the EU is now a united and peaceful region in which large-scale aggression 
among its member states is improbable (European Council 2003: 3, 6). In contrast, as 
underlined in Chapter 5, due to existing territorial disputes and other factors, tensions 
between ASEAN members remain. Furthermore, while the EU’s external environment, 
e.g. its neighbourhood, is relatively stable, the security situation in Southeast Asia and 
the Asia-Pacific region is still volatile. Indeed, despite important changes in the 
international system during the last decades, the security context that ASEAN states 
experienced 40 or 50 years ago has not changed significantly. 
Given the differences of their security context – and this illustrates well how their 
respective environment determine their norms, which is the (2) assumption – security is 
also understood differently in the EU and ASEAN. In the EU, security is no longer 
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perceived within the realist state-centric view of national security, e.g. territorial 
defence against threats from another state. It is interpreted in a much broader sense 
(Ellner 2008: 10; Yeo 2009: 11). In its ESS, which is the key document of the EU on 
security, the EU identified terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, 
regional conflicts, state failure and organised crimes as the key threats to its security 
(European Council 2003: 5-9). With regard to the state failure, which the EU sees as an 
alarming phenomenon that undermines global governance and adds to regional stability, 
the ESS identifies bad governance, e.g. corruption, abuse of power, weak institutions 
and lack of accountability, and civil conflict corrode states from within as two major 
causes (European Council 2003: 8-9). Thus, it is clear that from the EU’s perspective, 
non-traditional problems are the major sources of threats to its security and global 
security.159 That is why the intra-state problems, e.g. the Aceh conflict, the East Timor 
issue and the Myanmar problem, featured in its foreign policy and its relations with 
ASEAN. A crucial element of the ESS is that though it does not explicitly mention the 
concept of ‘human security’,160
In contrast, in ASEAN, security is mainly understood in the most traditional 
concept of national security. Chapter 5 has underlined that in Southeast Asia, three 
sources of challenges/threat to security are identified. They are those that emanate from 
(1) other regional states, (2) from states outside the region and (3) from within 
individual states. It also noted that the security that Southeast Asian countries aim to 
  it strongly focuses on this form of security. In fact, nine 
months after the publication of the ESS, a team led by Mary Kaldor and other members 
of the Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, which was convened by Javier 
Solana issued A Human Security Doctrine for Europe with the aim of proposing a new 
doctrine for implementing the ESS (Kaldor et al. 2004: 8). According to this report, 
which emphasises that the main sources of insecurity are either authoritarian states that 
repress their own citizens or a combination of state and non-state armed groups in 
conditions of state failure, human security means individual freedom from basic 
insecurities, caused by gross human rights violations (Kaldor et al. 2004: 8-9).  
                                                 
159 This emphasis on non-traditional security threats is also strongly stressed in the 2008 Report on the 
Implementation of the European Security Strategy (European Council 2008; Kaunert, Léonard 2011: 
363). 
160 The concept of human security is generally associated to Human Development Report: New 
Dimensions of Human Security by UN Development Programme (UNDP) in 1994, which defined that 
“human security is people-centred” (UNDP 1994: 23). For more on this concept and the EU’s human 
security doctrine, see also Kaldor et al. (2004, 2007), Glasius and Kaldor (2006a), MacFarlane and Khong 
(2006), Manners (2007), Martin (2007), Tadjbakhsh (2007), Vankovska (2007), Nishikawa (2009), 
Kaunert and Léonard (2011). 
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maintain is that of (1) the region as a whole, (2) the regional countries, i.e. territorial 
integrity and sovereignty, and (3) the regimes/ruling elites in the region (Bellamy 2004: 
166; Kivimaki 2007: 434; Stubbs: 2008: 459). As illustrated by the two first sources and 
forms of security, in ASEAN security is predominantly state-centred and related to 
inter-state conflicts,161
Finally, due the two first, the EU and ASEAN approaches to security divergently; 
and this is another important reason why they had different postures towards the Aceh 
peace process, the AMM and its achievement. The EU’s security strategy states that 
“the best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic states” and 
stresses that the best means of fostering and strengthening that world are “spreading 
good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and 
abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights” (European 
Council 2003: 16). More precisely, as Biscop (2007a: 4; 2007b: 5) highlights, the EU 
opts for a ‘soft’ approach to security, which emphasises the access to four core ‘global 
public goods’. They are: (1) physical security or freedom from fear, (2) economic 
prosperity or freedom from want, (3) political participation, i.e. democracy, respect for 
human rights, and (4) social well-being, i.e. access to health care and education.
 not the internal conflicts, e.g. the Aceh issue, were and continue 
to be the primary concerns of ASEAN members. ASEAN’s state-centric view of 
security is also obvious in the concept of ‘comprehensive security’ used by policy 
makers in ASEAN, which emphasises a holistic view of security that includes both 
military and non-military threats, does not pay attention to the aspects of human 
security, e.g. human rights (Yeo 2009c: 15). Furthermore, though expanding  the scope 
of security to include non-traditional types of security threats, e.g. ethnic, religious, 
racial, and inter-group conflicts, this concept still regards those threats as the threats to 
the states (Nishikawa 2009: 225). 
162
                                                 
161 These include territorial disputes in the South China Sea, bilateral territorial disputes among ASEAN 
members, and the possible rivalry among major powers (Sukma 2009: 112).   
 The 
EU’s adoption of such a normative approach to security, which is strongly rooted in the 
concept of human security (Ellner 2008: 9), was the key reason behind its support for 
the Helsinki talks and its engagement in the AMM. As noted by the EU’s doctrine of 
human security, a human security approach for the EU “means that it should contribute to 
the protection of every individual human being and not focus only on the defence of the 
162 In his speech at the Special Winston Churchill Lecture 2011, President of the European Council also 
argued that the key security threats to European and global security could not be solved by military means 
alone”. For this reason, he maintained that the EU champions a “soft power” approach that links 
“security, development aid and human rights” (Rompuy 2011).  
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Union’s borders” (Kaldor et al. 2004: 9). There are a number of reasons behind the EU’s 
particular way of dealing with security, which is an essential part of the EU’s strategic 
culture. One of these is its reasoning that it would be safer if other regions in the world 
looked more like itself (Rynning 2003: 483). In other words, the logic behind this 
analysis, known as the EU’s ‘enlightened self-interest’, is that Europeans cannot be 
secure while others in the world live in severe insecurity (Kaldor et al. 2004: 9).163
While the EU’s road to security focuses on the well-being of individuals, in 
ASEAN, where sovereignty is jealously guarded (Yeo 2009c: 14), approach to security 
is primarily state-focused (Umbach 2008: 128). Such a posture, which is clearly 
manifest in the ASEAN way and through the establishment and the mode of functions 
of the ASEAN-led institutions, e.g. the ARF and the EAS, has a number of implications. 
First, intra-state and/or non-traditional security problems, e.g. East Timor or Aceh, are 
primarily left to individual member states to resolve, especially through their own 
nation-building measures (Sukma 2009: 111). This is the reason why, as has been so far, 
ASEAN states refrain from involving in the issues of East Timor, Myanmar and Aceh. 
Second, cooperation within ASEAN and other ASEAN-led multilateral institutions, e.g. 
the ARF, the EAS and the ADMM-Plus, primarily focuses on inter-state and/or 
traditional security challenges and aims to reinforce national sovereignty and security. 
Given such a realist reasoning and approach, ASEAN states also rely on realpolitik, 
balancing and military powers, in dealing with security. This is another reason why a 
normative power Europe with its soft power approach to security is hardly attractive to 
ASEAN. As maintained by a major Asian scholar at a recent debate on Europe and the 
Asian Century, organised by Friends of Europe (2011), when Asian countries look at 
who can be a real player in the region, they still look for hard power. Finally, given its 
state-centred approach, ASEAN largely overlooks human security despite its recent 
inclusion of liberal and democratic values, e.g. human rights, in its discourse. The lack 
of focus on human security in ASEAN is reflected in the fact that one of the three key 
forms of security that are protected in Southeast Asia is that of some regional regimes or 
ruling elites, whose legitimacy is challenged. Indeed, as Nishikawa (2009: 232) points 
out, ASEAN governments’ mistrust of the liberal interventionist connotations of the 
  
                                                 
163 There are two other reasons why the EU is concerned about human security. One of these is based on 
morality, i.e. a concomitant obligation to help each other when that security is threatened. The other is 
legal. The protection of human rights, the core component of human security, is enshrined in international 
treaties and the EU’s key documents (Kaldor et al. 2004: 9-10; Glasius and Kaldor 2006b: 8-9). 
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concept of human security is a key reason for the limited acceptance of this concept in 
ASEAN.  
Thus, it is obvious that the EU and ASEAN are two different normative powers, 
with different ways of viewing and dealing with security. One of their major 
divergences is that while the former focuses on human security the latter pays attention 
to national security. The responses to the author’s survey confirm these divergences. 
When asked to express their views on the statement  that ‘with respect to security, the 
EU focuses on ‘human security’, which emphasises the well-being of peoples, i.e. a 
people-centred approach, whereas ASEAN stresses the well-being of states, i.e. a state-
centred approach’, of the 21 responses, two answered ‘completely agree’, 12 ‘agree’, 
six ‘neutral’ and only one ‘disagree’. Their differences in terms of their perceptions and 
approaches vis-à-vis security are the reason why they reacted differently towards the 
Aceh peace process, the AMM and its achievement. The EU regarded the Aceh’s 
peaceful evolution and its contribution to this process as a significant success of its 
foreign policy and its relations with ASEAN. In contrast, for ASEAN, the Aceh matter 
and its peace process was a purely an Indonesian matter and did not have any major 
impact on regional security. More significantly, those divergences are one of the major 
causes why despite its significant contribution to the Aceh peace process, the EU’s 
overall role in the security in Southeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific region is relatively 
insignificant. To illustrate ASEAN’s dissimilar way of perceiving and conducting 
security (from the EU’s) and how such a divergence is a central reason for the EU’s 
lack of cooperation with ASEAN in the strategic and security area, the next section 
briefly looks at two key ASEAN-led security institutions, namely the ARF and the EAS.  
 
8.4. The EU’s modest contribution to ASEAN security 
 
8.4.1. The ASEAN Regional Forum 
Though its original idea did not come from ASEAN,164 the ARF is an ASEAN-led 
mechanism for a number of reasons.165
                                                 
164 Australia and Canada proposed a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Asia, modelled on the 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, to deal with post-Cold War Asian security issues. 
However, ASEAN did not want to duplicate the European model, preferring a more informal framework 
based on its existing PMC (Antolik 1994; Narine 1997; Katsumata 2006; Weber 2009). 
 One of these is that it is based on ASEAN norms 
165 Several works have examined the ARF (Antolik 1994; Narine 1997; Acharya 1998b; 1999; Garofano 
2002; Weber 2009) and its different aspects, e.g. its mode of function (Katsumata 2006) and major 
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(Heller 2005). Precisely, it adopted ASEAN’s TAC and the ASEAN way as its mode of 
function (ARF 1994; 1995). ASEAN adopted that approach partly because it wanted to 
engage China, who did not want to copy the European style of security cooperation, 
which is very formal, law-abiding and problem-solving (Deng 1998; Yong 1998). 
China’s appreciation of the ARF’s approach was very significant because ASEAN’s 
rationale behind the ARF’s creation was to engage the major powers in a constructive 
dialogue regarding regional political security issues (Caballero-Anthony 2005). China 
was the first among these powers because, due historical mistrust, territorial disputes in 
the South China Sea and China’s rapid economic and military rise, ASEAN states 
believed that it was critical to create a regional forum that involved China (Antolik 
1994; Leifer 1996; 1997; Whiting 1997; Cunha 1998; Foot 1998; Yong 1998; Gilson 
2007b). Another important power that ASEAN sought to bring in to maintain a balance 
of power in the region was the US (Emmers 2001; Goh 2004). Besides China and the 
US, ASEAN also sought to engage other powers and one of these was the EU, who was 
a member when the forum was created.166
Since its establishment in 1994, the officials from its Troika, i.e. the Commission, 
the current presidency and the incoming presidency, attend the ARF’s ministerial 
meetings (Lim 2003: 5). Nevertheless, the EU’s contribution to the ARF was very 
different from that of other participants. While the ARF’s non-ASEAN members, 
including China, India, Japan, and South Korea, Russia and even the US took the forum 
seriously, the EU did not give it the same consideration. This is reflected in its lack of 
commitment to ARF activities, e.g. the ARF’s Inter-Sessional Meetings (ISM), Inter-
Sessional Groups (ISG), seminars and workshops. These activities are the third formal 
 Before looking at the EU’s contribution to 
the ARF, three important points should be underlined here. First, ASEAN’s concern 
about traditional security issues was a key factor behind the ARF’s creation. Second, 
like the EU, ASEAN mainly relies on norms to deal with its internal and external 
affairs. The difference is that its preferred norms are primarily state-centred. Third, in 
addition to its reliance on its preferred normative framework, ASEAN also uses some 
kind of balancing of influence and/or power in the region, which was regarded as vital 
for regional stability. The question asked is whether the EU shared such a view of and 
approach to security and was capable and willing to play a key role in the ARF.  
                                                                                                                                               
powers’ participation in the forum (Simon 1998; Emmers 2001; 2003; Garofano 2002), notably the US 
(Goh 2004), China (Foot 1998; Evans 2003) and Japan (Kawasakia 1997; Yuzawa 2005; 2007). 
166 It is now composed of 27 members (see Appendix 14) 
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activities of importance (after the Foreign Ministers’ Meetings) of the ARF. In his 
remark at the 11th ARF in 2004 in Jakarta, Javier Solana said that the EU “continues to 
attach high value to our participation in the ARF, a unique forum for dialogue on 
security policy issues in the Asia-Pacific region” (Solana 2004). However, until 2002 
the EU did not co-chair any ISG or ISM and hosted only a few workshops (see 
Appendix 15). In contrast, Australia, the US, China, India, Japan, Russia and Canada 
co-chaired several ISGs and ISMs and hosted a great number of workshops. Only in 
2004 did the EU co-chair, for the first time, an ISG. 
The EU’s lack of engagement with the ARF and security in Southeast Asia was 
manifested in other ways. One of these was its delay in signing the Treaty of Amity and 
Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC). ASEAN’s main partners, China, India, Japan and 
Russia acceded to this treaty in 2003 and 2004 (see Appendix 16). In contrast, the EU, 
despite being the oldest partner of ASEAN, the EU only formally signed a Declaration 
on Accession to the TAC in May 2009. From ASEAN’s viewpoint, the accession to the 
TAC by non-ASEAN member states is seen as a symbol of their commitment to the 
region’s security and their support for its way of dealing with regional security issues.167 
Given such a symbolic significance, China, India, Japan and even Russia were quick to 
seek to accede to it. It is also worth noting that the accession to this treaty is also a 
precursor to membership of the EAS and, as will shown later, the EU’s reluctance to 
adhere to the TAC was a key reason for its exclusion from the EAS. Another example 
of the EU’s lack of interest towards ASEAN and the ARF was the absence of its high-
ranking officials in the ARF meetings as well as to other important meetings of the EU-
ASEAN cooperation framework. This makes ASEAN officials question whether the EU 
takes ASEAN and its relations with the latter seriously (Moeller 2008; Camroux 2010; 
Islam 2010a; 2010b). The EU’s modest involvement was also reflected in the fact that 
in the existing literature on the ARF and regional security, the EU’s role is rarely 
mentioned whereas that of China, the US and even Japan is widely examined (see 
footnote 214). In contrast, there is only one significant work on the EU, namely that of 
Robles (2003).168
                                                 
167 For instance, the primary motivation of the US’s application for the accession to the treaty was to send 
a signal to ASEAN and its partners that the US wanted to upgrade its presence in Southeast Asia (Manyin 
et al. 2009: 1). 
 Overall, as concluded by Yeo (2009c: 16-7), “the rather lacklustre 
participation of the EU in ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) only served to reaffirm the 
limits of the EU’s security role, and also the limits of its influence” in Southeast Asia 
168 The other paper on the role of the EU in the ARF is a policy brief of Berkofsky (2003).  
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and the Asia-Pacific region as a whole.169
There are several reasons for this. One of these is that from the early 1990s to 
2004, the EU was in the middle of enlargement to East Europe. Consequently, it was 
largely internally focused. The EU’s lack of cohesion, authority and autonomy, which 
are three of the key institutional elements that make up the actorness of an entity and 
enable it to act effectively, was another inhibiting factor. For instance, originally only 
sovereign states were allowed to accede to TAC. Therefore, in order to admit the EU, 
ASEAN countries and other signatories of the treaty had to amend it. This prompted 
France to go it alone and sign in 2007. Another crucial factor that hindered the EU from 
playing a more active role in the ARF was the EU’s divergences from ASEAN in terms 
of its perspectives and approaches vis-à-vis security issues.
 The question asked is why the EU did not 
actively engage in the ARF, and (consequently) in the region’s security.  
170
8.4.2. The East Asia Summit 
 While the EU 
championed a normative power approach to security, which is strongly rooted in human 
security, ASEAN countries predominantly view and deal with international relations 
and security in particular in realist terms. ASEAN’s state-centred posture was clearly 
reflected by the rationale behind the ARF and its use of the ASEAN way as its mode of 
function. Because of such divergences, the EU and ASEAN found it difficult to 
establish a meaningful partnership. These two factors are also the key reasons behind 
the EU’s absence in the EAS. 
The East Asia Summit (EAS) began in 2005 when it convened the meeting of the 
leaders of the 10 ASEAN members plus those of China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, 
India and New Zealand (Tanaka 2006).171
                                                 
169 Despite its limited efficiency in solving important regional security issues, the ARF remains a major 
security mechanism not only in Southeast Asia but also in the Asia-Pacific region. For ASEAN, apart 
from the ADMM-Plus and the EAS, the ARF is the forum that it uses to foster dialogue on regional 
security issues with its main partners. Thus, from its viewpoint, the level of engagement of the non-
ASEAN members, notably the influential ones, in the forum, is a variable to judge their level of interest 
in regional security issues. 
 Since 2011, the leaders of the US and Russia 
attend the summit. Like the ARF, the rationale behind the establishment of the EAS was 
to deal with the region’s traditional security challenges. For instance, it is argued that 
ASEAN decided to expand the EAS to the US and Russia because it wanted to limit the 
170 The EU was reluctant to accede to the TAC partly because the treaty is “replete with language on non-
interference and sovereignty”, and it “not quite a mirror image of the EU’s values” (Parello-Plesner 
(2010). Given this, the accession to it would prevent it from being free to criticise those who did not 
respect human rights, e.g. Myanmar.   
171 For more information on East Asia Summit, see for instance, Malik (2006; 2009), Richardson (2006), 
Camroux (2012). 
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dominance of a single power in regional affairs, notably China. As a Southeast Asian 
diplomat said, “[t]here must be a counterbalance, otherwise one country will dominate” 
(quoted by AFP 2010), and this ‘one country’ referred to is “an increasingly assertive 
China” (Islam 2011: 2). The EAS also adopted ASEAN’s core norms as its mode of 
function. However, in terms of official involvement, the EAS is the highest ASEAN-led 
forum because it is the summit of Heads of State/Government. Furthermore, with the 
participation of the US and Russia since 2011, it now consists of 18 members, with 
eight of them being members of the G-20 and three of the four BRIC countries (Doan 
2011). Given this, it is now regarded as the prime security forum in East Asia the Asia-
Pacific region (Islam 2011: 2). While the other major partners of ASEAN have been 
enthusiastically involved in this new and important arrangement, the EU is absent from 
it despite being ASEAN’s longest partner (Doan 2011). According to Parello-Plesner 
(2010; 2012), a senior advisor to the Danish government on Asian affairs, the EU’s 
absence was not good for the EU because its non-appearance prevented it from 
contributing to regional affairs and security. Due that absence, unlike other regional and 
global powers, especially China, Japan and India, and now Russia and the US, the EU 
does not have regular contact with ASEAN at the highest level in the security area. 
Indeed, though the EU was a strong economic player in East Asia, in political and 
security terms, it was largely absent in the region (Gaens 2012: 93; Wong 2012: 33). 
Given this conspicuous absence, in a speech to European foreign policy experts in 
Berlin, former Australian former Prime Minister Kevin Rudd asked “if the world is 
moving to become an Asia Pacific world, where does Europe fit in” (Quoted in Parello-
Plesner 2012). The EU’s exclusion in the EAS also illustrates that its successful 
cooperation with ASEAN in the AMM did not help enhance EU-ASEAN relations and 
their cooperation in the security area in particular as the EU predicted and hoped. As 
noted earlier, in the aftermath of the accomplishment of the AMM, the EU believed that 
the AMM could boost EU-ASEAN relations and that it should be the model for their 
future cooperation (Solana 2006b; 2006c; 2006d; 2007; Feith 2007: 1). The question is 
why the EU is still absent from the EAS and, consequently, unable or unwilling to play 
a key role in Southeast Asian security and East Asia in general. 
Parello-Plesner (2010) identified three reasons for the EU’s non-involvement. The 
first was the EU’s delayed accession to the TAC, which technically prevented it from 
being allowed to participate. The second was the EU’s lack of a single, coherent and 
powerful voice that would be listened to by the rest of the summit. In other words, as he 
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put it, if finally ASEAN states decide to invite the EU to take part, they would not be 
sure who would be this Mr. or Mrs. Europe that should be invited. The third cause of 
the EU’s non-involvement in the EAS was the EU’s lack of clear priorities and concerns 
vis-à-vis its relations with ASEAN. He pointed out that during her presence in Hanoi at 
the 17th ARF meeting and the fifth EAS in July and October 2010 respectively, Hillary 
Clinton brought up the SCS issue and by doing so, she rightly addressed worries of 
ASEAN countries. In his view, if the EU had been present at the EAS in Hanoi, its 
strong priorities would be free trade (Parello-Plesner 2010). However, as illustrate in-
depth in Chapter 7, given a number of factors, notably its difference with ASEAN over 
the inclusion of Myanmar in the FTA, the EU failed to materialise that FTA with 
ASEAN. Besides these three factors, the EU’s lack of capabilities, especially military 
ones, also makes it less attractive to ASEAN countries that still view international 
relations in realist terms and face many realist security issues as mentioned. By 
highlighting this, this author agrees with Doidge and others that the institutional and 
material elements are important components of the regional actorness and that the EU’s 
lack of these elements significantly prevents it from acting effectively in world politics 
and Asian affairs in particular. 
Yet, another important reason for the EU’s exclusion from the EAS, as already 
underlined, was its differences from the EU in terms of its perceptions of and 
approaches to security. Given such divergences, the EU is not strongly receptive to 
ASEAN, its security concerns and its efforts to deal with them. In fact, ASEAN and its 
members do not feature among the EU’s top security partners identified by the ESS 
(European Council 2003). Furthermore, while the EU has already established a great 
number of strategic partnerships with several countries and regional groupings, it 
remains reluctant to move its relationship with ASEAN into this category (Moeller 
2007: 469). Meanwhile, the US, Japan, China, India and Australia have all become 
strategic partners of ASEAN, each carefully eyeing the other’s moves. For this reason, 
it is believed the EU “should also be a strategic partner, but its politics seem to have 
lagged behind the economics” (Yeo 2005). Given the EU’s indifference to ASEAN, it 
was also overlooked by the latter. According to Singapore’s Foreign Minister Yeo, 
when ASEAN Foreign Ministers discussed plans for an East Asia summit, they all took 
into account the views of China, Japan, India, Australia and the US. However, the EU 
“did not figure at all because it had not shown any interest in such a summit” (Yeo 
2005). The EU’s posture changed following ASEAN’s decision to invite the US and 
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Russia to participate in the EAS and it was craving for a similar invitation to this prime 
security forum of the region (Islam 2011: 2). According to an EU official, the EU’s 
decision to accede the TAC could enhance its chance of being given a place at this 
summit because such a decision was a very big initiative on the EU side, showing that it 
wanted to be associated with the EAS as closely as possible (Interview, 2009). 
Nevertheless, as it was made clear by ASEAN officials, this would not happen soon 
(Islam 2010b). In fact, the EU was excluded from the last EAS, which was held in 
Cambodia in 2012. 
The argument that the normative divergences of the EU and ASEAN were an 
obstacle to their relations and security cooperation was also confirmed by the author’s 
survey. When asked to rank a number of factors that make the EU less attractive to 
ASEAN, seven of the 21 responses to the author’s survey ranked first the divergence of 
norms and beliefs between the two organisations (see Appendix 17). Furthermore, as 
the responses to the survey illustrate, it is not the EU’s lack of military capabilities but 
rather its continuing insistence on human rights that makes ASEAN less interested in 
the EU. Similarly, when asked to rank the six reasons for the absence of a strategic 
partnership between the EU and ASEAN, five of the 21 respondents named their 
divergence of worldviews and values as the first factor that prevented the EU and 
ASEAN from forging a strategic partnership (see Appendix 18). In contrast, only one 
respondent identified the EU’s lack of military capabilities and two respondents 
regarded the EU’s lack of interest in ASEAN as the first cause. This means the 
ideational and normative divergences of the EU and ASEAN vis-à-vis regional and 
international affairs and security in particular were a defining reason behind the EU’s 
lacklustre contribution to the ARF, its exclusion from the EAS and, consequently, its 
irrelevance in Southeast Asian security and East Asia in general. 
To sum up, the examination of the Aceh issue illustrates that when their ways of 
viewing and conducting regional and international affairs converge, the EU and 
ASEAN are better able to work together. They would not have cooperated with each 
other in the AMM if the EU had criticised Indonesia’s human rights violations in Aceh 
and insisted ASEAN to intervene as it did in the case of East Timor and Myanmar. Yet, 
while the two organisations found some common ground to work together in the AMM, 
their perceptions, priorities and approaches vis-à-vis international relations and security 
in particular remain significantly different. Their postures vis-à-vis the AMM and its 
achievement illustrates that they are two different normative powers with two divergent 
203 
 
ways of dealing their regional and international affairs. As illustrated by its ESS and its 
Human Security Doctrine, the EU is – and acts as – a cosmopolitan normative power 
that upholds and promotes a set of fundamentally liberal or individual-cantered values 
in its relations with the world. The ESS is not simply a security strategy of the EU. It 
also expresses its identity, values and political philosophy (Major and Riecke 2006: 45; 
Biscop 2007a: 5). Indeed, as noted by Biava et al. (2011: 1236), the ESS is “an 
expression of what the EU itself is and thereby creates standards and benchmarks for 
the normative model the EU wants to embody. It also represents the philosophy 
underlying the EU’s external actions”. The EU views and acts as such because of its 
historical experience and especially its reasoning that it is safer if the world is more like 
itself. The comment of Kaldor et al. (2007: 287) resumes well the EU’s normative 
identity and role as well as the reason behind its commitment to the Aceh peace process.  
“Many Europeans crave a role for the EU on the world stage as a 
peace promoter in order to banish the demons of Europe’s own conflict-
ridden experience; they seek to extend beyond Europe’s borders the zone of 
peace and stability which the integration project has helped to achieve; and 
they believe that the EU can use its transformative power to persuade others 
to move from war to peace and to universalize its own norms and ethics”. 
 
In contrast, though relying on norms and seeking to promote them in its internal 
and external relations, ASEAN’s norms are predominantly state-centred. As reflected 
by the establishment and the mode of function of the ARF and the EAS, ASEAN is – 
and acts as – a communitarian normative power. Though these normative divergences 
do not lead the EU and ASEAN to dispute with each other over security issues, they 
prevent them from establishing a strong partnership in the security area. In other words, 
as seen shown in this chapter as well as the two previous ones, they significantly hinder 
their cooperation. With this point, the thesis comes to its concluding chapter. 
9. Conclusion: EU-ASEAN relations and interregionalism  
– Looking back and looking ahead 
 
9.1. A summary of the research 
This thesis has begun with an observation that after the end of the Cold War, 
regional organisations have become prominent in the global system; they have actively 
developed and strengthened their relations with major powers and with each other. By 
doing so, not only have they become actors in their own right on the international stage 
but also created a new and indelible feature in post-Cold War world politics, known as 
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interregionalism. Chief among those who have proactively fostered this form of 
relations are the EU and ASEAN. Interregionalism has also greatly interested 
scholarship and a number of works has been undertaken to investigate the different 
aspects, such as its forms, rationales, impacts, of this phenomenon. Yet, despite such an 
increasing scholarly interest, interregionalism in general and EU-ASEAN relations in 
particular have been underdeveloped. A particular area, which was still understudied, 
was the significance of the normative factors of regional organisations to their 
interregionalism. Such paucity was reflected in and by the two main and related bodies 
of existing literature. First, most of scholarship on interregionalism focused on why and 
how interregional relations define the collective identities of regional organisations 
involved whereas it paid a little attention to why and how the participant regional 
organisations’ identities – or more exactly, the norms, values and principles that 
constitute them as actors in world politics – determine their interregionalism. Second, 
the relevance of the normative factors of regional organisations to their interregionalism 
was also under-explored in – if not, ignored by – the works on the concept of regional 
actorness, which was conceptualised to explain the influence of a regional organisation 
in its external activity. In other words, the existing literature on interregionalism and 
regional actorness rarely considered the significance of regional organisations’ 
normative features to their interregional relations.  
That ignorance was a significant omission because for regional organisations, e.g. 
the EU and ASEAN, their normative elements were of central importance to not only 
their intra-regional cooperation but also their extra-regional relations in the post-Cold 
War period. This argument was based on the three key observations of the EU, ASEAN 
and their interaction. First, in its foreign policy, its interregionalism and its relations 
with ASEAN, the EU espouses and advocates a set of liberal and democratic values. 
Second, like the EU, norms also play a central role in ASEAN’s regional and 
international relations. The difference is that the set of norms on which it is based and 
seeks to advocate is predominantly state-centric, e.g. the principles of non-interference 
and national sovereignty. Third, given those normative differences, they have found it 
difficult to interact with each other since the end of the Cold War. It is for these reasons 
that the thesis chose to study EU-ASEAN relations with a strong focus on why and how 
their normative dimensions impact on their interaction. More precisely, by taking their 
normative premises as the criterion and the focal point to examine their post-Cold War 
relationship, the thesis assumed that the EU and ASEAN are two different regional 
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actors that espouse dissimilar norms to guide their regional and international affairs 
and those normative differences hinder their relations. Within this hypothesis, the thesis 
sought to explore the three central questions: 
• First, what are the normative features that constitute the EU and ASEAN 
as actors in world politics and that make them different from each other?  
• Second, what are the main sources of their normative differences? In other 
words, why do they promote two different sets of norms? 
• Third, why do their normative differences become a conflictual and 
obstructive factor in their relationship? 
To address these issues, the thesis chose to draw on the insights offered by social 
constructivism and normative theory because these two IR perspectives are very useful 
in answering those questions. Methodologically, it opted for a narrative and empirical 
inquiry. A narrative methodology was very helpful in describing what the EU, ASEAN 
and their normative premises are and explaining why they promote two different sets of 
norms, whereas the three case studies provided it with valuable evidence to further 
support the two first issues and to illustrate why their normative differences lead to 
disruptions in their relationship. For both narrative and empirical inquiry, this thesis 
drew on a wide range of important information and data that are acquired from the three 
major sources: (1) official documents, (2) scholarly works and (3) interview and 
questionnaires. With the mentioned hypothesis, research questions, theoretical 
methodological approaches, the investigation has critically examined the normative 
foundation/differentiation of the EU and ASEAN, the sources of their normative 
foundation/differentiation and the impact of their normative premises/differences on 
their interregional relations. In doing so, it has reached the following conclusions. 
9.2. The major findings 
9.2.1. The EU and ASEAN: Two different normative powers 
As stated from its beginning, the thesis has recognised that by forging relations 
with major powers and with each other, the EU and ASEAN have become actors on 
their own right in world politics. The first question it has sought to address is what 
characterises these two regional organisations as international actors and what 
distinguishes them from other actors and from each other. This inquiry has only looked 
at the normative dimensions that constitute them as actors in world politics and that 
make them different from each other. By doing so, it has found that since their 
foundation in 1951 and 1967 respectively, the EC/EU and ASEAN have developed their 
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own sets of norms, which are enshrined in their respective key documents, e.g. treaties, 
declarations, communications, speeches, issued by their own institutions and officials. 
In fact, based on these documents as well as scholarly works, Chapter 4 and 5 have 
identified the sets of norms of the EU and ASEAN.  
 
The normative constitution of the EU and ASEAN 
For the EU, its normative basis consists of nine norms. They are peace, liberty, 
democracy, human rights, the rule of law, solidarity, equality, development and good 
governance. For Manners (2002: 242), the first five norms are the EU’s ‘core’ norms 
and the last four as its ‘minor’ norms. Lucarelli and Manners (2006b: 202) classify 
peace as the EU’s prime value and categorise human dignity/rights, freedom/liberty, 
democracy, equality, justice/rule of law and solidarity as its core values.172
The EU and ASEAN have generated their own norms first to guide their internal 
relations. However, as norms not only regulate or guide the behaviour of actors within a 
given community but also define their interests, worldviews and preferences and 
constitute their identity, the norms of the EU and ASEAN fundamentally constitute 
 While these 
norms define the EU’s foreign policy, its interregionalism and its relations with 
ASEAN, human rights are the EU’s most mentioned norm in the post-Cold War era. 
They are present in the EU’s important documents, discourses, policies and agreements, 
especially those that are related to its external relations. ASEAN’s norms are included 
in the well-known term, the ASEAN way, which consists of six key norms. They are 
sovereign equality, non-use of force and the peaceful settlement of conflict, non-
interference and non-intervention, the non-involvement of ASEAN to address unsolved 
bilateral conflict between members, quiet diplomacy and mutual respect and tolerance. 
If human rights are the most cited norm in the internal and external policies of the EU, 
non-interference is the most important norm in ASEAN. In fact, it is the sine qua non of 
cooperation in ASEAN. This principle, which has jealously been kept and ardently 
promoted since its establishment, was emphasised in the ASEAN’s founding 
declaration. It was reiterated in ASEAN’s later important documents, e.g. the TAC 
(1976) and the ASEAN Charter (2007). Even though it was criticised after the Asian 
financial crisis and there were calls from outside and even within ASEAN for altering, 
non-interference remains the core norm of ASEAN’s internal and external relations.  
                                                 
172 As noted in Chapter 2, norms and values are closely interrelated and often used as synonyms. 
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them as actors in world politics. Indeed, as illustrated at in different chapters of this 
thesis, the set of liberal and democratic norms the EU has espoused is not only the basis 
on which it is founded. Those norms have also defined its international identity and 
role. Similarly, the ASEAN way is not only the modus operandi of ASEAN’s regional 
and international relations. It has also shaped ASEAN’s overall raison d’être. Because 
of this, while acknowledging that the institutional and material elements of the EU and 
ASEAN are the important components that make up their actorness or actorship, this 
thesis has maintained that their normative constituents are also of vital importance. 
They are the essential elements that constitute them as actors in world politics and that 
define their external relations as well as their influence on the external world. Their 
respective norms also determine their institutional structure to some extent. The EU is 
founded on a set of liberal and democratic values and vows to uphold and promote them 
in its relations with the wider world since the end of the Cold War. Given this, it sought 
to include the human rights clause in a cooperation framework, which it had planed to 
negotiate with ASEAN in the early 1990s. Its focus on human rights was also the reason 
behind its refusal to accept the participation of Myanmar in the FTA, which it decided 
to negotiate with ASEAN in the 2000s. Similarly, ASEAN’s norms have defined its 
regional and international relations as well as its relationship with the EU. For instance, 
due to its commitment to the principle of non-interference, it was silent over the East 
Timor issue and allowed Myanmar to become a member despite the EU’s opposition. 
Yet, the involvement of their normative dimensions in their relations does not always 
bring about positive results. It can produce negative consequences. This point will be 
further explained later. The point made here is that their normative elements are of 
importance to their regional and international relations. 
Like the EU, ASEAN is a norm entrepreneur  
The argument that the EU is a norm entrepreneur is widely acknowledged. Indeed, 
the EU has created its preferred set of norms not only to guide its internal and external 
relations but also actively promoted or exported those norms in Europe and worldwide. 
Its Copenhagen criteria or membership criteria and its conditionality or human rights 
clause are the two well-known means it uses to defend and spread its norms. The three 
case studies have shown that the EU is a very active norm generator and promoter. 
Chapters 6 and 7 have illustrated that the EU strongly insisted the protection and 
promotion of the norm of human rights, which is also its most mentioned norm in its 
post-Cold War foreign policy, in its relations with ASEAN and its members. Chapter 8 
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has shown that the defining reason behind its support for the Aceh peace process and its 
engagement in the Aceh Monitoring Mission was its desire to bring peace, human 
rights, the rule of law and good governance, which are its key norms, to this province.  
Equally, in its relations with the EU and its external relations, ASEAN has also 
fervently championed its favourite normative framework. ASEAN’s insistence on the 
access to its TAC as the condition for the membership in the EAS was a proof to 
ASEAN’s efforts to advocate its norms. ASEAN plays a central role in regionalism in 
East Asia and the security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region not because of its 
economic or military capabilities but rather because it has a code of conduct for 
international relations, i.e. its norms, that has been widely acknowledged by the region’s 
countries (Loder et al. 2011: 83). Economically and militarily, ASEAN as a whole and 
its members are much weaker than regional powers, e.g. China and India. Yet, as 
underlined in Chapters 5 and 8, the ASEAN way has now been accepted as the modus 
operandi of the three important institutions in the region, namely the ARF, the EAS and 
the ADMM-Plus. ASEAN’s approach to regional governance is regarded as a real 
alternative to the Western liberal model of global governance that tends to focus on the 
norm of interventionism (Stubbs 2007; Stubbs et al 2010). This point illustrates 
convincingly that, like the EU, ASEAN is a prominent norm entrepreneur. It also 
supports very well another important argument made by the thesis that is powerful 
actors in world politics do not always hold a monopoly on norm entrepreneurship as 
most of literature on norms assumes. Weaker actors, e.g. ASEAN and its members, also 
play the role of norm entrepreneurs by seeking to advance norms that influence world 
politics in a particular way. Indeed, norm entrepreneurship is an essential aspect of 
ASEAN’s actorness. 
Like the EU, ASEAN is a normative power  
In the existing literature on normative power (NP) in general and normative power 
Europe (NPE), there are different interpretations of the concept of NP and different, 
even opposing, narratives of the EU as an international actor as noted in Chapter 4.173
                                                 
173 The EU is depicted as a civilian power (Duchêne 1972; Telò 2006; Borzel and Risse 2009), a military 
power (Bull 1982; Sangiovanni 2003; Treacher 2004), an ethical power (Aggestam 2008), a realist power 
(Zimmerman 2007; 2008) and a pragmatic power (Wood 2011). 
 
Followed and adapted a definition by De Zutter (2010: 1122), this thesis defines a NP 
“as the identity of a power in the international system that shapes the normal in world 
politics through its norm-driven practices and the adaption of its norms by [some] 
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others”. Based on this definition, the thesis has described the EU as a NP because such 
a conceptualisation singles out four major elements that reflect very well the 
international identity and role of the EU. First, a NP is an identity in the international 
system. Second, a NP is also a power that has the ability to shape the normal in world 
politics. Third, a NP shapes the normal through its norm-driven practices. Fourth, a NP 
is a power, whose norms are adopted by some others. As illustrated in Chapter 4, 
whatever the EU is depicted, that depiction always refers to the EU’s particular type of 
actor or specific identity (Diez 2005: 614; Sjursen 2006a; Powel 2009: 195; Manners 
2011: 233). The EU’s liberal and democratic norms, e.g. human rights and democracy, 
are the ‘normal’ practices that are enshrined in the UN Human Rights Declaration and 
the UN Charter. The EU’s ability to shape the normal in world politics through its 
norm-driven practices and the adoption of its norms by other has been illustrated by the 
acceptance of countries, e.g. former communist countries in Eastern and Central 
Europe, who were willing to conform to the EU’s membership criteria. The fact its 
preferred norms of peace, good governance, the rule of law and human rights were 
embraced in Aceh as demonstrated in Chapter 8 is another example. The reason why 
this thesis has slightly modified De Zutter’s definition adding the word ‘some’ before 
‘others’ is that no power in world politics is able to produce and put in place a 
normative framework that is fully accepted by all and every time (Hamilton 2008: 81). 
ASEAN’s resistance to the EU’s values of human rights and democracy in the 1990s 
was a proof to this. Overall, this inquiry maintains that the EU is a power that is 
predominantly based on, and predisposed to promote, a set of liberal cosmopolitan 
values in its relations with the world in general and ASEAN in particular.  
In the literature on ASEAN, there are few accounts that regard ASEAN as a norm 
entrepreneur (Katsumata 2003; Rüland 2011). Nevertheless, with the exception of 
Robinson (2011: 49), who argues that ASEAN may “be much closer to the EU’s own 
aspirations for normative power than the EU itself”, there is not a single work, which 
explicitly classifies ASEAN as a NP. From what has been illustrated in this thesis, 
ASEAN is a normative power. Indeed, it fits very well the definition of NP by De Zutter 
(2010: 1122) that the thesis adopts and slightly modifies mentioned previously because 
its core norms, e.g. national sovereignty and non-interference, are internationally held 
principles. The fact that ASEAN way and its TAC are accepted and adhered by rising 
powers, e.g. China and India, and other major powers, e.g. Russia, Japan and the US, is 
a proof of ASEAN’s normative influence. It is also worth noting that a central 
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hypothesis of the NPE thesis advocated by Manners (2002: 252) is the argument that 
“the most important factor shaping the international role of the EU is not what it does or 
what it says, but what it is”. This too can be applied to ASEAN because as shown in this 
thesis, notably in Chapters 5 and 8, the most crucial factor defining ASEAN’s role in 
the wider Pacific-Asia region and its actorness in general is its raison d’être. Thus, the 
argument that ASEAN is a normative power is also one of the inquiry’s major 
contributions to the existing literature on ASEAN and regional organisations in general. 
 
Cosmopolitan normative power vs. communitarian normative power 
While both the EU and ASEAN are norm entrepreneurs and normative powers, 
the norms they have espoused are different from each other. The two narrative chapters 
on the EU and ASEAN respectively as well as three empirical chapters on their 
relations have demonstrated that the EU is founded on, and promotes, a set of primarily 
individual-focused or liberal cosmopolitan norms, whereas ASEAN is premised on and 
champions a normative framework, which is predominantly state-centric or 
communitarian. Such differences of their normative nature are manifested not only in 
their regional and international relations but also in their security policy and 
cooperation. Chapter 8 has shown that while the EU’s view and way of security largely 
focuses on human security, i.e. the well-being of individuals, ASEAN’s principally 
stresses national security, i.e. the well-being of states. Based on the two normative 
positions highlighted by normative theory, namely cosmopolitanism and 
communitarianism, this study describes the EU as a cosmopolitan normative power and 
ASEAN as a communitarian normative power. 
9.2.2. The sources of their normative differences 
The question that the thesis has sought to address is the EU and ASEAN promote 
two different sets of norms. Chapter 2 has underlined that while norms are defined as 
standards of appropriate or normal behaviour, those standards are regarded as 
appropriate or normal for actors with a given identity (bold for emphasis). That means 
different actors in different contexts are likely to adopt different norms (Tocci and 
Manners 2008: 307). For this reason, the preference for international norms is at the 
same time the product of a specific history (Ruggie 1999: 239; Laïdi 2008: 4; Postel-
Vinay 2008: 40). It has also argued that as they are not pre-social, actors in world 
politics are defined by the environment in which they find themselves (Barnett 2005: 
259; Risse 2005: 161). These two positions have led the thesis to maintain that, like 
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other actors in world politics, the EU, ASEAN and their respective normative 
underpinnings are shaped by their own context-specific conditions. Based on this, it has 
identified a wide range of factors that are the reasons behind the normative differences 
of the EU and ASEAN. Some of these can be recalled here. 
 
Europe’s war-torn past and Southeast Asia’s colonial legacy 
For the EU, a defining factor that has determined European integration as a whole, 
the EU’s and normative foundation and differentiation was Europe’s pre-EC/EU war-
torn past. As underlined in Chapter 4, different scholars on the EU, e.g. Duchêne 
(1972), Waever (1998) Manners (2002), Gillingham (2003) and Lucarelli (2006), all 
agreed that the rationale behind European integration was to surmount the age-old 
processes of war and their root causes, e.g. nationalism or ultranationalism that had 
shattered Europe. Given this, right from the beginning, European integration was seen 
as a peace project, which was built on liberty, democracy and human rights. It is worth 
noting that the EU was granted the 2012 Nobel Peace Prize mainly because of its 
achievement in transforming most of Europe from a continent of war to a continent of 
peace (Jagland 2012). As noted in Chapter 8 the EU strongly focuses on human security 
partly because “many Europeans crave a role for the EU on the world stage as a peace 
promoter to banish the demons of Europe’s own conflict-ridden experience” (Kaldor et 
al. 2007: 287). In fact, Europe’s bitter past has been repeatedly highlighted and narrated 
by EU officials to justify not only the process of European integration but also the EU’s 
protection and promotion of peace and other liberal cosmopolitan values in its relations 
with the world (Forchtner and Kølvraa 2012). 
In contrast, for ASEAN, an overriding factor that has defined its raison d’être and 
its normative premises was Southeast Asia’s colonisation and its consequences. Unlike 
European countries, which, despite conflicts and wars between European countries, had 
been independent and sovereign entities for centuries,174
                                                 
174 Furthermore, in the aftermath of the WWII, nationalism was regarded as the cause of wars. 
Consequently, restraining it was considered essential for the rebuilding of post-war Europe. In this 
context, national sovereignty was not of such high importance.  
 when ASEAN was established, 
none of the Southeast Asian nations, except Thailand, had long-term experience of 
sovereign statehood having only recently gained – and indeed hard fought to earn – 
their independence from their former colonial powers. Subsequently, the nation-state 
was so cherished and nation building was an overriding concern for these newly 
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independent countries. Furthermore, in their nation building process, they faced 
multiple and huge internal challenges, which could be only dealt with if they had a 
stable external environment. It is for these reasons that from the outset ASEAN states 
placed a particular emphasis on the principles of national sovereignty and non-
interference and that the institutional design in ASEAN as well as ASEAN-led 
multilateral mechanisms, e.g. the ARF and the EAS, remains deeply wedded to state 
sovereignty (Beeson 2002; Katsumata 2003; Khong and Nesadurai 2007; Nishikawa 
2007; Yeo 2009b). 
 
Other important factors 
In addition to their historical dissimilarities, there are other differences, which 
also play a significant role in making the EU and ASEAN follow two unalike sets of 
normative premises. Cultural difference is one of these. In Europe, thanks to its rich 
cultural heritage and long-lasting tradition, offered by the Enlightenment and other 
major movements, individual rights and democratic principles are greatly valued in 
social, economic and political life. However, these ideals were not so highly valued –
and remain secondary – in ASEAN and in Asia in general. While recognising that the 
debate about the ‘Western/European values’ and the ‘Asian values’ is controversial, 
especially in the case of the ‘Asian values’, the thesis stressed the fact that the EU 
members are mature liberal democracies whereas most ASEAN countries are not. 
Indeed, as illustrated in Chapter 3, if based on their respective average overall score (of 
the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Index 2010), the ASEAN countries were classified as 
‘hybrid regimes’ whereas the EU members were full democracies. 
Their historical and cultural dissimilarities were also amplified by other regional 
and global developments in the post-Cold War era. For the EU, its transformation from 
the EC into the EU and the triumphant sentiment of the West following the collapse of 
the communist bloc also inspired and prompted it to export its values to other regional 
organisations and countries. Thanks to the impressive economic growth that they 
enjoyed throughout the 1970s and 1980s until the late 1990s, ASEAN states became 
more confident in their own model of (economic) development and were even willing to 
oppose European value-based policies in the 1990s. As underlined, following the Asian 
financial crisis, Asian values and the ASEAN way were challenged. There were calls 
from outside, even within ASEAN, for modifying its cherished principle of non-
interference. Yet, despite those calls, the key principles of ASEAN were not modified. 
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Instead, they continue to be reiterated in ASEAN’s key documents such as the Bali 
Concord II (2003) and the ASEAN Charter (2007). The ASEAN way was even chosen 
to be the modus operandi of ASEAN-led regional institutions, e.g. the EAS and 
ADMM-Plus. Another difference between the two regional organisations, which is 
worth highlighting, is their geopolitical context. With the collapse of the Soviet Union 
and other communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe, the EU members no 
longer face major intraregional conflicts or prominent external aggression. In contrast, 
ASEAN members were, and remain, concerned about intraregional conflicts and 
external challenges and threats.  
Overall, except the fact that the two organisations were established in the Cold 
War and their development until the late 1980s was significantly defined by Cold War 
politics,175
9.2.4. Why their normative differences are unconstructive 
 the EU and ASEAN were established and evolved in two historical, cultural 
and geopolitical backgrounds, which are radically different. In other words, the ‘we-
group’ and ‘they-group’ factors that have influenced the EU, ASEAN and their 
respective norms differ significantly from each other. It is for this reason that despite 
some changes in ASEAN, e.g. the process of democratisation in some members of 
ASEAN and its establishment of a regional human rights body, which have someway 
shortened the normative gaps between the two regional organisations, their normative 
premises are overall different from each other. This is why they disputed over a number 
of issues, e.g. human rights, East Timor and Myanmar in the 1990s. 
Chapter 2 has theorised a number of hypotheses to explain why their normative 
differences become a source of disagreements in their relations, which in return 
negatively affect their post-Cold War cooperation. Three empirical chapters have tested 
and illustrated those propositions. Some of these can be drawn and reiterated now. 
 
The differences of their normative natures  
The relationship between the EU and ASEAN, i.e. a self/other interaction, is 
contentious primarily because the natures of their collective identity and norms differ. 
The EU is based on a set of liberal and cosmopolitan values, e.g. human rights and 
democracy, which are inclusive and can be acquired if a state or a regional organisation 
                                                 
175 As noted in Chapter 3, during the Cold War, the two organisations shared an overriding anti-
communist and westernised posture and, thanks to this, not only did their other inherent and foundational 
normative divergences diminish but also they could establish and maintain a friendly relationship with 
each other. 
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fulfils certain criteria, e.g. the Copenhagen criteria. In contrast, ASEAN is premised on 
a set of communitarian norms, e.g. non-interference and national sovereignty, which are 
inherent and exclusive, and as a result, more difficult to leave. Even though it has 
recently paid attention to and somehow included liberal and democratic norms in their 
internal policies, ASEAN still strongly upholds the core principles of non-interference. 
Thus, given their own normative nature, while the EU tends to push for the rights of 
individuals to the point of being willing to interfere into others’ internal affairs to make 
sure that its cherished norms are respected, ASEAN explicitly discourages any external 
interference into others’ internal affairs in any form or manifestation. This means EU-
ASEAN relations are inclined to be conflictual first of all not because of what either 
organisation does or not does but because of what the EU and ASEAN are. As seen in 
Chapter 7, Myanmar became a contentious issue in EU-ASEAN relations in the early 
1990s even though in those years this country was not a member of ASEAN. As 
mentioned in Chapter 3, the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre even became a point of 
contention between the two organisations in their 1990 ministerial meeting. Indeed, as 
illustrated several times in Chapters 6 and 7, the EU and ASEAN disputed with each 
other over human rights and the issues of East Timor and Myanmar because of the 
differences of their normative natures. For instance, due to its normative identity, the 
EU sought to insert its human rights clause into the cooperation agreement it intended to 
negotiate with ASEAN in the early 1990s. Similarly, because of its normative nature, 
ASEAN had no choice but to oppose that assertion because it violated the core of its 
normative culture. This leads to the next point. 
 
The assertion of one and the opposition of the other 
The interaction between the EU and ASEAN is certain to be conflictual when one 
regional organisation’s core norms are opposed by the other. The thesis has 
demonstrated that the EU and ASEAN clashed with each other over human rights, the 
East Timor issue and the Myanmar problem because one organisation’s norms were 
rejected or violated by the other. As discovered in Chapter 6 the EU and ASEAN 
disputed over human rights and the East Timor issue in the early 1990s, because they 
now entered a ‘we-group’ versus ‘they-group’ relationship. In this interaction, the EU, 
who regarded its values of democracy and human rights as universal, considered, either 
intentionally or unintentionally, ASEAN as a violator of universal principles or inferior 
to it. Consequently, it urged and demanded ASEAN and its members to respect those 
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liberal and cosmopolitan norms. In contrast, ASEAN vigorously opposed the EU’s 
posture and regarded that assertion on the respect of human rights as a new moralism or 
a neo-colonialism. Such an insistence of the EU and ASEAN’s resistance heated their 
exchanges. The EU’s insistence on the inclusion of a human right clause in the new and 
more advanced cooperation agreement that EU wanted to conclude with ASEAN and 
ASEAN’s opposition to it in the early 1990s was an example of this 
insistence/resistance pattern.  
Similarly, Chapter 7 has shown that the two regional organisations disputed over 
human rights and the Myanmar issue because the EU’s emphasis on the protection and 
promotion of its core norms was opposed by ASEAN. That opposition made the EU 
unhappy and annoyed not only because those norms are its constitutive component of its 
identity but also its belief that the respect of those norms is essential for building a 
stable and peaceful society. The comment of Luxembourg’s Foreign Minister Jacques 
Poos at the ninth AEMM in the 1991 quoted at the beginning of the section 3.3 of 
Chapter 3 summarises well the EU’s particular emphasis on human rights and its 
irritation if those norms were not respected. ASEAN also felt irritated because by the 
EU’s criticisms and usage of different negative measures violated its core principle of 
non-interference. For example, as noted, an ASEAN official bluntly said that how 
ASEAN dealt with Myanmar was its business and the EU had no right to interfere 
(Business Times, 1997b). In brief, the EU and ASEAN disputed over human rights and 
the Myanmar issue because the EU’s posture challenged and infringed the core of 
ASEAN’s normative culture whereas ASEAN’s refusal to accept the EU’s norms defied 
the EU’s normative identity. 
The normative disconnection between the two organisations 
A third important and related reason why their normative differences became a 
disruptive issue in their post-Cold War interaction was that due to the different natures 
of their norms, they found it difficult to associate with each other. If during the Cold 
War period they shared an overriding outlook, i.e. the anti-communist and westernised 
posture, they now no longer shared a prevailing worldview that could connect them or 
facilitate their interaction. Instead, they disassociated from each other and each regional 
organisation sought to develop and promote its own preferred norms, which were 
radically different from each other. Chapters 6 and 7 have cited a number of examples 
to illustrate the normative disconnection between the EU and ASEAN in their post-Cold 
War interaction. The development and endorsement of the ‘Asian values’ by some 
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ASEAN leaders to oppose the Western/European values was one of these examples. 
While it is controversial to argue that there exists values that are typically and culturally 
Asian, it is clear that those ‘Asian values’ were formulated to defy the so-called 
Western/European values. Another instance was ASEAN states’ decision to ally with 
China and other Asian countries to discuss and issue a declaration on human rights 
before the World Conference on Human Rights in 1993. In this declaration, they 
emphasised their particular understanding of, and approach to, human rights, which 
were different from Western/European countries’ one. This normative disassociation 
was also manifested in the ASEM process where non-ASEAN members of the Asian 
side of ASEM, e.g. China and Japan, sided with ASEAN on issues such as human 
rights, East Timor and Myanmar. 
Overall, the two organisations disputed with each other over human rights and the 
issues of East Timor and Myanmar in the 1990s because their normative natures became 
different from each other. Moreover, the identity or normative discourses and 
performances of one regional organisation were rejected by the other and this rejection 
led them to clash. The disconnection of one regional entity to the other and its core 
norms also contributed to their tensions in those years. Because of these three factors, 
the EU and ASEAN experienced what was termed as a ‘value-system friction’ (Dent 
1999: 51; Wiessala 2002: 64), which was also the ‘dark side’ of their relationship in the 
1990s (Dosch 2001: 64). Furthermore, they contributed to their disagreements over the 
exclusion/inclusion of Myanmar in their negotiations in the late 2000s as well as other 
disputes between the two sides in the ASEM process. 
 
Less confrontational when normative divergences were limited 
This thesis has also shown that when they try to avoid, limit or accommodate their 
normative differences or when their normative premises converge, their tensions are 
decreased or removed and this paves the way for some cooperation. For instance, their 
decision to put aside the sensitive issues and to focus on economic matters enabled them 
to create a new dynamism in their relations between 1993 and 1996, which also resulted 
in the creation of ASEM. Similarly, coupled with many international changes and 
regional developments, notably in ASEAN, e.g. the democratisation process in some 
ASEAN members, which somehow limited the normative divergences between the EU 
and ASEAN, the two organisations also tried to reduce and accommodate their 
divergences in the 2000s. Consequently, their interaction was much less confrontational 
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than in the 1990s. After several years of being disrupted by the disputes over human 
rights and the Myanmar problem, the AEMM was resumed in 2000 and they took a 
number of initiatives to revitalise their relations and economic cooperation in particular. 
One of these was the establishment of the TREATI, which eventually paved the way for 
them to open negotiations towards an FTA in 2007.  
The most significant example of how the limitation of normative divergences or 
the convergence of normative premises between the two organisations fostered their 
relations was their cooperation in the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM). The Aceh 
peace process and the EU-led AMM were successful firstly because the EU’s efforts to 
bring peace, democracy, human rights and the rule of law – which are its core values – 
were accepted by Indonesia, which was by that time in the process of democratisation. 
The fact that EU did not criticise Indonesia and its dealing with and involvement in the 
Aceh conflict also made it easier for the Government of Indonesia to accept the EU as 
the leading organisation of the AMM. Another reason for the success of the AMM, 
which significantly contributed to the successful implementation of the Aceh peace 
process, was that it delicately dealt with the human rights issue, which was very 
sensitive in Indonesia politics and Southeast Asian context. In brief, unlike the issues of 
East Timor and Myanmar, which the EU and ASEAN not only failed to find any 
common ground to solve but also let them jeopardise their relations, the EU had some 
significant cooperation with ASEAN and its members in the Aceh matter. This is 
because they did not strongly insisted their preferred norms and opposed the other’s 
ones. 
Yet, the collapse of their negotiations towards an interregional FTA has 
demonstrated that even though the normative differences of the EU and ASEAN were 
significantly diminished in the 2000s, they were not completely removed. Their 
normative discrepancies were even manifest in the AMM. While the EU repeatedly 
mentioned and even hailed the achievement and significance of the Aceh peace process 
and the AMM in particular, ASEAN rarely talked about it. This is because views and 
approaches of the EU and ASEAN vis-à-vis international relations and security issues in 
particular were considerably different. As illustrated in Chapter 8, the EU’s way of 
security was predominantly individual-oriented whereas ASEAN’s one was primarily 
state-centred. While such differences did not always lead to tensions between the two 
regional organisations, they were the reason for their indifferences to each other and 
their initiatives. The EU’s lack of contribution to and participation in the ASEAN-led 
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institutions, e.g. the ARF and the EAS, partly because the issues discussed in these 
wider regional mechanisms and the ways they were dealt with did not fit very well the 
EU’s way of security. That lack of response from the EU also made ASEAN less 
receptive to the EU and its role in the region. In short, while their different ways of 
viewing and conducting regional and international affairs, including security issues do 
not lead them to clash (if one does not oppose the other and its norms) they significantly 
hinders their cooperation. This will lead to the next important argument made by the 
thesis. 
 
The negative impacts of their normative differences on their relations 
A chief argument maintained by the thesis that their normative differences made it 
difficult for them to cooperate meaningfully with each other. Throughout its chapters, 
notably Chapters 6, 7 and 8, the inquiry has demonstrated why the conflicting norms of 
the EU and ASEAN impeded their post-Cold War operation. Coupled with the 
involvement of the East Timor, their disagreements over the exclusion/inclusion of the 
human right clause in a more advanced cooperation framework they had desired and 
planned in the late 1980s and the early 1990s was the reason behind their failure to 
negotiate such an agreement. Their differences over Myanmar led to the suspension of 
the AEMM for several years in the late 1990s and the two ministerial meetings of 
ASEM in the mid-2000s. The Myanmar issue was one of the key factor that led them 
suspend the FTA negotiations despite the hugely perceived economic and political 
benefits that a region-to-region FTA could bring to the two regions. Their different 
ways of cooperation and their disputes over the Myanmar issue hindered the overall 
progress of the ASEM process. Their differences of perceptions and approaches vis-à-
vis security also limited their cooperation in the strategic and security area. 
The negative consequences that their normative divergences brought to their 
economic, political and security relations illustrate well a number of important 
arguments made by the thesis. One of these is the contention that the normative 
dimensions of the EU and ASEAN played a key role in determining their 
interregionalism. As noted in Chapter 8, this inquiry recognised that the lack of 
institutional and material factors, notably military powers, prevented the EU from 
becoming – or being perceived as – a major strategic/security actor in Southeast Asia 
and the wider Asia-Pacific region. Yet, it is clear that conflicting worldviews and 
approaches between the EU and ASEAN was also an inhibitory factor. In other words, 
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while acknowledging that the lack of actorness, notably the institutional and materials 
dimensions, of the EU and ASEAN deterred their cooperation, the thesis has illustrated 
that their divergent normative features also considerably held back their cooperation in 
the post-Cold War era. Thus, a major contribution of the thesis is to add to the 
established literature on actorness, which focuses heavily on institutional and material 
pre-requisites. 
Another is related to impact of the normative constituents of the EU and ASEAN 
on their interregional relations. As noted in Chapter 1 and illustrated in the section on 
ASEM of Chapter 7, this thesis agrees with key scholars on interregionalism that 
interregional relations, e.g. the EU-ASEAN relationship and the ASEM process defined 
the collective identity and normative features of the regional organisations/groupings 
involved. However, this thesis goes beyond that argument maintaining that the 
normative dimensions of the participant regional organisations/groupings also shaped 
their interregional interaction. Indeed, as illustrated in this thesis, the normative 
components of the EU and ASEAN determined the content, shape and outcome of their 
interregional relationship.  
Finally, the negative impacts of the normative divergences of the EU and ASEAN 
on their relations illustrate that norms and normative powers are not always a force for 
cooperation or a force for good as some scholars, notably those who work on normative 
power Europe, e.g. Manners (2002) assume. They can be a source of tension and 
conflict if they are opposed to each other. 
 
9.3. Some final remarks and recommendations  
From what it has discovered, this research wishes to make some remarks and offer 
some suggestions relating to (1) the research of regional organisations and their 
interregionalism, (2) the future of the EU-ASEAN relationship and (3) the impact of 
interregionalism on world politics. 
 
9.3.1. The research of regional actorness and interregionalism 
This thesis began by noting that the current literature on the concept of regional 
actorness mainly focuses on the institutional and material factors of regional 
organisations when examining their influence on the external world. Consequently, they 
often overlook or ignore their normative constituents, which also play a vital role in 
determining not only the form and the content but also the outcome their external 
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relations and interregionalism. This thesis has demonstrated that ideational and 
normative factors, e.g. norms, values and worldviews, matter in world politics, the EU’s 
foreign policy, ASEAN’s external relations and their interregional relationship. Indeed, 
it has discovered that the ideational and normative dimensions, notably norms, of the 
EU and ASEAN are among the fundamental constituents that make up their actorness 
and, consequently, define their interregionalism. For this reason, in order to understand 
fully the EU and ASEAN as actors in world politics and the way they act, it is essential 
to take into account their ideational and normative dimensions. Furthermore, in order to 
explain comprehensively why they behave in a particular way, it is vital to look at their 
historical, cultural, geopolitical backgrounds. For instance, their own history is a 
constitutive part of their identities and norms. Thus, it is important to consider the 
ideational and normative features of regional organisations, e.g. the EU and ASEAN, 
when examining their actorness. The influential role of the ideational and normative 
dimensions of organisations, e.g. the EU and ASEAN, in their interregionalism also 
implies that when exploring the phenomenon of interregionalism and its implications to 
world politics, it is not only worth considering why interregional relations form and 
reinforce the collective identities or norms of the participant organisations. It is also of 
great importance to look at why their collective identities or normative premises affect 
their interregionalism. As underlined at the beginning of the thesis, this area remains 
under-developed in the current scholarship on interregionalism.  
 
Indeed, in order to understand the nature of interregional relationships and their 
impact (or lack thereof), it is indispensable to take into account the raison d’être of the 
regional organisations involved or the way they view and conduct their regional and 
international affairs. Yet, it is important to underline here that by focusing on the 
ideational and normative factors of the EU and ASEAN to examine their actorness and 
their interregionalism, this thesis does not aim to nullify the arguments maintained by a 
number of scholars on actorness that regional organisations’ institutional and material 
elements are important components of their actorness. Nor does it intend to invalidate 
the argument held by Doidge (2004b; 2007; 2008) that the actorness of the participant 
organisations decides the performance of their interregional relations. Nor does it aim to 
nullify the argument that interregional relations shape and/or reinforce the collective 
identities or the normative natures of the regions involved. Rather, it intends to 
complement these arguments. In other words, an analytical framework that ignores the 
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ideational and normative factors of the regional organisations involved or their 
institutional and material ones will not adequately explain their actorness and 
interregionalism. Equally, an analysis that focuses either only on the level of actorness 
of the regional organisations involved or only on their normative convergences or 
divergences to explore the performance or non-performance of their interregional 
relations will not give a full picture of the relevance of interregional relations in world 
politics.176
 
  
9.3.2. The EU-ASEAN relationship: Looking ahead 
The aim of this thesis is to investigate the EU-ASEAN relationship to see why 
their normative and ideational premises define their interaction rather than to assess it 
and, accordingly, suggest what should be done to improve it. Yet, from what it has 
studied and discovered, it can make some remarks and offer some suggestions for its 
future. First, despite the setbacks it faced since the end of the Cold War, this 
relationship continues to be maintained. For the EU, whatever ASEAN is, it is the most 
advanced regional organisation, which has become more structured and dynamic, after 
the EU and plays a major role in the wider Asia-Pacific region. For ASEAN, the EU is 
its second biggest trading partner. However, from what the thesis has discovered, 
whether their cooperation will move to an advanced level – for instance, establishing a 
more substantial partnership in which the EU and ASEAN consider each other as a 
strategic partner or concluding an interregional FTA – depends on many regional and 
external international factors. These include the desire, willingness and ability of the EU 
and ASEAN to enhance their respective actorness, making them strong, coherent and 
effective actors at the economic, political and strategic/security levels. For instance, the 
thesis has noted that the EU has not been invited to the EAS partly because it was not 
seen as a genuinely strategic and security actor in Asia. Yet, the central argument made 
by this thesis is that the normative divergences significantly hindered their economic, 
political and security cooperation. Therefore, to enhance their relations, the two regional 
organisations need to limit their normative differences because they are better able to 
cooperate with each other when they do so. Chapter 7 has shown that their relationship 
during the last ten years was much less conflictual than in the 1990s because tried to 
                                                 
176 Besides these two variables, there are probably other factors, which affect, to varying degrees, the 
rationale and the performance of interregionalism. For instance, the thesis has pointed out that the rise of 
China on the global stage had an impact on the EU, ASEAN and their relations. These can provide 
avenues for future investigation. 
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compromise, avoid or accommodate their normative differences. They were able to 
work together closely and successfully in the Aceh Monitoring Mission because they 
shared some common ground to undertake this unprecedented mission.  
It is also worth noting that the political opening in Myanmar that began in 2010 
(Doan 2011) led many high-ranking EU officials to visit this country. In April 2012, 
Catherine Ashton, High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy, attended the 19th AEMM in Brunei. It was the first time that she went to the 
ASEAN region to participate such a ministerial meeting. According to the EU, that 
meeting was set to take the EU’s “relations with Southeast Asia to a new level” and “the 
progress in Myanmar will ultimately help EU interaction with ASEAN as a whole” 
(European Commission, Press Release 2012). This means that the political reforms in 
Myanmar, which used to a major obstacle in EU-ASEAN relations, contributed to the 
recently enhanced relations between the two organisations. It also shows that if ASEAN 
and its members continue to open up politically and embrace the liberal and democratic 
values that the EU holds their ideational and normative underpinnings will become 
more converged with the EU. Such convergences will also make the EU feel more 
comfortable as well as interested in interacting with ASEAN. Consequently, their 
cooperation will be improved.  
Nevertheless, whether – and if so when – the EU and ASEAN can or will reach to 
a higher level of the convergence of perceptions, priorities and approaches to forge a 
substantial cooperation, especially in the political, security/strategic area remains an 
open issue. For the moment, there still exist major differences between the EU and 
ASEAN. One of these is, despite the major changes in ASEAN and its members, 
especially the latest developments in Myanmar, in terms of their normative and 
ideational premises, the EU and ASEAN are considerably different and will be the case 
for many years to come. For instance, as illustrated in Chapter 8, the EU and ASEAN’s 
ways of security cooperation remains significantly divergent from each other with the 
former focusing on human security whereas the latter is still preoccupied with state 
security. Given the current discrepancies of their historical, cultural and geopolitical 
factors, those divergences will not appear soon. In other words, while their ideational 
and normative factors have become increasingly similar, and (consequently) their 
interaction is no longer conflictual as it was 15 or 20 years ago, there are still notable 
differences between the two organisations in terms of their raison d’être and ways of 
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functioning in the global system. For the moment, these divergences are still greater 
than their convergences.  
 
9.3.3. Interregionalism and global governance  
As noted in Chapter 1, a key issue that a number of scholars on interregionalism 
are interested in is whether interregional relations contribute anything to global 
governance.177
First, embedded in its own specific backgrounds, each regional organisation was 
originally established to deal with specific challenges faced by the countries in that 
region and, consequently, adopted its own way of organising its affairs and functioning 
in the global system. This thesis illustrates that because of their respective historical, 
cultural and geopolitical environments, the EU and ASEAN have divergent 
perspectives, priorities and approaches vis-à-vis their internal and external affairs. 
Second, their differences are a major obstacle for them to establish meaningful 
interregional partnerships that can influence the global system. This thesis has 
acknowledged that the lack of actorness (notably institutional and material component, 
e.g. military capabilities, of regional organisations considerably limits the performance 
of their interregional relationships. A case in point is the lack of a united and concerted 
response by the EU and other regional organisations vis-à-vis the US-led Iraq war and 
the unilateralism of the George W. Bush administration in general. Besides the lack of 
military capabilities, the divisions within the EU vis-à-vis the Iraq war prevented it from 
making any substantial challenge to the US. However, if the EU had managed to form a 
united and strong position, and then sought to ally with other regional organisations, 
 It has been repeatedly argued that interregionalism can only contribute to 
global governance if it performs the five deduced functions of interregionalism, and the 
fulfilment of these five functions depends on the level of actorness of the regional 
organisations involved (Rüland 2001c; 2006; Doidge 2004b; 2007; 2008; 2011). While 
acknowledging that generalisations are not always helpful, some remarks can be made 
based on what has been discovered from the examination of the EU and ASEAN and 
their relationship.  
                                                 
177 Global governance is problematic is generally understood as governance without the existence of an 
overarching sovereign authority (see also Finkelstein 1995; Fischer 2008). In that sense, with the 
emergence of interregional arrangements, it is argued that a multi-layered global governance system has 
emerged. This includes: (1) the global and multilateral level, e.g. UN, WTO; (2) inter- and transregional 
dialogues, e.g. EU-ASEAN relationship, ASEM; (3) regional organisations/groupings, e.g. EU, ASEAN; 
(4) sub-regional arrangements, e.g. Greater Mekong cooperation and (5) bilateral, i.e. state-to-state, 
relations. 
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such as ASEAN, to oppose that war, it is still unlikely that it would have been 
successful. This is because not only ASEAN lacks actorness, which enables it to 
challenge US’s policy, but also because major international issues, like the Iraq war, do 
not rank very highly on its agenda. While the EU may be inspired to become a global 
actor and play a major role in shaping global affairs, at the moment, and in the near 
future, this will not happen in the case of ASEAN. ASEAN’s activity and influence has 
been, and remains, largely confined to East Asia or the wider Asia-Pacific region. This 
is because ASEAN and its members have other issues, which are more important and 
urgent than global matters, e.g. the Iraq War or the current conflict in Syria. Their major 
concerns continue to be how to deal with territorial disputes, e.g. in the South China Sea 
and other traditional securities challenges. In this context, regional organisations can 
only establish strong interregional partnerships that can make a significant contribution 
to global governance if their perceptions, priorities and approaches vis-à-vis regional 
and international affairs converge. 
The question about the impact of regional organisations and their interactions on 
the global system also interest other scholars of regionalism and interregionalism. 
Padoan (2007: 53) believes that two main features are likely to characterise the 
evolution of the international system in the foreseeable future. One is the emergence of 
new world leaders, e.g. China and India, which strengthens the trend towards a 
multipolar system. The other is the emergence of regional blocs, i.e. ‘a club of clubs’, 
which are expected to exist alongside major powers and pursue independent and, 
possibly conflicting, policies vis-à-vis the latter. Hettne (2005; 2007) predicts that 
regionalism pursued by the EU and other regional organisations could lead to a future 
global pattern, that he terms ‘post-Westphalian’. According to him, in this post-
Westphalian scenario for global governance, which is preferred by the EU, “[t]he state 
system would be replaced or complemented by a regionalised world order and a 
strengthened global civil society, supported by a ‘normative architect’ of world order 
values such as multiculturalism and multilateralism” (Hettne 2005: 563; 2007: 113). 
Furthermore, he argues that in the long-term, the EU could play an important role in 
shaping that post-Westphalian global governance, which he refers to as Pax Europaea, 
for two reasons. First, its emphasis on interregionalism would lead to the rebuilding of 
that multilateral world order in a regionalised form. Second, there is a clear pattern in 
the EU’s external policy to shape the world order in accordance with its experience of 
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solving conflicts through dialogue, multilateralism, based on international laws and 
institutionalised relations.  
From what has been examined in this thesis, whether regional organisations will 
pursue independent and conflicting policies vis-à-vis major powers as assumed by 
Padoan is yet unclear. Yet, what is sure is that their presence and relevance will be 
maintained. The fact is that ASEAN is able to engage a number of major powers into its 
multilateral mechanisms, such as the ADMM-Plus and the EAS. However, the Pax 
Europaea preferred and advocated by the EU and predicted by Hettne does not seem so 
feasible outside Europe. A key reason for this is that the Pax Europaea, as 
acknowledged by Hettne (2005: 563), “can be called ‘soft imperialism’, based on ‘soft 
power’, since despite fine diplomacy, it is often felt as an imposition in other parts of 
the world”, and is not always well received by other regional organisations. ASEAN’s 
resistance to the core values promoted by the EU and its members was a proof of this. 
Furthermore, ASEAN has sought to link with regional powers, notably China, to 
promote an alternative paradigm, which is predominantly premised on its core principle 
of non-interference, to the dominant Western/European approach to global governance, 
which emphasises the norm of interventionism. These two paradigms are increasingly at 
odds with each other (Stubbs 2007; Dunn et al. 2010). Because of these divergences, as 
the EU-ASEAN case illustrates, building influential interregional relationships, as the 
Pax Europaea preferred, will not be an easy task.  
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Appendix 10: The Index of Democracy 2010 of the EU countries 
 
 
 Rank 
(167) 
Overall 
Score 
Category Scores Classifications 
1 2 3 4 5 
Austria 13 8.49 9.58 7.86 7.78 8.13 9.12 Full democracy 
Belgium 23 8.05 9.58 8.21 5.56 7.50 9.41 Full democracy 
Bulgaria 51 6.84 9.17 5.71 6.11 4.38 8.82 Flawed democracy 
Cyprus 39 7.29 9.17 6.43 6.11 5.63 9.12 Flawed democracy 
Czech Rep 16 8.19 9.58 7.14 6.67 8.13 9.41 Full democracy 
Denmark 3 9.52 10.00 9.64 8.89 9.38 9.71 Full democracy 
Estonia 33 7.68 9.58 7.50 5.00 7.50 8.82 Flawed democracy 
Finland 7 9.19 10.00 9.64 7.22 9.38 9.38 Full democracy 
France 31 7.77 9.58 7.14 6.11 7.50 8.53 Flawed democracy 
Germany 14 8.38 9.58 7.86 7.22 8.13 9.12 Full democracy 
Greece 28 7.92 9.58 6.43 6.67 7.50 9.41 Flawed democracy 
Hungary 43 7.21 9.58 6.07 5.00 6.88 8.24 Flawed democracy 
Ireland 12 8.79 9.58 7.86 7.78 8.75 10.00 Full democracy 
Italy 29 7.83 9.58 6.79 6.11 8.13 8.53 Flawed democracy 
Latvia  48 7.05 9.58 5.36 5.56 5.63 9.12 Flawed democracy 
Lithuania 41 7.24 9.58 5.71 5.56 6.25 9.12 Flawed democracy 
Luxembourg  11 8.88 10.00 9.29 6.67 8.75 9.71 Full democracy 
Malta 15 8.28 9.17 8.21 5.56 8.75 9.71 Flawed democracy 
Netherlands 10 8.99 9.58 8.93 8.89 8.13 9.41 Full democracy 
Poland 48 7.05 9.58 6.07 6.11 4.38 9.12 Flawed democracy 
Portugal  26 8.02 9.58 7.50 6.11 7.50 9.41 Full democracy 
Romania 56 6.60 9.58 6.44 5.00 3.75 8.24 Flawed democracy 
Slovakia 38 7.35 9.58 7.50 5.56 5.00 9.12 Flawed democracy 
Slovenia 32 7.69 9.58 7.14 6.67 6.25 8.53 Flawed democracy 
Spain 18 8.16 9.58 8.21 6.11 7.50 9.41 Full democracy 
Sweden 4 9.50 9.58 9.64 8.89 9.38 10.00 Full democracy 
UK 19 8.16 9.58 7.86 6.11 8.13 9.12 Full democracy 
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Appendix 12: FDI in ASEAN by host countries, 1995-2004 
 
Source: ASEAN Secretariat 2005. 
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Source: World Bank, World 
Development Report 1999/2000 
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Appendix 15: Participation of ASEAN’s major partners in the 
ARF’s activities (1995-2002) 
Source: Modified based on Heller (2005: 132) 
Appendix 14: Members of the ARF  
Sources: The official websites of ASEAN and the ARF, as of March 2011. 
* Pakistan is a sectoral dialogue partner of ASEAN 
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Appendix 18: The reasons for the absence of an EU-ASEAN strategic partnership 
 
Factors\Rankings 1st  2nd  3rd  4th  5th  6th  7th  
EU’s lack of military capabilities 1x 2x 2x 4x 4x 5x 1x 
EU’s lack of interest in ASEAN  2x 4x 3x 3x 4x   
The rise of China, India and other Asian powers 8x 5x 3x 1x 2x   
Lack of integration in ASEAN 6x 5x 1x 1x 4x   
Divergences of worldviews and values between the two 5x 4x 4x 5x 1x   
Geographical distance  1x 5x 1x 2x 6x 1x 
Others        
The EU is less attractive compared with the US    1x    
Lack of consensus within the EU members     1x   
Source: From the survey undertaken by the author 
 
Appendix 17: The factors that make the EU less attractive to ASEAN 
 
The factors/Rankings 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 
The geographical distance 5x 3x 7x 4x  
The EU’s lack of military capabilities 3x 3x 7x 4x 1x 
The divergences of worldviews and norms between the two 7x 5x 1x 4x  
The EU’s continuing consistence on the human rights issue 5x 8x 6x 2x  
Other      
The EU’s lack of strategic vision and inward-lookingness 1x     
Disaccord in the EU 1x     
Source: From the survey undertaken by the author 
Appendix 16: List of countries that have already acceded to the TAC 
Source: ASEAN’s website, as of 
30 March 2010 
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Appendix 20: Survey on EU-ASEAN Relations 
 
Xuan Loc DOAN, PhD candidate, Aston University, UK 
Research topic: ‘EU-ASEAN Relations’  
Supervisor: Dr. Uwe Wunderlich; Email: j.u.wunderlich@aston.ac.uk 
--------- 
I am working on the interregional relationship between the EU and ASEAN with a focus on 
how their normative and ideational dimensions, e.g. worldviews, principles, norms and beliefs, 
affect their external relations and their interaction with each other in particular.  
 
This survey is part of my doctoral research. It is aimed at enabling me to extend my knowledge 
of EU-ASEAN relations as well as to fulfil my PhD. Thus, your contribution is of vital 
importance. For that reason, I would be grateful if you could answer this questionnaire and 
return the completed one to me by email to doanx@aston.ac.uk by 10 September 2011. 
 
The questionnaire is divided into three sections and consists of 30 questions. 
--------- 
Respondent’s details 
Name:  
Institution:  
Contact:  
--------- 
Survey Questionnaire 
 
A. For the following ten multiple choice questions please select all that apply and put them in 
rank order 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 ... with 1 being the most important by putting an appropriate 
number in [  ]. 
 
1. The  objectives of ASEAN’s external relations (have been): 
a.  To enable the economic development of its members .............................. [   ] 
b. To preserve the national integrity and sovereignty of its members…..... [   ] 
c.  To enhance ASEAN’s relevance in the region .......................................... [   ] 
d. To maintain regional stability ............................................................. [   ] 
e.  Other (please specify and rank) ........................................................... 
………………………………………………………………….................... [   ] 
 
2. The objectives of the EU’s foreign policy since the end of the Cold War (are): 
a.  To build the EU’s identity as a global actor............................................... [   ] 
b. To compete with other major powers, e.g. the US, China ...................... [   ] 
c.  To promote its values, e.g. human rights, democracy ............................... [   ] 
d. To protect the EU’s interests and increase its influence ......... ................ [   ] 
e.  Other (please specify and rank)............................................................. 
................................................................................................................... [   ] 
 
3. The main (economic, political and security) partners of ASEAN (are): 
a.  Australia and New Zealand ....................................................................... [   ]
  
b. China........................................................................................................ [   ] 
c.  India ........................................................................................................... [   ] 
d. Japan ................................................................................... ............ [   ] 
e.  South Korea ............................................................................................... [   ] 
f.   The EU ...................................................................................................... [   ] 
g. The US ..................................................................................................... [   ] 
 
4. The factors that make the EU an attractive partner for ASEAN (are):  
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a.  The EU’s economic weight (e.g. trade and investment)............................. [   ] 
b. The EU’s political influence (e.g. EU as a global actor) .......................... [   ] 
c.  The EU as a regional organisation ............................................................. [   ] 
d. The EU as a counter-balance in the region ...............................................[   ] 
e.  Other (please specify and rank) ............................................................ 
................................................................................................................... [   ] 
 
5. The factors that make the EU less attractive for ASEAN (are): 
a.  The geographical distance ......................................................................... [   ] 
b. The EU’s lack of military capabilities ...................................................... [   ] 
c.  The divergence of worldviews, principles, norms and beliefs 
between the two regional organisations .................................................. [   ] 
d. The EU’s continuing insistence on the human rights issue ...................... [   ] 
e.  Other (please specify and rank) .................................................................  
................................................................................................................... [   ] 
 
6. The regions/regional groupings in the EU’s priorities (are): 
a.  ACP (i.e. countries under the Lome Convention) ..................................... [   ] 
b. ASEAN and Southeast Asia...................................................................... [   ] 
c.  EU candidates (e.g. Croatia, Turkey ...) .................................................... [   ] 
d. Mediterranean countries ........................................................................... [   ] 
e.  Latin America (e.g. MERCOSUR, Andean Community) ......................... [   ] 
f.   South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)...............[   ] 
 
7. The partners (in Asia-Pacific region) in the EU’s priorities (are): 
a.  ASEAN ...................................................................................................... [   ] 
b. Australia/New Zealand ............................................................................. [   ] 
c.  China .......................................................................................................... [   ] 
d. India .......................................................................................................... [   ] 
e.  Japan .......................................................................................................... [   ] 
f.   South Korea .............................................................................................. [   ] 
 
8. The EU’s main priorities in its relations with Southeast Asia and ASEAN (are): 
a.  Supporting stability in Southeast Asia ....................................................... [   ] 
b. Strengthening its economic interest.......................................................... [   ] 
c.  Promoting human rights, democracy and good governance....................... [   ] 
d. Promoting regional integration in ASEAN............................................... [   ] 
e.  Other (please specify and rank) ................................................................  
................................................................................................................... [   ] 
 
9. In 2007, the EU and ASEAN decided to open negotiations towards an interregional free 
trade agreement (FTA). However, two years later, they decided to halt the FTA talks. The 
causes of the failure of the ASEAN-EU FTA negotiations (are): 
 
a.  ASEAN’s preoccupation with FTA negotiations with others ................... [   ]  
b. Discrepancies of ASEAN members (e.g. level of development).............. [   ] 
c.  Lack of cohesion in ASEAN (e.g. lack of supranational body)................. [   ] 
d. Disagreement over whether Burma/Myanmar should or should not be 
included in the FTA .................................................................................. [   ] 
e.  Other (please specify and rank) ............................................................. 
................................................................................................................... [   ] 
 
10. Despite three decades of formal relations, the EU and ASEAN do not yet consider each other 
as strategic partners. The factors that prevent the EU and ASEAN from forging a 
strategic partnership with each other (are): 
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a.  EU’s lack of military capabilities ............................................................. [   ] 
b. EU’s lack of interest and an overall strategy towards ASEAN................. [   ] 
c.  The rise of China, India and other Asian powers ...................................... [   ] 
d. Lack of integration in ASEAN ................................................................. [   ] 
e.  Divergence of worldviews and values between the EU and ASEAN........ [   ] 
f.   Geographical distance.........................................................................[   ]  
g. Other (please specify and rank)............................................................ 
................................................................................................................... [   ] 
 
B. Please give your view on each of the following 19 statements by putting the number that the 
best reflects your view in [  ]: 
 
 
 
11. Compared to their interaction in the 1990s, when the EU and ASEAN disagreed over 
human rights, the relationship between the European community (EC) and ASEAN in the 
1980s was quite smooth (e.g. no major disagreements), especially on a political level. [  ] 
 
12. The Soviet-backed Vietnamese intervention in Kampuchea (Cambodia) in 1978 and the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 strengthened the EC-ASEAN relationship. [   ] 
 
13. The capitalist and anti-communist stance of the EC and ASEAN bonded the two regional 
organisations together and prompted them to work closely in supporting each other’s 
position on the Afghanistan and Cambodian issues in international fora, e.g. the UN, in the 
late 1970s and throughout the 1980s.  [   ]  
 
14. The political differences (e.g. over human rights) between the EU and ASEAN became 
prominent following the end of the Cold War. [   ] 
 
15. In terms of values and principles, the EU and ASEAN are considerably different from, and 
even somewhat opposed to, each other. [   ] 
 
16. Promoting its values, e.g. human rights and democracy, is an integral part in the EU’s 
relations with Asia and ASEAN. [   ] 
 
17. ASEAN also seeks to promote its norms, i.e. the ‘ASEAN way’ and its core principle of 
non-interference in its internal and external relations. [   ] 
 
18. The EU and ASEAN disagree over the Burma/Myanmar issue because the EU and ASEAN 
promote two different sets of values and norms (with the former promoting its values, e.g. 
human rights and democracy, and the latter advocating its ASEAN way, notably its core 
principle of non-interference. [   ] 
 
19. If the Cambodian and Afghanistan issues united the EC and ASEAN and strengthened their 
relations during the Cold War, the East Timor issue and the Burma/Myanmar problem 
divided them and undermined their cooperation in the post-Cold War era. [   ] 
 
20. The Burma/Myanmar issue became a stumbling-block in the EU-ASEAN cooperation. [   ] 
 
21. With respect to security, the EU focuses on ‘human security’, which emphasises the well-
being of peoples, i.e. a people-centred approach, whereas ASEAN focuses on 
‘comprehensive security’, which stresses the well-being of states, i.e. a state-centred 
approach. [   ] 
 
1 = Strongly Disagree; 2 = Disagree; 3 = Neutral; 4 = Agree; and 5 = Strongly Agree  
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22. The disagreement over human rights is one of the main factors that prevented the EU and 
ASEAN from renewing their 1980 Cooperation Agreement in the 1990s and concluding the 
FTA in 2009. [   ] 
 
23. Despite more than thirty years of formal dialogue between the EC/EU and ASEAN, their 
cooperation remains relatively weak. [   ] 
 
24. The lack of ‘actorness’, i.e. capacity to act actively and deliberately in the international 
system, of the EU and ASEAN hinders their cooperation. [   ] 
 
25.  Divergence of worldviews, principles, norms and beliefs between the EU and ASEAN also 
prevents them from establishing a robust interregional partnership. [   ] 
 
26. The relationship between the EU and ASEAN “has not moved from a consultative to a more 
substantive one”. The main reason for this is that “the EU and ASEAN have never really 
fully understood each other, what their respective objectives are and how they work” 
(Moeller – Denmark’s former Ambassador to Singapore). [   ] 
 
27. The Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) process has stayed “at the information-sharing level and 
has not moved into a substantive cooperation” (Report on ASEM in its Tenth Year). [   ] 
 
28. The controversial and sensitive issues, e.g. human rights and the Burma/Myanmar problem, 
overshadowed some ASEM summits. [   ] 
 
29. “Both the ASEAN-EU and ASEM processes have come to be held hostage by a single issue 
[i.e. Burma/Myanmar]. The result is an impoverishment of dialogue and the overshadowing 
of more important strategic issues by ritualistic exchange” (Goh Chok Tong – Singapore’s 
former Prime Minister). [   ] 
 
C. Additional question:  
 
30. It is maintained that “both the EU and ASEAN are very different multi-dimensional 
regional entities with quite different histories, objectives, structures and capacities. It is this 
asymmetry that is at the heart of the difficulties in their attempts at inter-regional 
cooperation” (Camroux – Senior Research Associate, CERI, Sciences Po Paris). What do 
you think about this argument? (Please comment below). 
.......... 
 
Thank you very much for your contribution! 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
